1	No relevant facts are in dispute and the statutes and the numerous		
2	cases supporting the Motion are clear. Therefore, the Court can rule as a matter of		
3	law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.		
4	II. INTRODUCTORY CONTEXT FOR THE MOTION <sup>1</sup>		
5	A. The Joint Venture Between the Tribe and SRP.		
6	The Tribe entered into a written joint venture agreement (the "JVA")		
7	with defendant Spokane Raceway Park, Inc. ("SRP") on September 19, 1994.		
8	Under the JVA, the Tribe and SRP were to work together to develop certain real		
9	property in Airway Heights (the "Joint Venture").		
10	Contemporaneously with the JVA, SRP (as general managing partner		
11	of Washington Motorsports Limited Partnership ("WML")) gift deeded 40 acres of		
12	real estate ("Property") to the United States in trust for the Tribe. (Attachment A		
13	at Exhibit 1.) In 1996, the Bureau of Indian Affairs proclaimed the entire 40-acre		
14	Property to be part of the Kalispel Indian Reservation and now holds it in trust for		
15	the Tribe. SRP and/or WML own other property immediately to the north and		
16	west of the Property, on which they operate the SRP auto racing complex.		
17	Under the JVA, a 20-acre portion of the Property's 40 acres was to be		
18	developed by the Joint Venture (the Tribe and SRP) as a "Business Enterprise		
19	Zone." The remaining 20 acres (the "Tribal Zone") were to be used solely by the		
20			
21	The facts in this Introductory section are for background purposes only and have		
22	been taken from the previous motions filed herein and their supporting declarations		
23	and exhibits. An LR 56.1(a) Statement of the undisputed facts germane to this		
24			
25	Motion is filed herewith, with Attachments A (with Exhibits 1 through 3) and B		
26	(with Exhibit 4).		

1	Tribe. (Attachment A at Exhibit 2.) Eventually, the Tribe opened the Northern	
2	Quest Casino on a portion of the Property.	
3	B. The Deterioration of the Joint Venture Relationship.	
4	In late October 2003, SRP's Orville Moe began threatening to damage	
5	the Casino property. On November 2, 2003, he directed an SRP employee to use a	
6	D8 Cat with a rear ripper attachment to drive back and forth across a section of the	
7	Casino parking lot, intentionally digging two parallel trenches across the asphalt	
8	and pulling up various electrical wires buried beneath the asphalt.	
9	On November 13, 2003, the Tribe applied to this Court for a temporary	
10	restraining order (and then a preliminary injunction) against SRP, Mr. Moe, and	
11	certain SRP employees (the employees have been previously dismissed from this	
12	lawsuit). The Court issued the injunction and it remains in place today, against	
13	Mr. Moe. (See Docket 1 through 5, 14.)	
14	C. The Joint Venture Has Been Dissolved.	
14 15	C. The Joint Venture Has Been Dissolved.  In late 2004, the Tribe decided to dissolve the Joint Venture created	
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1	had ever been distributed to them from the operation of the SRP raceway. During that		
2	litigation, a court appointed receiver, Barry Davidson, took the reins of WML, and		
3	thereafter he intervened in SRP v. Kalispel Tribe pending before Judge Austin.		
4	E. The Spokane County Action Was Removed.		
5	On May 15, 2006, the Tribe removed the Spokane County action that		
6	was pending before Judge Austin, based on allegations against the Tribe by WML		
7	(as an intervener) that raised federal questions (among other grounds). (See		
8	Docket 74.) As a result, no further proceedings took place in that court.		
9	Consequently, all the players and all of the claims, counterclaims, and		
10	cross-claims were thereafter pending before this Court.		
11	F. SRP Declared Bankruptcy.		
12	In late 2006, Moe caused SRP to declare bankruptcy (United States		
13	Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Washington; Case No. 06-01966-		
14	PCW11 [Judge Williams]), in an effort to stave off further action in the Materne		
15	case. However, this tactic was rejected by Judge Williams and a U.S. Trustee		
16	(John Munding) was appointed over SRP. Moe was then removed from all		
17	authority positions in SRP.		
18	G. The Tribe, WML, and SRP Reached a Mediated Settlement.		
19	On January 31 and February 1, 2007, the Tribe, WML (through the		
20	Receiver), and SRP (through the U.S. Trustee) mediated a settlement of all claims		
21	between the Tribe on the one hand and WML and SRP on the other. The settlement		
22	has been approved by the Tribe, by Judge Austin in the WML receivership case, and		
23	by the Bankruptcy Court. Dismissals between those parties have now been entered		
24	in the SRP v. Kalispel Tribe case pending before Judge Austin and in this case.		
25	(See Docket 156 through 161.)		

26

1	H. Claims Against and By Moe Are Still Extant in This Court.	
2	Defendant Moe was not part of the mediation or settlement. Therefore,	
3	the Tribe's claims against him and his claims against the Tribe were unaffected. <sup>2</sup>	
4	The counterclaims of Orville Moe are that (a) the Tribe allegedly	
5	somehow deprived him of compensation as a Joint Venture board member and	
6	(b) that when it barred him from the Casino, (1) it defamed him, and (2) it allegedly	
7	interfered with "economic relations with third parties" and (3) "injur[ed] his	
8	business reputation." (See Attachment A at Exhibit 3 [Counterclaim] at pp. 15-16.)	
9	All of these claims can be dismissed on summary judgment.	
10	III. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS	
11	Although the Tribe has followed LR 56.1(a) by filing herewith a	
12	formal "Statement," the same facts are listed here (in order) for the convenience of	
13	the Court, and pursuant to LR 7.1(f). All of the referenced Attachments and	
14	Exhibits 1 through 4 are attached to the Statement, per LR 56.1(a).	
15	1. On September 19, 1994, WML, of which SRP was the general	
16	partner, conveyed by gift deed approximately 40 acres of land "to the United	
17	States of America in trust for the Kalispel Tribe of Indians." (See Attachment A	
18	[Declaration of James H. Jordan, Jr.] at Exhibit 1 [Statutory Warranty Deed].) <sup>3</sup>	
19	<sup>2</sup> After the Court dismisses Moe's counterclaim, as discussed below, the Tribe	
20	anticipates that, in the interest of economic efficiency, it may voluntarily dismiss	
21	its claims against Moe and the action could be fully dismissed.	
22		
23	<sup>3</sup> Exhibits 1 through 3 referenced herein are exhibits to Attachment A, which is the	
24	Declaration of James H. Jordan, Jr., attached to the LR 56.1 Statement. Exhibit 4	
25	is attached to the Declaration of David C. Bonga, also attached to the LR 56.1	
26	Statement, as Attachment B.	

1	2. The land was not conveyed to the Tribe, and the Tribe has		
2	never held it in fee. (Id.) It is owned by the United States, in trust for the Tribe.		
3	(Id.)		
4	3. Also on September 19, 1994, the Tribe and SRP executed the		
5	JVA. (Exhibit 2 [Joint Venture Agreement].)		
6	4. Orville Moe is not a party to the JVA, and the Tribe did not		
7	waive its sovereign immunity as to him. (Id.)		
8	5. No Joint Venture board member ever demanded or was paid by		
9	either the Tribe or the Joint Venture for their time on the board. (Attachment B		
10	[Declaration of David Bonga] at $\P$ 3.) Mr. Moe was to be paid by SRP. (Id. at $\P$ 4		
11	and Exhibit 4 at p. 3, item D.)		
12	IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES		
13	1. This Court should grant the Tribe's motion for summary		
14	judgment, holding that Orville Moe's counterclaims are barred by the doctrine of		
15	tribal sovereign immunity.		
16	2. In the alternative, Moe has failed to state claims upon which		
17	relief can be granted.		
18	3. Moe's claim for board compensation is time-barred and		
19	frivolous, and if owed at all it is owed by SRP and SRP is not a party.		
20	V. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON		
21	The Motion is based on the portions of the record attached to the		
22	LR 56.1 Statement – the Declarations of James H. Jordan, Jr. with Exhibits 1-3,		
23	which is attached to the Statement as Attachment A, and of David Bonga,		
24	Attachment B with Exhibit 4 – and the pleadings, papers, files, and records		
25	herein.		
26			

1	VI. <u>ARGUMENT</u>	
2	A. All of Moe's Counterclaims Are Barred by the Tribe's Sovereign Immunity.	
3	The Court can rule, as a matter of law, that Orville Moe's	
4	counterclaims are barred by the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.	
5	Section 10 of the JVA reads as follows:	
6		
7	SECTION TEN LIMITED WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN RIGHTS	
8	The Kalispel Tribe agrees to a limited waiver of their sovereign rights. Said waiver shall be limited to such actions that arise	
9	through this agreement or it's breach. Any collection on a judgement against the Tribe is limited to the proceeds of such insurance policies as are set forth in Section 7 herein or in the event that there is no coverage or adequate coverage under the value of the Venture or outside of coverage, then an amount equal to the policy limits or an agreed amount by both parties based on an appraisal by both business and land appraisers or an amount agreed to by both parties. In no event will a decision against the Tribe subject Tribal	
10		
11		
12	trust lands or proceeds from those lands to be a part of a judgement.	
13	The very limited waiver in Section 10 does not open the door for	
14	defendants Moe's permissive counterclaims.	
15	1. Moe cannot assert any counterclaim against the Tribe.	
16	First, the "Limited Waiver" is only between the Tribe and SRP, the	
17	only parties to and signatories of the JVA. (See Exhibit 1 at pp. 1, 5.) This	
18	eliminates all of Moe's counterclaims against the Tribe as a matter of law.	
19	The U.S. Supreme Court considered this issue in Oklahoma Tax	
20	Commission v. Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991). In that case, the tribe filed	
21	suit in federal court to enjoin assessment of a tax on cigarettes. Oklahoma	
22	counterclaimed, asking for enforcement of a \$2.7 million claim against the tribe for	
23	assessment of uncollected taxes and to enjoin the tribe from selling cigarettes in the	
24	future without collecting and remitting state taxes on the sales. Relying on its	
25	decision in United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506,	
26	511-12 (1940), the Court stated as follows:	

1 2	A tribe does not waive its sovereign immunity from actions that could not otherwise be brought against it merely because those actions were pleaded in a counterclaim to an action filed by the tribe. Possessing		
3	immunity from direct suit, we are of the opinion the Indian nations possess a similar immunity from cross-suits. We uphold the Court of Appeals' determination that the Tribe did not waive its sovereign		
4	immunity merely by filing an action for declaratory relief.		
5	Oklahoma Tax Commission, 498 U.S. at 509-10 (internal quotations and citations		
6	omitted).		
7	The Ninth Circuit, in Squaxin Island Tribe v. Washington, 781 F.2d		
8	715, 723 (9th Cir. 1986), similarly held that when a tribe brought suit (for an		
9	injunction, as here), any counterclaim for monetary relief was barred by the		
10	doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. See also Pit River Home & Agr. Co-op		
11	Ass'n v. United States, 30 F.3d 1088, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1994).		
12	The Supreme Court has noted the "perceived inequity" of such a		
13	policy, but has upheld it nonetheless. In Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort		
14	Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 893 (1986), it held		
15	as follows:		
16	The perceived inequity of permitting the Tribe to recover from a non- Indian for civil wrongs in instances where a non-Indian allegedly may		
17	not recover against the Tribe simply must be accepted in view of the overriding federal and tribal interests in these circumstances, much in		
18	the same way that the perceived inequity of permitting the United		
19	States or North Dakota to sue in cases where they could not be sued as defendants because of their sovereign immunity also must be		
20	accepted.		
21	Accordingly, all counterclaims by Moe against the Tribe - either qua		
22	Tribe, or as a partner of SRP in the now-dissolved Joint Venture – must be		
23	dismissed, as a matter of well-established federal law, and he cannot recover any		
24	monies or property directly from the Tribe.		
25	Second, the "Limited Waiver" is narrowly tailored to apply only to		
26	actions that are directly related to the JVA (to which Moe is not a party). By		

1	contract, the Limited Waiver is "limited to such actions that arise through this		
2	agreement or it's (sic) breach." (Exhibit 3 at § 10.) Therefore, to the extent that		
3	Moe – a non-party to the JVA – is seeking relief against the Tribe for defamation		
4	or tortious interference – issues outside of the JVA – they are likewise barred by		
5	the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. See cases cited above. <sup>4</sup>		
6	B. The "Defamation" and "Tortious Interference" Claims Are Defective.		
7	1. There is no evidence of either defamation or damages.		
8	Washington law defines defamation as follows:		
9	In Washington, a defamation plaintiff must show four essential		
10	elements: falsity, an unprivileged communication, fault, and damages." Commodore v. Univ. Mech. Contractors. Inc., 120 Wn.2d 120, 133.		
11	839 P.2d 314 (1992). Liability for defamation requires that the defamation be communicated to someone other than the person defamed; in other words, there must be a "publication" of the defamation. Pate v. Tyee Motor Inn, Inc., 77 Wn.2d 819, 821, 467 P.2d 301 (1970).		
12			
13			
14	Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 143 Wn.2d 687, 701 (2001). <sup>5</sup> In this case, Moe's		
15	counterclaim failed to allege any of the requisite elements: the communication (no		
16	specifics); to whom published (no person identified); the falsity (not explained); o		
17	any damages (not pled). (See Exhibit 3 at pp. 15-16.) Accordingly, he has failed		
18	to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.		
19			
20			
21	<sup>4</sup> Due to the unique pleading style of Moe's Answer, it is somewhat unclear what		
22	exactly is the factual and legal basis for each counterclaim (if, in fact, there are		
23	more than one). Nevertheless, this Motion is the first and final step necessary to		
24	clarify the ambiguities.		
25	<sup>5</sup> Reversed on unrelated grounds: 536 U.S. 273 (2002).		
26	Reversed on america grounds. 330 0.5. 213 (2002).		

1		Further, without any proof of actual damages, there is no claim.	
2	Dismissal is proper.		
3	2.	There was no "tortious interference."	
4		Moe further alleges that as a result of the Tribe justifiably barring him	
5	from the Casino's premises after he tore up the Casino parking lot, he was allegedly		
6	unable to "e	engage in economic relations with third parties." (Exhibit 3 at pp. 15-16.)	
7	Not only does this allegation make no sense whatsoever, but it is akin to complaining		
8	in vain about a restaurant's "No Shirt, No Shoes, No Service" rule: here, "No Civility		
9	No Service." A private establishment unquestionably has an absolute right to bar		
10	someone from its premises for any non-discriminatory reason.		
11	Further, the five required elements of such a claim are "(1) the existence		
12	of a valid c	ontractual relationship or business expectancy; (2) the defendant's	
13	knowledge	of that relationship; (3) an intentional interference inducing or causing	
14	a breach or	termination of the relationship or expectancy; (4) the defendant's	
15	interference	e for an improper purpose or by improper means; and (5) resulting	
16	damage."	Koch v. Mut. of Enumclaw, 108 Wn. App. 500, 506 (2001) (emphasis	
17	added). He	ere, being barred from the Tribe's Casino did not interfere with his	
18	"business e	expectancy" with other parties, only with the Tribe's own Casino.6	
19	Consequen	tly, since all five required elements cannot be established, the claim	
20	should be d	lismissed.	
21			
22			
23	<sup>6</sup> At the No	orthern Quest Casino, one generally plays against the House, except for	
24		d games. Regardless, recreational gaming in a casino cannot be	
25		haracterized as a "business expectancy."	
26	serie asi, o	indicated as a casiness supersuity.	

1	C. The "Board Compensation" Claim is Both Frivolous and Time-Barred.
2	Moe lastly alleges that he was somehow entitled to lifetime
3	compensation from the Joint Venture for serving on the Joint Venture board.
4	(Answer [Exhibit 3] at p. 15, $\P$ 3.) However, there are numerous fatal defects in
5	this claim.
6	First, there is no dispute that the Joint Venture was judicially
7	dissolved in October 2004. That established an end point to the alleged "lifetime."
8	Second, no board member – including Moe – ever demanded and the
9	Joint Venture never paid any such compensation. (Attachment B at ¶ 3.) In fact,
10	the Joint Venture never established any specific amount of compensation for board
11	members. (Id. at $\P\P$ 3-4.)
12	Third, any claim that Moe allegedly has for compensation must be
13	asserted against SRP, not the Tribe, because SRP was to pay him. (Id. at $\P$ 4 and
14	Exhibit 4.) Therefore, he is out of luck in this action against the Tribe.
15	Consequently, Moe's claim for compensation - assuming for
16	argument purposes only that it was not barred by sovereign immunity - that was
17	allegedly owed beginning in 1994 – is (a) time-barred under RCW 4.16.040(1)
18	(contract actions must be brought within six years of breach), and (b) owed to him
19	by a non-party. It should be dismissed.
20	VII. CONCLUSION
21	For all of the reasons stated above, the Court should rule, as a matter
22	of law, that Moe's counterclaims are barred by the doctrine of tribal sovereign
23	immunity and/or factually and legally defective.
24	
25	
26	

1	DATED 41: 10th 1 CD 1 2007
2	DATED this 19 <sup>th</sup> day of December, 2007.
3	MILLER NASH LLP
4	Samuel As In Inc.
5	James H. Jordan, Jr.
6	James.jordan@millernash.com
7	(206) 622-8484
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff The Kalispel Tribe of Indians
9	
10	I hereby certify that on this 19 <sup>th</sup> day of December, 2007, I electronically filed
11	the PLAINTIFF KALISPEL TRIBE OF INDIANS' MOTION AND
12	MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
13	
14	AGAINST DEFENDANTS MOE with all Attachments and Exhibits with the
15	Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system. I also caused the filing to be e-
16	mailed to defendants' attorney (who has not formally appeared on the record,
17	according to the docket) on the date set forth below.
18	Aaron L. Lowe
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22	
23	JA Jordan
24	James H. Jordan, Jr.
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