business in park areas without a permit, contract or written

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agreement with the United States, in violation of Title 36, Code

of Federal Regulations, Section 5.3.

3. Whether the <u>American Indian Religious Freedom Act</u> provided the defendant a defense to the criminal charges.

II.

JURISDICTION

The Magistrate Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (a). This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3402.

III.

BAIL STATUS

The defendant is not in custody. At the defendant's sentencing hearing before the magistrate court on August 29, 2007, he was sentenced to 12 months of unsupervised probation, ordered to complete 198 hours of community service, and to pay a \$20 special assessment. C.F. 40. The sentence was stayed pending appeal. C.R. 48.

IV.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Park Ranger Todd Bruno initiated an investigation of defendant Lorenzo Baca in August 2004, in response to allegations that Baca filmed and produced a commercial film without a permit and used footage taken from within Yosemite National Park ("YNP") during 2002-2003. The film footage included Native American dancers participating in a "Big Time" Native American Event within YNP at the Indian Village. Further, the film contained additional footage from the "Indian Village" of the interior of the Roundhouse, Baca at the entrance of the Roundhouse and the Sweat Lodge inside a closed area, with narration by Baca, and interviews

by the Baca of park service employees demonstrating traditional Native American activities.

ARGUMENT

V.

A. Judge Wunderlich Did Not Err in Failing to Disqualify Himself

The defendant had his first appearance in magistrate court on May 10, 2005, in response to a summons charging him with Class B misdemeanors. On December 13, 2005, Baca orally requested that Magistrate Judge Wunderlich recuse himself. Judge Wunderlich did not find sufficient basis for recusal.

A bench trial was begun on August 15, 2007 on a superseding information charging Baca with three Class B misdemeanors. The government concluded its presentation of its case-in-chief on August 17, 2007. During the course of the trial, Baca orally moved that the prosecutor, the Magistrate Judge, and the defense attorney all recuse themselves or be disqualified. The requests were made at different times. None of the requests were granted.

The defense began their case on August 17, 2007, and trial was continued to the following Monday, August 20, 2007. On the morning of August 20, the defendant arrived late and requested that the trial be interrupted due to health reasons. The trial was then continued until November 14, 2007. The trial concluded on November 16, 2007.

The first motion to disqualify Judge Wunderlich was made on December 13, 2005. The motion was apparently made in chambers, and not on the record. Judge Wunderlich commented on the grounds for the motion when denying it:

THE COURT: I'll take Lorenzo Baca. There's a waiver on file for that matter. This is on today for a motion to disqualify me as the trial judge, which we discussed in chambers.

You stated your reasons. Is there anything else you wanted to put on the record?

MS. MOSES: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I do not find there's sufficient basis for me to step aside in this matter. I understand the basis is that at his arraignment I told him to stay out of trouble, and from that, he has concluded that I might believe he is already been in trouble. That certainly was not my intent or my message. The motion to disqualify my as trial judge is denied.

R.T. 1 (12/13/2005).

The defense is not now claiming that the court erred in denying this first motion to disqualify Judge Wunderlich. On November 14, 2007, however, the defense renewed their motion to disqualify Magistrate Judge Wunderlich on a new ground. The basis for this motion was that the defendant had seen a newspaper article complete with photographs, and one of the photographs had a hangman's noose hanging in the chambers. The defense represented that:

Mr. Baca ... feels that as a result of the symbolism, and he feels that hangman's noose represents, that it is threatening, intimidating, offensive, and he feels prejudiced that he would not be able to receive a fair trial in this matter. He feels that this is symbolic of cultural insensitivity and given the history of American courts and the administration of justice by the white man against Native Americans that this is just a furtherance of that which he perceives to be injustice and he would not receive a fair trial in this matter.

R.T. 5-2.

Judge Wunderlich denied the renewed motion for recusal, stating:

Mr. Baca, on one level I guess I can understand your concern. This item did not appear in the newspaper article. To have seen this item, you would have had to click on a slide show that was available on the Internet that accompanied the article.

Nonetheless, it is true that it was a hangman's noose hanging on a coatrack in my chambers. I explained in the article and I will explain to you now that it was given to me as a sort of memento, sort of a joke by the people of the District Attorney's office when I left the DA's office in 1985 to take the bench.

It was accompanied by a note saying don't forget where you come from. I have always viewed it as something of a joke and I hung onto it as a - something given to me by people that I enjoyed working with. It had really nothing to do with my personal philosophy. I think anyone who knows me would tell you that I'm not what they would call a hanging judge.

I tend to - I try to be sensitive to people's feelings and I feel that I can do a fair job of presiding over this trial. So if I have offended your sensitivities by the possession of this item, I apologize, but I am not recusing myself from the remainder of this trial. Proceed.

R.T. 5-2 to 5-3.

Section 455 provides that a judge shall disqualify himself "in any proceeding in which his partiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455. An appeals court reviews a lower court's denial of a disqualification motion for an abuse of discretion. Kulas v. Flores, 255 F.3d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 2001).

"[R]ecusal is appropriate where a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that [the] judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Id. at 786.

In this case, no reasonable person could have questioned Judge Wunderlich's impartiality based on his possession in his office of a memento by his former colleagues at the D.A.'s office. Judge Wunderlich explained that the noose did not represent his feelings as a "hanging judge", and thus could not give a defendant cause to

believe that the judge was biased towards a conviction. Nor did the noose in any fashion represent the judge's racial bias towards Native Americans or towards anyone else. In some contexts a noose might indeed represent a symbol of racial hatred and oppression. Outside of a judicial context, it can represent the worst of the era of "lynchings" and extra-judicial executions, particularly when it is displayed in a threatening manner towards another. Context is everything, however.¹ In a judicial legal context, hanging is used in the United States as method of execution up to the present day.² There is nothing in the context in which this noose was displayed in Judge Wunderlich's office that would make a reasonable person believe it was being displayed as a symbol of racial hatred or oppression.

B. The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Sufficient Was Sufficient To Convict the Defendant of Engaging in a Business Without A Permit

1. Standard of Review

The evidence is sufficient if, after viewing the evidence and record as a whole in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. <u>United States v. Peters</u>, 962 F.2d 1410, 1413 (9th Cir. 1992). The government is entitled to all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. <u>United States v. Johnson</u>, 804 F.2d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 1986).

¹A cross, for example, can be a religious symbol when displayed in a church, but a symbol of racial hatred when burned on a front lawn.

 $^{^2}$ Hanging is still permitted as a means of execution in New Hampshire and Washington. N.H. Rev. Statutes § 630:5; West RCWA 10.95.180.

The appellate court "does not weigh evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses in making this determination." <u>United States v. Goldin</u>, 311 F.3d 191, 194 (3rd Cir. 2002).

2. Argument

Baca challenges his conviction of "engaging or soliciting business" in Yosemite National Park without a permit, in violation of Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 5.5.3 This regulation makes it a Class B misdemeanor to engage in the following conduct:

Engaging in or soliciting any business in park areas, except in accordance with the provisions of a permit, contract, or other written agreement with the United States, except as may be specifically authorized under special regulations applicable to a park area, is prohibited.

36 C.F.R. § 5.5. The defendant claims that "the evidence presented by the park service came from the testimony of an employee of the private nonprofit entity, Yosemite Association, Nicole Brocchini. Appellant's Opening Brief, p.20. He claims that Ms. Brocchini's testimony would not support his conviction.

This "straw man" argument is wrong on its face because it erroneously identifies the evidence that supported his conviction.

Judge Wunderlich expressly stated the following conclusion:

You went in there to engage in a business and so I'm finding you guilty of Count 3 as well. Not because you solicited business from Ms. Brocchini down at the museum but because on Big Time 2002 you were there to conduct a

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³In Appellant's Opening Brief, he actually cites 36 C.F.R. § 2.1(a)(5). This regulation makes it a crime to "walk on, climb, enter, ascend, descend or traverse an archeological or cultural resource", and has nothing to do with commercial activities. The defendant was also convicted of violating this statute in Count One. He is not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support that conviction, however.

business. You were there to make a film that you intended to sell. Your intent is made obvious by your earlier conduct with the Tuolemne Band, all of which is in evidence in this matter and with your subsequent conduct in selling this to Mr. Puffer and to the museum. You entered not for educational reasons but for business reasons into the - into a cultural resource. You made a movie you intended to sell. So I believe you were engaged in a business in a park area without a permit

R.T. 6-104.

The defendant challenges only the evidence that he engaged in commercial activity by selling through Ms. Brocchini, which was not what he was convicted of doing; he does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the actual finding of the magistrate judge that he was engaging in a business by entering the park to make a movie that he intended sell.

There was sufficient evidence to support this conviction. First, it was undisputed that no permit to engage in this business was obtained by Mr. Baca.

The evidence showed that at Yosemite, a "Big Time" is a type of ceremony that is not open to the public, that begins up in the mountains with a ceremony that is very, very private and removed, as well as deliberations and preparations of ceremony in YNP in the Indian Cultural village. T.R. 1-11.

After the Big Time ceremony ended, a national park ranger obtained a copy of the video that Baca made and saw that it was being sold for \$30 each at the museum. T.R. 1-34. The tape was marked with a copyright designation. T.R. 1-39. Baca had arranged with the museum shop to sell these tapes. T.R. 1-132. The shop also sold other items made by Baca, including a CD of Miwok songs. Id.

The court also heard testimony from Herbert Puffer. Mr. Puffer operates a business in the Folsom area called Pacific Western Traders. T.R. 2-84. The witness had known Mr. Baca for more than 30 years. T.R. 2-84. He has sold in his shop cassettes and videos that Mr. Baca made, including one of Miwok songs, a cassette and CD and a video of a Big Time at Point Reyes National Seashore Park in Marin County and one of a Big Time in Yosemite. T.R. 2-85. The witness identified invoices for Big Time at Yosemite videos he purchased from Mr. Baca. T.R. 2-87, 2-88.

A National Park Ranger identified certain slides taken directly from the Big Time video. One of them contained the following statement: "For your copy of Big Time at Yosemite, indicate VHS or DVD format and send check or money order of \$30, S&H to Lorenzo, P.O. Box 4343, Sonora, California, 95370" Below that was a reference to a website,

AmericanIndianDesignsbyLorenzo.com. R.T. 2-113.

The ranger also discovered a civil suit had been filed against Mr. Baca, where it appeared there was an audio recording of a ceremonial dance made that was later offered for sale, and the Tuolemne band of Miwoks or the dance troop was taking legal action against Mr. Baca. T.R. 2-118. As evidence on Mr. Baca's intent, the court heard testimony under Rule 404(b) of two witnesses about Mr. Baca's prior activities in filming Native Americans dancing and singing and then reducing that to a tape that was eventually to be sold. T.R. 2-135 to 2-163.

Finally, another witness testified about his investigation into the internet sales of Big Time in Yosemite. T.R. 3-47. He found Big Time in Yosemite being advertised for sale for \$30 for

the video and \$40 for the DVD. T.R. 3-47.

This evidence, which was specifically referred to by Judge Wunderlich in his decision, is sufficient to show that Mr. Baca entered Yosemite for the purpose of engaging in a commercial enterprise, that is, to produce a film that he intended to put up for sale.

C. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act Did Not Provide Baca To A Defense To These Criminal Charges

Without citing any case authority, Baca claims that he has a complete defense to the criminal charges brought against him by the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996.

The <u>American Indian Religious Freedom Act</u> (AIRFA) provides as follows:

On and after August 11, 1978, it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.

42 U.S.C. § 1996.

On its face, AIRFA is a policy statement and does not create a defense in a criminal case. <u>United States v. Mitchell</u>, 502 F.3d 931 (9th Cir 2007). In <u>Mitchell</u>, the defendant attempted to raise as a defense against the imposition of the death penalty the Navajo Nation's religious opposition to the death penalty. The court first rejected a first amendment challenge⁴ raised by the

⁴Baca does not raise in this appeal a first amendment challenge to his conviction. This is probably because he admits, in his brief, that he did not enter the roundhouse for religious purposes, but claims rather that he intended "to film it for

defendant. It then found that the defendant's "reliance on AIRFA fares no better as 'AIRFA is simply a policy statement and does not create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable rights.'" 502 F.3d at 949 (citing Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709, 711 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, AIRFA does not provide a defense to Baca against the criminal charges brought against him.

Even if AIRFA did provide individual judicial rights, Baca's conduct does not fit within the conduct described by the statute. The statute is clearly designed to recognize the first amendment free exercise rights of the Indians described in the act. Baca did not enter the roundhouse for purposes of practicing his religion, but rather claims to have done so "for purposes of preservation and education." Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 24. That is obviously a different matter then entering into a religious site for purposes of "worship[ing] through ceremonials and traditional rites." Indeed, Mr. Baca entered this site to film those ceremonial rites, over the objections of the Native American group whose traditional religious and sacred rites that site represented. See R.T. 1-112.

Finally, it is unclear that the roundhouse would even be a protected site under AIRFA. Baca testified at trial that the roundhouse was not an authentic religious place. T.R. 6-32. He did not claim that he viewed it as a sacred site.

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purposes of preservation and education." Appellant's Opening Brief, p.24

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| 1 | VI. |
| 2 | <u>CONCLUSION</u> |
| 3 | Based upon the foregoing, the Government requests that the |
| 4 | court affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
| 5 | Respectfully submitted this 13th day of January, 2009 |
| 6 | LAWRENCE G. BROWN |
| 7 | ACTING UNITED STATES ATTORNEY |
| 8 | |
| 9 | By: /s/Mark J. McKeon |
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