Terry Goddard 1 Attorney General (Firm State Bar No. 14000) 2 3 Brian P. Luse Assistant Attorney General State Bar No. 021194 1275 W. Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85007-2997 5 Telephone: (602) 542-7778 Facsimile: (602) 542-4385 6 brian.luse@azag.gov adminlaw@azag.gov Attorneys for the Honorable Peter J. DeNinno and the Superior Court for Gila County 8 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 11 12 ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIBE, Case No: 2:09 CV-01660-PHX-MHM **13** Plaintiff. 14 REPLY TO STATE JUDICIAL **DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 15** DISMISS COMPLAINT ANTANELLE DUWYENIE, an unmarried **16** woman, PETER J. DENINNO, JUDGE PRO TEMPORE, GILA COUNTY SUPERIOR 17 COURT, SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE **18** OF ARIZONA, 19 Defendants. 20 The State Judicial Defendants, Gila County Superior Court Judge Pro Tempore 21 Peter J. DeNinno and the Superior Court for Gila County, through undersigned counsel, 22 hereby file this Reply supporting State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint with 23 prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., as this Court lacks subject-matter 24 jurisdiction. 25

26

26

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's complaint

a. The Eleventh Amendment & Judicial Immunity

Plaintiff asserts that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar his action on the basis that he is seeking only declaratory relief against Judge DeNinno and State Defendants. Plaintiff's assertion lacks merit. It is well established that the Eleventh Amendment immunizes states and arms of the states from suit in federal court unless they consent to it in *unequivocal terms* or unless Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of power, unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate the immunity. *Pennhurst State* School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984). The Superior Court of Gila County is inarguably an arm of the state and Plaintiff has sued Judge DeNinno in his official capacity. The Eleventh Amendment immunizes state officials from suit in their official capacities, because such suits are, in essence, suits against the state. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991). While the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), provides a narrow exception for suits against state officers seeking prospective equitable relief, this exception only applies to ongoing and continuous violations of federal law. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1986) (emphasis added). As recognized by the Ninth Circuit, "simply asking for injunctive relief and not damages does not clear the path for a suit" in federal court against a state official. Ulaleo v. Paty, 902 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original). Regardless of how

Plaintiff labels his request for relief, he is seeking retrospective relief from this Court, not prospective relief. Additionally, Plaintiff has not even alleged that there is an "ongoing and continuing violation of a federal law." Indeed, he cannot credibly do so. That is, the relief requested is not intended to stop a present, continuing violation of federal law. Rather, the complaint simply targets Judge DeNinno's past actions and demand their reversal. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims do not fall within the *Ex Parte Young* exception and, therefore, must be dismissed because the Eleventh Amendment deprives this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

b. <u>Plaintiff's complaint is barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine</u>

Although Plaintiff in name is different than the plaintiff in the Gila Count case, they are inextricably intertwined and their motivations are the same, to challenge the State court ruling. Plaintiff in effect wants to step into another's shoes to seek reversal of a state court judgment. In that, Plaintiff is essentially a disappointed litigant in Arizona state court who brought this action in federal district court against Judge DeNinno and the Gila County Superior Court.

Claims for relief are barred by the *Rooker-Feldman* Doctrine if upholding the claims and granting relief would effectively void the state court ruling. *Landers Seed Co. v. Champaign Nat'l Bank*, 15 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir.1994), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 811 (1994). However the claim is framed, the underlying inquiry remains whether "the district court is in essence being called upon to review the state court decision." *District*

1 of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483-84, n. 16 (1983). 2 No matter how it characterizes the claim, Plaintiff is improperly attempting to 3 have a state court action reviewed and reversed by this Court. This Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's complaint because it is barred by the Rooker-5 6 Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed. 7 III. **CONCLUSION** 8 For the reasons set forth above, the State Judicial Defendants respectfully request 9 that the Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 10 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of December, 2009. 11 12 TERRY GODDARD **Attorney General** 13 14 s/ Brian P. Luse Brian P. Luse 15 **Assistant Attorney General** Attorneys for the Honorable Peter J. **16** DeNinno and the Superior Court of **17** Gila County **18** CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 19 X I hereby certify that on December 18th, 2009, I electronically transmitted the 20 attached document to the Clerk's Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and 21 transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following CM/ECF registrants: 22 Allan Liebowitz, Attorney for Plaintiff 23 ALiebowitz@cox.net 24 Scott A. Salmon, Attorney for Defendant Antanelle Duwyenie Ssalmon@cavanaghlaw.com 25 **26**

X I hereby certify that on December 18th, 2009, I caused the attached document to be served by first class mail to: The Honorable Mary H. Murguia United States District Court Sandra Day O'Connor U.S. Courthouse, Suite 525 401 West Washington Street, SPC 53 Phoenix, AZ 85003-2154