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The Honorable Edward F. Shea  
Motion Date: August 30, 2010  
Time: 9:00 a.m.

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7  
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Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation

9  
10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

11 CONFEDERATED TRIBES AND  
BANDS OF THE YAKAMA NATION,  
12 a federally-recognized Indian tribal  
government and as *parens patriae* on  
13 behalf of the Enrolled Members of the  
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the  
14 Yakama Nation; FRIENDS OF THE  
COLUMBIA GORGE, an Oregon non-  
15 profit corporation; NORTHWEST  
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE  
16 CENTER, an Oregon non-profit  
corporation; COLUMBIA  
17 RIVERKEEPER, a Washington non-  
profit corporation; DAWN STOVER, a  
18 Washington resident; DANIEL

NO. CV-10-3050-EFS

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN  
SUPPORT OF CONFEDERATED  
TRIBES AND BANDS OF THE  
YAKAMA NATION'S MOTION  
FOR PRELIMINARY  
INJUNCTION

19 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF CONFEDERATED TRIBES AND BANDS  
OF THE YAKAMA NATION'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY  
RESTRAINING ORDER - 1  
(CV-10-3050-EFS)

Yakama Nation  
Office of Legal Counsel  
P.O. Box 151  
401 Fort Road  
Toppenish, WA 98948

1 LICHTENWALD, a Washington  
resident;

2 Plaintiffs,

3 v.

4 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF  
5 AGRICULTURE; UNITED STATES  
6 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
7 ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH  
8 INSPECTION SERVICE; TOM  
9 VILSACK, Secretary of the United  
States Department of Agriculture;  
CINDY SMITH, Administrator of the  
United States Department of Agriculture  
Animal and Plant Health Inspection  
Service;

10 Defendants.  
11

12 **I. INTRODUCTION**

13 This Court should issue a Preliminary Injunction preventing the shipment  
14 of any Hawaiian waste to the mainland United States pending final resolution of  
15 this lawsuit. Because Defendants failed to oppose the substantive grounds of  
16 Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the sole issue before the Court is  
17 whether Defendants have met their burden showing that every one of Plaintiffs'  
18 claims are moot. Defendants have not.

19 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF CONFEDERATED TRIBES AND BANDS  
OF THE YAKAMA NATION'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY  
RESTRAINING ORDER - 2  
(CV-10-3050-EFS)

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1 As set forth below, none of Plaintiffs' claims are rendered moot by  
2 Defendants' voluntary termination of a Compliance Agreement (CA) with  
3 Hawaii Waste Systems. Nothing about the termination of the CA guarantees that  
4 Defendants will not issue another violative CA tomorrow. In fact, it appears the  
5 Court fully grasped this when issuing its Temporary Restraining Order and  
6 enjoining Defendants from authorizing Hawaii Waste Systems, **"or any other**  
7 **private waste hauling enterprise"** to ship garbage from Hawaii to the mainland  
8 United States. This Court's TRO rightly reflects the fact that Plaintiffs' claims  
9 are not confined by one "terminated" Compliance Agreement, with the current  
10 low-bid garbage hauler.

11 All issues in Plaintiffs' Complaint and Amended Complaint are  
12 unanswered, viable and should be adjudicated. If Defendants stated intent to  
13 revisit their deficient environmental and historical analyses is genuine,  
14 Defendants lack any compelling reason to oppose the issuance of a Preliminary  
15 Injunction. In fact, the opposition to an injunction raises the specter that  
16 additional Compliance Agreements may be at play here, through which the  
17 Defendants may intend to facilitate the shipment and dumping of Hawaiian waste  
18 on the United States mainland once the matter is no longer before this Court.

1 Put simply, Plaintiffs have met their burden for issuance of Preliminary  
2 Injunction. Apart from the contention that Plaintiffs' claims are mooted by  
3 Defendants' voluntary action, Defendants do not raise objections or otherwise  
4 oppose any of the evidence and argument advanced in support of Plaintiffs'  
5 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Thus, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this  
6 Court grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and enjoin Defendants  
7 from permitting the shipment of garbage from Hawaii to the mainland pending  
8 final resolution of this lawsuit.

## 9 II. AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

10 This Court should issue a Preliminary Injunction because Defendants (A)  
11 have failed to establish that Plaintiffs' claims are moot, and (B) do not dispute the  
12 evidence and argument set forth in Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

### 13 A. Defendants Fail To Meet Their Burden On The Sole Issue Before The 14 Court: Whether Plaintiffs' Claims Are Mooted By The Termination Of The Compliance Agreement.

15 In their Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Injunctive Relief (Dkt. # 57)  
16 Defendants rely entirely upon the argument that the termination of the Hawaiian  
17 Waste Systems CA excuses Defendants from answering for their violations of  
18

1 federal law, and permits Defendants to escape this lawsuit with no consequences.

2 Controlling law set forth below shows how Defendants' argument falls short.

3 The general rule is that a defendant's voluntary cessation of a violative  
4 action or course of action does not render a case moot.<sup>1</sup> When a defendant seeks  
5 to avoid an injunction by arguing that a plaintiff's claims are mooted by such  
6 voluntary cessation of action, the defendant must satisfy a "heavy burden"— part  
7 of which requires persuading "the court that the challenged conduct cannot  
8 reasonably be expected to start up again."<sup>2</sup> The Supreme Court held that despite  
9 any voluntary cessation of wrongdoing by defendants, trial courts must retain  
10 their "power to determine the legality of the practice."<sup>3</sup> Otherwise, trial courts  
11 would be forced to leave the defendant "free to return to his old ways."<sup>4</sup>

12 Instead, for a defendant to cease wrongdoing and establish that plaintiffs'  
13 claims are therefore moot, it must be "**absolutely clear that the allegedly**

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15 <sup>1</sup> *Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Env'tl. Servs.*, 528 U.S. 167, 174 (2000).

16 <sup>2</sup> *Id.* at 189.

17 <sup>3</sup> *Id.*

18 <sup>4</sup> *Id.*

1 **wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”<sup>5</sup>** Defendants  
2 have utterly failed to meet this threshold element of Defendants’ burden on  
3 establishing mootness. Defendants have not even suggested that they will refrain  
4 from the illegal conduct that led to the CA, much less attempt to show that the  
5 termination of the CA guarantees proper conduct by the government moving  
6 forward. This void in Defendants’ argument emphasizes why Defendants’  
7 argument fails and a Preliminary Injunction should issue.

8 Defendants’ burden extends beyond proving - *with absolute clarity* - that  
9 Defendants’ wrongful conduct cannot occur in the future. Even if Defendants had  
10 met this element, which they have not, Defendants must also show that  
11 rescinding the CA has “completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the  
12 alleged violation[s].”<sup>6</sup> As set forth in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Plaintiffs’ claims  
13 reach far beyond the issuance of a defective CA to one garbage hauler. Plaintiffs’  
14 claims go to the heart of the matter – the deficient process undertaken by

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15 <sup>5</sup> *Id.* (emphasis added).

16 <sup>6</sup> *Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections*, 776 F.2d 851, 853-54 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.  
17 1985), *quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis*, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979).

Defendants that underlies the violative CA; namely, Defendants' deficient environmental assessments, their failure to comply with the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and their failure to meaningfully consult with the Yakama Nation concerning its hunting, fishing, and gathering rights, in violation of, among other federal laws, the Treaty of 1855.

B. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Not Moot Because Defendants Have Failed To Address The Actual Violations Of NEPA Underlying The CA.

The Defendants do not dispute that they undertook a fundamentally flawed process resulting in a fundamentally flawed FONSI. Rather, Defendants falsely contend that the CA "was the only agency action Plaintiffs challenged in this case."<sup>7</sup> In fact, the Second Claim to Plaintiffs' lawsuit alleges: "Violation of NEPA – Invalid FONSI", and more specifically that:

2010 Site-Specific EA and FONSI, *and* the Compliance Agreements, **which are directly challenged in this Complaint**, were the culmination of Defendants' decision-making process that approved the creation of a new way for invasive species to enter the continental United States.<sup>8</sup>

Therefore, the question is whether Plaintiffs' claims under NEPA regarding the

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<sup>7</sup> Dkt. # 57, 5.

<sup>8</sup> Dkt. # 1, 42:4; # 56, 42:4, 6-10, ¶ 72 (emphasis added).

1 United States' FONSI and its Site-Specific EA are moot because of the rescission  
2 of the CA. Contrary to Defendants' contentions otherwise, binding authority  
3 dictates that the "termination" of the CA does not moot Plaintiffs' claims.

4 The May 2010 FONSI issued by Defendants is a judicially reviewable  
5 action that Plaintiffs may challenge – and in fact have challenged. The Supreme  
6 Court has held that under NEPA, an interim action requiring another step before  
7 further harm may ensue is still judicially reviewable.<sup>9</sup> In the *Aberdeen* case, an  
8 across-the-board railroad rate hike was challenged on the premise that the hike  
9 would adversely impact the environment, contrary to the agency's conclusions  
10 resulting from its deficient process to assess environmental impact.<sup>10</sup> The agency  
11 had completed its NEPA review but had yet to hold the requisite hearings on the  
12 issue before the rate hikes could go into effect. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court  
13 held that because the agency had completed its consideration of environmental  
14 matters, that action was judicially reviewable:

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16 <sup>9</sup> *Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency*  
17 *Procedures (SCRAP)*, 422 U.S. 289, 319 (1975).

18 <sup>10</sup> *Id.* at 304.



1 When agency or departmental consideration of environmental factors  
2 in connection with that ‘federal action’ is complete, notions of finality  
3 and exhaustion do not stand in the way of judicial review of the  
adequacy of such consideration, even though other aspects of the  
[action] are not ripe for review.<sup>11</sup>

4 The Supreme Court employs a two-prong test to determine whether an  
5 action is a final agency action for the purpose of bringing a suit under the APA.<sup>12</sup>  
6 First, the challenged action must mark the consummation of the agency’s  
7 decision-making process. Second, the action must be one by which rights or  
8 obligations have been determined or from which legal consequences flow.<sup>13</sup>  
9 Because Defendants’ 2010 FONSI represents the consummation of its  
10 consideration of environmental factors required under NEPA, the issuance of the  
11 FONSI itself constitutes a final agency action that is ripe for review, even in the  
12 absence of any compliance agreements authorizing shipment of Hawaiian  
13 garbage to the continental United States.

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16 <sup>11</sup> *Id.* at 319.

17 <sup>12</sup> *Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).

18 <sup>13</sup> *Id.* at 177-78.

1 The ongoing threat of irreparable harm in this context is the added risk of  
2 harm to the environment caused by the agency's failure to fully consider the  
3 consequences of dumping Hawaiian garbage on the Mainland as required under  
4 NEPA.<sup>14</sup> Given Defendants' issuance of a defective FONSI, Plaintiffs are injured  
5 by virtue of the risk posed by the FONSI, and will continue to face injury without  
6 injunctive relief.

7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has decided a  
8 case in a similar procedural posture. In *Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of*  
9 *Engineers*, the plaintiffs sued because the Army Corps of Engineers failed to  
10 complete an EIS regarding the construction of a levee.<sup>15</sup> The Corps moved to  
11 dismiss, arguing there was no final agency action.<sup>16</sup> The Corps argued that it had  
12 not yet entered into any cooperation agreements for levee construction and lacked  
13 government funding to complete the project.<sup>17</sup> The Eighth Circuit disagreed,

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15 <sup>14</sup> See *Sierra Club v. Marsh*, 872 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1989).

16 <sup>15</sup> *Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*, 446 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2006).

17 <sup>16</sup> *Id.* at 811.

18 <sup>17</sup> *Id.* at 812.

1 finding that “the Corps’ issuance of an environmental assessment and a finding of  
2 no significant impact did constitute final agency action under NEPA,”  
3 *notwithstanding the requisite additional steps the Corps had to undertake*  
4 *before it could act.*<sup>18</sup>

5 The Eighth Circuit found that the FONSI was the conclusion of the Corps’  
6 NEPA decision-making process and, therefore, reviewable. Denying judicial  
7 review of the NEPA process the Corps undertook would, according to the Eighth  
8 Circuit, “undermine the purpose of judicial review under NEPA—to ‘ensure that  
9 important effects will not be overlooked or underestimated only to be discovered  
10 after resources have been committed or the die otherwise cast.’”<sup>19</sup> The Eighth  
11 Circuit’s reasoning appears to be based on the Supreme Court’s strong signal  
12 “that an agency’s decision to issue either a FONSI or an environmental impact  
13 statement is a ‘final agency action’ permitting immediate judicial review under  
14 NEPA.”<sup>20</sup>

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16 <sup>18</sup> *Id.* at 811.

17 <sup>19</sup> *Id.* at 816.

18 <sup>20</sup> *Id.* at 815.

1 Case law from the Ninth Circuit is in line with the Eighth Circuit's holding  
2 that the issuance of a FONSI is a final agency action, subject to judicial review.<sup>21</sup>

3 Defendants here imply that because a final small step must be taken before  
4 Hawaiian garbage may be shipped to and dumped on the United States mainland,  
5 this Court may not review Defendants' deeply flawed FONSI. The case law  
6 unequivocally establishes that Defendants may not use the procedural gimmick of  
7 terminating a CA when, for purposes of NEPA, the FONSI is a final agency  
8 action that has caused harm, and continues to threaten irreparable harm absent  
9 preliminary injunctive relief.

10 C. A Preliminary Injunction Should Issue Because Plaintiff Yakama Nation  
11 Continues To Face Imminent Threat Of Irreparable Harm.

12 Since Defendants have acted and continue to act in such a manner as to  
13 deny the Yakama Nation its rights, or ignore them altogether, this Court should

14 <sup>21</sup> See *ONRC v. Harrell*, 52 F.3d 1499, 1503 (9th Cir. 1995); see also *City of Las*  
15 *Vegas v. FAA*, 570 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Las Vegas . . . satisfies [the  
16 APA's] requirements, as the FONSI/ROD is a final agency action that adversely  
17 affects Las Vegas, and the city alleges a concrete injury to its interests in the  
18 environment and in safety which falls within the zone of interests of NEPA.").

1 issue a preliminary injunction.<sup>22</sup> Indeed Defendants' conduct since the Court's  
2 ruling on the Nation's first injunction motion only highlights the need for  
3 preliminary protection against an agency that refuses to satisfy its consultation  
4 obligations: Defendants have not even provided the Nation with the official  
5 document suspending the CA. Nor have Defendants provided such  
6 documentation to the Court under cover of the declaration of Ms. Bech.  
7 Accordingly, the Nation may only assume that the official suspension of the CA  
8 is inconsistent with the position Defendants have taken before the Court.

9 Defendants further imply that the termination of the CA "means that  
10 Plaintiffs cannot establish any imminent irreparable harm."<sup>23</sup> Defendants  
11 terminated the CA, in a thinly veiled admission that the Defendants failed to  
12 follow the consultation requirements of Section 106 of the NHPA. "APHIS has  
13 decided to conduct further analysis under the National Historic Preservation Act

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14  
15 <sup>22</sup> *Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Kempthorne*, 442 F.Supp.2d 774 (D.S.D. 2006) (issuing  
16 an injunction against BIA action where the tribe was not adequately consulted in  
17 compliance with federal regulations).

18 <sup>23</sup> Dkt. #57, 7:11-13.

1 (NHPA), *one of the statutes* under which Plaintiffs bring their claims in this  
2 case,” according to Defendants,<sup>24</sup> “in order to allow APHIS the opportunity to  
3 incorporate any relevant information that may be learned from the additional  
4 NHPA analysis into its decision making.”<sup>25</sup> Therefore, Defendants conclude,  
5 Plaintiffs will suffer “no prejudice by being forced to wait for review until the  
6 agency reconsiders its decision.”<sup>26</sup> Defendants, however, fail, or refuse, to  
7 address their obdurate abrogation of the Yakama Nation’s rights under the  
8 statutes asserted in this case, particularly the Treaty With the Yakama of 1855, 12  
9 Stat. 951.

10 This Court has already found that Plaintiff Yakama Nation is likely to  
11 suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction that enjoins the shipment  
12 of Hawaiian garbage to “the area in which tribal members exercise their ‘in  
13 common’ hunting, gathering, and fishing rights protected by the 1855 Treaty.”<sup>27</sup>

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14 <sup>24</sup> Dkt. #57, 5:17-19.

15 <sup>25</sup> Bech Decl., ¶ 5.

16 <sup>26</sup> Dkt. #57, 4:16-18.

17 <sup>27</sup> Dkt. #33, 4:3-7.

1 In so ruling, the Court questioned “whether the USDA adequately consulted with  
2 the Tribe” pursuant to various federal laws, which, in addition to the NHPA,  
3 require Defendants to meaningfully consult with the Yakama Nation.<sup>28</sup> Although  
4 Defendants now issue a vague statement that they will “conduct further analysis  
5 regarding the compliance agreements pursuant to the [NHPA],” Defendants  
6 refuse to commit to consultation with Yakama pursuant to the various other  
7 federal laws under which the Nation has asserted claims in this case.<sup>29</sup>

8 Defendants’ continued refusal to consult with the Yakama Nation about the  
9 “immeasurable harm” posed to Yakama Treaty-protected resources and  
10 waterways by an invasive species or contamination from Hawaiian garbage is, in  
11 and of itself, an imminent and continuing irreparable violation of the Yakama  
12 Treaty and federal trust responsibility owed to Yakama Indians.

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13 <sup>28</sup> *Id.*, 4:1-2.

14 <sup>29</sup> Particularly, the Treaty With the Yakama of 1855, 12 Stat. 951; United States  
15 Presidential Executive Orders, Nos. 13175, 13,007, and 12,898; NEPA  
16 regulations, 40 CFR §§ 1501.2 and 1508.8, 1508.27; and Defendant APHIS’  
17 own Directive 1040.1.

1 The Supreme Court has held that the United States has a fiduciary duty and  
 2 “moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust” to protect the Indians’  
 3 treaty rights.<sup>30</sup> “In practical terms, a procedural duty has arisen from the trust  
 4 relationship such that the federal government must consult with an Indian Tribe  
 5 in the decision-making process to avoid adverse effects on treaty resources.”<sup>31</sup>  
 6 Defendants have already irreparably violated, and threaten continued imminent  
 7 irreparable violation of, the United States’ duty to consult with Yakama.

8 \_\_\_\_\_  
 9 <sup>30</sup> *Seminole Nation v. United States*, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942), *cited in*  
 10 *Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall*, 698 F.Supp. 1504, 1510-11 (W.D. Wash.  
 11 1988) (preliminary injunction issued against the United States to prohibit the  
 12 construction of a marina on usual and accustomed Indian fishing place).

13 <sup>31</sup> *Klamath Tribes v. U.S.*, 1996 WL 924509, at \*8 (D. Or. 1996), *See also*  
 14 *Midwater Trawlers Cooperative vs. United States Dept. of Commerce*, 139  
 15 F.Supp.2d 1136, 1145 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (“That the federal government may  
 16 consult with the Tribes over the application of their treaty rights is well-grounded  
 17 in the government's trust relationship with the tribes.”), *aff’d in part, rev’d in part*  
 18 *on other grounds* 282 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2002).



1       Importantly, Defendants’ consultation obligations under the NHPA are  
 2 unique and distinct from its consultation obligations pursuant to, *inter alia*,  
 3 NEPA, the Yakama Treaty and federal common law trust responsibility.<sup>32</sup> As  
 4 such, Defendants’ implicit admission that they failed to consult with Yakama  
 5 pursuant to Section 106 of the NHPA, and vague statement that Defendants’ will  
 6 undertake “additional NHPA analysis,”<sup>33</sup> do not relieve Defendants of their  
 7 obligation to adequately consult with the Yakama Nation pursuant to various  
 8 other federal laws, most notably the Yakama Treaty of 1855.

9       The United States Constitution dictates that the Treaty is “the supreme  
 10 Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby . . .”<sup>34</sup> A

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11  
 12 <sup>32</sup> See *San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States*, 417 F.3d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir.  
 13 2005) (“What § 106 of NHPA does for sites of historical import, NEPA does for  
 14 our natural environment.”); *United States v. 0.95 Acres of Land*, 994 F.2d 696,  
 15 698 (9th Cir. 1993) (“NHPA is similar to NEPA except that it requires  
 16 consideration of historic sites, rather than the environment.”).

17 <sup>33</sup> Dkt. #58, 2:22 – 3:1.

18 <sup>34</sup> U.S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2.

1 violation or loss of rights guaranteed by Treaty and protected under the  
 2 Constitution is considered “irreparable in the equitable sense.”<sup>35</sup> Indian Treaty  
 3 rights are unique and damages sustained by Treaty Indians are generally  
 4 insusceptible of monetary determination.<sup>36</sup> Indeed, as this Court has already  
 5 concluded: “The introduction of an invasive species or contamination by the  
 6 Hawaiian garbage would immeasurably harm the resources and waterways  
 7 enjoyed by tribal members . . . as well as the Tribe’s logging industry.”<sup>37</sup>  
 8 Defendants’ undisputed violation of both the federal trust responsibility owed to  
 9 the Yakama Indians, and the Yakama Treaty is irreparable harm.

10 Further, “[i]t is the threat of irreparable harm that provides the situation its

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11  
 12 <sup>35</sup> *Muckleshoot Indian Tribe*, 698 F.Supp. at 1516, citing *Los Angeles Memorial*  
 13 *Coliseum v. National Football League*, 634 F.3d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980).

14 <sup>36</sup> *United States v. Washington*, 384 F.Supp. 312, 404 (W.D.Wash. 1974), *aff’d*  
 15 520 F.2d 676 (9thCir. 1975), *cert. denied*, 423 U.S. 1096, *substantially aff’d sub*  
 16 *nom. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel*  
 17 *Ass’n*, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).

18 <sup>37</sup> Dkt. #33, 4:7-11.

urgency.”<sup>38</sup> “Simply stated, the threat of irreparable harm renders the situation urgent because it means a party is in danger of losing something irretrievable.”<sup>39</sup> This situation remains urgent because Yakama is in danger of losing something irretrievable: federal stewardship of, and respect for, the rights and procedural duties guaranteed to Yakama Indians pursuant to the supreme Law of the Land – the Yakama Treaty of 1855. Moreover, the threat of grave and irreparable harm posed by the Defendants’ continuing conduct extends to threaten the Yakama People’s fundamental rights, their values, and their way of life since time immemorial. Accordingly, a preliminary injunction should issue.<sup>40</sup>

### III. CONCLUSION

Defendants failed to oppose any of the substantive grounds underpinning Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Instead, Defendants rely

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<sup>38</sup> *Ford Motor Company v. Todecheene*, 221 F.Supp.2d 1070, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002), citing *Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo*, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).

<sup>39</sup> *Id.*, citing 11 A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2918.1 p. 139 (2d ed. 1995).

<sup>40</sup> *Yankton Sioux Tribe, supra.*

1 exclusively on the position that the termination of a Compliance Agreement  
2 renders the Motion for Preliminary Injunction moot. As established above,  
3 Defendants' position is fatally flawed. Plaintiffs have met their burden in  
4 establishing the requisite elements for the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction.  
5 The termination of the CA does not obviate the grave threat lying at the heart of  
6 this matter – the potential for environmental disaster enabled by the Defendants  
7 multifaceted failures to execute their duties, and the potential for an irreparable  
8 abrogation of the Yakama Nation's Treaty of 1855.

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Office of Legal Counsel  
P.O. Box 151  
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Toppenish, WA 98948**

1 Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court grant Plaintiffs' Motion for  
2 Preliminary Injunction and enjoin Defendants from permitting the shipment of  
3 garbage from Hawaii to the United States mainland pending final resolution of  
4 this lawsuit.

5 DATED this 20th day of August, 2010.

6 s/ Julio Carranza, WSBA #3821

Julio Carranza, WSBA #38211

7 Attorney for Confederated Tribes and Bands of  
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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, Julio Carranza, say:

1. I am now, and at all times herein mentioned, a citizen of the United States, a resident of the State of Washington, over the age of 18 years, not a party to or interested in the above-entitled action, and competent to be a witness herein.

2. On August 20, 2010, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification via e-mail to:

Pamela De Rusha  
United States Attorney's Office  
E-mail : Pamela.derusha@usdoj.gov

And to :

Tyler Bair  
United States Department of Justice  
E-mail: tyler.bair@usdoj.gov

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//

DATED this 20th day of August, 2010.

s/ Julio Carranza, WSBA #3821

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the Yakama Nation

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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF CONFEDERATED TRIBES AND BANDS  
OF THE YAKAMA NATION'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY  
RESTRAINING ORDER - 23  
(CV-10-3050-EFS)

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