1	EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.					
2	Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.					
3	818 W. Riverside, Suite 250					
4	Spokane, WA 99201-0910 (509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632					
5	E-mail: ecoulter@ecl-law.com					
6	Attorneys for Defendants					
7						
8		DISTRICT COURT				
9	FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON					
10	SHAWN LAWRENCE DESAUTEL,					
11	TAMARA DESAUTEL DAVIS, and	Case No. CV-11-301-EFS				
12	TONIA RENE DESAUTEL,					
13	Plaintiffs,	DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF				
13	Trantitis,	MOTION TO DISMISS				
15	vs.					
	ANITA D DIDDIC ET AL					
16	ANITA B. DUPRIS, ET AL.					
17	Defendants.					
18	Detendants.					
19	COME NOW the Defendants, by an	nd through their attorneys, and herewith				
20	submit the following Memorandum of lav	v in support of the Motions to Dismiss.				
21	PLEADINGS BEFORE THE	COURT & BACKGROUND				
22		its filed with the Complaint indicate the				
23	•	•				
24	Plaintiffs are seeking to challenge the intr	amurai arrairs of the Colville Tribe in				
25	respect to membership enrollment.					
26						
27						
28	DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO	Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.				
29	DISMISS	818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 Spokane, WA 99201-0910				
30	Page 1	(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632				

Plaintiffs are of Indian blood and sought to be enrolled as Colville Tribal Members. All three (3) Plaintiffs allege that they sought to be enrolled as infants, and the Colville Tribal Council rejected the enrollment requests submitted by the Plaintiffs' parents based upon a lack of sufficient Indian blood. Many years later, Plaintiffs pursued enrollment and were subsequently enrolled as tribal members pursuant to the Colville Tribal Code on the basis of the Code's adoption enrollment procedures. Lead Plaintiff Shawn Lawrence DesAutel, apparently being dissatisfied with his enrollment date, filed suit in the Colville Tribal Court challenging the Tribe's enrollment ruling. Shawn Lawrence DesAutel (hereinafter referred to as "Mr. DesAutel") pursued all of his remedies through the tribal trial court and through appeal. At every juncture in the tribal court system litigation when Mr. DesAutel lost, he then proceeded to file a litany of suits against tribal council members, judges, and attorneys representing the Tribe.

Tamara DesAutel Davis (hereinafter "Ms. Davis") and Tonia Rene DesAutel (hereinafter "Ms. DesAutel) did not pursue an appeal of their adoption enrollment date. That is, Mr. DesAutel pursued all of his appeal rights through the Colville Tribal Court system whereas Ms. Davis and Ms. DesAutel did not pursue their appeal rights through the tribal court system.

Mr. DesAutel's enrollment appeal action as well as collateral actions against trial court judges and appellant court judges reached the point that the tribal court system would not accept any further filings on the part of Mr. DesAutel in relation to the enrollment appeal or collateral suits against tribal council members, judges, and attorneys.

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Page 2

Plaintiffs now file in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, naming six (6) judges/justices of the Colville Tribal Court system, eleven (11) tribal council members, four (4) attorneys that represented the Tribe in the various tribal court actions brought by Mr. DesAutel, and lastly the Colville Business Council and Colville Tribal Court itself.

Defendants Anita B. Dupris, Dennis L. Nelson, David C. Bonga, and Gary F. Bass are all Colville Tribal Appellate Court justices who decided the underlying enrollment litigation appeals as well as the collateral litigation appeals. Trudy Flamand and Steven D. Aycock were Colville Tribal Trial Court judges.

Lee Adolph, Ted Bessette, Terry Finley, Margie Hutchinson, Jeanne Jerred, Andy Joseph, Gene Joseph, Cherie Moomaw, Brian Nissen, Doug Seymour, and Virgil Seymour are all past or present Colville Business Council Members who acted in their official capacity as council members in respect to enrollment decisions or decisions relating to the underlying tribal court litigation.

Thomas W. Christie, Timothy W. Woolsey, Juliana C. Repp, and Wayne Svaren are all attorneys that at one point or another represented the Tribe in respect to the underlying tribal court litigation.

The Colville Business Council is the governing body of the Colville Tribe. The Colville Tribal Court is a constitutionally established tribal court system for the Colville Tribe.

## PLAINTIFFS' JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Plaintiffs' Complaint contains five paragraphs asserting federal jurisdiction and venue. (See Plaintiffs' Complaint, ECF No. 1 at page 3, paragraphs 3-7)

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Page 3

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Plaintiffs allege their claims create a claim under the United States Constitution and that a federal question jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. 1331premised upon Civil Rights claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, *et seq.* Plaintiffs' jurisdiction statement cites 18 U.S.C. §1985, which appears to be a typographical error in that Defendants are unable to find any code section cite for 18 U.S.C. §1985.

#### LEGAL AUTHORITY & ARGUMENT

1. Summary of Argument – The extensive Complaint and exhibits appended to the Complaint set forth Plaintiffs' dissatisfaction with tribal enrollment decisions of the Colville Business Council and the tribal court system. Defendants in this case have tribal sovereign immunity and when tribal sovereign immunity exists, federal jurisdiction does not exist. None of the immune Defendants have waived the tribal sovereign immunity.

Plaintiffs Tamara DesAutel Davis and Tonia Rene DesAutel have failed to exhaust all of their remedies in tribal court, and as such federal jurisdiction is lacking.

Plaintiffs' 92-page Complaint plus the exhibits and appendences are excessive and violate FRCP 8(a) requirement of short and concise allegations.

All Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6).

2. **Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction** – In order to establish federal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs are required to sufficiently plead that there is federal jurisdiction for the action otherwise the court is compelled to dismiss Plaintiffs'

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Page 4

29

30

suit. *See Gibbs v. Buck*, 307 U.S. 66, 77, 59 S.Ct. 725, 83 L. Ed. 1111(1939). The court itself is permitted to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction *sua sponte* whether at the trial court level or on an appeal. *See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp*, 546 U.S. 500, 506, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 1240, 163 L. Ed.2.d 1097 (2006).

**3. Sovereign Immunity** – Tribal sovereign immunity is a limit on federal subject matter jurisdiction when the action is brought against a sovereign. *See Alvarado v. Table Mountain Rancheria*, 509 F.3d 1008, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiffs seemingly recognize the significance of the United States Supreme Court holding in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). Plaintiffs refer to Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, supra, on a number of occasions. The Santa Clara Pueblo court was faced with somewhat of a similar legal issue involving Martinez bringing suit against the Santa Clara Pueblo Tribe for enrollment discrimination. The court held the Tribe's immunity defeated federal subject matter jurisdiction, and secondly the Indian Civil Rights Act (hereinafter "ICRA") did not create a private cause of action against the Tribe, nor did ICRA create a private cause of action for declaratory injunctive relief against tribal officers. More recently the 9th Circuit addressed a similar issue in Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2005). This case involved plaintiffs suing the United States seeking to enforce tribal enrollment rights. The trial court dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals held that the Tribe's sovereign immunity could not be avoided by suing the United States Department of Interior & Bureau of Indian Affairs. The

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Page 5

1

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 11

12 13

14 15

16 17

18 19

20 21

22 23

24 25

26 27

28 29

30 Page 6

court recognized the importance of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra, as holding that Indian Tribes as sovereign Indian Nations were to be left to their own political decisions as it related to purely intramural tribal enrollment issues, and as such there was a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in federal court over tribal membership disputes. See also Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farms, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985).

In Alvarado v. Table Mountain Rancherias, 509 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2007) Plaintiffs were unsuccessful in their enrollment application and brought suit in federal court. The court of appeals very clearly and succinctly ruled tribal sovereign immunity prohibited federal subject matter jurisdiction on actions relating to tribal government and tribal enrollment.

4. Constitutional Claim - Plaintiffs seemingly have sought to assert federal subject matter jurisdiction by claiming there has been a violation by the Tribal Defendants of the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights in respect to enrollment and tribal court procedures. "Indian Tribes are 'distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights' in matters of local self government." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 citing Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 559, 8 L.Ed.483 (1832). Stated another way, the Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra, reiterated that Indian Nations predated the United States Constitution and have been historically regarded as unconstrained by the United States constitutional provisions, and specifically as to limitations on federal or state authority. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 56.

**DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF** LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO **DISMISS** 

Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 Spokane, WA 99201-0910

(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632

1	5. Individual Immunity - Plaintiffs have named individual defendants		
2	alleging they were acting in their individual capacity in an effort to invoke federal		
3	jurisdiction. A tribe's sovereign immunity extends to individual tribal officials		
4 5	who were acting in their representative capacity and within the scope of their		
6	authority. See Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476, 479 (9th		
7	Cir. 1985). Thus, when the Tribe itself is not subject to suit based upon immunity,		
8	tribal officials, officers, judges, and attorneys all acting on behalf of the Tribe		
9	cannot be sued on the basis of tribal obligations. Further, Santa Clara Pueblo v.		
10	Martinez, 436 U.S. 58-59 held, "It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity		
11	cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed" citing <i>United States v</i> .		
12 13	Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 953, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976). Plaintiffs		
13	seemingly have acknowledged that the Tribe and tribal court have immunity.		
15	Whereas Plaintiffs have not alleged a waiver of the individual sovereign immunity		
16	of the individually named Defendants.		
17	The record before the Court specifically the exhibits and appendices to the		
18	Complaint clearly demonstrate the individual Defendants were acting within their		
19	official representative capacity on behalf of the Tribe. Appellate Court Justices		
<ul><li>20</li><li>21</li></ul>	Dupris, Nelson, and Bonga were clearly acting in their representative capacity.		
22	See ECF No.1-4 at pages 280-291 of Plaintiffs' exhibits. Further, after Mr.		
23	DesAutel did not prevail on appeal, he filed suit in tribal court naming Justices		
24	Dupris, Nelson and Bonga as justices of the Colville Appellate Court. See ECF		
25	No. 1-6 at page 314 of Plaintiffs' exhibits. See also ECF No. 1-7 at page 393 of		
26			

**DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF** LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO **DISMISS** 

Page 7

27

28

29

30

Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 Spokane, WA 99201-0910 (509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632

Plaintiffs' exhibits wherein Mr. DesAutel denominates Justices Dupris, Nelson, and Bonga as appellate justices.

Justice Gary F. Bass was acting in his official and representative capacity when he entered an order dismissing Mr. DesAutel's second appeal wherein Mr. DesAutel sued the appellate court Justices, trial court judges, and tribal court members. This is set forth in **ECF No. 1-7 at pages 416-424** of Plaintiffs' exhibits.

Trial court judges Trudy Flamand and Steven D. Aycock were acting in their judicial, official representative capacity when they made trial court decisions adverse to Mr. DesAutel's various suits. See ECF No. 1-3 at pages 207-215 of Plaintiffs' exhibits in respect to Judge Aycock (ECF No. 1-3 at pages 259-260) and (ECF No. 1-6 at pages 375) of Plaintiffs' exhibits in respect to Judge Flamand.

Colville Business Council Members, Adolph, Bessette, Finley, Hutchinson, Jerred, Joseph, Joseph, Moomaw, Nissen, Seymour, and Seymour were all acting as Colville Business Council Members in their official capacity and Mr. DesAutel filed suit in tribal court against these council members designating them as business council members. (See ECF No. 1-6 at pages 341-358 of Plaintiffs' exhibits)

Attorneys Svaren, Repp, Christie, and Woolsey were all acting within their representative capacity as attorneys representing the Tribe. (See ECF No. 1-3, Answer of Colville Business Council prepared by Attorney Svaren at pages 188-192 of Plaintiffs' exhibits; See Attorney Repp's Notice of Appearance (ECF No. 1-

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Page 8

3 at pages 199, 220, 259); See Attorney Christie pleadings in tribal court, (ECF No. 1-6 at pages 328, 329 of Plaintiffs' exhibits); See Attorney Woolsey pleadings, (ECF No. 1-6 at pages 362,363 of Plaintiffs' exhibits.)

Mr. DesAutel chose to sue tribal judges, business council members, and tribal attorneys in tribal court designating them in their official and representative capacity, and now cannot claim to sue the same individuals in their individual capacity in an effort to pursue federal claims in federal court.

- 6. **Federal Civil Rights Claims -** The Plaintiffs in this case have alleged federal Civil Rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983, *et seq.* as a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. As a matter of law, there is no subject matter jurisdiction because federal Civil Right claims are not actionable arising out of Indian Country. In *Evans v. McKay* 869 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1989) suit was brought against individuals of the Blackfeet Tribe. Plaintiff asserted a federal Civil Rights claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, and the court of appeals held that there was no jurisdiction in that Civil Rights claims arise only under color of state law and tribes are not states. *Accord R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority*, 719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 3476, 87 L.Ed.2d 612 (1985).
- 7. Exhaustion None of the named Defendants in this action admit federal jurisdiction exists for the claims being asserted. However, an additional ground for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is found in the doctrine of failure to exhaust tribal court remedies. "Under the doctrine of exhaustion of tribal court remedies, relief may not be sought in federal court until appellate review of a

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Page 9

1	pending matter in a tribal court is complete." Attwood v. Fortpack Tribal Court				
2	Assiniboine 513 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v.				
3	[Laplante, 480 U.S. 9, 17, 107 Sup. Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987). In addition, "A				
<ul><li>4</li><li>5</li></ul>	federal court must give the tribe a full opportunity to determine its own				
6	jurisdiction, which includes exhausting opportunities for appellate review in tribal				
7	courts." Boozer v. Wilder, 381 F.3d 931, 935-37 (9th Cir. 2004).				
8	The exhaustion doctrine is applicable to Tamara DesAutel Davis and Tonia				
9	Rene DesAutel. The exhibits and appendices to the Complaint clearly show these				
10	two Plaintiffs did not pursue appeals in the appropriate tribal court.				
11	8. <b>Dismissal Per Federal Rule 8(a)</b> – Federal Rule 8(a) provides that				
12 13	pleadings, such as Plaintiffs' Complaint, are required to contain a short and plain				
14	statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction and the relief being sought. In				
15	Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 2007), the court of appeals				
16	held that a 99-page Complaint that was a single spaced pleading violated the short				
17	and plain statement requirement of Rule 8. Complaints are appropriately				
18	dismissed when the Complaint is "patently verbose, confusing, and rambling." See				
19	Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 109/, 1105 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008).				
20 21	Defense counsel readily admits Plaintiffs are pro se and are entitled to some				
22	latitude. However, a 92-page Complaint and exhibits, such as the present				
23	Complaint, do violate the essence of Rule 8(a) in respect to a short, concise				
24	statement without extensive confusion of verbosity.				
25					
26					
27					
28	DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO  Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.  118 W. Bissonida, Soita 250				
29 30	DISMISS       818 W. Riverside, Suite 250         Spokane, WA 99201-0910         Page 10       (509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632				
-	<del></del>				

# 9. Failure to State a Claim as Required by FRCP 12(b)(6) -

- **9.1** Plaintiffs have asserted federal jurisdiction on the premise that they are pursuing United States Constitutional claims against the Defendants. As noted in the subject matter jurisdiction portion of this memorandum of law, such a claim is not actionable. Defendants move to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
- 9.2 Defendants move pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state claim on the Federal Civil Rights allegations. For the same reason there is no federal matter jurisdiction in this case for Federal Civil Rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983, et seq., there is no claim as a matter of law. See Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1989); A.R. J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority, 719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied 472 U.S. 1016, 105 Sup. Ct. 3476, 87 L.Ed.2d 612 (1985).
- 10. Fraud To the extent Plaintiffs are trying to claim a fraud has been committed by the Defendants, the Plaintiffs' Complaint is deficient and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Pursuant to FRCP 9(b), a plaintiff must plead with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud, including all nine (9) elements of fraud. Such is not the case here, and Defendants' immunity is a bar to stating a claim upon which relief can be granted.

## **CONCLUSION**

1) Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Page 11

Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 Spokane, WA 99201-0910 (509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632

1	2)	2) Plaintiffs Tamara DesAutel Davis and Tonia Rene DesAutel have		
2	failed to exhaust their tribal court remedies in respect to enrollment, and as such			
3	federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.			
4	3)	Plaintiffs have failed to a	ppropriately plead claims against the	
5 6	Defendants, and have further failed to allege claims upon which relief can be			
7	granted and as such dismissal is required.			
8	The Complaint must (should) be dismissed.			
9	RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of September, 2011.			
10				
11			EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, PS	
12			/s/ Everett B. Coulter, Jr.	
13			By EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.	
14			WSBA #6877	
15			Attorneys for Defendants	
16			Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 818 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 250	
17 18			Spokane, WA 99201	
19			Telephone: (509) 455-5200 Fax: (509) 455-3632	
20			E-mail: ecoulter@ecl-law.com	
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27		ITS' MEMORANDUM OF		
28 29	LAW IN SU	PPORT OF MOTION TO	Evans, Craven & Lack ie, P.S. 818 W. Riverside, Suite 250	
30	DISMISS Page 12		Spokane, WA 99201-0910 (509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632	
•				

## 

Page 13

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on the 21st day of September, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF System, which will send notification of such filing to the following:

#### No Known Electronic Notifications

I hereby further certify that I have caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document(s) on the non-CM/ECF participants as indicated:

Shawn Lawrence DesAutel 1005 W. North Ave. Chewelah, WA 99109	Via Regular Mail Via Certified Mail Via Facsimile Hand Delivered	[X] [ ] [ ]
Tamara DesAutel Davis 7315 W. Lund Rathdrum, ID 83858	Via Regular Mail Via Certified Mail Via Facsimile Hand Delivered	[X] [ ] [ ]
Tonia Rene DesAutel 19029 E. Boone Ave. #20 Spokane Valley, WA 99016	Via Regular Mail Via Certified Mail Via Facsimile Hand Delivered	[X] [ ] [ ]

/s/ Everett B. Coulter, Jr.

**DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF** LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO **DISMISS** 

Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.

818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 Spokane, WA 99201-0910 (509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632