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Attorney for Plaintiffs

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON**

TERRY TONASKET, dba )  
STOGIE SHOP; and DANIEL )  
T. MILLER, an individual; )  
  
Plaintiffs, )  
  
v. )

No. CV-11-073-LRS  
  
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE  
TO DEFENDANTS'  
MOTION TO DISMISS  
AMENDED COMPLAINT

TOM SARGENT, TOBACCO )  
TAX ADMINISTRATOR, AND )  
THE COLVILLE BUSINESS )  
COUNCIL; MICHAEL O. )  
FINLEY, CHAIRMAN; )  
HARVEY MOSES JR.; SYLVIA )  
PEASLEY; BRIAN NISSEN; )  
SUSIE ALLEN; CHERIE )  
MOOMAW; JOHN STENSGAR; )  
ANDREW JOSEPH; VIRGIL )  
SEYMOUR SR.; MIKE )  
MARCHARD; ERNIE )  
WILLIAMS; DOUG SEYMOUR; )  
SHIRLEY CHARLEY; RICKY )  
GABRIEL; and THE COLVILLE )  
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF )

Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants'  
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 1

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THE COLVILLE INDIAN )  
RESERVATION, A FEDERALLY )  
RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBE; )  
 )  
Defendants. )

The Motion is brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), lack of subject matter jurisdiction and (7), failure to join and indispensable party under Rule 19.

Defendants’ sovereign immunity argument is a defense, hence not within Rule 12(b). This motion must be confined to examining the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 40) to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.

A party asserting the defense of sovereignty has the burden of proof. *New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation*, 523 F.Supp.2d 185, 297-299 (E.D.NY 2007); *New York v. Golden Feather Smoke Shop*, 2009 WL 705815, page 4 (E.D.NY 2009); *Dye v. Choctaw Casino of Pocola*, 230 P.3d 507 (Okla. 2009). *Vann v. Kempthorne*, 534 F.3d 741, 750 (D.C.Cir. 2008) and *TTEA v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo*, 181 F.3d 676, 680 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) deny sovereign immunity if ongoing violations are sought to be enjoined.

Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’  
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 2

1 The burden to establish absolute immunity is upon the  
2  
3 defendant that wishes to use it as a defense. *Burns v. Reed*, 500  
4 U.S. 478, 486-87, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991);  
5  
6 *Lacey v. Maricopa County*, \_\_\_ F.3d \_\_\_, 2011 WL 2276198,  
7 page 3 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2011).

8  
9 In the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 40 at 31-36),  
10 injunctions and declaratory judgments are sought. *Burns v.*  
11 *Reed*, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) states, “These decisions have  
12 also empathized that the official seeking absolute immunity  
13 bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for  
14 the function in question.”

15  
16  
17 The complaint may be inartfully drawn, but if it contains  
18 sufficient facts, it survives dismissal. *Mendondo v. Centinela*  
19 *Hosp. Medical Center*, 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2008).

20  
21  
22 At ECF No. 46 at 1, Defendants attempt to characterize the  
23 Amended Complaint (ECF No. 40) as a challenge to the cigarette  
24 compact between the Tribe and the State. This is misleading as  
25 the Amended Complaint’s title and introduction and ECF No. 40

26  
27 Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’  
28 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 3

1 at 5 states, "This is an action for illegal price fixing, antitrust and  
2 unfair competition violating the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 15  
3 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3, 13, 15 and 26." ECF No. 40 at 14-31.  
4

5  
6 The incidence of the cigarette tax is on Miller. ECF No. 40  
7 at 29. The Tribe has no regulatory jurisdiction on Miller,  
8 therefore, sovereign immunity is never an issue.  
9

10 **The Defendant Tribe has no Sovereign Immunity to a**  
11 **Federal Law of General Applicability. In Any Event,**  
12 **The Tribe has Waived Immunity.**

13 The Tribe is bound by the decision of the Ninth Circuit  
14 denying sovereignty, *Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm*, 751  
15 F.2d 1113 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985). The specific holding is that tribal  
16 sovereignty cannot be used as a refusal to follow federal statutes  
17 of general applicability. The court rejected the defense of tribal  
18 sovereignty on the basis that the tribe was conducting a  
19 commercial enterprise.  
20  
21  
22

23 William C. Canby, Jr., Senior Judge of the Ninth Circuit,  
24 states in his book, "*American Indian Law*" 5<sup>th</sup> Edition, West 2009  
25 at pages 310-311 that "The most widely accepted rule is that set  
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27 Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants'  
28 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 4

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forth in *Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm*, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985).”

In *Freedom Holdings v. Spitzer*, 357 F.3d 205, 226 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 2004), the MSA was held to be a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1.

*Costco Wholesale Corp v. Maleng*, 522 F.3d 874, 895 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2008) also held that state price fixing was an antitrust violation.

*U.S. v. Baker*, 63 F.3d 1478, 1485 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) holds that the federal statutes forbidding Indians to transport cigarettes is a federal law of general applicability. The Defendant is an Indian tribe cigarette retailer.

The argument of sovereign immunity has no application to a horizontal restraint of liquor prices. *TFWS Inc v. Schaefer*, 242 F.3d 198, 210-11 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) states:

The district court’s denial of immunity is validated by *324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy*, 479 U.S. 335, 344-45, 107 S.Ct 720, 93 L.Ed.2d 667 (1987), a case in which the Supreme Court held that one aspect of the New York State liquor pricing system was not entitled to

1 antitrust immunity under *Parker v. Brown*. . . .The  
2 Court ruled that New York's program was not entitled  
3 to antitrust immunity because the State did not  
4 actively supervise the pricing scheme.

5 This state antitrust immunity issue and the case upholding  
6 lack of immunity from injunctive relief on tribal tax have the  
7 same common cases, *Ex parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56, 28  
8 S.Ct 441, 52 L.Ed 714 (1908) and *Burlington Northern and Santa*  
9 *Fe Railway v. Vaughn*, 509 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007). The  
10 harmony of these cases deny sovereign immunity of the  
11 Defendant Tribe where injunctive relief, as here, is sought  
12 against a tribal market competitor.  
13

14 *McArthur Dairy, LLC v. McCowtree Bros. Dairy, Inc.*, 2011  
15 WL 2118701 (S.D.Fla 2011) held that an agreement on  
16 distribution of milk products violated the Sherman Antitrust Act  
17 and denied a motion to dismiss.  
18

19 In *L.G. Balfour Company v. F.T.C.*, 442 F.2d 1, 6 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir.  
20 1971) the market competitor organized a company that  
21 recommended that all purchases of jewelry by college fraternities  
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28 Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants'  
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 6

1 be exclusively with Balfour. The holding was that the exclusive  
2 supply contract was a violation of the antitrust laws. *Balfour*  
3 states that a violation does not require that all violators be listed  
4 as Defendants.  
5

6  
7 *Solis v. Matheson*, 563 F.3d 425, 434 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2009) is also  
8 conclusive. Federal wage and hour laws are statutes of general  
9 applicability.  
10

11  
12 The Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 40 at page 28) states,  
13 “Plaintiff Daniel T. Miller has never been and cannot be subject  
14 to any defense of tribal immunity as he has no nexus with the  
15 Defendant Colville Tribe that would allow a defense of sovereign  
16 immunity.” ECF No. 40 at 30 states, “the action by the  
17 Defendant Tribe in delegating price control to the State of  
18 Washington waives tribal immunity.” The Tribe, despite its  
19 assertion of sovereign immunity by its conduct, waived its  
20 immunity by entering into the agreement, by agreeing to  
21 mediation and by waiving any judicial enforcement. The  
22 Compact, ECF No. 1 at 76, 19.0 contains detailed mediation.  
23  
24  
25  
26

27 Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’  
28 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 7

1 Mediation and arbitration waives immunity. *C & L*  
2  
3 *Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe*, 532 U.S.  
4 411, 121 S.Ct 1589, 149 L.Ed.2d 623 (2001); *Smith v. Hopland*  
5 *Band of Pomo Indians*, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 455, 463 (2002). These  
6  
7 waivers alone overcome a motion to dismiss.

8  
9 The Tribe designated control to the State or at least joint  
10 control. The Compact, ECF No. 1 at 70-72, 14.0 provides that  
11 all wholesalers must be licensed by the State; enforcement is  
12 joint. ECF No. 1 at 73, 15.2. The Tribe will provide Colville  
13 retailer information. ECF No. 1 at 68, 6.1.4, 6.1.3. By delegating  
14 the information the joint venture is not an “arm” of the Tribe.  
15  
16 The Amended Complaint, ECF No. 40 at 23 states, “. . .the  
17 conduct of the Defendant Tribe by entering into a price fixing  
18 agreement alone waives the tribal sovereignty of Defendants.”  
19  
20 *Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co.*, 772 P.2d 1104 (Ariz. 1989).  
21

22  
23 The Defendant Tribe operates a cigarette retail business.  
24  
25 ECF No. 40 at 4-5. It agreed that the State could regulate the  
26 sale of its cigarettes. ECF No. 1 at 72-73, 14.2.3, 14.4. This

27 Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants'  
28 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 8



1 brings the situation completely within *Narragansett Indian Tribe*  
2  
3 *v. Rhode Island*, 449 F.3d 16, 25 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2006). The case holds  
4 that an Indian tribe's sovereign immunity may be "limited" by  
5 tribal conduct. . . "an effective limitation on tribal sovereign  
6 immunity need not use magic words." 449 F.3d at 25.  
7

8  
9 The Amended Complaint, ECF No. 40 at 31, states that  
10 forcing the State's lawsuit settlement (MSA) by increased prices  
11 waives immunity. ECF No. 40 at 32-33 states, "The Defendant  
12 Colville Tribe cannot claim sovereign immunity, as it was not a  
13 party to the MSA agreement and is collecting a substitute tax  
14 that increases prices. . . The Defendant Tribe has no sovereign  
15 immunity to a federal statute of general application."  
16  
17

18  
19 ECF No. 40 at 3, 21, 27, 31-35 and especially at 32-3,  
20 alleges that the Defendant Tribe agreed to force Plaintiff  
21 Tonasket to purchase his cigarettes from an exclusive group of  
22 wholesalers who had to have a cigarette license with the State of  
23 Washington or certify that they would comply with state law. No  
24 licensed retailer (ECF No. 40 at 27) was a party to the MSA  
25  
26

27 Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants'  
28 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 9

1 agreement. No Indian tribe was a party to the MSA lawsuit  
2  
3 settlement (ECF No. 40 at 23) and the Colville Tribe gets no  
4  
5 benefit. However it is required to pay into the state escrow. ECF  
6  
7 No. 40 at 26. The requirement by the Tribe also requires that  
8  
9 Tonasket sell his cigarettes at a minimum price plus the taxes.  
10  
11 Compact, ECF No 1 at 68, 6.2, 6.2.1. This pricing overcharges  
12  
13 Tonasket by approximately \$5 per carton of cigarettes. He is  
14  
15 forced to increase his price to Miller. ECF No. 40 at 27.

16  
17 At ECF No. 46 at 2 of their memorandum, the Defendants  
18  
19 refer to the Declaration of Tom Sargent that completely  
20  
21 contradicts the compact and its own law.

22  
23 The Defendants assert that they do not “set wholesale  
24  
25 prices” but the truth is contained in the Amended Complaint  
26  
27 ECF No. 40 at 19-24. The Defendant Tribe forces Tonasket to  
28  
29 buy from wholesalers who charge more for the cigarettes. If the  
30  
31 State raises its tax, Tonasket must raise his prices. As stated at  
32  
33 ECF No. 40 at 22, “this practice violates the common law  
34  
35 revenue rule and is classic price fixing.” At ECF No. 40 at 21 it

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37 Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’  
38 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 10

1 states:  
2

3 The Defendant Tribe has a substantial market share  
4 of the retail cigarette sales in the same market as  
5 Plaintiff Tonasket. The forced conduct by the Tribe  
6 making Tonasket sell at the same prices exerts  
7 competitive market pricing that has substantial anti-  
8 competitive effects on pricing to Plaintiff Daniel T.  
9 Miller and other purchasers.

10 These are factual allegations and do not require specificity.

11 *Newcal Industries v. IKON Office Solutions*, 513 F.3d 1038, 1045  
12 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2008); on remand 2011 WL 1899404 (D.C.N.D. Cal.,  
13 2011). The court held that the complaint also met the plausible  
14 standard.  
15

16 The statement at ECF No. 46 at 2 of Defendants'  
17 Memorandum, "The compact and code do not limit wholesalers  
18 to those approved by the state" is untrue. Wash.Rev.Code  
19 43.06.455(5)(b) clearly states that the state must approve.  
20

21 The Compact, ECF 1 at 69, 7.0 states that tribal retailers  
22 must buy from state certified retailers.  
23  
24  
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26

27 Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants'  
28 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 11

1 The Colville Tribal Code states:  
2

3 **6-8-10 Purchase of Cigarettes by Tobacco Retailers**

4 Tobacco retailers must purchase cigarettes only from:

- 5 (a) Wholesalers or manufacturers licensed to do  
6 business in Washington State;  
7 (b) Self-certified tribal wholesalers;  
8 (c) Self-certified wholesalers.

9 The Second Declaration of Tom Sargent filed with the  
10 Motion at ECF No. 47, is merely a legal argument on the  
11 contents of the compact and state law. At ECF No. 47 at 2, it  
12 states that the wholesaler collects the tax by tax stamps. It  
13 states that the Tribe does not set wholesaler prices.  
14

15 *Pacific Coast Agr. Export Assn v. Sunkist Growers*, 526 F.2d  
16 1196, 1205 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1975) held that where competitive selling  
17 was prevented by an association controlled by market prices, 15  
18 U.S.C. § 1 was violated and denied a motion to dismiss.  
19

20 *Ice Cream Liquidators Inc. v. Land O Lakes*, 253 F.Supp.2d  
21 262, 272 (D.Conn 2003) applies as it also held that 15 U.S.C. §  
22 1 was violated by cheese prices that could be manipulated to  
23 reduce milk prices.  
24

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27 Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants'  
28 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 12

1           *Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods*, 232 F.3d 979, 984 (9<sup>th</sup>  
2  
3 Cir. 2000) is conclusive. When horizontal market competitors  
4  
5 manipulate prices, directly and indirectly an antitrust action is  
6  
7 sufficient to avoid dismissal.

8           *Idaho ex rel. Wasden v. Native Wholesale Supply Company*,  
9  
10 2009 WL 940731 (D.Idaho 2009) exemplifies the issue. The  
11  
12 Coeur d'Alene Tribe bought from a wholesaler who was not  
13  
14 bound by the MSA agreement and paid less for the cigarettes.

15           If a competitor interferes at the wholesaler level by  
16  
17 prohibiting a retailer from purchasing at the same price as sold  
18  
19 to other retail purchasers, an antitrust injunction will be issued.  
20  
21 *Bergen Drug v. Parke Davis*, 307 F.2d 725, 728 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1962).

22           Restrictions on choice raising costs is an antitrust violation.  
23  
24 *Real Comp II Ltd. v. F.T.C.*, 635 F.3d 815, 830 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2011).

25           The Defendants argue at ECF No. 46 at 7 that the language  
26  
27 of the Compact, ECF No. 1 at 65 stating non-waiver binds  
28  
29 Plaintiffs. Yet the Compact, ECF No. 1 at 65, also states, "No  
30  
31 third party shall have any rights or obligations under this

32  
33 Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants'  
34  
35 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 13

1 compact.” Plaintiffs are not parties to the compact. The citation,  
2  
3 at ECF No. 46 at 2, to *Matheson v. Gregoire*, 139 Wash.App 624,  
4  
5 161 P.3d 486 (Div. II 2007) a state intermediate court, did not  
6  
7 construe a complaint against the tribe presuming factual  
8  
9 allegations as true.

10 *Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co.*, 301 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.  
11  
12 2002) states that in antitrust actions “The complaint need not  
13  
14 set out the facts in detail.”

15 Much is said about the fact that the Tribe taxes itself. This  
16  
17 results in the Tribe collecting tax from its competitor and also  
18  
19 raising its own price by the tax it charges but does not pay the  
20  
21 tax to anyone. It gets \$30 a carton on Tonasket’s sales and  
22  
23 keeps \$30 more in profit by adding its own tax to its own sales.

24 **Double Taxation is Not Possible on these Plaintiffs.**

25 Defendants, at ECF No. 46 at 14, again argue that the  
26  
27 compact prohibits double taxation of cigarettes by smoke shops.  
28  
29 The reality is that the State continues to arrest smoke shop  
30  
31 owners even when compacts are in effect. *U.S. v. Wilbur*, 2010

32 Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’  
33 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 14

1 WL 519735, pgs. 4-5 (D.C.W.D.Wa 2010); *State v. Comenout*,  
2  
3 Case No. 85067-4, Washington State Supreme Court, argued  
4  
5 June 30, 2011.

6 **The State is not an Indispensable Party.**

7 Defendants attempt to characterize the Amended  
8  
9 Complaint as an attack on the compact. The compact is not the  
10  
11 issue. The subject matter easily gives this court jurisdiction  
12  
13 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 15. At ECF No. 40 at 4, the Amended  
14  
15 Complaint states, "The State of Washington is not a competitor  
16  
17 of Plaintiffs, hence is not a Defendant in this action."

18 The Defendants in their memorandum, ECF No. 46 at 16-  
19  
20 17, states that the State is in an unlawful conspiracy and that  
21  
22 the validity of the compact is at issue. The Tribe is a market  
23  
24 participant against Plaintiff Tonasket, not the State. The  
25  
26 Plaintiffs are not a party to the compact and never signed it. It  
27  
28 states that third parties are not affected. ECF No. 1 at 65. The  
29  
30 Defendant Tribe states that it is trying to protect Tonasket.  
31  
32 Fed.R.Civ.P 19 by its terms, is not applicable. The reason is that

33 Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants'  
34 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 15

1 complete relief can be obtained by Plaintiff Miller without the  
2 State as a party. The Plaintiffs do not attack the compact. No  
3 relief is sought against the State. If the Defendants want to  
4 proceed against the State, they may seek interpleader. *Hudson*  
5 *v. Newell*, 172 F.2d 848, 852 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1949). This is a suit by a  
6 competitor against another competitor. No joinder was necessary  
7 to invalidate a tribal tax on a non-Indian. In *Atkinson Trading*  
8 *Co. v. Shirley*, 532 U.S. 645, 647, 121 S.Ct 1825, 149 L.Ed.2d  
9 889 (2001), complete relief was obtained. *American Needle Inc.*  
10 *v. National Football League*, 130 S.Ct 2201, 2216-17, 176  
11 L.Ed.2d 947 (2010) applies it states, “. . .competitors cannot  
12 simply get around antitrust liability by acting through a third  
13 party intermediary or joint venture” to serve as exclusive sellers.  
14 Joinder is unnecessary.

15 Defendants at ECF No. 46 at 3, cite *Water Wheel Camp*  
16 *Recreational Area*, 642 F.3d 802 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2011) as applying a rule  
17 not requiring a consensual relationship for tribal jurisdiction of  
18 non-Indians. The case holds that a consensual relationship

19 Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants'  
20 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 16



1 existed. 642 F.3d at 818. The court also noted that the party  
2 lived on the land for more than 20 years and trespass was at  
3 issue. 642 F.3d at 811. *Water Wheel*, 642 F.3d at 814, also  
4 distinguishes the case of *Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley*, 532  
5 U.S. 645, 121 S.Ct. 1825, 149 L.Ed.2d 889 (2001). *Atkinson*, 532  
6 U.S. at 653 states, “An Indian tribe’s sovereign power to tax  
7 whatever its derivation reaches no further than tribal land.” The  
8 tax on a non-member is “presumptively invalid.” *Atkinson*, 532  
9 U.S. at 659. Since *Atkinson* involved the incidence of tax on a  
10 non-member, that the activity was not on tribal land and that  
11 the customers lawfully entered onto the reservation. *Water*  
12 *Wheel*, 642 F.3d at 810.

13 Defendants argue at ECF No. 46 at 13, that both the State  
14 and Tribe can impose their own cigarette taxes. This is wrong.  
15 The State cannot impose its taxes on Tonasket as he does not  
16 have to pay state taxes including cigarette tax; nor does he have  
17 to obtain a tobacco sales license. *McClanahan v. State Tax*  
18 *Commission of Arizona*, 411 U.S. 164, 93 S.Ct 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d

19 Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’  
20 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 17

1 129 (1973); *Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the*  
2  
3 *Flathead Reservation*, 425 U.S. 463, 480, 96 S.Ct 1634, 48  
4 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976).

5  
6 **The Individual Defendants are not Immune from**  
7 **Injunction or Declaratory Judgment. Tribal Officials**  
8 **Have no Immunity When They Act Without and Beyond**  
9 **Their Authority.**

10 The Defendants, at ECF No. 46 at 8 argue that the  
11 individual Defendants are immune. The Defendants also  
12 assume that they can tax non-Indians, a principle that was  
13 rejected by the Supreme Court in *Atkinson, supra*. The  
14 Defendants also ignore the allegations that they cannot force  
15 Plaintiff Tonasket to collect the MSA lawsuit settlement. ECF  
16  
17 No. 40 at 9-13.

18  
19 Regarding injunction, the law is stated in Canby, *Federal*  
20  
21 *Indian Law*, 5<sup>th</sup> Ed. 2009 at 106:

22 Thus a party claiming that a tribe had no power  
23 under federal law to impose a tax can sue tribal  
24 officials to enjoin enforcement, just as state taxpayers  
25 can sue state officials under *Ex Parte Young*, 209 U.S.  
26 123 (1908). *Burlington Northern & Sante Fe Ry. v.*  
27 *Vaughn*, 509 F.3d 1085 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007).

28 Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants'  
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 18

1 A tribal officer is not protected by a tribe's immunity.  
2  
3 *Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez*, 436 U.S. 49, 59, 98 S.Ct 1670,  
4 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978).

5  
6 *Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway v. Vaughn*, 509 F.3d  
7 1085, 1092, (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007) is conclusive. The court stated:

8  
9 This doctrine has been extended to tribal officials  
10 sued in their official capacity such that "tribal  
11 sovereign immunity does not bar a suit for  
12 prospective relief against tribal officers allegedly  
acting in violation of federal law."

13 BNSF seeks a declaration that the tax is invalid as  
14 applied to its right-of-way and a permanent injunction  
15 prohibiting the tribal officials from enforcing the tax  
16 against it. Compl. ¶ 1. This is clearly the type of suit  
17 that is permissible under the doctrine of *Ex Parte*  
*Young*.

18 **Conclusion.**

19 The Defendant Tribe operates a retail store in direct  
20 competition with Plaintiff Tonasket. It has no sovereign  
21 immunity against a complaint alleging violation of federal  
22 statutes of general applicability and antitrust laws. Its activities,  
23 by agreeing to enforcement, also waives immunity. Joinder of a  
24  
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26

27 Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants'  
28 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 19

1 non-competitor to Plaintiffs Tonasket and Miller where complete  
2 relief can be had against a horizontal competitor, is not required.  
3

4 The motion should be denied.  
5

6 DATED this 18<sup>th</sup> day of August 2011.  
7

8  
9 s/ Robert E. Kovacevich  
10 ROBERT E. KOVACEVICH, #2723  
11 Attorney for Plaintiffs  
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27 Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants'  
28 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint - 20

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on the 18<sup>th</sup> day of August 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF System which will send notification of such filing to attorney for Defendants.

s/ Robert E. Kovacevich  
ROBERT E. KOVACEVICH, #2723  
Attorney for Plaintiffs

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