| 1 2 3 | James K. Kawahara, Esq., SBN 155723 james@kawaharalaw.com KAWAHARA LAW, A PROFESSIONAL COR 6080 Center Drive Sixth Floor | RPORATION |
|----------|--|--|
| 4 | Los Angeles, California 90045-9205 Telephone: (310) 348-0070 | |
| 5 | Facsimile: (310) 807-9250 Attorney for the La Jolla Band of Luiseño Indian | ns |
| 6 7 | | |
| 8 | UNITED STATES DIS | STRICT COURT |
| 9 | SOUTHERN DISTRICT | OF CALIFORNIA |
| 10 | | |
| 11 | GOLD RIVER, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company dba Gold River, LLC, a | CASE NO. 11CV1750 JM BGS |
| 12 | California limited liability corporation, | The Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller |
| 13 | Plaintiff, | NOTICE OF MOTION AND |
| 14 | VS. | MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF |
| 15 | LA JOLLA BAND OF LUISEÑO MISSION INDIANS. | MOTION OF DEFENDANT LA JOLLA BAND OF LUISEÑO INDIANS TO |
| 16 | Defendant. | DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT UNDER FED R. CIV. PROC. 12(b)(1) |
| 17 | Berendant. | |
| 18 | | [Filed Concurrently with Supporting Declaration of James K. Kawahara] |
| 19 20 | | Date: November 21, 2011 Time: 10:00 a.m. |
| 21 | | Room 16 |
| 22 | | Amended Complaint: September 27, 2011 |
| 23 | | Action Filed: August 5, 2011 |
| 24 | | |
| 25 | | |
| 26 | | _ |
| 27 | | |
| 28 | NOTICE AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AN LA JOLLA BAND OF LUISEÑO INDIANS' M | 1 ND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT |
| | | 11CV1750 JM BGS |
| - 1 | 1 | |

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT AND COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on November 21, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Courtroom 16, Fifth Floor of the above-entitled Court located at 940 Front Street, Los Angeles, California 92101-8900, Defendant La Jolla Band of Luiseño Indians (incorrectly named as "La Jolla Band of Luiseño *Mission* Indians") ("La Jolla Band") will and hereby does move for dismissal of this action pursuant to *Federal Rules of Civil Procedure* 12(b)(1) against Plaintiff, Gold River LLC dba Nevada Gold River LLC ("Gold River").

This motion is based on the grounds that the facts set out, or referred to, in Gold River's Amended Complaint fails to establish this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, because it does not plead an agreement under which the La Jolla Band has expressly and unequivocally, waived its sovereign immunity and consented to this suit. Although Plaintiff's Original Complaint did allege a purported breach of a written contract, i.e., the March 26, 2005 Promissory Note ("Promissory Note"), and an alleged contractual waiver of sovereign immunity, the Amended Complaint does not allege any contract between the parties at all. Rather, Plaintiff now asserts only quasi-contract claims that seek to invoke this Court's equitable jurisdiction, as if this were a court of general jurisdiction. In the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff has abandoned its previous legal contract claim that was grounded in federal law. Therefore, because there is no waiver of sovereign immunity or consent to be sued, the La Jolla Band is entitled to an order of dismissal against Gold River. Specifically, the La Jolla Band seeks dismissal on the following bases:

Plaintiff correctly alleges the fact that La Jolla Band is a federally-recognized Indian tribe that exercises powers of self-government. Amended Complaint,
 The Court may also take judicial notice of this fact, since the U.S Department of the Interior publishes a list of federally-recognized tribes in the Federal Register. Defendant

requests that the Court take judicial notice of this fact under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, since it is capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. (Supporting Declaration of James K. Kawahara "Kawahara Dec." ¶ 2; Exhibit 7, page 60811 (Bates No. 496-LJB)).

- 2. Because federally-recognized Indian tribes are sovereign entities, they are immune from suit absent a waiver or congressional abrogation. *See Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Techs.*, *Inc.*, 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998) ("As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.").
- 3. Plaintiff initially alleged that the parties entered into a written agreement whereby the La Jolla Band agreed to waive its sovereign immunity. Original Complaint, ¶ 5 and ¶ 6, citing Article IV(c) and Article IV(d) of Exhibit "A." The Original Complaint also alleged a single legal claim of "Breach of Contract."
- 4. On September 7, 2011, the La Jolla Band noticed and filed a motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim set out in the Original Complaint for the reason that, *inter alia*, the contract was "void" because Plaintiff failed to meet federal statutory and regulatory requirements, including: (a) failure to obtain approval of the National Indian Gaming Commission under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act under 25 U.S.C. §2711(a)(1) and (b) failure to obtain approval of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, United States Department of the Interior, under Agreements with Indians, 25 U.S.C. § 81.
- 5. Rather than oppose the La Jolla Band's motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff filed and served an Amended Complaint that contains two claims that seek to invoke this Court's equitable authority: i.e., (1) unjust enrichment, and (2) a common count of money had and received. Plaintiff does not re-allege or attach the Promissory Note, and has abandoned a legal claim for breach of contract. In Paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint, Gold River makes a vague allegation that "Plaintiff is informed and believes

| 1 | and herein alleges Defendant has unequivocally and expressly waived Tribal Immunity for | |
|----|---|--|
| 2 | the claims asserted herein by Plaintiff." This is legally insufficient to plead waiver of | |
| 3 | sovereign immunity and consent to be sued by implication. | |
| 4 | 5. In summary, because Plaintiff has abandoned a legal claim that the La Jolla | |
| 5 | Band allegedly entered into an agreement, therefore, as a matter of federal law, this action | |
| 6 | must be dismissed by application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. | |
| 7 | This motion is based upon the La Jolla Band's Notice of Motion, the Memorandum | |
| 8 | of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of James K. Kawahara, and attached Exhibit in | |
| 9 | support of the motion, on the records and pleadings on file with the Court, and upon such | |
| 10 | further evidence that may be submitted in connection with the hearing on this motion. | |
| 11 | | |
| 12 | DATED: October 11, 2011 KAWAHARA LAW A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION | |
| 13 | ATROPESSIONAL CORFORMION | |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | Dr. /a/ Iamaa W. Waxaahana | |
| 16 | By /s/ James K. Kawahara JAMES K. KAWAHARA | |
| 17 | Attorney for the La Jolla Band of Luiseno Indians | |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | | |
| 21 | | |
| 22 | | |
| 23 | | |
| 24 | | |
| 25 | | |
| 26 | | |
| 27 | 4 | |
| 28 | NOTICE AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT LA JOLLA BAND OF LUISEÑO INDIANS' MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT | |

11CV1750 JM BGS

| 1 | TABLE OF CONTENTS |
|----|---|
| 2 | I. INTRODUCTION5 |
| 3 | II. STATEMENT OF FACTS6 |
| 4 | A. THE PLAINTIFF IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT HAS ABANDONED THE PREVIOUS LEGAL |
| 5 | CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT6 B. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT ALLEGE AN AGREEMENT WHEREBY THE LA JOLLA |
| 6 | BAND WAIVED ITS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND CONSENTED TO BE SUED |
| 7 | THAT EXERCISES POWERS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT |
| 8 | III. LEGAL STANDARD UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(1), DISMISSAL IS PROPER WHEN THE COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER |
| 9 | JURISDICTION8 |
| 10 | IV. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE LA JOLLA BAND IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER OF DISMISSAL AGAINST GOLD RIVER BASED ON THE DOCTRINE OF |
| 11 | SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY |
| 12 | V. CONCLUSION |
| 13 | |
| 14 | |
| 15 | |
| 16 | |
| 17 | |
| 18 | |
| 19 | |
| 20 | |
| 21 | |
| 22 | |
| 23 | |
| 24 | |
| 25 | i |
| 26 | NOTICE AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT LA JOLLA BAND OF LUISEÑO INDIANS' MOTION TO DISMISS |
| 27 | |
| 28 | 11CV1750 JM BGS |
| | |

| 1 2 | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES <u>Page</u> |
|------------|--|
| 3 | CASES |
| 4 | Andrews v. Metro North Commuter R.R. Co. 882 F2d 705, 707 (2nd Cir. 1989) |
| 5 6 | Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Superior Court, 133 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1193, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 357, 364 (2005) |
| 7 | C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 532 U.S. 411, 418, 121 S.Ct. 1589, 1595 (2001) |
| 9 | Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 684 n. 1 (9th Cir.2008) (overruled on other grounds by Hui v. Castaneda, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 1845, 176 L.Ed.2d 703 (2010)) |
| .0 | Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987)9 |
| 1 | Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) |
| 2 | King v. Dogan, 31 F3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994); Carver v. Condie 169 F3d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 1999) |
| 4 | Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754, 118 S.Ct. 1700, 140 L.Ed.2d 981 (1998) |
| .6 | Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort and Casino, 153 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1369, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 23, 26 (2007) |
| .7 | London v. Coopers & Lybrand 644 F2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981) |
| 8 | Marx v. Loral Corp. 87 F3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 1996) |
| .9 | McBride v. Boughton 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 394 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 115] (2004) |
| 20 | Missouri River Services v. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, 267 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 2001) |
| 21 | Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. California State Board of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir.1988) |
| 22 23 | Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) |
| 24 | Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 505–06, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991) |
| 25 | ii |
| 26 | NOTICE AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT LA JOLLA BAND OF LUISEÑO INDIANS' MOTION TO DISMISS |
| 27 28 | 11CV1750 JM BGS |

Case 3:11-cv-01750-JM -BGS Document 7 Filed 10/11/11 Page 7 of 16

| 1 | Safe Air v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.2004) |
|----|---|
| 2 | State of California v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir.2003) |
| 3 | Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) |
| 5 | Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.1989) |
| 6 | Sun Valley Gasoline, Inc. v. Ernst Enters., Inc., 711 F.2d 138, 139 (9th Cir.1983) |
| 7 | United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1503 (1969) |
| 8 | White v. ARCO/Polymers, Inc. 720 F2d 1391, 1396, fn. 5 (5th Cir. 1983) |
| 9 | White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir.2000) |
| 10 | |
| 11 | <u>STATUTES</u> |
| 12 | Agreements with Indians 25 U.S.C. § 81 |
| 13 | Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq |
| 14 | Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 25 U.S.C. §2711(a)(1) and (b) |
| 15 | |
| 16 | RULES |
| 17 | Federal Rule of Evidence 201 |
| 18 | Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) |
| 19 | Federa Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) |
| 20 | |
| 21 | TREATISES |
| 22 | 15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3844, at 332 (1986) |
| 23 | (1700) |
| 24 | |
| 25 | |
| 26 | NOTICE AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT LA JOLLA BAND OF LUISEÑO INDIANS' MOTION TO DISMISS |
| 27 | |
| 28 | 11CV1750 JM BGS |
| | |

Case 3:11-cv-01750-JM -BGS Document 7 Filed 10/11/11 Page 8 of 16

| 1 | OTHER AUTHORITIES |
|----|---|
| 2 | Federal Register Vol. 75, No. 190, October 1, 2010 page 60810-60814 |
| 3 | Tribal-State Compact of 1999 http://www.nigc.gov/Portals/0/NIGC%20Uploads/readingroom/compacts/ |
| 4 | La% 20Jolla% 20Band% 20of% 20Luiseno% 20Mission% 20Indians/lajolllacomp0505 00.pdf (last visited September 7, 2011) |
| 5 | 00.pur (last visited September 7, 2011) |
| 6 | |
| 7 | |
| 8 | |
| 9 | |
| 10 | |
| 11 | |
| 12 | |
| 13 | |
| 14 | |
| 15 | |
| 16 | |
| 17 | |
| 18 | |
| 19 | |
| 20 | |
| 21 | |
| 22 | |
| 23 | |
| 24 | |
| 25 | iv |
| 26 | NOTICE AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT LA JOLLA BAND OF LUISEÑO INDIANS' MOTION TO DISMISS |
| 27 | 11071750 75700 |
| 28 | 11CV1750 JM BGS |
| | |

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. Introduction

Since 2000, when it was authorized under a Tribal-State Gaming Compact executed with the State of California¹, the La Jolla Band has sought assistance from companies that could help it develop a gaming facility on its federally-created Indian reservation in northern San Diego County. In 2004, the La Jolla Band selected Gold River, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Nevada Gold and Casinos, Inc. After three years, the La Jolla Band terminated its relationship with Gold River for failing to secure federal approval of its agreements with the La Jolla Band and failing to raise adequate funds to develop the gaming facility.

Funds extended on the development were used for project costs that were approved by Gold River, and were not "pocketed" by the La Jolla Band. The La Jolla Band was harmed by this relationship with Gold River and the aborted casino development, including the demolition of its tribal meeting hall at the proposed site, and in many ways the La Jolla Band continues to be harmed, since the Band does not have a gaming facility. The source of repayment of any advanced funds from Gold River was supposed to be net gaming revenue. However, the casino facility was never constructed or put into operation. The La Jolla Band refers the Court to its previously filed 12(b) (6) Motion to Dismiss the Original Complaint (pages 6-10) and that Motion's Supporting Declaration of James K. Kawahara (paragraph 2, and Exhibits 1-6) for the detail information regarding the proposed agreements between the parties that failed to receive federal approval.

22 | 1 Tribal State Con

¹ Tribal State Compact 1999

http://www.nigc.gov/Portals/0/NIGC%20Uploads/readingroom/compacts/

La%20Jolla%20Band%20of%20Luiseno%20Mission%20Indians/lajolllacomp050500.pdf

(last visited September 7, 2011)

II. Statement Of Facts

A. The Plaintiff In The Amended Complaint Has Abandoned The Previous Legal Claim For Breach Of Contract.

The Original Complaint filed by Gold River sought to enforce **one contract** executed between the parties and omitted to inform the Court about the **seven other contracts** that were part of one interconnected transaction that proposed to create the "formal business relationship" mentioned in paragraph 7 of the Original Complaint. Plaintiff initially alleged that the parties entered into a written agreement whereby the La Jolla Band agreed to waive its sovereign immunity. Original Complaint, ¶ 5 and ¶ 6, citing Article IV(c) and Article IV(d) of Exhibit "A." The Original Complaint also alleged a single legal claim of "Breach of Contract."

On September 7, 2011, the La Jolla Band brought a motion to dismiss to inform the Court of the fact that there were seven other proposed contracts, and Plaintiff failed to obtain federal approval of its contracts, and therefore, in accordance with applicable federal law, such contracts were "void." Rather than oppose the motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff filed and served an Amended Complaint on September 27 2011. The Amended Complaint abandons and omits any mention of the Promissory Note, and does not re-allege "breach of contract."

B. The Amended Complaint Does Not Allege An Agreement Whereby The La Jolla Band Waived Its Sovereign Immunity And Consented To Be Sued

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint also does not allege that the La Jolla Band entered into a written agreement to provide a waiver of sovereign immunity and consent to be sued. Instead, paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint makes a vague allegation to imply a waiver be asserting that "Plaintiff is informed and believes and herein alleges Defendant has unequivocally and expressly waived Tribal Immunity for the claims asserted herein by

7 8

C.

Plaintiff." In an apparent effort to plead around the Promissory Note (the subject of the La Jolla Band's first motion to dismiss), Plaintiff seeks to un-ring the bell, and asks the Court to believe Plaintiff is now pleading upon information and belief, not on a voidable written contract.

The Amended Complaint contains two claims. The first claim is based on the equitable theory of unjust enrichment. Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 12-16. The second claim is also based on an equitable claim of a common count for "Money Had and Received." Amended Complaint ¶¶ 17-21. In a similar fashion, the prayer for relief in the Amended Complaint seeks the equitable remedy of restitution or an order "returning" funds that were "had and received." Amended Complaint, p. 4.

The La Jolla Band Of Luiseño Indians Is A Federally-Recognized Indian Tribe That Exercises Powers of Self-Government

The Amended Complaint acknowledges that the La Jolla Band is a federally-recognized Indian tribe that exercises powers of self-government. Amended Complaint ¶ 2. The La Jolla Band of Luiseño Indians is a federally-recognized Indian tribe. The Department of the Interior publishes a list of federally-recognized Indian tribes in the Federal Register Vol. 75, No. 190, October 1, 2010 page 60810-60814, and the La Jolla Band is on that list on page 60811. (Kawahara Dec. ¶ 2, Exhibit 7 (Bates No. 496-LJB).)³

² "A common count is not a specific cause of action, . . . rather, it is a simplified form of pleading normally used to aver the existence of various forms of monetary indebtedness, including that arising from an alleged duty to make restitution under an assumpsit theory. When a common count is used as an alternative way of seeking the same recovery demanded in a specific cause of action, and is based on the same facts, the common count is demurrable if the cause of action is demurrable." (*McBride v. Boughton* 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 394 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 115] (2004), internal citations omitted.)

³ Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of this fact under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, since it is capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to (footnote continued)

III. <u>Legal Standard -- Under Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), Dismissal</u> Is Proper When The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction

It is well-established that a federal court cannot reach the merits of any dispute until it confirms its own subject matter jurisdiction. *Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ.*, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." *Id.* (quoting *Ex parte McCardle*, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868)). Accordingly, federal courts are under a continuing duty to confirm their jurisdictional power and are "obliged to inquire *sua sponte* whenever a doubt arises as to [its] existence...." *Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle*, 429 U.S. 274, 278, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (citations omitted).

Furthermore, "[a] federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears." *Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation,* 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.1989). Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). In determining the presence or absence of federal jurisdiction, the court applies the "'well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." *State of California v. Dynegy, Inc.*, 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting *Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams*, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987).

When assessing subject matter jurisdiction, the court assumes the truth of all allegations in the complaint. *See Castaneda v. United States*, 546 F.3d 682, 684 n. 1 (9th

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

| Cir.2008) (overruled on other grounds by Hui v. Castaneda, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. |
|--|
| 1845, 176 L.Ed.2d 703 (2010)). "If jurisdiction is lacking at the outset, the district court |
| has 'no power to do anything with the case except dismiss.' "Morongo Band of Mission |
| Indians v. California State Board of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir.1988) |
| (quoting 15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3844, at |
| 332 (1986)). |
| |

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be either a facial attack on the sufficiency of the pleadings or a factual attack on the basis for a court's jurisdiction. *See White v. Lee*, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir.2000). "In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the district court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." *Safe Air v. Meyer*, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.2004). "The court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations." *Id.* (citing *White*, 227 F.3d at 1242). However, "[j]urisdictional finding of genuinely disputed facts is inappropriate when the jurisdictional issue and substantive issues are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits of an action." *Sun Valley Gasoline, Inc. v. Ernst Enters., Inc.*, 711 F.2d 138, 139 (9th Cir.1983).

The La Jolla Band's current Motion to Dismiss is brought pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) based on a facial analysis of the Amended Complaint, which does not set out sufficient facts to establish this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, because as a federally-recognized Indian tribe, the La Jolla Band cannot be sued without an express and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity. It is undisputed that the La Jolla Band of Luiseño Indians is a federally-recognized Indian tribe. However, from the Amended Complaint, it is not known when and how the La Jolla Band is supposed to have waived its sovereign immunity based on the allegation in paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint, which implies that one exists "upon information and belief."

A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity

| "As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress |
|---|
| has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity." Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. |
| Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754, 118 S.Ct. 1700, 140 L.Ed.2d 981 (1998). In Oklahoma |
| Tax Comm. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 505–06, 111 |
| S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991) the Supreme Court reaffirmed its "longstanding |
| doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity in order to promote Indian self-government, self- |
| sufficiency, and economic development" Oklahoma Tax Comm., 498 U.S. at 505-06. Ir |
| turn, a waiver of sovereign immunity "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally |
| expressed." United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1503 (1969). Further, "to |
| relinquish its immunity, a tribe's waiver must be 'clear.' C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen |
| Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 532 U.S. 411, 418, 121 S.Ct. 1589, 1595 |
| (2001). "Because a waiver of immunity is altogether voluntary on the part of [a tribe], it |
| follows that [a tribe] may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be |
| sued, and the manner in which the suit shall be conducted." Big Valley Band of Pomo |
| Indians v. Superior Court, 133 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1193, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 357, 364 (2005) |
| (citing Missouri River Services v. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, 267 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. |
| 2001) (emphasis added). "Where a tribe gives such consent, any conditional limitation |
| imposed thereon must be strictly construed and applied." Lawrence v. Barona Valley |
| Ranch Resort and Casino, 153 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1369, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 23, 26 (2007) |
| (emphasis added). |
| |

Again, Paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint fails to meet this standard, a waiver cannot be implied. Therefore, the Amended Complaint should be dismissed by application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

B. Amended Complaint Supersedes Original: The Amended Complaint must stand or fall on its own. Jurisdictional and other allegations essential to the claim must be

realleged. The amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and renders it of no legal effect, unless the amended complaint *incorporates by reference* portions of the prior pleading. *See King v. Dogan*, 31 F3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994); *Carver v. Condie* 169 F3d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 1999). Again, the Amended Complaint does not incorporate by reference or reallege the existence of any written agreement between the parties.

- (1) Claims Not Realleged Are Deemed Waived: The Ninth Circuit has long held that claims in the original complaint that are not realleged in the amended complaint are no longer before the court. *London v. Coopers & Lybrand* 644 F2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus, plaintiff *waives* all causes of action alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended complaint. *Id.*, 644 F2d at 814; *Marx v. Loral Corp.* 87 F3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 1996). Therefore, Gold River cannot renew or now replead a claim based on written contract, since that claim has now been abandoned and waived.
- (2) **The Original Complaint Allegations May Be Treated As Admissions of Fact:** Although superseded as a pleading, the Original Complaint may be admissible in evidence against the pleader; e.g., as an admission or prior inconsistent statement by the pleader: "The amendment of a pleading does not make it any the less an admission of the party." *Andrews v. Metro North Commuter R.R. Co.* 882 F2d 705, 707 (2nd Cir. 1989); see also *White v. ARCO/Polymers, Inc.* 720 F2d 1391, 1396, fn. 5 (5th Cir. 1983).

In this motion, the La Jolla Band challenges the sufficiency of facts alleged by Plaintiff to bring only equitable claims without alleging the existence of a written contract concerning the financing, development and proposed management of an Indian gaming facility under federal law. (See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 2, 3, & 6.) Moreover, the Amended Complaint abandons and waives the claim in the Original Complaint concerning a Promissory Note connected to the financing, development and management of a gaming facility under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, apparently because Gold River agrees that it did not obtain the congressional mandated approval from the National Indian

| 1 | Gaming Commission and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In this case, Plaintiff cannot plead | |
|----|---|--|
| 2 | that there is an express, unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity by implication. | |
| 3 | IV. As A Matter Of Law, the La Jolla Band Is Entitled To An Order of Dismissal | |
| 4 | Against Gold River Based On The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity | |
| 5 | The Amended Complaint fails to adequately plead a claim against the La Jolla | |
| 6 | Band, which is a federally-recognized Indian tribe, because it does not allege where and | |
| 7 | how the La Jolla Band provided an unequivocal, and express waiver of its sovereign | |
| 8 | immunity and consented to be sued | |
| 9 | V. <u>Conclusion</u> | |
| 10 | Based on the foregoing, the La Jolla Band respectfully requests that the Court grant | |
| 11 | its motion to dismiss this action, since Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a waiver of | |
| 12 | sovereign immunity. | |
| 13 | DATED: October 11, 2011 KAWAHARA LAW A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION | |
| 14 | ATROLESSIONAL CORTON | |
| 15 | By /S/ James K. Kawahara | |
| 16 | James K. Kawahara | |
| 17 | Attorney for La Jolla Band of Luiseno Mission Indians | |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | | |
| 21 | | |
| 22 | | |
| 23 | | |
| 24 | | |
| 25 | | |
| 26 | | |
| 27 | NOTICE AND MEMORANDIM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT | |
| 28 | NOTICE AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT LA JOLLA BAND OF LUISEÑO INDIANS' MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT | |

11CV1750 JM BGS