

Hon. Lonny R. Suko

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Nation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF
LICENSING, CHRISTINE GREGOIRE,
Governor, and ALAN HAIGHT,
Director of Washington State
Department of Licensing;

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE TRIBAL COURT FOR THE
CONFEDERATED TRIBES AND
BANDS OF THE YAKAMA NATION,
and its CHIEF TRIBAL COURT JUDGE
TED STRONG, and the
CONFEDERATED TRIBES AND
BANDS OF THE YAKAMA NATION,
a Federally Recognized Indian Tribe,

Defendants.

NO. CV-12-3152-LRS

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF YAKAMA NATION'S
CROSS-MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Confederated Tribes and Band of the Yakama Nation (“Yakama Nation”) respectfully requests that, if the Court determines that remedies of the Yakama Nation Tribal Court need not be exhausted, *cf. City of Wolf Point v. Mail*, No. 10-0072, 2011 WL 2117270, at *2 (D. Mont. May 24, 2011), it enjoin Plaintiffs from refusing to mediate without first complying with the explicit terms of a U.S. District Court-approved contract.

To be clear, respectfully, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the Yakama Nation and this lawsuit. The Nation and its officers cannot be sued in any court without its consent. Moreover, an agreement between the parties requires all disputes to be mediated in good faith until released by a mediator, which also precludes litigation in this forum. Finally, Plaintiffs present no federal question upon which the Court can exercise jurisdiction.

However, without waiver of the foregoing, because the facts and law surrounding Plaintiffs’ breach of contract are clear, the Nation requests that the Court issue a Preliminary Injunction enjoining Plaintiffs from further violating of the contract that brings the parties before this Court.

Plaintiffs are in breach of Consent Decree by refusing to mediate. The parties’ Mediator has not “determine[d] that the parties are not able to resolve the dispute,” as required by the Consent Decree. Yet, the Plaintiffs have refused to

1 mediate. Plaintiffs take this stance, notwithstanding the Mediator’s criticism of
2 Plaintiffs’ behavior in mediation. *See* ECF No. 7, p. 68¹ (Plaintiffs “wanted
3 closure of the mediation process as fast as possible. . . The State’s strategy was, on
4 more than one occasion, to put out a ‘best’ or ‘last and final’ offer. If the tribe
5 wouldn’t meet several of its deal points than the State saw no value in further
6 negotiations.”).

7 The requested injunction simply requires Plaintiffs to mediate with the
8 Yakama Nation “in mutual good faith on a government to government basis . . .
9 until the dispute is resolved or until the mediator determines that the parties are not
10 able to resolve the dispute,” as required by the court-approved contract to which
11 Plaintiffs agreed to be bound.

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¹ For the sake of judicial economy, Defendants cite to the Yakama Tribal Court
16 record as offered by Plaintiffs in the Declarations of William G. Clark and Karla
17 Laughlin. The page numbers will refer to the documents as filed in the ECF
18 system, not those imprinted on the pages by Plaintiffs. Defendants refer to these
19 documents while recognizing that there are some deficiencies in Plaintiffs’
20 declarations and without waiving their objections thereto.

II. FACTS²

1 The Yakama Nation is a federally recognized tribal government, whose
2 Reservation was established by the Treaty With The Yakama, 12 Stat. 951 (1859).
3

A. 1994 Consent Decree

4 In May of 1993 the Yakama Nation filed suit against Plaintiffs. Complaint
5 at 6, *Teo v. Steffenson*, No. 93-3050 (E.D. Wash. May 7, 1993). On August 23,
6 1993, the Court issued a TRO in favor of the Nation, reasoning, in part, that
7 “serious questions are raised by the possibility that continued collection of the
8 [state fuel] tax from plaintiffs’ distributors would, as a practical matter, result in
9 the routine collection of what may be an invalid tax, and by the possibility that the
10 tax may impermissibly infringe on plaintiffs’ treaty rights.” *Teo v. Steffenson*, No.
11 93-3050, at 8-9 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Order].
12

13 After the District Court entered an Order Setting Settlement Conference on
14 September 8, 1993, the Nation and Plaintiffs “conferred and engaged in mediated
15 negotiations.” *Teo v. Steffenson*, No. 93-3050 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 2, 1994)
16 [hereinafter “1994 Consent Decree”], available at ECF No. 6, Ex. B. Plaintiffs
17 admitted that throughout 1994, both parties demonstrated “good faith effort to
18

19 ² These facts are largely the same as those presented to the Yakama Tribal Court
20 on December 6, 2012. See ECF No. 7, at 37-42. For the sake of judicial economy,
The Yakama Nation incorporates that TRO briefing herein, where indicated.

1 resolve” the dispute. *Id.* The parties exchanged several letters regarding a
2 settlement agreement that would become a Consent Decree. *See* ECF No. 7, at pp.
3 71-102. The State prepared the 1994 Consent Decree.³

4 On November 2, 1994, after over a year of mediation negotiations, U.S.
5 District Court Judge Alan A. MacDonald entered the Consent Decree, which
6 became effective on January 1, 1995. 1994 Consent Decree, at 23. In it, both the
7 Nation and state declared their “desire[] to work within the framework of a
8 government-to-government relationship.” *Id.* at 1. As explained in more detail
9 below, through the Consent Decree, the parties consented to a process for resolving
10 any disputes initially and primarily through mediation – a process they agreed must
11 continue until **the Mediator** might declare impasse, in which case the parties could
12 invoke the continuing jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for traditional dispute
13 resolution. 1994 Consent Decree, at ¶ 4.7.

14
15 ³ *See* ECF No. 7, at 71 (“Enclosed is our latest version of draft Consent Decree
16 prepared after conferring with DOL and DOT. . . . We have made several other
17 changes, as well”); *id.*, at 74 (“Before we can put the Consent Decree into
18 final form, the blanks in paragraphs 4.9 and 4.10 will need to be filled in.”); *id.*, at
19 77 (“attached is the proposed Consent Decree in *Teo*” and outlining the State’s
20 latest changes).

1 **B. 2006 Consent Decree**

2 In July of 2004, the Nation filed a Petition with the U.S. District Court to
3 enforce the terms of the 1994 Consent Decree against Plaintiffs, explaining that the
4 parties had attempted to mediate issues that had arisen under the original Decree
5 but had “reached an impasse” after having “engaged in a mediation on May 20,
6 2003.” *Teo v. Steffenson*, No. 04-3079, at 2 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2006), ECF No.
7 66 [hereinafter “2006 Consent Decree”], *available at* ECF No. 6, Ex. F.

8 Thereafter, the parties again “engaged in negotiations,” pursuant to Local
9 Rule 16.2, which, after a year and a half of mediation, resulted in a new Consent
10 Decree entered by District Court Magistrate Judge Cynthia Imbrogno on August
11 21, 2006. *Id.* at 1. The resulting Consent Decree terminated any continuing
12 jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court,⁴ but retained the 1994 Consent Decree’s
13 mediation mandate – to wit, that the pursue mediation “in good faith until the
14 dispute is resolved or until **the mediator** determines that the parties are not able to

15 _____
16 ⁴ Specifically, Consent Decree deleted the provisions of the 1994 Consent Decree
17 “for maintaining that continuing jurisdiction” of this Court. Consent Decree, at 3.
18 The Consent Decree did not contain any waiver of the regulatory or adjudicatory
19 authority of the Yakama Nation. *See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache*, 455 U.S. 130,
20 147 (1982) (holding that a tribal government does not “abandon[] its sovereign
powers simply because it has not expressly reserved them through contract”).

1 resolve the dispute.” *Id.* at ¶ 4.7.d (emphasis added). The Consent Decree, now in
2 force, contains the following contractual language to mandate that the parties
3 mediate and arbitrate in “good faith” on a “government to government basis”⁵:

4 The parties agree that provisions . . . for maintaining the continuing
5 jurisdiction of the court should be deleted. The parties agree to
6 resolve further disputes exercising mutual good faith on a government
7 to government basis and, to the extent they are unable to resolve such
8 disputes, **the dispute resolution process in ¶ 4.7 [of the 1994
9 Consent Decree] shall apply.**

10 Consent Decree, at ¶ H (emphasis added). The provision referred to in the 1994
11 Consent Decree reads as follows:

12 4.7 Should a dispute arise between the Yakama Indian Nation and
13 the State of Washington upon an issue of compliance with the
14 Consent Decree by either government, or by their officers, employees
15 or agents, the Tribe and the State shall attempt to resolve the dispute
16 through the following dispute resolution process:

- 17
- 18 a. Either party may invoke the dispute resolution process by
19 notifying the other, in writing, of its intent to do so. The notice
20 shall set out the issue(s) in dispute and the position of the party
giving notice as to each such issue.
 - b. The first stage of the process shall include a face-to-face
meeting between representatives of the two governments to
attempt to resolve the dispute by negotiation. The meeting shall
be convened within thirty (30) days of the written notice
described in ¶ 4.7.a. The representatives of each government

⁵ This mandate comports with Plaintiffs’ more general instruction to “[m]ake
reasonable efforts to collaborate with Indian tribes in the development of . . .
agreements.” WASH. REV. CODE. § 43.376.020(1).

1 shall come to the meeting with the authority to settle the
2 dispute.

3 c. If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute within sixty (60)
4 days of the date of the written notice described in ¶ 4.7.a, the
5 parties **shall engage the services of a mutually-agreed-upon**
6 **qualified mediator to assist them in attempting to negotiate**
7 **the dispute.** If the parties cannot agree who the mediator
8 should be, the mediator shall be a person or persons selected by
9 the Court pursuant to Local Rule 39.1(d)(1). Cost for the
10 mediator shall be borne equally between the two governments.

11 d. **Both parties shall pursue the mediation process in good**
12 **faith until the dispute is resolved or until *the mediator***
13 **determines that the parties are not able to resolve the**
14 **dispute.** If the parties cannot agree on a format for the
15 mediation process, the format shall that directed by the
16 mediator. If the dispute is resolved, the resolution shall be
17 memorialized by the mediator and shall bind the parties.

18 e. Except as provided in ¶ 4.15.3, if either party terminates the
19 process before completion, or if the mediator determines that
20 the dispute cannot be resolved in the mediation process, or if
the dispute is not resolved within thirty (30) days of the date the
mediator is selected, the other party may petition the Court for
enforcement of the Consent Decree as to the disputed and
unresolved issue or issues.

1994 Consent Decree, at ¶ 4.7 (emphasis added).

As modified by ¶¶ H-K of the 2006 Consent Decree, the alternative dispute
resolution (“ADR”) clause and related provisions that now bind the parties reads as
follows:⁶

⁶ The excluded 1994 text has been stricken out and the additional 2006 text has
been bolded.

1 4.1 Plaintiff shall voluntarily dismiss their complaint in this action,
2 with prejudice, contemporaneously with their entry of this Consent
3 Decree. ~~The Court shall, however, retain jurisdiction over this case
for a period of one year for the limited purpose of ensuring
compliance with this Consent Decree.~~

4 4.2 ~~Subject to ¶¶ 4.6 and 4.7, either the Yakama Indian Nation or the
5 State of Washington may initiate an action in this Court at any time
6 for the limited purpose of requesting the court to enforce the terms of
7 this Consent Decree. If the action is initiated within one year of the
8 date of entry of this Consent Decree, with party may file a petition
9 seeking enforcement of the terms of this Consent Decree under the
10 cause number assigned to this case without paying an additional filing
11 fee. Any action brought under this Consent Decree after that one-year
12 period expires must be filed as a new and separate action requesting
the Court to enforce the Consent Decree. The parties consent to such
an action being brought for the limited purpose of enforcing this
Consent Decree, including an action to recover monies alleged to be
owed to either party **The parties agree to resolve further
disputes exercising mutual good faith on a government to
government basis and, to the extent they are unable to resolve
such disputes, the dispute resolution process in ¶ 4.7 shall apply.**~~

12 * * * *

13 4.6 Neither the Yakama Indian Nation, nor the State of
14 Washington, nor officers acting on either government’s behalf, may
15 petition the Court to enforce this Consent Decree unless (a) the
16 dispute resolution process described in ¶ 4.7 has been followed in
good faith to completion without successful resolution, or unless (b)
the party fails to enter into the dispute resolution process or terminates
the process before its completion.

17 4.7 Should a dispute arise between the Yakama Indian Nation and
18 the State of Washington upon an issue of compliance with the
19 Consent Decree by either government, or by their officers, employees
or agents, the Tribe and the State shall attempt to resolve the dispute
through the following dispute resolution process:

- 20 a. Either party may invoke the dispute resolution process by
notifying the other, in writing, of its intent to do so. The notice

1 shall set out the issue(s) in dispute and the position of the party
2 giving notice as to each such issue.

3 b. The first stage of the process shall include a face-to-face
4 meeting between representatives of the two governments to
5 attempt to resolve the dispute by negotiation. The meeting shall
6 be convened within thirty (30) days of the written notice
7 described in ¶ 4.7.a. The representatives of each government
8 shall come to the meeting with the authority to settle the
9 dispute.

10 c. If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute within sixty (60)
11 days of the date of the written notice described in ¶ 4.7.a, the
12 parties shall engage the services of a mutually-agreed-upon
13 qualified mediator to assist them in attempting to negotiate the
14 dispute. If the parties cannot agree who the mediator should be,
15 the mediator shall be a person or persons selected by the Court
16 pursuant to Local Rule 39.1(d)(1). Cost for the mediator shall
17 be borne equally between the two governments.

18 d. Both parties shall pursue the mediation process in good faith
19 until the dispute is resolved or until the mediator determines
20 that the parties are not able to resolve the dispute. If the parties
cannot agree on a format for the mediation process, the format
shall that directed by the mediator. If the dispute is resolved,
the resolution shall be memorialized by the mediator and shall
bind the parties. **If the dispute is not resolved by mediation,
the parties may agree to have a neutral third party
arbitrator make a final binding decision resolving the
dispute, or if a dispute is unresolved for more than 180
days, either party may give notice of intent to terminate this
agreement as provided for *infra*.**

~~e. Except as provided in ¶ 4.15.3, if wither party terminates the
process before completion, or if the mediator determines that
the dispute cannot be resolved in the mediation process, or if
the dispute is not resolved within thirty (30) days of the date the
mediator is selected, the other party may petition the Court for
enforcement of the Consent Decree as to the disputed and
unresolved issue or issues.~~

C. Dispute Resolution & Mediation

1 C. **Dispute Resolution & Mediation**
2 In late 2011, the state announced that “[n]either the State nor the Yakama
3 Nation is in compliance with [the] Consent Decree,” confessing that its
4 “requirements for audit and record keeping are difficult to administer for both
5 parties.” ECF No. 8, at 3. Thereafter, on March 16, 2011, DOL Director Elizabeth
6 Luce unilaterally sought to invoke “the dispute resolution process per section 4.7
7 of the Consent Decree.” *Id.* at 6. The State outlined five substantive “issues in
8 dispute,” for resolution. *Id.*

9 The parties commenced dispute resolution from the Yakama Nation Main
10 Agency on June 13, 2011, with the State framing the “issues to resolve,” including
11 the negotiation of a “future fuel tax agreement,” i.e. modifying the current Consent
12 Decree, as well as several retrospective issues dating back to 2007. *Id.* at 10-13.
13 After a June 27, 2011, teleconference and a September 14, 2011, meeting between
14 the parties, Plaintiffs unilaterally declared: “DOL feels there is not enough
15 agreement to warrant an extension [of the Consent Decree] and will proceed with
16 terminating the Consent Decree. . . . Therefore, the Department of Licensing
17 hereby notifies the Yakama Nation that it is exercising the termination clause in the
18 agreement.” *Id.* at 15-16. Plaintiffs did, however, express their “willing[ness] to
19 continue negotiations with the Yakama Nation” for an additional 180 days. *Id.*

20 On February 28, 2012, the Yakama Nation requested mediation of the
retrospective and prospective issues previously framed by the State for dispute

1 resolution. ECF No. 7, at 63, ¶ 4. After initially declining mediation, Plaintiffs
2 “reconsidered” and agreed to “mediate the issues of the consent decree under
3 dispute as articulated in the letter sent by Director Luce to the Yakama Nation on
4 March 16, 2011.” ECF No. 8, at 18. Yakama and State officials entered into a
5 Mediation Agreement, with John Bickerman, a mediator from Washington, DC,
6 and engaged in an initial mediation session on March 23, 2012. Thereafter, the
7 parties’ staff counsel did engage in a number of conference calls with the Mediator
8 from May through October 2012, in which the Office of Legal Counsel
9 participated in from the Yakama Nation Main Agency. ECF No. 7, at 63, ¶3.

10 Despite two prior Yakama-State mediations under the Consent Decree –
11 which each lasted over a year – the March 23, 2012, mediation session would
12 prove to be the only in-person negotiation between Yakama and State officials that
13 the Mediator would be allowed to conduct. On December 5, 2012 – just seven
14 months into the mediation process and only three months after mediation became
15 “meaningful” according to the Mediator (ECF No. 7, at 68) – Plaintiffs informed
16 the Yakama Nation that they were terminating mediation. *Id.* at 64, ¶ 14.

17 On December 5, 2012, Plaintiffs participated in a conference call with
18 attorneys for the Nation. *Id.* At approximately 1:30 p.m., Washington State’s
19 Senior Assistant Attorney General, Mary Tennyson, informed the Nation’s
20 attorneys that the state was “terminating mediation and the consent decree,” and

1 would inform the Nation of the same via letter, to be emailed on the afternoon of
2 December 5, 2012. *Id.* Plaintiffs also informed the Nation that immediately upon
3 sending its so-called notice of “termination” it would notify all fuel distributors who
4 service the Yakama Reservation, by letter and by telephone, that any future delivery
5 to the Nation “needs to have the full amount of the state’s tax included” in the sale
6 price and that the state would “no longer be offering refunds” to these distributors.
7 *Id.* at 65-66, ¶ 15. The Nation’s express position in the face of this unilateral
8 attempt at “termination” that the parties remain able to resolve this matter through
9 good faith government-to-government negotiation. *Id.* at 66, ¶ 15. Specifically, the
10 Nation expressed its position that “continued mediation and trying to work through
11 the differences” to “get a deal done” was still entirely “on the table.” *Id.*

12 **The State has refused to mediate with the defendants, despite the fact**
13 **that the Mediator had not declared the parties unable to resolve their**
14 **differences, as contemplated by ¶ 4.7 of the Consent Decree, ¶ 4.7.** ECF No. 7,
15 at pp. 64-65. Not only had the Mediator not by then declared, i.e., impasse, but a
16 week before the State’s attempt at “termination” he advised the parties:

17 This has been one of the more frustrating mediations for which I have
18 served as a neutral. Like many disputes that I am asked to mediate,
19 there has been a long history between the parties that I can't hope to
20 reconcile in a mediation. Indeed, the State claimed that it had been in
negotiations with Yakama for a very long time before the mediation
process began and wanted closure of the mediation process as fast as
possible. However, in my experience concerning tribal negotiations,
the actual period of negotiation was extremely brief. Real

1 meaningful negotiations did not take place until late August at the
2 earliest. The initial phase of the mediation prior to August was
3 counter-productive. The joint session was unhelpful and set the
4 process back. **From that point forward the negotiations were**
5 **extremely asymmetrical. The State's strategy was, on more than**
6 **one occasion, to put out a 'best' or 'last and final' offer.** If the
7 tribe wouldn't meet several of its deal points than the State saw no
8 value in further negotiations. Several times this approach froze the
9 tribe's negotiating team and its ability to respond. **These offers**
10 **tended to stall negotiations rather than elicit productive counter-**
11 **proposals.** In turn, the tribe expected there to be more of the
'negotiation dance' where there would be give and take. Therefore,
Yakama never put out its best offer because of a lack of reciprocal
concessions by the State. It never communicated effectively what the
State would need to do to get a deal with Yakama. Please don't
misunderstand my point — I do believe that there was movement but
not enough. **We never got to the critical point where both sides**
12 **had their best proposals on the table and strategies for**
13 **compromise emerged.** It's when both sides have put their last
14 proposal on the table that the real work often begins. **We never got**
15 **to that point in these negotiations.**

12 ECF No. 7, at 68. From November 26, 2012, until it unilaterally attempted to
13 “terminate” mediation on December 5, 2012, the State halted communication with
14 the Mediator.

15 III. AUTHORITY

16 A. Plaintiffs Should Be Enjoined.

17 “A [party] seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to
18 succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
19 preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
20 injunction is in the public interest.” *Winter v. NRDC*, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374 (2008).
Courts in the Ninth Circuit use a “sliding scale” under which “the required degree

1 of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases.” *Save Our*
2 *Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers*, 408 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, where parties
3 “demonstrate[] a strong likelihood of success on the merits, then plaintiffs . . .
4 need[] only to make a minimal showing of harm to justify [a] preliminary
5 injunction.” *Kootenai Tribe v. Veneman*, 313 F.3d 1094, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002).
6 Conversely, the more a movant shows that “the balance of hardships tips decidedly
7 in their favor,” the less a “likelihood of success on the merits” must be
8 demonstrated. *Id.*

9 Plaintiffs have *per se* violated the Consent Decree, ¶ 4.7. Based upon these
10 violations alone, the Yakama Nation will succeed on the merits. Thus, the showing
11 of harm immediately below is more than adequate to justify a TRO.

12 But even were the Court to find some imperfection in the Yakama Nation’s
13 preliminary arguments on the merits, Plaintiffs cannot show that the granting of an
14 injunction would cause any harm at all. Plaintiffs do not have a governmental or
15 organizational interest in refusing to negotiate in good faith on a government-to-
16 government basis with the Yakama Nation. Plaintiffs’ proper interest is in carrying
17 out their duties in full compliance with the law. The minimally intrusive injunction
18 that the Nation seeks – one to compel inter-governmental mediation in good faith –
19 will only help Plaintiffs satisfy this important interest.

20 **1. Plaintiffs Have Irreparably Harmed The Yakama Nation.**

1 Plaintiffs have irreparably harmed the Yakama Nation in at least three ways.
2 First, the Yakama Nation has been irreparably harmed, and will continue to be
3 irreparably harmed, by Plaintiffs' breach of contract. Mediation, fulfilled "in
4 mutual good faith on a government to government basis" until the mediator
5 "determines that the parties are not able to resolve the dispute," was a bargained-
6 for aspect of the Consent Decree; to benefit, bind, and be enforceable by each
7 party. A breach of the terms of the Consent Decree itself, particularly the
8 mediation clause, therefore constitutes irreparable harm. *See International Ass'n*
9 *of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (IAM) v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.*,
10 674 F.Supp. 1387, 1391 (D. Minn. 1987) ("since it appears that mediation was
11 properly invoked, [plaintiff] faces irreparable harm if the [Plaintiffs] are not
12 restrained."); *Qwest Communications Intern. Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.*
13 *of Pittsburgh*, 821 A.2d 323, 329 (Del. Ch. 2002) ("[A] loss of the right to
14 designate mediation as the method of ADR threatens [a plaintiff] with irreparable
15 harm . . ."); *Reliance Nat., Ins. Co. v. Seismic Risk Ins. Service, Inc.*, 962 F. Supp.
16 385, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same); *Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial Ltda. v.*
17 *GE Medical Systems Information*, No. 02-9369, 2003 WL 23641529, at *12
18 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2003) ("The deprivation of [a movant's] contractual right to
19 [alternative dispute resolution] constitutes irreparable harm.").

20

1 Second, the injury to the Yakama Nation concerns a breach of the Yakama
2 Treaty of 1855 and interference with the Nation’ right “to make [its] own laws and
3 be governed by them,” which will permanently harm the Nation and its members.
4 This type of harm is irreparable because it cannot not be adequately compensated
5 for by monetary damages or other remedy. *Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v.*
6 *Pierce*, 253 F.3d 1234, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 2001). Not only is the resultant
7 psychological harm to a sovereign Indian Nation not easily subject to valuation,
8 but also, and perhaps more important, the loss of the Nation’s ability to produce
9 tax revenue on fuel will result in decreased services and programs to tribal
10 members and the loss of employment for specific Tribal members. *See* ECF No. 8,
11 at 26, ¶27 (“When the state pulled out of mediation and ceased complying with the
12 Consent Decree . . . it had an immediate and profound effect on the Yakama
13 Nation and Yakamas living on the Reservation.”). Thus, Federal Courts have
14 found “irreparable harm to the future economic well-being” of an entire
15 demographic as grounds to issue a TRO. *State of Del. v. Bender*, 370 F.Supp.
16 1193, 1201 (D.C. Del. 1974). As the court noted in *Sac and Fox Nation of*
17 *Missouri v. LaFaver*, 905 F.Supp. 904 (D. Kan.1995):

18 [S]uch devastating losses of revenue may well mean the complete
19 elimination of social service, medical, and education payments to
20 tribal members. . . . [I]f the Department is not enjoined from
collecting the taxes and the Tribes win on the merits, the loss of
revenue in the interim may so devastate the Tribes that the ability to
sustain themselves may be irretrievably lost. . . . [T]he court considers

1 the consequences of such losses as extremely serious and potentially
2 devastating to the Tribes. Such loss would indeed meet the
irreparable harm test.

3 *Id.* at 907; *see also Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 359 (1976) (government
4 interference with fundamental rights is presumed to constitute irreparable harm);
5 *Baker Electric Cooperative v. Chaske et al.*, 28 F.3d 1466, 1473 (8th Cir. 1994)
6 (granting preliminary injunction to tribe because threatened disruption of electric
7 services could hinder the productivity of a tribal enterprise).

8 Finally, based on Plaintiffs' imposition of the state motor fuels tax before
9 the Consent Decree became effective, "the high likelihood that the violations will
10 recur absent issuance of an injunction [also] counsels in favor of equitable rather
11 than legal relief." *LaDuke v. Nelson*, 762 F.2d 1318, 1330 (9th Cir. 1985).

12 In sum, mediation is mandated by the Consent Decree. Plaintiffs' have
13 failed to mediate until the Mediator declares that the dispute cannot be resolved.
14 The fact that the Nation has been denied this negotiated and legally mandated
15 benefit of mediation constitutes irreparable harm. Additionally, any resultant
16 breach of the Treaty will also created irreparable harm. Thus, the high likelihood
17 that Plaintiffs will continue to harm the Nation absent issuance of an injunction
18 also counsels in further favor of equitable relief. Only an injunction can ensure the
19 uninterrupted operation of mediation as contemplated by the Consent Decree.

20 **2. The Yakama Nation Is Likely To Prevail On The Merits.**

1 That Plaintiffs have acted, and are acting, in violation of the Consent Decree
2 has been briefed, argued, and decided in the Yakama Tribal Court. For the sake of
3 judicial economy, The Yakama Nation incorporates that briefing herein, and offers
4 the following short recapitulation:

5 **a. The Consent Decree Is An Enforceable Contract**

6 The Consent Decree is an enforceable contract between the parties. *See*
7 Consent Decree, at ¶ H; *Beaver v. Kingman*, 785 P.2d 998, 1003 (Kan. 1990).
8 Because the cause of action is properly based in the common law of contracts, the
9 requested preliminary injunction must be evaluated under that standard. *See*
10 Consent Decree, at ¶ H (“The parties agree that provisions . . . for maintaining the
11 continuing jurisdiction of the court should be deleted.”); *Beaver*, 785 P.2d at 1003.
12 If the standards for granting injunctive relief can be met, injunctive relief must issue
13 to compel Plaintiffs to act in compliance with the Consent Decree’s dispute
14 resolution procedures. *See e.g. United Capital Financial Advisers, Inc. v. Capital*
15 *Insight Partners, LLC*, No. 12-0300, 2012 WL 1079329 (D. Nev. Mar. 30, 2012)
16 (TRO to enforce contract); *Global Tel*Link Corp. v. Scott*, 652 F.Supp.2d 1240,
17 1246 (M.D. Fla. 2009 (TRO to enforce mediation and arbitration).

18 **b. The Consent Decree Created A Duty To Mediate In Good**
19 **Faith Until The Mediator Declares Impasse – Plaintiffs Have**
20 **Breached That Duty.**

The Consent Decree clearly contemplates that mediation be fulfilled “in good
faith” by both parties, and that mediation continue “until the dispute is resolved or

1 until **the mediator** determines that the parties are not able to resolve the dispute.”
2 Consent Decree, at ¶ 4.7.d (emphasis added). In the case that the Mediator
3 determines that the parties are not able to resolve the dispute, the consent decree
4 envisions that the parties either arbitrate the dispute or, if 180 days has passed since
5 the Mediator has determined that the dispute cannot be resolved, that the Consent
6 Decree be terminated upon the request of one of the parties. *Id.* Nowhere does the
7 Consent Decree allow for a party to unilaterally opt-out of the terms of the Consent
8 Decree without first fulfilling these requirements. In fact, just the opposite is true –
9 the Consent Decree contemplates that the Nation may petition “to enforce this
10 Consent Decree” where one of the parties “fails to enter into the dispute resolution
11 process or **terminates the process before its completion.**” Consent Decree, at ¶
12 4.6 (emphasis added). The Yakama Nation has done just that by petitioning the
13 Tribal Court.

14 The Mediator has yet to “determine[] that the parties are not able to resolve
15 the dispute.” Consent Decree, at ¶4.7(d). Plaintiffs have nonetheless refused to
16 mediate at this early stage of dispute resolution. Plaintiffs have breached their duty
17 to mediate, in good faith, until the Mediator declares impasse.

18 **c. The Yakama Nation Has Been Damaged.**

19 Damages that may be claimed for breaching a contractual duty to mediate
20 include “one’s own attorneys’ fees and costs for having to compel mediation, stay
arbitration or litigation, vacate a resulting arbitral award, or seek relief from a

1 judgment.” Thomas H. Oehmke & Joan M. Brovins, *Cause of Action for Enforcing*
2 *Mediation Contracts*, 50 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 609, § 11 (2011) (citing *McEntyre*
3 *v. Edwards*, 583 S.E.2d 889 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)).

4 Here the Yakama Nation has thus far already spent tens of thousands of
5 dollars in its efforts to coerce the state into fulfilling its obligation to mediate under
6 the Consent Decree, and has therefore been damaged by Plaintiffs’ breach of
7 contract.⁷ Unless and until Plaintiffs are enjoined from further refusing to mediate,
8 in further violation of the Consent Decree, these costs and fees for having to compel
9 mediation will continue to accrue.

10 The Yakama Nation will succeed on its breach of Consent Decree claim. *See*
11 *e.g. Global Tel*Link Corp.*, 652 F.Supp.2d 1240; *U.S. v. Bankers Ins. Co.*, 245 F.3d
12 315 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing *In re Complaint of Hornbeck Offshore Corp.*, 981 F.2d
13 752 (5th Cir. 1993)). There exists a valid, enforceable contract between the parties;

14 ⁷ Although the Nation has suffered damages, it is not seeking to recover money
15 damages against Plaintiffs, nor is it claiming that those damages constitute
16 “irreparable harm” for the purpose of the requested TRO. *See Bowen v.*
17 *Massachusetts*, 487 U.S. 879, 893 (1988) (drawing a distinction between “monetary
18 relief” and “money damages” for a contract claim where nonmonetary relief is
19 being requested); *Fedex Trade Networks, Inc. v. U.S.*, No. 11-890, 2011 WL
20 4715217, at *8 (D. Md. Oct. 6, 2011) (same).

1 that contract creates a duty that Plaintiffs mediate in good faith until the Mediator
2 declares that the dispute cannot be resolved; Plaintiffs have breached that duty; and
3 the Yakama Nation has been damaged by Plaintiffs' breach. *See* 50 CAUSES OF
4 ACTION 2d at § 11 ("If mediation has been contractually agreed to be an ADR step
5 precedent to litigation . . . then a court may compel parties to mediation.").

6 Moreover, as the Yakama Tribal Court has already determined, the Nation is
7 likely to prevail on this claim. *See Prescott v. Little Six, Inc.*, 897 F.Supp. 1217,
8 1223 (D. Minn. 1995) (litigation in tribal courts "provide other courts with the
9 benefit of their expertise in such matters in the event of further judicial review").
10 The Nation is likely to succeed on the merits of this breach-of-contract claim.

11 **3. The Balance Of Hardships And The Public Interest Favor The**
12 **Nation.**

13 **a. The Balance Of Hardships Requires A Preliminary**
14 **Injunction.**

15 Plaintiffs will suffer no harm if they are enjoined from unilaterally pulling
16 out of mediation without complying with the terms of the Consent Decree. Such
17 action is neither authorized nor contemplated by the parties' agreement – in fact,
18 just the opposite is mandated of Plaintiffs. *See Global Tel*Link Corp.*, 652
19 F.Supp.2d at 1247 ("[B]eing denied the opportunity to engage in alternative dispute
20 resolution, as set forth in the Agreement, clearly outweighs any potential harm . . .
arising from being forced to engage in alternative dispute resolution.").

1 Plaintiffs do not have any governmental or organizational interest in violating
2 the law by failing to comply with the Consent Decree and the Treaty rights that that
3 Consent Decree protects. Plaintiffs' proper interest is in carrying out their duties in
4 full compliance with the law. The minimally intrusive injunction that the Nation
5 seeks – one only to compel mediation – will only help Plaintiffs meet this
6 important interest. *See* WASH. REV. CODE. § 43.376.020 (“In establishing a
7 government-to-government relationship with Indian tribes, state agencies must . . .
8 [m]ake reasonable efforts to collaborate with Indian tribes in the development of . . .
9 agreements”); WASH. REV. CODE. § 43.376.040 (mandating “[e]ffective
10 communication and collaboration between state agencies and Indian tribes”).
11 Further, while Plaintiffs continue to mediate they will continue to receive 100% of
12 their fuel taxes, which further militates against any finding of detriment to
13 Plaintiffs. Consent Decree, at ¶ 2.3; ECF No. 8, at 20, ¶4. Plaintiffs will be in the
14 identical situation they have been in for almost a decade. Indeed, Plaintiffs will be
15 in the same situation they are in with almost every other Tribe in Washington. The
16 Nation wishes only to preserve the *status quo* and otherwise comply with the letter
17 of the agreement between the parties.

18 The harm to the Yakama Nation that will result as a consequence of this
19 Court's failing to issue the requested relief, however, is overwhelming – especially
20 considering the disparity in size and revenue sources between the Yakama Nation

1 and Plaintiffs. *See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona Dep't of Game & Fish*,
2 649 F.2d 1274, 1285 (9th Cir. 1981)) (in considering the balance of hardships,
3 District Courts are to take into account “the disparity in size and revenue sources
4 between the tribe and the state.”).

5 Pursuant to the Revised Yakama Law and Order Code (“R.Y.C.”) § 30.11.02
6 the Yakama Nation charges a tax of \$0.055 per gallon of fuel sold to Yakamas.⁸
7 ECF No. 8 at 20, ¶6 (Plaintiffs’ numbering 121). Recognizing the high poverty and
8 unemployment rates on the Reservation, the Yakama tax collected is used to fund
9 valuable services provided by the Nation to its citizens, including opportunities for
10 employment and transportation thereto.⁹ *See* R.Y.C. § 30.11.08 (Yakama-licensed

11 ⁸ “An enrolled Yakama petroleum products retailer may sell to another enrolled
12 Yakama without assessing or collecting state fuel tax and/or excise tax” if they
13 instead collect the Yakama tax. R.Y.C. § 30.11.02. Where the Yakama tax is not
14 collected – i.e. sales to non-Yakamas – the seller “must assess state fuel tax and/or
15 excise taxes.” *Id.* Any Yakama who violates the statute is subject to 90 days in jail,
16 a fine of \$350, and/or the revocation of their license to sell fuel. R.Y.C. § 30.11.03.

17 ⁹ In contrast, Washington State’s motor vehicle taxes are used *exclusively* to fund
18 state highway and county arterial construction and maintenance. *Washington Off-*
19 *Highway Vehicle Alliance v. State*, 260 P.3d 956, 959 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (citing
20 Wash. Const. art. II, § 40); WASH. REV. CODE. § 46.68.090. Although not directly

1 petroleum products retailers must “give Yakamas employment preference”); R.Y.C.
2 § 30.11.12 (fuel tax revenues “shall be a benefit to the health, safety and general
3 welfare of all residents of the Yakama Reservation”); R.Y.C. § 71.01.03 (Yakama
4 preference in employment statute); YAKAMA NATION TRIBAL TRANSIT SERVICE
5 OPERATION PLAN 10 (2007) (discussing the Yakama Nation Tribal Transit Program;
6 a program funded by the Yakama Nation to provide transportation services to
7 disadvantaged Yakamas using a fleet of ADA accessible vehicles). It is thus vital
8 to Reservation community and economics that these taxes are collected. See ECF
9 No. 8 at 20, ¶6 (Plaintiffs’ numbering 121); R.Y.C. § 30.11.10.

10 Were Plaintiffs to import their surcharge *in toto*¹⁰ to the Yakama Reservation,
11 however, Yakamas pay \$.28125 more for each gallon of gas. ECF No. 8, at 26-27,

12 at issue in the instant motion, the Treaty of 1855 guarantees that the state cannot
13 charge Yakamas for highway and county arterial construction and maintenance.
14 *Salton Sea Venture, Inc. v. Ramsey*, No. 11-1968, 2011 WL 4945072, at *7 (S.D.
15 Cal. Oct. 18, 2011) (holding that California’s “state tax constitutes a restriction on
16 the Yakama’s transportation of fuel into California” and therefore “violates the
17 Yakama’s rights under the Treaty of 1855”).

18 ¹⁰ The cost of gas on the Yakama Reservation included a \$.09375 per gallon state-
19 required surcharge before the state terminated the Consent Decree (25% of \$.375).
20 ECF No. 8 at 26-27, ¶29 (Plaintiffs’ numbering 127-128).

1 ¶29. This is a 200% increase in state-initiated per-mile charges on Yakamas. *Id.*
2 “For those Yakamas who live paycheck-to-paycheck or without employment, which
3 is too many Yakamas, these [additional state] surcharges are significant” as they
4 “prevent certain Yakamas from travelling at all,” thereby “ultimately prevent[ing]
5 Yakamas from their way of Indian life.” *Id.* at ¶ 33. Other contributions to the
6 disparity in size and revenue sources between the parties that further warrant a
7 tipping of the scales in favor of the Yakama Nation include the following:

8 • The Yakama Reservation is located in a rural, isolated, and
9 economically distressed area of South Central Washington, 200 miles from the
10 urban centers of Seattle and Spokane. While the Reservation is home to a variety
11 of businesses and commerce, ranging from farming to tobacco manufacturing, to
12 casino and cultural centers, at roughly 39.4 percent, the Reservation has one of the
highest below-poverty level rates in the state. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Environmental Justice Indicators: Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakama Nation, http://www.epa.gov/region10/pdf/ej/yakama_bpov_map.pdf (last
visited Dec. 26, 2012).

13 • At the same time, the Yakama Nation has the largest number of
14 enrolled tribal population in the state. Roughly 50% of those enrolled members are
15 unemployed. Multiple studies have found that this is high unemployment rate is
16 caused by the high costs of travel. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, YAKIMA VALLEY REGION COORDINATED PUBLIC TRANSIT-
HUMAN SERVICES TRANSPORTATION PLAN 9 (2010) [hereinafter “WSDOT
TRANSPORTATION PLAN”].

17 • According to Plaintiffs themselves, although roughly 70% of
18 Yakamas have reliable transportation, their inability to utilize that transportation
has caused “difficulty [in] obtaining employment.” YAKAMA NATION TRIBAL
TRANSIT SERVICE OPERATION PLAN 8, 10 (2007).

19 • “The Wapato DSHS office, located on the Yakama Nation, conducted
20 a survey in October 2005 with TANF clients and over 70% of the respondents
indicated that transportation was a barrier to seeking, obtaining, and retaining
employment.” *Id.* at 8.

1 • Also due to this lack of mobility, “[l]ow-income individuals have
2 difficulty accessing education and social services that will assist individuals to
become self-sufficient citizens.” *Id.*

3 • An increase in the Reservation’s homeless population has also been
4 correlated to a lack of “transportation to social service appointments and medical
services.” WSDOT TRANSPORTATION PLAN, at 4.

5 • For those Yakamas who live paycheck-to-paycheck or without
6 employment – which is a large number of Yakamas – the additional state
7 surcharges are significant enough to “prevent certain Yakamas from travelling at
all.” ECF No. 8 at 28, ¶33 (Plaintiffs’ numbering 129. And because traveling is a
8 very important spiritual and cultural aspect of Yakamas, one they explicitly
reserved in the Treaty with the Yakama, these “surcharges ultimately prevent
Yakamas from their way of Indian life.” *Id.*

9 In fact, this Court has already found that, based upon similar facts existing in
10 1993, allowing Plaintiffs to have “the full amount of the state’s tax included in the
11 sale price” of fuel to Yakamas requires that a TRO be issued. *See* 1993 Order at
12 12-13.¹¹ This weighs in favor of granting the requested TRO.

13 ¹¹ The “law of the case doctrine” also weighs in favor of The Yakama Nation. *See*
14 *Protect Lake Pleasant, LLC v. Connor*, No. 07-0454, 2010 WL 5638735, at *8 (D.
15 Ariz. July 30, 2010) (“the law of the case doctrine ordinarily precludes a court from
16 reexamining an issue previously decided” in the same dispute) (quotation omitted);
17 *Mayweathers v. Terhune*, 136 F.Supp.2d 1152 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that the
18 doctrine applies to the issuance of preliminary injunctions just the same as it does
19 all other previously issued orders and rulings, particularly where “the Plaintiffs’
20 contentions were previously argued and rejected when the court issued the first . . .
preliminary injunction.”).

1 **b. The Public Interest Requires A Preliminary Injunction.**

2 The public interest weighs heavily in favor of preventing irreparable harm to
3 the Yakama Nation. Numerous courts have found that the public interest in
4 promoting and enforcing valid mediation and arbitration clauses militates in favor
5 enjoining a party's unilateral and unlawful departure therefrom. *See e.g. Antonelli*
6 *v. Finish Line, Inc.*, No. 11-3874, 2012 WL 2499930, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 27,
7 2012) (arbitration); *S & T Oil Equipment & Machinery, Ltd. v. Juridica Investments*
8 *Ltd.*, No. 11-0542, 2011 WL 864837, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2011) (arbitration);
9 *Siag v. King & Spalding LLP*, No. 10-0367, 2010 WL 2671580, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
10 June 30, 2010) (arbitration); *International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace*
11 *Workers v. National Mediation Bd.*, 374 F.Supp.2d 135, 143 (D.D.C. 2005)
12 (mediation); *see also Global Tel*Link Corp*, 652 F.Supp.2d at 1247 (“[E]njoining
13 the parties to engage in alternative dispute resolution, as contractually agreed by the
14 parties in the Agreement, is in furtherance of the public interest.”); *Charles Schwab*
15 *& Co., Inc. v. McMurry*, No. 08-0534, 2008 WL 5381922, at *10 (M.D. Fla. 2008)
16 (public interest in upholding contracts).

17 Plaintiffs have unilaterally breached the Consent Decree's mediation and
18 arbitration clause. The public – both Yakamas and the Washington State citizenry –
19 has been harmed by the Plaintiffs' breach of contract, and will continue to be
20 harmed until Plaintiffs are enjoined from further ignoring their duties pursuant
thereto. *See* ECF No. 8, at 91, ¶3 (Plaintiffs' numbering 192) (“Abandoning

1 mediation for the more exhausting and expensive litigation would be detrimental to
2 . . . both sovereign governments . . . at a time when economies are struggling to
3 rebound from recession and citizens are experiencing historic high rates of
4 unemployment.”).

5 IV. CONCLUSION

6 The words of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court ring true here: “Every
7 sovereign owes a solemn duty to its citizens not to subject them to judicial train
8 wrecks that will happen if they do not resolve to cooperate with competing
9 sovereigns to their mutual benefit.” *In re Montclair*, No. CC-C-2008-037, 2008
10 WL 7903915, at *8 (Stand. R. Sioux Trib. Ct. June 9, 2008).

11 Here, Plaintiffs have resolved not to cooperate with the Yakama Nation. In
12 order to avoid a “judicial train wreck,” the Nation has petitioned the Yakama Tribal
13 Court, and now this Federal Court, so that Plaintiffs might reconsider their position.
14 The Yakama Nation is simply requesting that Plaintiffs not break their promises of
15 1994 and 2006, so that exhausting and expensive litigation, detrimental to all
16 constituents, not to mention the equally important government-to-government
17 relationship between the parties, can be avoided.

18 Based upon the above and foregoing initial factual exposition and law, the
19 Yakama Nation prays that its Cross-Motion for Preliminary Injunction be
20 **GRANTED**, and that this Court enjoin Plaintiffs from refusing to mediate with The

1 Yakama Nation without first complying with the explicit terms of that contract, i.e.
2 mediate in good faith until the mediator declares the dispute unresolvable.

3 DATED this 26th day of December, 2012.

4 s/Gabriel S. Galanda
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20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Gabriel S. Galanda, declare as follows:

1. I am now and at all times herein mentioned a legal and permanent resident of the United States and the State of Washington, over the age of eighteen years, not a party to the above-entitled action, and competent to testify as a witness.

2. I am employed with the law firm of Galanda Broadman PLLC, 8606 35th Ave. NE, Suite L1, Seattle, WA 98115.

3. On December 26, 2012, I filed the foregoing document, which will provide service to the following via ECF:

Mary Tennyson

Rob Costello

Bill Clark

The foregoing statement is made under penalty of perjury and under the laws of the State of Washington and is true and correct.

Signed at Seattle, Washington, this 26th day of December, 2012.

s/Gabriel S. Galanda