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December 3, 2012

Molly C. Dwyer, Clerk of the Court Office of the Clerk James R. Browning Courthouse U.S. Court of Appeals P.O. Box 193939 San Francisco, CA 94119-3939

Re: Maxwell v. County of San Diego

Case No. 10-56671

Decision Filed September 13, 2012 Panel: Judges Farris, Clifton, and Ikuta

Appellants' Opposition to Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc (ECF # 43)

Dear Ms. Dwyer:

Plaintiff-Appellants submit this Fed. R. App. Proc. 28(j) letter in connection with the Opposition to the Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc they filed on November 28, 2012.

In that Opposition, Plaintiffs responded to an issue raised for the first time by Defendants-Appellees in their Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc. To respond to that issue, they submitted a supplemental except of record containing two pleadings from the District Court's docket that had not been previously relevant. These are: (1) Plaintiffs' Notice of Motion and Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, with supporting pleadings (dated 11/07/08); and (2) a Scheduling Order (dated 10/07/08).

The Clerk's Office subsequently informed Plaintiffs' counsel that a supplemental excerpt of record was the incorrect procedure and that they should have utilized a Fed. R. App. Proc. 28(j) letter. Accordingly, the two pleadings are attached hereto and are submitted with this letter.

The relevance of the pleadings is as follows: Defendants have suggested that Plaintiffs amended their Complaint to name Defendants Bradley Avi and Jeremy Felber because of the dismissal of the Defendant Viejas Tribe. In actuality, it was Plaintiffs' discovery of the identity of Avi and Felber that prompted Plaintiffs to seek leave to amend, not the dismissal of Viejas.

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Molly C. Dwyer, Clerk of the Court December 3, 2012 Page 2

Specifically, Plaintiffs filed their complaint in December 2007. (ER 312). Viejas filed its motion to dismiss in January 2008. (ER 338.) The District Court granted Viejas's motion to dismiss in June 2008. (ER 56-58). On September 5, 2008, Defendant County of San Diego produced documents that for the first time disclosed the identities of the potentially liable individual emergency medical responders, including Avi and Felber. (*See* MPA ISO Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (attached hereto) at 4:1-9; Scheduling Order (attached hereto)). Any motion to amend was due on November 9, 2008 under the District Court's Scheduling Order. (*Id.*) Plaintiffs thus moved for leave to substitute the now-identified individual defendants – including the Viejas Fire employees – on November 7, 2008, in accordance with the District Court's deadline and based upon the discovery of their identities. (*See* ER 341).

Very truly yours,

/s/ Daniel M. Benjamin

Daniel M. Benjamin

DMB:km

cc: Phillip C. Samouris Morris G. Hill Kevin M. Osterberg Thomas L. Murphy Sanford Kingsley Sarah Thompson

TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 8, 2008, at 2:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, in the courtroom of the Honorable John A. Houston, United States District Court Judge, located at 940 Front Street, San Diego, California, Plaintiffs JIM MAXWELL and KAY MAXWELL, Individually and as guardians of TREVER ALLEN BRUCE and KELTEN TANNER BRUCE; and JIM MAXWELL, as executor Of the ESTATE OF KRISTIN MARIE MAXWELL-BRUCE ("Plaintiffs") will and hereby do, move the Court for an order granting leave to file an amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

This motion is made for the following reasons and is based on the following grounds:

(1) Plaintiffs seek to: (1) add a cause of action for *Monell* liability against the County of San Diego for failure to provide adequate training, pursuant to *City of Canton v. Harris*, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); (2) substitute San Diego County Sheriff's Department Captain Greg Reynolds, Lieutenant Anthony Salazar, Sergeant M. Knobbe, Deputy Jeffrey Jackson, Deputy Warren Voth, Deputy G. Kneeshaw, Deputy William Reilly, and Deputy L. Rodriguez in place of DOE defendants 1-8; and (3) substitute Alpine Fire Protection District employees Brian Boggeln, Colby Ross, Chip Howell, and Michael Mead in place of DOE defendants 26-29; and (4) substitute Viejas Fire employees Bradley Avi and Jeremy Felber in place of DOE defendants 30-31. Defendants will not be prejudiced if Plaintiffs' the motion is granted.

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1	This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points and		
2	Authorities, the [Proposed] First Amended Complaint lodged concurrently herewith as Exhibit		
3	A to the Memorandum, the papers and pleadings on file in this matter, and any such oral and		
4	documentary evidence as may be presented prior to, or at the time of, the hearing on this		
5	matter.		
6	Dated: November 7, 2008 CHARLES G. LA BELLA		
7	Teresa M. Gillis La Bella & McNamara, LLP		
8	TODD D. THIBODO		
9	LAW OFFICES OF TODD D. THIBODO A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION		
10	By: /s/Teresa M. Gillis		
11	Teresa M. Gillis Charles G. La Bella		
12	Attorney for PLAINTIFFS		
13	Email: <u>tgillis@labellamcnamara.com</u> <u>clabella@labellamcnamara.com</u>		
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

By this motion, Plaintiffs seek leave to file a First Amended Complaint ("FAC," attached hereto as Exhibit A). The FAC would (1) add a cause of action for Monell liability against the County of San Diego for failure to provide adequate training, pursuant to City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); (2) substitute San Diego County Sheriff's Department Captain Greg Reynolds, Lieutenant Anthony Salazar, Sergeant M. Knobbe, Deputy Jeffrey Jackson, Deputy Warren Voth, Deputy G. Kneeshaw, Deputy William Reilly, and Deputy L. Rodriguez in place of DOE defendants 1-8; and (3) substitute Alpine Fire Protection District employees Brian Boggeln, Colby Ross, Chip Howell, and Michael Mead in place of DOE defendants 26-29; and (4) substitute Viejas Fire employees Bradley Avi and Jeremy Felber in place of DOE defendants 30-31. Defendants will not be prejudiced if Plaintiffs' motion is granted.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant County of San Diego ("Defendant" or "County") Sheriff's deputy Lowell Bryan Bruce ("Bruce") shot his wife Kristin Maxwell Bruce ("Kristin") in the jaw at the home of Kristin's parents Jim Maxwell ("Jim") and Kay Maxwell ("Kay") on December 14, 2006. (Complaint, ¶ 1, 31.) Kristin was seriously injured, but she was able to walk to the telephone and call "911." (Complaint, ¶ 3, 32.) The San Diego County Sheriff's Department responded, and when it arrived minutes later, it locked down the scene of the shooting. (Complaint, $\P \ 3, 35, 36.$)

While acting under color of law and in the course and scope of their employment, Sheriff's deputies locked down the scene of the shooting and refused to allow Kristin to be transported to the hospital. (Complaint, ¶¶ 13, 36.) They refused to allow Jim or Kay to see or speak with Kristin. (Complaint, ¶ 37.) When Jim tried to walk down his driveway to see

his wife, an unknown defendant Sheriff's deputy hit him with a baton and pepper-sprayed him in the face. (Complaint, ¶¶ 37, 67, 72.)

Defendants showed deliberate indifference to Kristin's obvious medical needs, and they provided her with grossly negligent emergency medical care. (Complaint, ¶¶ 38, 41.) As a result, Kristin suffocated and drowned in her own blood; she died at the scene nearly an hour after being shot, while still in the deputies' custody. (Complaint, ¶ 3, 38.) The Maxwells found out their daughter had died only after the news media had already reported it, and Defendants caused the news media to believe that Jim was a suspect who had been arrested for the shooting of his daughter. (Complaint, ¶¶ 37, 78, 84.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed their complaint on December 19, 2007, asserting causes of action for (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (right of association), (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Monell liability) (based on negligent hiring and providing defendant Bruce with a weapon), (3) wrongful death, (4) survival action, (5) gross negligence, (6) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force), (7) battery; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (9) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

On January 10, 2008, Defendant County of San Diego filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' first, second, third and fourth causes of action, and Defendant Alpine Fire Protection District filed a motion to dismiss and/or sever and dismiss for lack of federal question or supplemental jurisdiction. On January 24, 2008, defendant Viejas Fire Department filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on sovereign immunity.

On June 3, 2008, the Court issued an order that: (1) granted Defendant Viejas Fire Department's motion to dismiss; (2) denied Defendant Alpine Fire Protection District's motion to dismiss and/or sever; and (3) granted Defendant County of San Diego's motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff's second cause of action only. The Court also denied Defendant County of San Diego's motion for a more definite statement.

On September 5, 2008, pursuant to the Court's Order Following Early Neutral Evaluation Conference, Setting Rule 26 Compliance and Notice of Case Management Conference, Defendant County of San Diego produced approximately 380 pages of documents. These documents identified to Plaintiffs for the first time the identities of the individual deputies and emergency medical responders who were present at Plaintiffs' home on the night of December 14, 2006, and whose actions form basis of Plaintiffs' complaint. On October 7, 2008, the Court issued a Scheduling Order that provided that "[a]ny motion to join other parties, to amend the pleadings, or to file additional pleadings shall be filed on or before November 9, 2008."

IV. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT PLAINTIFFS LEAVE TO AMEND

A. Leave to Amend Should Be Granted As Justice Requires

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly states that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." *Accord Allen v. City of Beverly Hills*, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990); *Friedlander v. Nims*, 755 F.2d 810, 813 (11th Cir. 1985). Leave to amend should be liberally granted. *Scott v. Eversole Mortuary*, 522 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir.1975).

B. Plaintiffs May Properly Assert a Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County, Based on the County's Failure to Provide Adequate Training.

The second cause of action in Plaintiffs' proposed First Amended Complaint asserts a claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on the County's failure to provide adequate training. Inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. *City of Canton v. Harris*, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); *Munger v. City of Glasgow*, 227 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000). To prevail on a claim under *City of Canton*, a plaintiff "must have sufficiently alleged that: (1) [he] was deprived of his constitutional rights by the City acting under color of state law; (2) that the City has customs or policies which amount to deliberate indifference to [his] constitutional rights; and (3) that these policies were

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the moving force behind the constitutional violations." *Estate of Amos v. City of Page*, 257 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotes omitted).

Plaintiffs' FAC adequately alleges the elements of a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the County's failure to adequately train its sheriff's deputies. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that: Defendant County implicitly or explicitly adopted a custom or policy of vesting with the deputy in charge of a crime scene the authority to determine when injured persons at the crime scene should be allowed to be removed from the crime scene or transported to a hospital; defendant County vested such authority with the deputy in charge of a crime scene without providing adequate training to recognize when it would be medically necessary for injured persons at a crime scene to be allowed to be removed from the crime scene or transported to a hospital; defendant County's failure to provide adequate training was reckless or grossly negligent; defendant County's failure to adequately train its officers amounts to deliberate indifference of the rights of the individuals its officers come into contact with; and defendant County's failure to train its officers caused the Defendants who were employed by the Sheriff's Department to fail to allow Kristin to be transported for appropriate medical treatment in a timely manner. (FAC, ¶¶ 47-51.) Therefore, Plaintiffs may properly assert a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County, based on the County's failure to provide adequate training to its deputies.

C. <u>It is Appropriate to Amend the Complaint to Reflect the True Names of the Individual "DOE" Defendants.</u>

As set forth above, Plaintiffs only recently discovered the identities of the individual deputies and emergency medical personnel who responded to their home and participated in the events that took place on the night of December 14, 2006. Because the relief sought by Plaintiffs against these individuals arises out of the occurrences forming the subject of the Complaint, Plaintiffs are entitled to add these persons as defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).

Indeed, as the facts may show, these persons may be necessary parties who must be joined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). The inquiry contemplated by Rule 19 is a practical one

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addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Frazier v. City of Norfolk, 236 F.R.D. 273, 275 (E.D. Va. 2006). In exercising its discretion, the trial court must consider the plaintiff's interest in choosing the parties to the action, the present defendant's interest, the interest of the potential but absent party, and the public's interest in complete, consistent and efficient adjudication of disputes. Bakia v. Los Angeles County, 687 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1982); Frazier, 236 F.R.D. 273 at 275.

In *Frazier*, an arrestee brought a Section 1983 action against city for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights and resulting physical injury inflicted by officers in connection with his arrest. *Frazier*, 236 F.R.D. 273 at 274. In his original complaint, plaintiff named the City of Norfolk and the individual officers who inflicted the injuries upon him as defendants. *Id.* Simultaneously with his federal complaint, plaintiff filed a complaint in state court against the individual police officers, seeking damages for excessive force, assault and battery, gross negligence, and conspiracy. *Id.* Eventually, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the police officers from his federal claim and left the city as the sole defendant. *Id.* Shortly after plaintiff dismissed the officers from the action, the city filed a motion pursuant to Rule 19(a) to bring the police officers back into the lawsuit. *Id.*

The *Frazier* court held that compulsory joinder of police officers was warranted, stating that "[a]s the perpetrators of the alleged constitutional injury on which the city's liability was allegedly based, the officers' presence in the action was plainly desirable[.]" *Id.* at 276. The Court further stated that "as a practical matter, the city could have less interest than the officers in defending the constitutionality of the officers' conduct because even if arrestee suffered constitutional injury at the hands of the officers, the city could escape liability for the injury by showing that the officers did not act pursuant to official policy or custom." *Id.*

The present case is analogous to *Frazier*, since the sheriff's deputies on scene were the ones who sealed the scene of the crime and they were the ones who did not let anyone, including the victim, leave the scene for over an hour after the shooting. Further, it was the

deputies who allegedly clubbed and sprayed Mr. Maxwell with mace. Therefore, the sheriff deputies are the perpetrators of the injuries complained of by Plaintiffs in this case.

Adding these individual defendants would not destroy the court's jurisdiction, as this is not a diversity jurisdiction case, and it would aid in the determination of whether the deputies were acting pursuant to official policy or custom. If the County claims that the officers were not acting pursuant to official policy or custom in order to limit its liability, the officers have an interest in showing that they did follow official policy or custom. Clearly, then, the individual Sheriff's deputies' interests are affected by this suit and they are necessary parties.

Finally, with respect to all of the individuals Plaintiffs seek to join, joining them would protect the Plaintiffs from the possibility of having to file multiple suits and would aid in judicial economy.

D. Viejas Fire Department Employees Are Not Immune From Suit

Sovereign immunity does not shield individual members of a federally-recognized Indian tribe, or the tribe's employees, from lawsuits against them in their individual capacity: "[E]ven if [a] tribe and its instrumentalities are immune, the individual officers of the tribe will not be immune unless they were 'acting in their representative capacity and within the scope of their authority.'" State of Alaska, ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir. 1988), quoting Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir.1985). Therefore, sovereign immunity would not protect individual employees of the Viejas Fire Department, if, for example, their actions with respect to Kristin Maxwell-Bruce, were outside the scope of authority extended to them by the Viejas Fire Department.

In sum, San Diego County Sheriff deputies, Alpine Fire Protection employees and the Viejas Fire Department personnel should be joined in this action as defendants. Joining the individual deputies and emergency medical responders would not destroy the court's jurisdiction, and the individuals are subject to the service of process here in San Diego County. Therefore, the Court should permit Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add these individuals

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who were at the scene of the incident and who took an active role in the events of December 14, 2006.

Defendants Will Not Be Prejudiced If Plaintiffs' Motion Is Granted. E.

To justify denial of leave to amend, the prejudice suffered by the opposing party must be substantial. See, e.g., Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). In addition, "[a]ny prejudice to the nonmovant must be weighed against the prejudice to the moving party by not allowing the amendment." Bell v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 452, 454 (8th Cir. 1998).

Defendants will not be prejudiced if Plaintiffs' motion is granted. The parties have only recently exchanged initial disclosures. None of the parties has propounded any written discovery, and the parties have not taken any depositions. No trial date has been set, and the final Pretrial Conference is not until November 16, 2009.

By contrast, Plaintiffs will suffer great prejudice if this motion is denied, as Plaintiffs will be prevented from asserting a meritorious claim and from seeking relief from the individuals who are potentially responsible for Plaintiffs' injuries.

THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DEEMED FILED AS OF V. THE DATE OF THIS MOTION

Plaintiffs submit herewith a Proposed Order, granting leave to amend the Complaint and to deem the proposed First Amended Complaint filed as of the date of this motion, November 7, 2008. This relief is requested out of an abundance of caution with respect to the possibility of a running of the statute of limitations on December 14, 2008. If this Motion is not decided before that date, the Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court order the First Amended Complaint filed as of November 7, 2008, as provided on the proposed Order.

VI. **CONCLUSION** 1 2 For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs request that the Court grant their motion for 3 leave to amend their complaint. 4 5 Dated: November 7, 2008 CHARLES G. LA BELLA TERESA M. GILLIS 6 LA BELLA & MCNAMARA, LLP 7 TODD D. THIBODO LAW OFFICES OF TODD D. THIBODO 8 A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 9 By: /s/Teresa M. Gillis Teresa M. Gillis 10 Charles G. La Bella Attorney for PLAINTIFFS 11 Email: tgillis@labellamcnamara.com 12 clabella@labellamcnamara.com 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case No. 07 CV-2385-JAH (WMc) - 9 -MEMO OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

EXHIBIT A

Case No. 07-cv-2385-JAH (WMc)

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ALLEN BRUCE and KELTEN TANNER BRUCE; and JIM MAXWELL, as executor of the ESTATE OF KRISTIN MARIE MAXWELL-BRUCE (collectively "Plaintiffs"), for the Complaint against defendants County of San Diego (the "County"), County employees Gregory Reynolds, Anthony Salazar, M. Knobbe, Jeffrey Jackson, Warren Voth, Gary Kneeshaw, William Reilly and L. Rodriguez, Alpine Fire Department ("Alpine Fire"), Alpine Fire employees Brian Boggeln, Colby Ross, Chip Howell and Michael Mead; Viejas Fire Department employees Bradley Avi and Jeremy Felber, Deputy Lowell Bryan "Sam" Bruce, DOES 9-25 San Diego County Employees, DOES 32-100 (all defendants collectively, "Defendants") allege as follows:

JIM MAXWELL and KAY MAXWELL, individually and as guardians of TREVER

INTRODUCTION

- 1. As of December 14, 2006, Lowell Bryan "Sam" Bruce ("Bruce" or "Deputy Bruce") was a San Diego County Deputy Sheriff assigned to the Las Colinas Detention Facility ("Las Colinas") in San Diego. On the evening of December 14, 2006, Bruce left Las Colinas and took his County-issued weapon home. Later that same evening, Bruce shot his 38-year old wife Kristin Marie Maxwell-Bruce ("Kristin") in the jaw. Bruce shot his wife Kristin in front of their 4-year old son, Kelten, in the home owned by Kristin's parents, Jim and Kay Maxwell ("Jim" and "Kay" or, collectively, the "Maxwells").
- 2. The County hired Bruce as a Deputy Sheriff to fill a vacancy at Las Colinas after Bruce twice failed the County's psychological evaluation. Prior to hiring Bruce, the County was experiencing difficulties in filling vacancies in the County's jail facilities. The County clearly understood and appreciated that he was unfit for duty and prone to violence, but hired him anyway. Not only did the County recklessly hire Bruce, but thereafter provided him with a Glock handgun, and allowed him to take it home with him. December 14 was one of the nights Bruce was permitted to take that weapon home, and, as a result, at least six lives were forever altered.
- 3. After Bruce fired his shot, Kristin was seriously injured, but able to walk to the telephone and call "911." The San Diego Sheriff's Department (the "Sheriff's Department")

- responded, but the scene of the shooting quickly became a scene of chaos and disorder under the direction and control of the Sheriff's Department after Sheriff's Deputies learned one of their own was the shooter. Sheriff's Deputies locked down the scene and refused to let Kristin be taken to the hospital. Meanwhile, emergency medical responders from Alpine Fire and Viejas Fire as well as from the Sheriff's Department allowed Kristin to suffocate and drown in her own blood. Kristin died nearly an hour after dialing "911."
- 4. Defendants also prevented Kristin's parents Jim and Kay Maxwell from seeing, speaking to, or comforting Kristin during the last hour of her life. Moreover, they kept Jim and Kay Maxwell from each other in this critical time. In fact, after Jim Maxwell learned that his daughter had died, he attempted to walk to where his wife was being held by Sheriff's Deputies. As Jim Maxwell attempted to walk down his driveway to see his wife, one of the Sheriff's Deputies pepper-sprayed him in the face and then clubbed him in order to keep him from his wife in this critical time. As a result, Kay Maxwell found out only after the news media already knew that her daughter had died.
- 5. Plaintiffs assert numerous claims arising from these gruesome and unsettling facts, based upon both tort and statutory law, and upon both federal and state law. Plaintiffs Kristin's two sons, Kristin's parents, and, upon a wrongful death claim, Kristin herself pray for damages against Defendants, and hope to obtain at least some relief from the catastrophe Defendants caused.

THE PARTIES

- 6. Plaintiffs Jim and Kay Maxwell are residents of the County of San Diego, within this judicial district. Jim Maxwell is the legal guardian of Trever Allen Bruce and Kelten Tanner Bruce, Kristin's children. The Maxwells are also Kristin's successors-in-interest under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.11.
- 7. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that the County of San Diego is, and at all relevant times was, a political subdivision of the State of California, and that the County is within this judicial district. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe that defendants Gregory Reynolds, Anthony Salazar, M. Knobbe, Jeffrey Jackson, Warren

Voth, Gary Kneeshaw, William Reilly and L. Rodriguez were, at all relevant times herein, employed by the County and acting under color of law and within the course and scope of their employment.

- 8. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that Defendant Alpine Fire Protection District ("Alpine Fire") is a fire department organized and existing pursuant to California Health and Safety Code §§ 13800 et seq., and that it is headquartered within this judicial district. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe that defendants Brian Boggeln, Colby Ross, Chip Howell and Michael Mead were, at all relevant times herein, employed by Alpine Fire and acting within the course and scope of their employment.
- 9. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that dismissed defendant Viejas Fire Department ("Viejas Fire") is a fire department wholly-owned and operated by the Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians, a federally recognized Indian tribe.

 Defendants Bradley Avi and Jeremy Felber were employed by Viejas Fire but are sued here in their individual capacities.
- 10. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that, at all relevant times, Defendant Lowell Bryan "Sam" Bruce ("Bruce" or "Deputy Bruce") was a Deputy Sheriff employed by the County of San Diego Sheriff's Department and an agent and employee of the County, and that he has resided, at all times relevant to this action, within this judicial district.
- Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants DOES 9-25 San Diego County Employees and DOES 32-50, inclusive, and therefore sue these defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will amend their complaint to allege the true names and capacities of those defendants when the same has been ascertained.
- 12. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that DOES 9-25 San Diego County Employees and DOES 32-100, and each of them, are responsible in some manner for the occurrences alleged herein and proximately caused Plaintiffs' damages. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendants acted at all times mentioned herein as the actual and/or ostensible agents, employees, servants or

representatives of each other and, in doing the activities alleged herein, acted within the scope of their authority as agents and employees, and with the permission and consent of each other.

13. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that at all times mentioned herein all Defendants acted under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulations, customs and usages of the State of California and County of San Diego.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 14. The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' federal law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
- 15. Venue in this judicial district is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as Defendants reside within this judicial district and the acts that form the basis of Plaintiffs' claims occurred in this judicial district.
- 16. Plaintiffs have timely complied with all government claim requirements, as set forth in California Government Code §§ 900 et seq. Plaintiffs received written rejection of their claims within six months of the filing of this complaint.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

- 17. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that in or about 1993, Bruce submitted an application for employment with the County for the position of Corrections Deputy Sheriff. As part of the application process, the County performed a background investigation and psychological evaluation of Bruce.
- 18. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that as part of the application process,
 Bruce underwent and failed the psychological evaluation, and, for that reason, the County
 denied employment to Bruce. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that pursuant to civil service
 rules established by the County, Bruce underwent a second psychological evaluation, which
 he also failed.
- 19. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the psychological evaluations administered by the County revealed a history of physical violence on the part of Bruce and

test results that indicated to the County that Bruce would tend to resort to violence as a way of resolving interpersonal differences with others.

- 20. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that after his failure of the psychological evaluation administered by the County, Bruce applied for and was rejected for a position with the San Diego Police Department.
- 21. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that after his failure of the psychological evaluation administered by the County, Bruce applied for and was rejected for a position with the San Diego Harbor Police.
- 22. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that after his failure of the psychological evaluation administered by the County, Bruce applied for and was rejected for a position with the California Highway Patrol.
- 23. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that after his failure of the psychological evaluation administered by the County, Bruce applied for and was rejected for a position with the San Diego Sheriff's Department a second time.
- 24. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that after his failure of the psychological evaluation administered by the County, Bruce applied for and was rejected for a position with the Los Angeles Police Department.
- 25. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that after his failure of the psychological evaluation administered by the County, Bruce applied for and was rejected for a position with the Chula Vista Police Department.
- 26. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that after his failure of the psychological evaluation administered by the County, Bruce applied for and was rejected for a position with the California Highway Patrol a second time.
- 27. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that after his failure of the psychological evaluation administered by the County, Bruce applied for and was rejected for a position with the Everett, Washington Police Department.

- 28. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that after his failure of the psychological evaluation administered by the County, Bruce applied for and was rejected for a position with the Kent, Washington Police Department.
- 29. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that after his failure of the psychological evaluation administered by the County, Bruce applied for and was rejected for a position with the Washington State Patrol.
- 30. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that despite its knowledge of Bruce's prior failure of two psychological evaluations and his lack of psychological fitness, and despite its knowledge that Bruce had applied to and been rejected for employment by at least eight other law enforcement agencies, the County decided to hire Bruce as a San Diego County Sheriff's Deputy and provide him with a deadly weapon which he ultimately used to shoot his wife.

THE NIGHT OF DECEMBER 14, 2006

- 31. On December 14, 2006, Bruce took his County-issued service weapon home with him from Las Colinas and fired a shot at his wife Kristin. His County-issued bullet hit Kristin in the jaw, severely injuring her. At the time, Kristin and Bruce were living at the Maxwells' home in Alpine, California. At the time Bruce shot Kristin, Jim and Kay, as well as Kristin and Bruce's two young sons, Trever Allen Bruce, and Kelten Tanner Bruce, ages seven and four respectively, were home. In fact, Bruce shot Kristin directly in front of Kelten, one of their two sons.
 - 32. With her jaw bleeding, Kristin was able to walk to a telephone and dial "911."
- 33. Shortly after Bruce shot Kristin with his County-issued weapon, Jim Maxwell seeing his daughter bleeding confronted Bruce about the seriousness of the injury to which Bruce responded in substance that the injury was not a life-threatening injury.
- 34. Bruce rather than calling "911" or requesting medical assistance for his victim wife instead called a supervisor at the Sheriff's Department and confessed to his employer that he had just shot his wife.

- 35. The Sheriff's Department and emergency medical responders from Alpine Fire and Viejas Fire responded to the Maxwell home. At the time they responded, Kristin was still alive.
- 36. Sheriff's Deputies Jeffrey Jackson, William Reilly, M. Knobbe and Gary Kneeshaw, acting within the course and scope of their employment and under the supervision, command and cooperation of Sheriff's Captain Reynolds and Sheriff's Lieutenant Salazar and Sheriffs' Deputies Rodriguez and Voth, locked down the scene of the shooting, and failed and refused to let Kristin be taken to the hospital. As a result, Kristin died at the scene, nearly an hour after she called for help. During the last hour of Kristin's life, Defendants refused to let her parents see her, refused to let them speak to her or comfort her, and refused to let Jim and Kay Maxwell see, speak to or comfort each other.
- 37. Sheriff's Deputies Jackson, Reilly, Knobbe and Kneeshaw, acting within the course and scope of their employment, and under the supervision, command and cooperation of Sheriff's Captain Reynolds and Sheriff's Lieutenant Salazar and Sheriffs' Deputies Rodriguez and Voth, assaulted, restrained, and otherwise mistreated the Maxwells as they sought to find out the status of their daughter's condition. Jim Maxwell was pepper-sprayed in the face and clubbed by Defendant Kneeshaw while he sought information about his daughter. Defendants' incompetence or arrogance even caused the news media to believe Jim was a "suspect," despite that Sheriff's Deputies clearly understood that Bruce had been Kristin's shooter. Meanwhile, Kay Maxwell was kept without any information and away from her daughter, learning that she died only after the news media knew that her daughter was dead. The Maxwells were unlawfully detained and falsely imprisoned, kept away from their daughter by Defendants acting in the course and scope of their employment. Kristin's young boys were also mistreated by Defendants. These actions caused emotional distress to these Plaintiffs.
- 38. Each of the Defendants who responded to the 911 call, including the Sheriff's Department employees, the Alpine Fire and Viejas Fire employees, and/or agents of the Sheriff's Department and Alpine Fire, caused Kristin's death by performing emergency

medical services, including but not limited to first aid, medical treatment, rescue procedures, transportation, and other necessary and related activities, in a grossly negligent manner.

39. Last but certainly not least, Bruce himself acted with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of his wife Kristin, the Maxwells, and his sons Trever Allen Bruce and Kelten Tanner Bruce. He subjected these members of his own family to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of their rights.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Right of Association) – against Defendants County of San Diego, San Diego County Employees Gregory Reynolds, Anthony Salazar, M. Knobbe, Jeffrey Jackson, Warren Voth, Gary Kneeshaw, William Reilly

40. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 39 of this Complaint, as if fully set forth at this point.

and L. Rodriguez and San Diego County Employees 9-25)

- 41. By their actions on the scene at the Maxwell residence on December 14 and 15, 2006, as described above, Sheriff's Deputies Jeffrey Jackson, William Reilly, M. Knobbe, Gary Kneeshaw, L. Rodriguez and Warren Voth, and Sheriff's Captain Gregory Reynolds and Sheriff's Lieutenant Anthony Salazar, prevented Kristin from receiving proper medical treatment, falsely imprisoned Kristin and the Maxwells, and prevented the Maxwells from association with their daughter in the last hour of her life.
- 42. Sheriff's Deputies Jeffrey Jackson, William Reilly, M. Knobbe, Gary Kneeshaw, L. Rodriguez and Warren Voth, and Sheriff's Captain Gregory Reynolds and Sheriff's Lieutenant Anthony Salazar each were on the scene at the Maxwell residence and participated in the actions taken on December 14 and 15, 2006, described above. In addition, each of these Defendants was in a position to prevent or stop other Defendants from violating the constitutional rights of Kristin and the Maxwells, but they knowingly failed to do so.
- 43. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived Plaintiffs of the right to familial relationships in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and without due process in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment, by use of unreasonable, unjustified force and violence, and by deliberate indifference to medical needs, causing injuries and failing to treat injuries, which resulted in the death of Kristin Maxwell-Bruce, in violation of the rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

- 44. As a result of the wrongful acts of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer general damages, including grief, emotional distress, loss of the care, comfort, affection and society, and special damages, including loss of protection and support, in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial.
- 45. In doing the foregoing wrongful acts, Defendants, and each of them, acted in reckless and callous disregard and deliberate indifference for the constitutional rights of Kristin Maxwell-Bruce. The wrongful acts were willful, oppressive, fraudulent, and malicious, thus warranting the award of exemplary and punitive damages against each defendant, except for governmental entity defendants, in an amount adequate to punish the wrongdoers and deter future misconduct.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Failure to Train) -

against Defendant County of San Diego)

- 46. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 45 of this Complaint, as if fully set forth at this point.
- 47. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendant County implicitly or explicitly adopted a custom or policy of vesting with the deputy in charge of a crime scene the authority to determine when injured persons at the crime scene should be allowed to be removed from the crime scene or transported to a hospital.
- 48. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that County vested such authority with the deputy in charge of a crime scene without providing adequate training

to recognize when it would be medically necessary for injured persons at a crime scene to be allowed to be removed from the crime scene or transported to a hospital.

- 49. Defendant County's failure to provide adequate training was reckless or grossly negligent.
- 50. Defendant County's failure to adequately train its officers amounts to deliberate indifference of the rights of the individuals its officers come into contact with.
- 51. Defendant County's failure to train its officers caused the Defendants who were employed by the Sheriff's Department to fail to allow Kristin to be transported for appropriate medical treatment in a timely manner.
- 52. As a result of the wrongful act of Defendant County, Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer general damages, including grief, emotional distress, loss of the care, comfort, affection and society, and special damages, including loss of protection and support, in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Wrongful death – By Jim Maxwell and Kay Maxwell, as guardians of Trever Allen Bruce and Kelten Tanner Bruce – against all Defendants)

- 53. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 52 of this Complaint, as if fully set forth at this point.
- 54. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that as a proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendants, including gross negligence in the provision of emergency services, Kristin Maxwell-Bruce suffered loss of life.
- 55. As a proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendants, including gross negligence in the provision of emergency services, and the death of Kristin Maxwell-Bruce, Trever Allen Bruce and Kelten Tanner Bruce have suffered and continue to suffer loss of the care, comfort, affection, society, protection and support of their mother, Kristin Maxwell-Bruce, in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial.

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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Survival action - By Jim Maxwell, as executor of the Estate of Kristin Marie Maxwell-Bruce – against all Defendants)

- 56. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 55 of this Complaint, as if fully set forth at this point.
- 57. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that as a proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendants, including gross negligence in the provision of emergency services, Kristin Maxwell-Bruce died of injuries she sustained on December 14, 2006.
- 58. As a proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendants, including gross negligence in the provision of emergency services, Kristin Maxwell-Bruce suffered compensable damages prior to her death, in an amount to be determined at trial according to proof.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Gross Negligence – against Defendants Alpine Fire, Brian Boggeln, Colby Ross, Chip Howell, Michael Mead, Bradley Avi, Jeremy Felber and DOES 32-35)

- 59. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 58 of this Complaint, as if fully set forth at this point.
- 60. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendants
 Alpine Fire, Brian Boggeln, Colby Ross, Chip Howell, Michael Mead, Bradley Avi and
 Jeremy Felber, and each of them, had a duty to provide emergency medical services to Kristin
 Maxwell-Bruce upon arriving at her home.
- 61. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendants Alpine Fire, Brian Boggeln, Colby Ross, Chip Howell, Michael Mead, Bradley Avi and Jeremy Felber, and each of them, were grossly negligent in their treatment of Kristin Maxwell-Bruce.

- 62. As a proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendants Alpine Fire, Brian Boggeln, Colby Ross, Chip Howell, Michael Mead, Bradley Avi and Jeremy Felber, and each of them, Kristin Maxwell-Bruce suffered loss of life.
- 63. As a further proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendants Alpine Fire, Brian Boggeln, Colby Ross, Chip Howell, Michael Mead, Bradley Avi and Jeremy Felber, including the grossly negligent provision of emergency medical services, and the death of Kristin Maxwell-Bruce, Jim Maxwell, Kay Maxwell, Trever Allen Bruce and Kelten Tanner Bruce have suffered and continue to suffer loss of the care, comfort, affection, society, protection and support of their daughter and mother, Kristin Maxwell-Bruce, in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Excessive Force) – by

Jim Maxwell against Defendants County of San Diego, Gary Kneeshaw

DOES 9-25 San Diego County employees)

- 64. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 63 of this Complaint, as if fully set forth at this point.
- 65. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendant County has adopted policies, procedures, practices or customs within the San Diego County Sheriff's Department that allow, among other things, the use of excessive force when other more reasonable and less drastic methods are available.
- 66. On or about December 14, 2006, Defendant Gary Kneeshaw and DOES 9-25 San Diego County employees, acting under color of state law, sprayed Jim Maxwell in the face with pepper spray and clubbed him as he was walking down his driveway in order to prevent him from seeing and comforting his wife.
- 67. The actions of Defendants amounted to deliberate indifference to the rights of Jim Maxwell to be free of excessive force and unreasonable seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

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As a result of the deliberate indifference to Jim Maxwell's rights by Defendant County and its agents, servants and employees, including, but not limited to Defendants Gary Kneeshaw and DOES 9-25 San Diego County Employees, and each of them, Jim Maxwell suffered great mental and physical pain and suffering, in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Battery - by Jim Maxwell against Defendants

County of San Diego, Gary Kneeshaw DOES 9-25 San Diego County employees)

- 69. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 68 of this Complaint, as if fully set forth at this point.
- 70. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendant Gary Kneeshaw and each of the Defendants sued herein as DOES 9-25 San Diego County Employees, inclusive, were the agents and employees of Defendant County and were at all times acting within the purpose and scope of such agency and employment on or about December 14, 2006 when they responded to a 911 call at Jim Maxwell's home in response to the claim that Defendant Bruce shot his wife Kristin Maxwell-Bruce.
- 71. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendant Kneeshaw and DOES 9-25 San Diego County Employees, in the course of responding to the 911 call, intentionally sprayed Jim Maxwell in the face with pepper spray and then clubbed him.
- 72. At no time did Jim Maxwell consent to any of the acts of Defendant Kneeshaw and DOES 9-25 San Diego County Employees alleged above.
- 73. As a proximate result of the acts of Defendant Kneeshaw and DOES 9-25 San Diego County Employees, Jim Maxwell has suffered physical injuries, pain and mental suffering.
- 74. The foregoing wrongful acts were willful, oppressive, fraudulent, and malicious, thus warranting the award of exemplary and punitive damages against each

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defendant, except for governmental entity defendants, in an amount adequate to punish the wrongdoers and deter future misconduct.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

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(Intentional Infliction of Emotional

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Distress - against all Defendants)

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Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 74 of this 75. Complaint, as if fully set forth at this point.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendant

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Bruce, by shooting his wife, Kristin Maxwell-Bruce, in their home, which resulted in her

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eventual death, intended to cause, or recklessly disregarded the probability of causing, mental

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anguish and emotional and physical distress to Kristin Maxwell-Bruce, Jim Maxwell, Kay

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Maxwell, Trever Allen Bruce and Kelten Tanner Bruce, all of whom resided in the home

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where Defendant's act occurred, and were present in the home at the time it occurred.

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77. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis further allege, that all remaining Defendants, by their acts and omissions, including gross negligence in the provision of emergency services to Kristin Maxwell-Bruce, unlawful detainment and false imprisonment of Jim Maxwell and Kay Maxwell, and causing the media to believe that Jim Maxwell was a suspect who had been arrested for the shooting of his daughter, engaged in outrageous, non-privileged conduct with reckless disregard of the probability of causing mental anguish, and emotional and physical distress to Kristin Maxwell-Bruce, Jim Maxwell, Kay Maxwell, Trever Allen Bruce and Kelten Tanner Bruce, all of whom resided in the home where Defendant's conduct occurred, and all of whom were present in the home at the time and witnessed Defendants' conduct.

As a proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Kristin Maxwell-Bruce, Jim 78. Maxwell, Kay Maxwell, Trever Allen Bruce and Kelten Tanner Bruce suffered severe physical and emotional distress and mental suffering; and Jim Maxwell, Kay Maxwell, Trever

Allen Bruce and Kelten Tanner Bruce continue to suffer severe physical and emotional distress and mental suffering.

- 79. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiffs were, and will be, caused to retain the services of other medical professionals and to incur reasonable expenses for the care and treatment of said injuries sustained, in an amount presently unknown to Plaintiffs, but to be proven at trial.
- 80. The foregoing wrongful acts were willful, oppressive, fraudulent, and malicious, thus warranting the award of exemplary and punitive damages against each defendant, except for governmental entity defendants, in an amount adequate to punish the wrongdoers and deter future misconduct.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Negligent Infliction of Emotional

Distress - against all Defendants)

- 81. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 80 of this Complaint, as if fully set forth at this point.
- 82. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendant Bruce knew or should have known that by shooting his wife, Kristin Maxwell-Bruce, in their home, which resulted in her eventual death, would cause Kristin Maxwell-Bruce, Jim Maxwell, Kay Maxwell, Trever Allen Bruce and Kelten Tanner Bruce, all of whom resided in the home where Defendant's act occurred, and all of whom were present in the home at the time and witnessed Defendants' conduct, to suffer mental anguish and emotional and physical distress.
- 83. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis further allege, that remaining Defendants knew or should have known that their acts and omissions, including gross negligence in the provision of emergency services to Kristin Maxwell-Bruce, unlawful detainment and false imprisonment of Jim and Kay Maxwell, and causing the media to believe that Jim Maxwell was a suspect who had been arrested for the shooting of his daughter, would cause Kristin Maxwell-Bruce, Jim Maxwell, Kay Maxwell, Trever Allen

1	Bruce and Ke	elten Tanner Bruce, all of whom resided in the home where Defendant's ongoing	
2	acts and omissions occurred, and all of whom were present in the home at the time and		
3	witnessed De	fendants' conduct, to suffer mental anguish and emotional and physical distress.	
4	84.	As a proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendants, Kristin	
5	Maxwell-Bru	ice, Jim Maxwell, Kay Maxwell, Trever Allen Bruce and Kelten Tanner Bruce	
6	suffered shoc	k, fear and mental anguish; and Jim Maxwell, Kay Maxwell, Trever Allen Bruce	
7	and Kelten Tanner Bruce continue to suffer severe physical and emotional distress and menta		
8	suffering.		
9	WHEREFOR	E, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:	
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11	FOR THE FI	RST, SECOND AND SIXTH CAUSES OF ACTION:	
12	1.	For compensatory damages, according to proof at trial;	
13	2.	For exemplary and punitive damages;	
14	3.	For attorneys fees;	
15	4.	For costs of suit incurred herein; and	
16	5.	For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.	
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18	FOR THE TI	HIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:	
19	1.	For damages for the loss of care, comfort, affection, society, protection and	
20		support of Kristin Maxwell-Bruce;	
21	2.	For exemplary and punitive damages;	
22	3.	For costs of suit incurred herein; and	
23	4.	For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.	
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25	FOR THE FO	DURTH, SEVENTH AND EIGHTH CAUSES OF ACTION:	
26	1.	For general and special damages, according to proof at trial;	
27	2.	For exemplary and punitive damages;	
28	3.	For costs of suit incurred herein; and	

1	4.	For such other and	further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
2			
3	FOR THE F	IFTH AND NINTH (CAUSES OF ACTION:
4	1.	For compensatory	damages, according to proof at trial;
5	2.	For costs of suit in	curred herein; and
6	3.	For such other and	further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
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8	·	DE	EMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
9	Plaintiffs her	reby submit this dema	and that this action be tried in front of a jury, pursuant to
10	Federal Rule	of Civil Procedure 3	88 and Civil L.R. 38.1.
11			
12	Dated: Nove	ember 7, 2008	CHARLES G. LA BELLA
13			Teresa M. Gillis La Bella & McNamara, LLP
14			TODD D. THIBODO
15			LAW OFFICES OF TODD D. THIBODO A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
16			A I ROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
17			
18			By: Teresa M. Gillis
19			Charles G. La Bella Attorney for PLAINTIFFS
20			Auomey for FLAM The Asset Samuel
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1	PROOF OF SERVICE		
2 3	Maxwell v. County of San Diego, et al. United States District Court of the Southern District of California Case Number: 07 CV-2385-JAH (WMc)		
4	I, Patricia A. Schussler, declare as follows:		
5	I am an employee of a member of the bar of this Court at whose direction was made in		
6	the County of San Diego, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the		
7	within action; my business address is 401 West "A" Street, Suite 1150, San Diego, California		
8	92101.		
9	On November 7, 2008, I served the foregoing document(s) described as:		
10	1) PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO		
11	FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT; 2) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF		
12	PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED		
13	COMPLAINT (with EXHIBIT A)		
14	Kevin Osterberg Counsel for Defendant Alpine Fire		
15	Stephen M. Caine Protection District Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP		
16	3750 University Avenue, Suite 240 Riverside, CA 92501-3313		
17	Email: kosterberg@hbblaw.com scaine@hbblaw.com		
18	John J. Sansone, County Counsel Counsel for Defendant County of San		
19	Morris G. Hill, Senior Counsel 1600 Pacific Highway, Room 355		
20	San Diego, CA 92101-2469 Email: morris.hill@sdcounty.ca.gov		
21	Bindin Hornonia Codocumy Tea.go.		
22	BY EMAIL/ECF by electronically filing the foregoing with the Clerk of the District Court		
23	using its ECF System, which electronically notifies them via email as indicated above.		
24	(FEDERAL) I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this		
25	court at whose direction the service was made.		
26	Executed Novembes, 7, , , 2008, in San Diego, California.		
27	Patricia A. Schussler		
28			

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parties must identify <u>any</u> person who may be used at trial to present evidence pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702, 703 and 705, respectively. This requirement is <u>not</u> limited to retained experts.

- 2. On or before *June 26*, *2009*, each party shall comply with the disclosure provisions in Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This disclosure requirement applies to all persons retained or specifically employed to provide expert testimony or whose duties as an employee of the part regularly involve the giving of expert testimony.
- 3. Any party shall supplement its disclosure regarding contradictory or rebuttal evidence under Rule 26(a)(2)(c)on or before *July 15, 2009*.
- 4. Please be advised that failure to comply with this section or any other discovery order of the court may result in the sanctions provided for in Fed.R.Civ.P.37 including a prohibition on the introduction of experts or other designated matters in evidence.
- 5. All discovery, including experts, shall be completed by all parties on or before **August 14, 2009.** "Completed" means that all discovery under Rules 30-36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and discovery subpoenas under Rule 45, must be initiated a sufficient period of time in advance of the cut-off date, *so that it may be completed* by the cut-off date, taking into account the times for service, notice and response as set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel shall promptly and in good faith meet and confer with regard to all discovery disputes in compliance with Local Rule 26.1(a). All discovery motions shall be filed within 30 days after counsel have met and conferred and reached an impasse with regard to any particular discovery issue, but in no event shall discovery motions be filed more than 30 days after the close of discovery.
- 6. A Mandatory Settlement Conference shall be conducted on <u>April 13, 2009 at</u>

 9:30 a.m. in the chambers of Magistrate Judge William McCurine, Jr. Counsel shall submit confidential settlement briefs **directly** to chambers at efile_mccurine@casd.uscourts.gov no later than **April 6, 2009**. The briefs shall set forth the party's statement of the case and the party's

settlement position, including the last offer or demand made by that party and a separate statement of the offer or demand the party is prepared to make at the Settlement Conference. Settlement Conference briefs shall not exceed ten (10) pages in length, and shall *not* include exhibits or attachments. All parties and claims adjusters for insured defendants and representatives with complete authority to enter into a binding settlement, as well as the principal attorney (s) responsible for the litigation, must be present and legally and factually prepared to discuss and resolve the case at the Mandatory Settlement Conference. **Any special arrangements desired in cases where settlement authority rests with a governing body shall be proposed in advance.**

- 7. All other pretrial motions must be filed on or before *September 14, 2009*. (*In intellectual property cases, this would include claims construction hearings*.) Please be advised that counsel for the moving party must obtain a motion hearing date from the law clerk of the judge who will hear the motion. Be further advised that the period of time between the date you request a motion date and the hearing date may vary from one district judge to another. Please plan accordingly. For example, you should contact the judge's law clerk in advance of the motion cut-off to calendar the motion. Failure to make a timely request a motion date may result in the motion not being heard.
- 8. Counsel shall file their Memoranda of Contentions of Fact and Law and take any other action required by Local Rule 16.1 (f) (2) on or before *October 26*, *2009*.
- 9. Counsel shall comply with the Pre-trial disclosure requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3) on or before *October 26*, *2009*.
- 10. Counsel shall meet and take the action required by Local Rule 16.1 (f) (4) on or before *November 2, 2009*.
 - 11. Objections to Pre-trial disclosures shall be filed no later than *November 9*, 2009.
- 12. The Proposed Final Pretrial Conference Order required by Local Rule 16.1 (f) (6) shall be prepared, served, and lodged on or before *November 9*, *2009*.
- 13. The final Pretrial Conference is scheduled on the calendar of **Judge John A. Houston** on *November 16, 2009* at *2:30 p.m.* The trial date will be given at the Pretrial

Conference.

- 14. A post trial settlement conference before a magistrate judge may be held within 30 days of verdict in the case.
- 15. The dates and times set forth herein will not be modified except for good cause shown.
- 16. Dates and times for hearings on motions should be approved by the Court's clerk before notice of hearing is served.
- 17. Briefs or memoranda in support of or in opposition to any pending motion shall not exceed twenty-five (25) pages in length without leave of a district court judge. No reply memorandum shall exceed ten (10) pages without leave of a district court judge. Briefs and memoranda exceeding ten (10) pages in length shall have a table of contents and a table of authorities cited.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 7, 2008

Hon. William McCurine, Jr. U.S. Magistrate Judge United States District Court

Milwines

9th Circuit Case Number(s)	10-56671
NOTE: To secure your input, yo	ou should print the filled-in form to PDF (File > Print > PDF Printer/Creator).
*********	********************
When All Case Particip	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE pants are Registered for the Appellate CM/ECF System
	lically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the ls for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system.
I certify that all participants in accomplished by the appellate	n the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be e CM/ECF system.
Signature (use "s/" format)	s/ Daniel M. Benjamin
When Not All Case Particle I hereby certify that I electron United States Court of Appear on (date) Participants in the case who a CM/ECF system. I further certify that some of the have mailed the foregoing do	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE cipants are Registered for the Appellate CM/ECF System nically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the lls for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the appellate the participants in the case are not registered CM/ECF users. I cument by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, or have dispatched it arrier for delivery within 3 calendar days to the following
Signature (use "s/" format)	

Case: 10-56671 12/04/2012 ID: 8425591 DktEntry: 44 Page: 39 of 39