1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.; ISB #376 Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 818 W. Riverside Ave., Suite 250 Spokane, WA 99201 (509) 455-5200 (509) 455-3632 (fax) E-mail: ecoulter@ecl-law.com Attorneys for Defendants the Coeur d'Ale	Honorable Edward J. Lodge
10	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
11	FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO	
12	ST. ISIDORE FARM, LLC, an Idaho	No. CV-13-00274-EJL
13	limited liability company; and	
14	GOBERS, LLC, a Washington limited liability company,	
15	naomty company,	RESPONSE RE: TEMPORARY
16	Plaintiffs,	RESTRAINING ORDER
17		
18	VS.	
19	COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE OF	
20	INDIANS, a federally-recognized	
21	Indian tribe, JOHN DOES 1-10, each	
	of which are Members of the Coeur	
22	d'Alene Tribe of Indians,	
23	Defendants.	
24	Defendants.	
25		
26	COME NOW the Defendants, by and through their attorneys, and	
27		
28	herewith respond to Plaintiffs' Temporary	y Restraining Order.
29		
30	RESPONSE RE:	
	TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER – 1	Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
		818 W. Riverside, Suite 250
		Spokane, WA 99201-0910 (509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632

PLAINTIFFS' TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order, hereinafter TRO, issued by the Court on June 28, 2013, without notice and without the attorney certification in writing regarding efforts to give notice and the reasons why notice should not be required.

The Court's temporary restraining order is in effect for fourteen days pursuant to federal rule.

THE TRIBE'S RESPONSE

The Coeur d'Alene Tribe, hereinafter the Tribe, is a federally recognized sovereign Indian Tribe located in the State of Idaho. The tribe is immune from suit and nothing contained herein should be construed to be a waiver of immunity.

Plaintiffs, St. Isidore Farm, LLC, and Gobers, LLC, are limited liability corporations conducting the spreading and disposal of untreated and untested human waste from septic tanks and portable toilets on real property located within the exterior boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Reservation.

The Tribe provided notice to Plaintiffs herein that the conduct in question was a threat to the Coeur d'Alene Tribe and in violation of Chapter 57 of the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Code, "Tribal Waste Management Act." The Tribe

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demanded the Plaintiffs cease and desist the conduct, and Plaintiffs continued to dispose of untested, untreated human waste.

The Tribe filed suit in Tribal Court and served the Plaintiffs with the Tribal Court suit. Shortly after commencement of the suit in Tribal Court, attorneys for Plaintiffs and counsel for the Tribe met and conferred regarding the Tribal Court action at which time the attorneys for Plaintiffs were given assurance that they would have adequate time to respond to the suit in Tribal Court. (*See*, Declaration of Everett B. Coulter, Jr.)

Plaintiffs then proceeded to file the present suit in Federal Court challenging the jurisdiction and sovereign authority of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe to pursue the action in Tribal Court. The present suit was provided to the Tribe's attorney on June 24, 2013. An email was sent to Plaintiffs' attorneys on June 25, 2013, indicating acceptance of service of process was not approved at present and that it would take some time given the fact the Coeur d'Alene Tribe is a sovereign entity with various decision-making departments. Plaintiffs were assured nothing was going to happen in Tribal Court pending the proceedings in Tribal Court. Within the email string to Plaintiffs' attorneys, the attorneys were advised the Tribal Court action would be stayed pending the proceedings in Federal Court and, in fact, the Motion to Stay Proceedings was served upon

Plaintiffs' attorneys on June 27, 2013, and is set for hearing on July 11, 2013, at 1:00 p.m. before Tribal Court. (*See*, Declaration of Everett B. Coulter, Jr.)

Contrary to the suggestions and assertions of Plaintiffs, no criminal action was investigated or opened by the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. (*See*, Declaration of Cody SiJohn.)

LEGAL ANALYSIS

(1) Summary of Argument.

Plaintiffs obtained a TRO without notice and without Plaintiffs' attorneys certifying in writing why notice should not be given. Plaintiffs' attorneys well knew the Tribe had an attorney pursuing the matter in Tribal Court and also well knew that the attorney representing the Tribe in Tribal Court had on more than one occasion provided assurances that nothing would be transpiring in Tribal Court pending the proceedings in Federal Court and further indicating there was no criminal action being asserted by the Tribe regarding the conduct of Plaintiffs disposing of human waste.

The Tribe is pursuing Plaintiffs pursuant to the second exception in *Montana v. United States*, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) and specifically that the United States Supreme Court under *Montana*, *supra*, permits an Indian Tribe to regulate the noxious conduct of non-Indians on fee land when the conduct threatens,

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menaces, imperils or has a direct impact upon the health or welfare of the Tribe. See, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 341 (2008), citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.

Plaintiffs' original Memorandum of Law mentions in passing the "exhaustion doctrine" giving no credence to the requirement that exhaustion is a prerequisite to seeking relief in Federal Court. *See*, *Grand Canyon Skywalk Development, LLC v. SA-NYU Wa, Inc.*, 715 F.3d 1196, 2013 WL 1777060 (9th Cir. 2013).

(2) Temporary Restraining Order.

restraining orders. The rule provides that the Court may issue a TRO without notice upon specified conditions which include (1) clear evidence irreparable injury would occur without the temporary order and, (2) "The movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1)(B).

Plaintiffs' attorneys in this case were amply aware that the Tribe was represented by counsel based upon an in-person meeting of the attorneys and secondly an email string wherein the undersigned, as the attorney for the Tribe, made clear that no action was going to take place in Tribal Court pending the

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Plaintiffs' challenge in Federal Court regarding the jurisdiction of Tribal Court.

The undersigned specifically indicated the Tribal Court proceedings would be stayed and the stay could be based upon a stipulation or a motion and, in fact, a

The Court's attention is called to *Reno Air Racing Association, Inc. v. McCord*, 452 F.3d 1126 (2006) wherein the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of temporary restraining orders being issued ex parte without notice pursuant to Rule 65(b). The Court pointed out that temporary restraining orders were an extraordinary remedy subject to stringent restrictions on the issuance citing *Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters*, 415 U.S. 423, 438-439 (1974). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals went further and noted there are very limited exceptions when ex parte temporary restraining orders are to be granted. The whole purpose is to preserve the status quo and in the present case the Coeur d'Alene Tribe as sovereign entity voluntarily agreed to a stay on the status quo regarding the Tribal Court action pending the jurisdictional issues resolution in Federal Court.

Plaintiffs should not be permitted to invoke the Court's injunctive jurisdiction as a way to gloss over the exhaustion requirement. The legal propriety of granting a temporary restraining order should not be properly

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motion was submitted to Tribal Court.

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determined without considering whether the Court should stay its hand under the exhaustion doctrine. *See*, *Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court*, 566 F.3d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing (1) that they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO; (3) that balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) injunctive relief is in the public interest. *See*, *Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

Plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of succeeding on the merits regarding Tribal Court jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth in the following exhaustion discussion of this brief, Plaintiffs should be required to exhaust their remedies in Tribal Court. Exhaustion of the jurisdictional challenge in Tribal Court has been recently held as a prerequisite to the Federal Court's exercise of its jurisdiction. See, Grand Canyon Skywalk Development, Inc., LLC, v. SA-NYU Wa, Inc., supra

The second element Plaintiffs have failed to establish is that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief. Under the holding in *Winter v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.*, Plaintiffs are obligated to establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a

preliminary injunction. *See*, *Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). The Tribe has submitted the Declaration of the Tribal Police Chief indicating there is no criminal matter now pending and there was no criminal investigation. Moreover, the preliminary jurisdictional challenge in Federal Court dealing with whether the Plaintiffs have to exhaust Tribal Court jurisdiction and presumably the challenge in Tribal Court of jurisdiction is a clear vehicle and approach for Plaintiffs to deal with the Tribal Court litigation.

The legal standard requiring Plaintiffs to exhaust in Tribal Court is: Tribal Court is not colorable or plausible. See *Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court*, 566 F.3d 842, 848, (9th cir. 2009). The legal threshold in Federal Court only requires the Tribe to prove that jurisdiction in Tribal Court is plausible or colorable, which is a low standard. Plaintiffs have not shown irreparable harm from failing to exhaust a jurisdictional challenge in Tribal Court.

The balancing of equities factor regarding injunctive relief weighs in favor of the Tribe based upon the exhaustion doctrine. The Federal Indian Law policy is in favor of allowing a Tribal Court the first opportunity to evaluate the jurisdictional challenge. *See*, *National Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe of Indians*, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985). A second factor under the exhaustion

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doctrine weighing in favor of the Tribe and against Plaintiffs is that Federal Court will benefit from the Tribal Court's expertise regarding defining its own ordinances and its own jurisdiction. *See*, *Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Crow Tribal Council*, 940 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1991).

The last requirement of proof for the Plaintiffs in seeking injunctive relief is the public interest element. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). There does not appear to be a public interest issue or element in the context of Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief. If injunctive relief is granted, the legitimacy and independence of a tribal court system comes into serious question and will undercut the tribal court system in contravention of the requiring exhaustion in Tribal Court. The public interest in federal Indian law policy weighs heavily in favor of denying the continued temporary restraining order. The Tribe has on its own volition moved to stay the Tribal Court proceeding knowing full well there is a jurisdictional challenge in Federal Court that raises the issue of Tribal Court jurisdiction on a preliminary basis and the exhaustion doctrine.

(3) Exhaustion

The following summary discussion of exhaustion in Tribal Court is submitted not as an exhaustive review of Tribal Court exhaustion but rather as a

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summary basis to deny the continuance of the temporary restraining order. It is noted herein, the Tribe is in the process of preparing a motion to dismiss requiring the Plaintiffs to exhaust Tribal Court jurisdiction, which will be submitted in the near term.

The doctrine of exhaustion remedies in Tribal Court requires Plaintiffs to challenge the jurisdiction of Tribal Court in Tribal Court and then proceed to Federal Court. See, Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985); *Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante*, 480 U.S. 9, 15-16 (1987); and Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239, 1244-47 (9th Cir. 1991). The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies in Tribal Court is premised upon comity and deference to Tribal Court to permit Tribal Courts, such as the Coeur d'Alene Tribe in this case, to determine its jurisdiction. That is, the federal court system as a matter of law has granted comity to Indian Tribes to determine jurisdiction over matters pending in Tribal Court prior to review in Federal Court. Comity is the courtesy, respect and privilege granted to another soverign. See, Wilson v. Marchington, 123 F.3d 805, 808, citing, Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 1113 (1895).

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In the recent case of *Grand Canyon Skywalk Development, LLC v. SA-NYU Wa, Inc.*,715 F.3d 1196, 2013 WL1777060 (9th Cir. 2013), the Court held as follows:

We have interpreted National Farmers as determining that tribal court jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional bar, but rather a prerequisite to a federal court's exercise of its jurisdiction. (Citations omitted.) Therefore, under National Farmers, the federal courts should not even make a ruling on tribal court jurisdiction until tribal court remedies are exhausted.

Three additional Ninth Circuit cases have required exhaustion in Tribal Court without ever addressing the issue of injunctive relief. See, Evans v. Shoshone Bannock Land Use Policy Commission, U.S. District Court for District of Idaho, Cause No. CV-417-BLW, 212 WL6651194, a district court decision December 20, 2012, by Judge Winmill (on Appeal to Ninth Circuit); Rincon Mushroom Corporation v. Mazzetti, 490 F. App'x. 11, 2012 WL2928605 (Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit (unpublished opinion and cited to the Court pursuant to Circuit Rule 36-3)); Dish Network Corporation v. Tewa, United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Cause No. CV-12-8077-PCT-JAT, November 12, 2002.

Under the Tribal Court exhaustion rule, which is based upon comity and deference to a native sovereign nation, the comity and deference is reciprocal

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running from Federal Court to Tribal Court and from Tribal Court to Federal Court. In this particular case, the Tribe on its own sought to stay the proceedings in Tribal Court until the Plaintiffs' jurisdictional challenges were determined in Federal Court.

(4) Criminal Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs have spent considerable time arguing criminal jurisdiction and civil penalties without addressing the issue of Tribal Court exhaustion, much less addressing the issue of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. 1301 et seq. Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, the Tribe has not asserted criminal jurisdiction and may well not assert criminal jurisdiction. Regardless, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 1303, there is a remedy for alleged criminal jurisdiction, namely habeas corpus. Thus, although there is no threatened or pending criminal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs' challenges regarding criminal issues are misplaced in that the proper procedure for challenging criminal jurisdiction is under the Indian Civil Rights Act, hereinafter ICRA, and a writ of habeas corpus.

Even though the Tribe has not asserted criminal jurisdiction, the exhaustion rule applies to criminal actions. *See*, *Jeffredo v. Macarro*, 599 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2010); *Valenzuela v. Silversmith*, 699 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2012) holding that exhaustion is required in Tribal Court.

(5) Ex Parte Young

The Coeur d'Alene Tribe and its representatives who are allegedly named as John Does 1-10 are immune from suit. Nothing contained in the original Tribal Court suit brought by the Tribe against Plaintiffs constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity. The Tribe's response to the temporary restraining order does not waive the sovereign immunity. The *Ex Parte Young Doctrine*, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), permits Federal Court to respectfully restrain individuals that are violating federal law when said individuals are state officials or alternatively are tribal officials. Under *Ex Parte Young*, "tribal sovereign immunity does not bar suit for prospective relief against tribal officers allegedly acting in violation of federal law." *Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Vaughn*, 509 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2007).

The difficulty with Plaintiffs' efforts in respect to the temporary restraining order is that the order encompasses the Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Indians, a native sovereign nation, and the *Ex Parte Young* doctrine does not apply to the Tribe itself due to its immunity. *See, Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala Band of Mission Indians*, 940 F.2d, 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 1991) citing *Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez*, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); *See also, Vann v. Dept. of Interior*, 701 F.3d 927 (DC Ct. Appeals 2012) for discussion of scope of *Ex Parte Young*.

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The Plaintiffs in their haste to race to federal court seeking injunctive relief while seemingly ignoring the Tribe and its representatives' immunity by not recognizing the application of *Ex Parte Young, supra*, is a clear disregard of Plaintiffs' obligations to present the court with a clear basis to support a temporary restraining order of a tribal official and any subsequent preliminary injunction. As such, the temporary restraining order should not be continued.

CONCLUSION

The temporary restraining order issued without notice and without the required written certification should not be continued. The issue in controversy is whether or not the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Court has jurisdiction, which will be subject to a Motion to Dismiss for lack of exhaustion of Tribal Court remedies. The United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have applied the exhaustion doctrine of deference to Tribal Courts on the basis of comity. There is absolutely no threat of irreparable harm to deal with the unique and complex Indian law issues this case presents relating to Tribal Court jurisdiction and exhaustion. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe honors the comity and deference doctrine to Federal Court initially and hopes that Federal Court will acknowledge the reciprocal comity and deference to permit Tribal Court to determine its jurisdiction over the subject in controversy.

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1	RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of July, 2013.	
2	EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S.	
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4	By <u>s/Everett B. Coulter, Jr.</u>	
5	EVERETT B. COULTER, JR., ISB #3768 Attorneys for Defendants	
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10	E-mail: ecoulter@ecl-law.com	
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12		
13	<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>	
14	I hereby certify that on the 8th day of July, 2013, I electronically filed the	
15	foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF System, which will send	
16	notification of such filing to the following:	
17	Ausey H. Robnett, III via ausey.robnett@painehamblen.com	
18	Gregg R. Smith via <u>Gregg.smith@painehamblen.com</u> Jerry K. Boyd via <u>jerry.boyd@painehamblen.com</u>	
19	Trevor B. Frank via trevor.frank@ecl-law.com	
20	I have by further certify that I have coused to be conved a true and correct conv. of	
21	I hereby further certify that I have caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document(s) on the non-CM/ECF participants as indicated:	
22	Hand Delivered	
23	No manual recipients U.S. Mail	
24	Overnight Mail Facsimile	
25	Facsimile	
26	/s/ Everett B. Coulter, Jr.	
27		
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30	RESPONSE RE: TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER – 15 Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 Spokane, WA 99201-0910	

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