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7	The state of the s							
8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT							
9	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA							
10	ALTURAS INDIAN RANCHERIA,) C	ase N	No. 2:10	o-cv-0199	97 LKK-EFB		
11	Plaintiff,	,				POINTS AND		
12	v.) F	OR C	ORDER	ENFOR	JPPORT OF MOTION CING JUDGMENT CANDANTS IN	N	
13	KENNETH SALAZAR, et al.,			EMPT	IG DEFE	NDANTS IN		
14	Defendant.		OATE: 'IME:		vember 4 00 a.m.	, 2013		
15) C	TRM	I.: 4, 15	th Floor	awrence K. Karlton		
16 17			CDG.	L. 11011	orable L	awrence K. Kartton		
18	Plaintiff, the Alturas Indian Rancheria ("Tribe"), moves the Court for an order enforcing the "Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of Judgment and Order," entered by this Court on January 12, 2012 ("Judgment") and holding the defendant federal officials, Secretary of the Interior Kenneth Salazar¹ et al. ("Federal Defendants"), in contempt for their willful and persistent failure to comply with the							
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23	Judgment. The Judgment states: The BIA has approved the Tribe's self-determination contract requests for the fiscal years 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and shall transfer the amounts provided in those requests to the Tribe's bank account maintained with the Plumas Bank in accordance with the terms contained in the contract award documents.							
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26								
27	¹ Former Secretary of the Inte				•			
28	matter at the time that the Judgment was rendered, has since left office. Sally Jewel is the current Secretary of the Interior.						:ne	
		1	1			JM OF POINTS AND S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO		

Judgment, p. 2.

In clear violation of the Court's Judgment, the Federal Defendants refuse to pay the contract support costs that they are required to pay to the Tribe under the terms of the self-determination contract for government operations entered into between the Tribe and the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450 et seq. ("ISDEAA"), and the ISDEAA's implementing regulations.

Pursuant to Rule 70 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 70"), the Tribe requests that the Court issue an order directing the Federal Defendants to pay the contract support costs the United States is obligated to pay pursuant to the Tribe's self-determination contract; holding the Federal Defendants in contempt for failing to comply with this Court's Judgment and, on that basis, impose sanctions in the form of the Tribe's attorneys' fees incurred in preparing this motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following are the only facts necessary to address the Tribe's present motion:

- 1. The Tribe entered into a self-determination contract for 2009 with the BIA for government operations, pursuant to the provisions of the ISDEAA. In that contract, the Tribe agreed to provide government operations services that the BIA would have been required to provide to the Tribe. In return, the BIA agreed to provide both base funding and funding for the contract support costs arising from the contract. Declaration of Wayne Smith in Support of Motion for Order Finding Federal Defendants in Contempt ("Smith Declaration"), p. 1, ¶ 2, and Exhibit 1 thereto.
- 2. In January, 2010, in response to an internal tribal dispute about who constituted the members of the Tribe and who constituted the members of the Tribe's Tribal Council, the BIA, Northern California Agency, refused to renew the Tribe's self-determination contract. Smith Declaration, p. 2, \P 3.
 - 3. As a result of the BIA's actions, the Tribe was not permitted to enter into

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California. The claims relating to those defendants are not relevant to the current motion.

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I.

THE TRIBE IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER FINDING THE FEDERAL DEFENDANTS IN CONTEMPT.

Rule 70(e) permits a court to direct a party to litigation to perform a specific act as directed by a judgment of the court and to hold a party in contempt where the party has failed to comply with the terms of a judgment issued by the Court. In the present case, the Federal Defendants have failed and refused to comply with the Judgment by failing to pay to the Tribe the contract support costs to which it is entitled under the Contract.

The Judgment requires that the Federal Defendants pay the contract support costs: "The BIA has approved the Tribe's self-determination contract requests for the fiscal years 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and shall transfer the amounts provided in those requests to the Tribe's bank account . . . in accordance with the terms contained in the contract award documents." (Emphasis added.)

The Contract provides that the BIA shall pay to the Tribe the contract support costs incurred by the Tribe in carrying out its obligations under the Contract. Smith Declaration, Exhibit 1, p. 8.

The ISDEAA also provides that the federal government shall pay to Indian tribes the contract support costs incurred by a tribe in carrying out its obligations under a self-determination contract, 25 U.S.C. § § 450j-1(a)(2), (g).

The BIA's failure to pay the indirect contract support costs arising from the administration of the Tribe's Self-Determination contract is, thus, a violation of the terms of the Judgment. Federal courts have concluded that a motion filed pursuant to Rule 70 is an appropriate means for enforcing a judgment against an agency of the federal government, even where the judgment requires the federal government to pay money to the plaintiff. *Gilbert v. Johnson*, 490 F.2d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 1974); *Lufkin v. United States*, 168 F. Supp. 451, 455 (D.N.H. 1958). An order of contempt is also appropriate, even where the defendants are public officials. *Gilbert*, 490 F.2d at 830;

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Sawyer v. Dollar, 190 F.2d 623, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See, also, Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 384 F. Supp. 846 (C.D. Cal. 1974).

Thus, the filing of the Tribe's notice, pursuant to FRCP Rule 70, is the appropriate means for enforcing the Judgment against the Federal Defendants in this case.

DEFENDANTS POLICY OF REFUSING TO PAY CONTRACT SUPPORT COSTS AS A RESULT OF INSUFFICIENT APPROPRIATIONS IS A VIOLATION OF THE ISDEAA.

II.

The BIA's response to the Tribe's repeated requests for the contract support costs to which it is entitled under the Contract is that the BIA is not obligated to pay those costs, because: (1) the Tribe was not on a "distribution list" that entitles tribes to contract support costs ("Alturas Rancheria is not identified on the attached FY 13 CSC distribution list, therefore, I am unsure as to why NCA is attempting to award the tribe CSC funding?"), and (2) there is no money available to pay the contract support costs funds to the Tribe, so the only funding that might be available would be from new appropriations ("They can be considered for the bottoms [*sic*] up distribution at the end of the year, if funds are available.").

The question of whether the federal government is required to provide contract support costs to Indian tribes that have entered into self-determination contracts, even where Congress has failed to appropriate sufficient funds to pay for all of the contract support costs for all of the tribes with which the BIA has entered into self-determination contracts was definitively resolved by the United States Supreme Court in *Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter*, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012) ("*Salazar*").

In both *Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U. S. 631, 639 (2005)*, and *Salazar*, the Court addressed the contention put forward by the federal officials that its obligation to pay contract support costs for ISDEAA self-determination contracts was "subject to the availability of appropriations." 25 U.S.C. §450j-1(b). "The Government contended . . . that Congress had appropriated inadequate funds to enable the [agency]

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to pay the Tribes' contract support costs in full, while meeting all of the agency's competing fiscal priorities." *Salazar*, 132 S. Ct. at 2188.

In *Salazar*, the Ramah Navajo School Board challenged the BIA's decision to grant indirect contract support costs to Indian tribes that had entered into self-determination contracts on a "uniform, pro rata basis," *Salazar*, 132 S. Ct. at 2187, because Congress failed to appropriate sufficient funds to pay the full amount of the contract support costs for all of the self-determination contracts. The school board sought all of the indirect contract support costs to which it was entitled under the terms of the contract.

The Supreme Court ruled that the school board was indeed entitled to all of the indirect contract support costs provided for in the contract and the ISDEAA, despite the fact that Congress had not allocated sufficient funding to pay for all of the contract support costs required under all of the self-determination contracts entered into with tribes throughout the country:

When a Government contractor is one of several persons to be paid out of a larger appropriation sufficient in itself to pay the contractor, it has long been the rule that the Government is responsible to the contractor for the full amount due under the contract, even if the agency exhausts the appropriation in service of other permissible ends. See *Ferris v. United States*, 27 Ct. Cl. 542, 546 (1892); Dougherty v. United States, 18 Ct. Cl. 496, 503 (1883); see also 2 GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, p. 6-17 (2d ed. 1992) (hereinafter GAO Redbook). That is so "even if an agency's total lump-sum appropriation is insufficient to pay *all* the contracts the agency has made." *Cherokee Nation*, 543 U. S., at 637, 125 S. Ct. 1172, 161 L. Ed. 2d 66. In such cases, "[t]he United States are as much bound by their contracts as are individuals." *Lynch v. United States*, 292 U. S. 571, 580, 54 S. Ct. 840, 78 L. Ed. 1434 (1934) Although the agency itself cannot disburse funds beyond those appropriated to it, the Government's "valid obligations will remain enforceable in the courts." GAO Redbook, p. 6-17.

Salazar, 132 S. Ct. 2181.

The Court went on to explain the basis of its holding:

[S]o long as Congress appropriates adequate funds to cover a prospective contract, contractors need not keep track of agencies' shifting priorities and competing obligations; rather, they may trust that the Government will honor its contractual promises. *Dougherty*, 18 Ct. Cl., at 503. In such cases, if an agency overcommits its funds such that it cannot fulfill its contractual commitments, even the Government has acknowledged that "[t]he risk of over-obligation may be found to fall on the agency," not the

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1	contractor.							
2	Salazar, 132 S. Ct. at 2189.							
3	The Supreme Court further explained that:							
4	The principles underlying <i>Cherokee Nation</i> and <i>Ferris</i> dictate the result							
5	in this case. Once "Congress has appropriated sufficient legally unrestricted funds to pay the contracts at issue, the Government							
6	normally cannot back out of a promise to pay on grounds of 'insufficient appropriations,' even if the contract uses language such as 'subject to the availability of appropriations,' and even if an agency's total lump-sum							
7	availability of appropriations,' and even if an agency's total lump-sum appropriation is insufficient to pay <i>all</i> the contracts the agency has made."							
8	Salazar, 132 S. Ct. 2190, quoting Cherokee Nation, 543 U. S., at 637.3							
9	In reaching this conclusion, the Salazar Court specifically rejected the argument							
10	that its ruling:							
11 12	could cause the Secretary to violate the Anti-Deficiency Act, which prevents federal officers from "mak[ing] or authoriz[ing] an expenditure							
13	or obligation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation." 31 U . S. C . $\S 1341(a)(1)(A)$. But a predecessor version of that Act was in place							
14	when <i>Ferris</i> and <i>Dougherty</i> were decided, see GAO Redbook, pp. 6-9 to 6-10, and the Government did not prevail there. As <i>Dougherty</i> explained, the Anti-Deficiency Act's requirements "apply to the official, but they do not affect the rights in this court of the citizen honestly contracting with							
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16	the Government." 18 Ct. Cl., at 503; see also Ferris, 27 Ct. Cl., at 546 ("An appropriation per se merely imposes limitations upon the							
17	Government's own agents; but its insufficiency does not pay the Government's debts, nor cancel its obligations").							
18	Salazar, 132 S. Ct. at 2193.							
19	The Salazar Court found that, where necessary, the shortfall in funding for self-							
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22	³ In <i>Cherokee Nation</i> , the Court found that:							
23	the Government's provision of funds under the Act is "subject to the							
24	availability of appropriations." 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(b). This language does not help the Government Language of this kind is often used with							
25	respect to Government contracts. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2716(a)(1) [22 USCS § 2716(a)(1)]; 42 U.S.C. §§ 6249(b)(4) [42 USCS § 6249(b)(4)], 12206(d)(1).							
26	This kind of language normally makes clear that an agency and a contracting							
27	party can negotiate a contract prior to the beginning of a fiscal year but that the contract will not become binding unless and until Congress appropriates funds for that year.							
28	Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 643.							

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determination contracts can be made up from the judgment fund⁴ established under 31 U.S.C. § 1304:

Congress expressly provided in ISDA that tribal contractors were entitled to sue for 'money damages' under the Contract Disputes Act upon the Government's failure to pay, 25 U. S. C. §§450m-1(a), (d), and judgments against the Government under that Act are payable from the Judgment Fund, 41 U. S. C. §7108(a).

Salazar, 132 S. Ct. at 2193.

The *Salazar* and *Cherokee Nation* decisions leave no doubt that the BIA is obligated to pay to the Tribe the contract support costs for all of the years the Contract was in force. To the extent that the appropriations by Congress were, or are, insufficient to pay all of the contract support costs to which the BIA is obligated under the Contract, the federal government must pay the costs from the Judgment Fund. *Id.*

Finally, there is nothing in the *Salazar* and *Cherokee Nation* cases that could be interpreted to allow the BIA to evade its obligation to pay contract support costs through the failure of BIA officials to place the Tribe on an internal BIA "distribution list."

CONCLUSION

The Federal Defendants are compelled to pay all of the contract support costs to which it has obligated itself under the Tribe's self-determination contract, because this Court has ordered the Federal Defendants to do so. The Federal Defendants are also compelled to pay all of the contract support costs to which it has obligated itself under the Contract, because the Supreme Court does not permit the federal government to avoid its obligation to pay contract support costs for self-determination contracts on the grounds that Congress failed to appropriate sufficient funding to cover all of the contracts that federal agencies have entered into: "[W]hen an agency makes competing contractual commitments with legally available funds and then fails to pay,

⁴When payment from the Judgment Fund (31 U.S.C. 1304) is required, guidance to agencies is provided by the Treasury Department's Financial Management Service at http://www.fms.treas.gov/judgefund/index.html.

Case 2:10-cv-01997-LKK-EFB Document 129 Filed 09/27/13 Page 11 of 11 it is the Government that must bear the fiscal consequences, not the contractor." 1 2 Salazar, 132 S. Ct. at 2192. In this case, the Federal Defendants do not dispute that they have failed to pay 3 the contract support costs due to the Tribe under the Contract. Instead, they maintain 4 5 that they cannot pay the contract support costs because Congress has not allocated sufficient funding for all of the contract support costs to which the BIA has obligated 6 7 itself. It is not the Tribe's responsibility to bear the consequences of the federal 8 government's failure to appropriate sufficient funds. 9 The Tribe therefore respectfully requests that the Court order the Federal 10 Defendants to pay all of the contract support costs to which it is obligated under the Tribe's self-determination contract for 2010-2012. By doing so, the Court will ensure 11 that the Tribe receives the funds that it is entitled to under its self-determination 12 contracts from the Judgment Fund. The Tribe also respectfully requests that the Court 13 14 find the Federal Defendants in contempt for their refusal to pay those contract support costs in violation of the Judgment and award the Tribe its costs and attorneys' fees 15 16 incurred in bringing this motion as a sanction for their behavior. Respectfully submitted, 17 Dated: September 27, 2013 RAPPORT AND MARSTON 18 19 By: /s/Lester J. Marston 20 Lester J. Marston Attorneys for the Alturas Indian 21 Rancheria 22 23 24 25 26 27 28