

02-10-15 P12:00 IN

*Betty Leathers*

IN THE NOOKSACK TRIBAL COURT

MICHELLE JOAN ROBERTS, et al.

Case No. 2013-CI-CL-003

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 2014-CI-CL-007

v.

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE IN  
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'  
"NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE"

ROBERT KELLY, Chairman of the Nooksack  
Tribal Council, et al.

Defendants.

BELMONT, et al.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROBERT KELLY, Chairman of the Nooksack  
Tribal Council, et al.

Defendants.

I. FACTS

A. The Injunction Orders

On March 31, 2014, this Court "issue[d] a permanent injunction against the Defendants enjoining them from undertaking disenrollment proceedings under Resolution 13-111, in accordance with the Nooksack Court of Appeals' Opinion in [*Roberts v. Kelly*, No. 2013- CI-

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION  
TO DEFENDANTS' "NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE" - 1

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1 CL-003 (Nooksack Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2014) [hereinafter *Roberts Opinion*].” *Roberts v. Kelly*,  
2 No. 2013-CI-CL-003 (Nooksack Tribal Ct. Mar. 31, 2014) [hereinafter *Roberts Permanent*  
3 *Injunction Order*]. This Court ruled in full that: “The Nooksack Court of Appeals held that  
4 because Resolution 13-111 was not constitutionally adopted by ordinance, or amendment to an  
5 ordinance, as was not approved by the Secretary [of the Interior], the Council cannot use the  
6 procedural rules in Resolution 13-111 in Appellant’s disenrollment proceedings.” *Id.* (citing  
7 *Roberts Opinion*, at 5) (brackets in original).

8 Notwithstanding the *Roberts Permanent Injunction Order*, in May 2014, Defendants  
9 attempted to recommence disenrollment against Plaintiffs Eleanor Belmont and Olive Oshiro.  
10 *Belmont v. Kelly*, No. 2014-CI-CL-007 (Nooksack Tribal Ct. Jun. 12, 2014), at 2 [hereinafter  
11 *Belmont Preliminary Injunction Order*”]. Defendants had issued Mrs. Belmont and Mrs. Oshiro  
12 (1) a document titled “Notice of Meeting” (“Notice”); (2) a document titled “Basis for  
13 Commencement for Disenrollment Proceedings”; and (3) Title 63, under cover of Nooksack  
14 Tribal Council Resolution No. 05-05, dated January 24, 2004. Motion for Preliminary  
15 Injunction, Belmont, No. 2014-CI-CL-007 (Nooksack Tr. Ct. May 29, 2014), Appendices 1-2.  
16 As this Court explained, Defendants described the Notices as follows:

17 The Notices explain that a response to the Basis may be submitted prior to the meeting, that  
18 Ms. Belmont and Ms. Oshiro may be represented by counsel at the meeting, that Ms.  
19 Belmont and Ms. Oshiro will each have 15 minutes to present oral testimony to the Tribal  
20 Council, and that the Council will provide written notice of its determination regarding  
21 disenrollment . . . The Bases [plural] note that the Tribal Council has the burden of proof in  
22 disenrollment meetings under Title 63, Section 63.04.001(B) and explain the evidence  
23 obtained by the Council indicating erroneous enrollment. *Defendants’ Response in*  
24 *Opposition*, 4.

21 *Belmont Preliminary Injunction Order*, at 2. This Court rejected Defendants’ argument that “the  
22 Notices are like ‘memos’” and thus not subject to Secretarial approval as disenrollment rules or  
23 ordinance as required by the *Roberts Opinion*. *Id.* at 5-6; *see also Roberts Opinion*, at 9 (“[A]ny  
24

1 procedural rules governing disenrollment proceedings must be adopted by ordinance and the  
2 ordinance approved by the Secretary of Interior as provided for in the Nooksack Constitution.”).

3 On June 12, 2014, this Court ruled that Defendants’ “approach appears to be an attempt  
4 to circumvent the very clear holdings of the Court of Appeals that disenrollment procedures . . .  
5 must be approved by the Secretary of the Interior.” *Belmont* Preliminary Injunction Order, at 6.<sup>1</sup>  
6 Accordingly, this Court issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining Defendants from  
7 recommencing disenrollment. *Id.*

8 **B. The Interior Secretary’s Approval of Nooksack’s Disenrollment Rules**

9 On September 23, 2014, Defendants promulgated “Polling Resolution” 14-110, which  
10 adopted an amended version of Title 63 that incorporated the “Disenrollment Procedures  
11 pursuant to Resolution 13-111,” as modified in hope of rectifying certain constitutional  
12 deficiencies in those procedures that were identified in the *Roberts* Opinion (in addition to the  
13 Secretarial approval deficiency). Declaration of Gabriel S. Galanda (“Galanda Decl.”), Ex. A.  
14 Defendants forwarded Resolution 14-110 and the amended Title 63 to the Department of Interior  
15 for approval as required by the Nooksack Constitution and the *Roberts* Opinion. *Id.* Defendants  
16 “tentatively approved, through a polling process, Resolution #14-110 and the attached amended  
17 Enrollment Ordinance.” *Id.*, Ex. B. Consequently, Interior rejected Resolution 14-110 and the  
18 amended Title 63. *Id.*

19 On October 10, 2014, Defendants passed Resolution 14-112 and readopting amended  
20 Title 63, at a Tribal Council meeting, by a vote of “3 FOR, 2 OPPOSED and 0  
21 ABSTENTIONS.” *Id.*, Ex. C. Like the federally rejected Resolution 14-110, Resolution 14-111  
22 sought to remedy the constitutional deficiencies in the incorporated disenrollment procedures per

23 <sup>1</sup> Defendants’ approach last May was consistent with the Court of Appeals’ criticism of Defendants’ ways of “fast-  
24 tracking the disenrollment process at nearly every turn” and otherwise acting “with haste,” since 2013. *Lomeli v.*  
*Kelly*, No. 2013-CI-APL-2013-002, at 8 n.7 (Nooksack Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2013).

1 the *Roberts* Opinion. *Id*; see also Exs. D, E. The Acting Superintendent of the Bureau of Indian  
2 Affairs Puget Sound Agency (“BIA”) received Resolution 14-112 and amended Title 63 papers  
3 on October 14, 2014, and approved them on October 24, 2014. *Id.*<sup>2</sup>

4 The Acting Superintendent cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in *Santa Clara*  
5 *Pueblo v. Martinez*, 436 U.S. 49, 62-64 (1978), as the basis for approving the “disenrollment  
6 rules and regulations” in Title 63, even though *Santa Clara* has nothing to do with disenrollment.  
7 *Id.* Instead, in *Santa Clara*, “the Supreme Court held that federal court enforcement of the  
8 [federal Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968] is limited to *habeas corpus* jurisdiction on behalf of  
9 persons in tribal custody [and that] the ICRA cannot be directly enforced against Indian tribes  
10 because they are shielded from suit by sovereign immunity.” *DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal*  
11 *Court*, 874 F.2d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 1989). In other words, *Santa Clara* was decided on  
12 procedural/jurisdictional grounds under ICRA, without anything to do with tribal disenrollment  
13 power. *Id.*<sup>3</sup>

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15 <sup>2</sup> Although in 2005-2006, the BIA Puget Sound Agency took fourteen months to approve the original Title 63, the  
Acting Superintendent took only eight working days to initially approve the latest Title 63 amendments in October  
of 2014. Galanda Decl., Exs. G, H.

16 <sup>3</sup> Indeed, until at least 1988—ten years after *Santa Clara*—Interior continued to acknowledge that, while tribes do  
17 possess the authority to set tribal membership standards, their authority has always been subservient to the Secretary  
of the Interior:

18 [W]hile it is true that membership in an Indian tribe is for the tribe to decide, that principle is  
19 dependent on and subordinate to the [DOI]. A tribe does not have authority under the guise of  
20 determining its own membership to include as members persons who are not maintaining some  
meaningful sort of political relationship with the tribal government. The DOI has concluded that  
it has broad and possibly nonreviewable authority to disapprove or withhold  
approval . . . regarding membership . . . .

21 Memorandum from Scott Keep, Ass’t Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to the Chief of the Division of Tribal  
Government Services 6 (Mar. 2, 1988) [hereinafter Keep Memo]. The Keep Memo was cited as persuasive  
22 authority for the position that the BIA possesses the authority to regulate tribal membership in *Masayesva for & on*  
*Behalf of Hopi Indian Tribe v. Zah*, 792 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 1992); see also KIRSTY GOVER, TRIBAL  
23 CONSTITUTIONALISM: STATES, TRIBES, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF MEMBERSHIP 126 (2010) (citing the Keep Memo  
for the proposition that the federal executive may determine for itself whether or not to maintain a political  
24 relationship with certain individuals). Thus, as “a delegated authority” from the United States, any tribal authority  
to disenroll tribal members “must necessarily be subservient to the [agency] by which the delegation was made”—  
here, the BIA. *State v. Overton*, 16 Nev. 136, 137 (1881). In other words, any tribal inherent “right to define its

1 **C. Plaintiffs' Federal Administrative Appeal, and Stay, of the Secretary's Approval**

2 On January 7, 2015, the BIA Northwest Regional Director approved Resolution 14-112  
3 and the amended Title 63 with disenrollment procedures on behalf of the Interior Secretary.  
4 Galanda Decl., Ex. F. In turn, the BIA Acting Superintendent informed Defendants of the  
5 Secretarial approval of those latest Nooksack laws on January 13, 2014. *Id.*, Ex. G. Plaintiffs,  
6 specifically "the currently enrolled 271 Nooksack Indians" known as the Nooksack 306,<sup>4</sup>  
7 appealed the Secretarial decision to approve to the BIA Acting Superintendent and U.S.  
8 Department of the Interior Board of Indian Appeals pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 2.9 and 43 C.F.R. §  
9 4.332, for violation of "both federal and Nooksack law." *Id.*, Ex H; *see also id.*, Ex. I (approval  
10 would be "arbitrary or capricious, or violat[ive of] federal constitutional civil rights protections  
11 or international human rights norms."); *id.*, Ex. J ("the proposed amendment is 'contrary to  
12 applicable law.' 25 U.S.C. § 476(c)(2)-(3).")<sup>5</sup>

13 Critically, as Plaintiffs explained in their federal appeal notice, by operation of federal  
14 law, "any legal effect of the decision under appeal is stayed pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 2.6(b) and  
15 43 C.F.R. § 4.314(a)." *Id.* Because the Secretary's approval of Resolution 14-112 and the  
16 amended Title 63 remains without legal effect pending Plaintiffs' federal administrative appeal,  
17 this Court must refrain from dissolving or vacating the *Roberts* Permanent Injunction Order or  
18 *Belmont* Preliminary Injunction Order. 25 C.F.R. § 2.6(b).

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21 own membership," Galanda Decl., Ex. E (quoting *Santa Clara*, 436 U.S. 49), is materially different than the  
federally delegated tribal right to disenroll Indians. The Secretary *qua* Acting BIA's Superintendent's reliance upon  
*Santa Clara* is misplaced, and her approval is otherwise unlawful. *See* Galanda Decl., Exs. H-J.

22 <sup>4</sup> *See* Sanford Levinson, "Who Counts?" "Sez Who?", 58 St. Louis U. L.J. 937, 945, 981 (2014) (discussing the  
plight of the "Nooksack 306" generally).

23 <sup>5</sup> Among other things, the Secretary and her subordinates failed to in any way consult with Plaintiffs relative to their  
review of the Title 63 amendments, as Plaintiffs formally requested on March 21, 2014 and August 19, 2014. *See*  
24 *generally* Galanda Decl., Ex. J. The United States breached the trust fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiffs, of "moral  
obligations of the highest responsibility and trust." *Seminole Nation v. U.S.*, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942).

1 Meanwhile, on January 30, 2015, Defendants recommenced disenrollment proceedings  
2 by issuing “meeting” Notices to at least seven of the Plaintiffs. Galanda Decl., Ex. K. Those  
3 seven Plaintiffs’ hearings are scheduled to occur at the same time as each other’s hearings, at  
4 either 10:00 AM and 1:00 AM, March 4, 2015, via teleconference. *Id.*; *see also* Title 63, §  
5 63.10.005B (“Meetings will be held telephonically via conference call . . .”).<sup>6</sup> Each of those  
6 Tribal members will be given “a maximum of ten (10) minutes to present his or her case to the  
7 Tribal Council” Defendants. *Id.*, § 63.10.005H.<sup>7</sup>

8 True to form, it was only *after* Defendants noticed the disenrollment of those seven  
9 Plaintiffs, when, on February 3, 2015, their counsel filed Notices of Compliance with this Court  
10 in each of the above-captioned matters. Notice of Compliance With order Enjoining  
11 Disenrollment Proceedings, *Roberts*, No. 2013-CI-CL-003 (Nooksack Tribal Ct. Feb. 3, 2015);  
12 Notice of Compliance with Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary  
13 Injunction, *Belmont*, No. 2014-CI-CL-007 (Nooksack Tribal Ct. Feb. 3, 2015). But, as discussed  
14 below, Defendants should have instead filed motions to dissolve or vacate the *Roberts* Permanent  
15 Injunction Order and *Belmont* Preliminary Injunction Order. Defendants are once again guilty of  
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17 <sup>6</sup> In May 2014, Plaintiffs were notified of the “important” nature of their teleconference-hearing: “**If your call is**  
18 **dropped, you will lose your Meeting**”; “You will immediately hear music while on hold. Stay on hold until you  
19 are prompted by Tribal Council. **There may be a wait of 10 minutes to 2 hours** . . . Failure to stay on the line until  
your Meeting commences will result in loss of your Meeting.”; “**No questions will be entertained.**” *Belmont*,  
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Appendices 1-2 (documents titled, “What to expect for your meeting”) (emphasis  
added). Plaintiffs presume these logistical ground-rules still apply, but are not sure as matters of dropped calls,  
lengthy hold times, and elevator music are not addressed in the most recent Notices. Galanda Decl., Ex. K.

20 <sup>7</sup> Also, each “may submit a Written Response” and “may present evidence supporting his or her case,” so long as  
that information submitted “no later than five (5) calendar days prior to the scheduled Meeting date.” *Id.*, §§  
21 63.10.005B, .005C. “Responses must be typed; hand written responses may be rejected.” *Id.*, § 63.10.005B.  
Supporting evidence can only be presented under cover of “an Exhibit List”; provided, the “Exhibits must be  
22 marked with a label on the lower right corner . . . [that] must include the Disenrollee’s name and enrollment number,  
exhibit number, and total number of pages for each exhibit.” *Id.*, § 63.10.005B(2). Any “[f]ailure to comply with  
23 these format requirements will result in the rejection of submissions.” *Id.*, § 63.10.005B(2)(d). Meanwhile, by way  
of glaring double standard, Defendants may take “official notice” of “any tribal historical fact within the Enrollment  
Department’s specialized knowledge” that staff offer in testimony—*i.e.*, of hearsay. *Id.*, § 63.10.005C(4); ER 401.  
24 Plaintiffs appreciate that these “rules” have been upheld by the Tribal Appeals Court; nevertheless, for a people of  
oral tradition, they violate Nooksack customs, traditions, and norms.

1 “fast-tracking the disenrollment process” and acting “with haste.” *Lomeli*, No. 2013-CI-APL-  
2 2013-002, at 8 n.7. Technically, Defendants now stand in contempt of Court.

3 On February 4, 2015, Plaintiffs’ undersigned counsel wrote Defendants’ counsel:

4 Thanks for the courtesy copies of these court notices, the related disenrollment  
5 hearing notices (which we note predate the court notices by a few days), and the  
6 partial federal correspondence regarding Interior’s approval of Title 63.

7 We believe that the administrative disenrollment process has recommenced  
8 prematurely.

9 Our understanding of law on injunction practice is that a permanent injunction  
10 order must be obeyed until it is dissolved or vacated. Barring such relief, the  
11 enjoined party is not at liberty to perform the acts that the Court prohibited. And  
12 the remedy for doing so is contempt of court.

13 Here, we do not believe that your clients are at liberty to recommence  
14 disenrollment, unless and until the Tribal Court’s permanent injunction order is  
15 dissolved or vacated. Are you willing to file a motion with the Tribal Court for  
16 such relief?

17 If you would, please let us know either way by close of business tomorrow  
18 [February 5, 2015]. We apologize for the short fuse on this inquiry but that is  
19 driven by the reality that disenrollment hearings are suddenly scheduled to  
20 recommence in about 30 days.

21 Galanda Decl., Ex. L. On February 6, 2015, having received no reply from defense counsel,  
22 Plaintiffs’ counsel asked: “Can we expect to hear from you?” *Id.* Having still not received the  
23 courtesy of any response, Plaintiffs file this Opposition, and accompanying Emergency Motion.

24 Plaintiffs hereby request that the *Roberts* Permanent Injunction Order and *Belmont*  
25 Preliminary Injunction Order be enforced, as soon before March 4, 2015, to prevent Defendants  
from carrying out the latest disenrollment “process” then—or from otherwise recommencing  
Plaintiffs’ disenrollment until the Secretary’s approval is of legal effect.

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## II. ARGUMENT

### A. The Injunction Orders Continue, Absent Dissolution or Vacature

It is well-established that injunctions “remain in effect until dissolved by an order of th[e] court.” *Gammoh v. City of La Habra*, 168 F.3d 498 (9th Cir. 1999). As the California Federal Circuit Court made clear as far back as 1879, compliance with the underlying ruling does not relieve a party from a finding of contempt if the injunction is violated:

The injunction should be obeyed until it is dissolved by the authority which granted it. Undoubtedly, if a proper showing were made, if the court were satisfied that the injunction should be dissolved, it would be dissolved; but until that is done, the party himself has no right to determine the fact that he has authority to proceed, in violation of the injunction of this court, to perform the acts which have been prohibited.

*Muller v. Henry*, 17 F. Cas. 978, 981 (Cir. Cal. 1879); see also *Pokegama Sugar-Pine Lumber Co v. Klamath River Lumber & Improvement Co.*, 86 F. 538, 540 (N.D. Cal. 1898) (“[P]arties can only be relieved from the operation of an injunction absolutely prohibiting the performance of a specific act by the court granting the injunction.”).

Here, neither the *Roberts* Permanent Injunction Order nor the *Belmont* Preliminary Injunction Order have been dissolved or vacated by this Court. Unless or until Defendants dissolve or vacate those injunctions—as discussed below, they cannot at this time—they remain in effect and must be enforced.

### B. The Legal Effect of the Secretary’s Approval is Stayed Pending Federal Appeal

The disenrollment procedures have not been “approved by the Secretary of the Interior.” *Belmont* Preliminary Injunction Order, at 6. Rather, the disenrollment procedures have been tentatively approved by Don Chambellan, Acting Superintendent for the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ Puget Sound Agency, and Stanley Speaks, Northwest Region Director. Galanda Decl., Exs. F,G. Their decision is not final, as far as Secretarial approval is concerned, until “the time



1 for filing a notice of appeal has expired and no notice of appeal has been filed.” 25 C.F.R. §  
2 2.6(b). If a Notice of Appeal is filed, the decision will “remain ineffective during the appeal  
3 period.” *Wichita and Affiliated Tribes v. Acting Southern Plains Regional Director*, 58 IBIA  
4 263, 266, 2014 WL 2417633, at \*2 n.6 (2014) *see also Yakama Nation v. Northwest Regional*  
5 *Director*, 47 IBIA 117, 119, 2008 WL 2802991, at \*2 (2008) (noting that an appeal of the  
6 Regional Director’s decision “would automatically be stayed” by § 2.6(b)). More specifically, it  
7 will remain “ineffective pending a decision on appeal,” if any, by the Interior Board of Indian  
8 Appeals. *Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States*, No. 03-2220, 2008 WL 2906095, at \*5 (D.  
9 Kan. July 24, 2008) (43 C.F.R. § 4.314(a)); *see also Del Rosa v. Acting Pacific Regional*  
10 *Director*, 51 IBIA 317, 319, 2010 WL 2679074, at \*2 (2010) (same).

11 Here, Appellants have timely filed a Notice of Appeal of the approval(s) rendered by  
12 Acting Superintendent Chambellan and Director Speaks’ on behalf of the Interior Secretary, as  
13 contemplated by 25 C.F.R. § 2.6(b). Galanda Decl., Ex. H. Until that appeal has been decided,  
14 said approval(s) are of no legal effect. 25 C.F.R. § 2.6(b); *Wichita and Affiliated Tribes, supra*.  
15 In others words, Therefore, at this time, neither the *Roberts* Permanent Injunction Order nor the  
16 *Belmont* Preliminary Injunction Order can be dissolved or vacated by this Court.

### 17 III. CONCLUSION

18 Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court find that for the time being, the *Roberts*  
19 Permanent Injunction Order and the *Belmont* Preliminary Injunction Order remain in full force  
20 and effect.

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1 DATED this 9th day of February, 2015.

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4 \_\_\_\_\_  
5 Gabriel S. Galanda  
6 Anthony S. Broadman  
7 Ryan D. Dreveskracht  
8 Attorneys for Plaintiffs  
9 GALANDA BROADMAN, PLLC  
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[illegible]

I, Molly A. Jones, say:

1. I am over eighteen years of age and am competent to testify, and have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein. I am employed with Galanda Broadman, PLLC.

2. Today, without waiver of any objection regarding the illegality of Appellees' recent amendments to the service requirements in N.T.C. Titles 10 and 80, I caused the following documents:

- A. Note for Motion
- B. Motion For Emergency Hearing
- C. Plaintiffs' Response In Opposition to Defendants' "Notice of Complainece"
- D. Declaration of Gabriel S. Galanda
- E. (Proposed) Order

to be filed with the above referenced court via US Mail, Return Receipt Requested,  
and to be delivered via U.S. Mail and email to,

**Rickie Armstrong**  
**Office of Tribal Attorney**  
**Nooksack Indian Tribe**  
**5047 Mt. Baker Hwy**  
**P.O. Box 63**  
**Deming, WA 98244**

and emailed to:

Thomas Schlosser  
Morisset, Schlosser, Jozwiak & Somerville  
1115 Norton Building  
801 Second Avenue  
Seattle, WA 98104-1509

1 The foregoing statement is made under penalty of perjury under the laws of the Nooksack  
2 Tribe and the State of Washington and is true and correct.

3 DATED this 9th day of February, 2015.

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6 Molly Jones  
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