NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF RYAN MICHAEL KROLL; [PROPOSED SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT] LODGED WITH THE PROPOSED SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Complaint is attached hereto and will be lodged separately with the Court.

SAN PASQUAL brings this Motion in response to the continued erroneous assertion by Defendants STATE OF CALIFORNIA and CALIFORNIA GAMBLING CONTROL COMMISSION (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "STATE"), that despite the continuing and reoccurring obligation of the STATE to issue available Gaming Device Licenses that SAN PASQUAL duly requests and the STATE's repeated failures to issue available Gaming Device Licenses after being duly requested by SAN PASQUAL, that STATE's lone breach of the 1999 Tribal-State Gaming Compact between the parties (hereinafter the "Compact") occurred in June 2002 and that based upon that erroneous assertion this Action is barred by the statute of limitations.

SAN PASQUAL disputes this contention. The STATE is wrong. The Compact creates a continuing obligation that the STATE repeatedly breached *each time* the Commission failed to issue all Gaming Device licenses authorized to be issued under the Compact. Indeed there was a separate Breach on six(6) independent unique occasions July 10, 2003, October 22, 2004, October 7, 2005, August 16, 2006, October 10, 2007, and December 11, 2008. None of those breaches was in 2002. The first of those Breaches was in 2003, and most recent December 2008. All of them, however, are compensable by this Complaint by Application of the applicable Statutes of Limitations on their face, as well as by the doctrines by equitable tolling and/or the application of *C.C.P.* § 355.

This Second Amended Complaint makes especially clear that this Action before this Court at this time encompasses all such dates, all such breaches, and thus contrary to the STATES assertions in its pending Motion for Summary Judgment. This is true even as to the earliest breach in 2003, or even if the Court were to accept, albeit wrong by, that a Breach occurred in 2002. The Second Amended Complaint alleges all these facts explicitly.

In addition, C.C.P. § 355 now permits SAN PASQUAL to file its Federal Action (Case NO. 06-CV-0988) in STATE Court as a Breach of Contract Action to obtain damages against the STATE because SAN PASQUAL's judgment in the Federal Action was reversed by the Ninth Circuit on September 12, 2011 when the Ninth Circuit vacated the lower court's judgment in favor of SAN PASQUAL due to the matter being moot, which is not a decision on the merits, and remanded

the matter back to the district court in order for that court to dismiss the Federal Action without prejudice, which it did on November 29, 2011.

SAN PASQUAL now diligently brings this Motion to Amend based upon the recent concessions of the STATE that the Federal Action and this Action are "based on same facts," and also that the STATE admits to suffering no prejudice by applying the doctrine of equitable tolling since the STATE has recently asserted that discovery is unnecessary into the parties' interpretations of Compact §4.3.2.2(a)(1) because the matter is resolved and also that discovery is unnecessary into the underlying the matters based upon the parties' recent Stipulation of Facts.

Therefore, in light of the STATE's continued assertions that the lone breach of the Compact occurred in June 2002 and that this Action is "based on same facts" as the previous Federal Action, SAN PASQUAL seeks to amend its Complaint to include specific facts that support the application of C.C.P. §355 and the doctrine of equitable tolling to this matter; and explicitly identify all six (6) breaches based thereon.

California law requires a liberal view to allowing amendments to pleadings to ensure trial on the merits and even permits amendments to pleadings up through trial. Here, no trial date has even been set. Additionally, SAN PASQUAL has not been dilatory in filing this Motion for Leave to Amend. No prejudice will result to the STATE from granting this leave to file SAN PASQUAL's proposed Second Amended Complaint because the new facts asserted in the Second Amended Complaint are well-known to the STATE as they reflect the occurrences in the parties' Federal Action and, in fact, many of them were asserted as true by the STATE in its recent assertions in its Motion for Summary judgment. Simply put, the facts asserted in the Second Amended Complaint have always been known to the STATE, and are relied upon by the STATE in its pending Motion for Summary Judgment, so the STATE cannot now complain it has been surprised in any way.

SAN PASQUAL's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint is and will be based upon this Notice, the Points and Authorities set forth below, the Declaration of Ryan Michael Kroll, and the Proposed Second Amended Complaint attached hereto and served and filed herewith, the Proposed Order served and filed herewith, and the complete files and records of this action. In addition, if such leave is granted, then SAN PASQUAL respectfully requests that the Proposed

Second Amended Complaint be deemed filed and served as of the date of the granting of the motion. Respectfully submitted, SOLOMON, SALTSMAN JAMIESON DATED: April 16, 2012 Stephen Warren Solomon Stephen Allen Jamieson R. Bruce Evans Ryan M. Kroll Attorneys for Plaintiff-SAN PASQUAL Band of Mission **Indians**

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I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Based upon the STATE's concession in its recent Motion for Summary Judgment that this Action is "based on same facts" as SAN PASQUAL's prior Federal Action, and STATE'S spurious arguments therein that the facts alleged are barred by Statutes of Limitation, SAN PASQUAL now seeks leave to file a Second Amended Complaint in order to plead facts that explicitly state what should be obvious: There was one "wrong" and one "dispute" when the STATE announced its misinterpretation of the Compact in 2002, but that no breach of Contract occurred until the STATE first refused certain slot machine Licenses demanded. This happened the first time on July 10, 2003 then 5 more independent unique breaches on October 22, 2004, October 7, 2005, August 16, 2006, October 10, 2007, and the most recent breach on December 11, 2008; and, that each and every such breach is actionable in the current timely filed Action pending in this Court. On its face, the relevant Statutes of Limitation for each independent breach reflect this lawsuit as timely for each one. Morever, the application of the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling and C.C.P. § 355 assure that to be the case.

Thus, since the STATE asserts that this Action, as pled in the First Amended Complaint, is seeking damages for a breach that occurred in June 2002, and while SAN PASQUAL continues to refute that the First Amended Complaint does not seek damages for a breach that occurred in June 2002, SAN PASQUAL seeks leave to file an amended complaint that alleges facts dating back to the dates of Actual breaches in Response to the STATE'S assertions that the 4 year Statute of Limitations for breach of written contract, C.C.P. §337, apply.

SAN PASQUAL has not been dilatory in filing this Motion for Leave to Amend. No prejudice will result to the STATE from granting this leave to file SAN PASQUAL's proposed Second Amended Complaint because the new facts asserted in the Second Amended Complaint are well-known to the STATE, as they were part of the federal court litigation in which both parties were involved. These facts and this dispute have been litigated, and discussed amongst the parties numerous times in person and otherwise over a period of years and there is no question that the

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STATE is well aware of the new facts alleged in SAN PASQUAL's Second Amended Complaint.

II. WHILE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS ARE PENDING REQUESTS FOR **LEAVE ARE ROUTINELY AND LIBERALLY GRANTED BY THE COURTS** CONSISTENT WITH JUDICIAL POLICY FAVORING RESOLUTION OF ALL **DISPUTED MATTERS**

"The court may grant leave to amend the pleadings at any stage of the action. Motions for leave to amend the pleadings are directed to the sound discretion of the Judge. 'The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading' [CCP § 473(a)(1); and see CCP § 576]." The Rutter Group, California Practice Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial Ch. 6, § 6:636, 6:637. The court's discretion to permit amendment of the pleadings is liberally exercised, Nestle v. Santa Monica, (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939, and the policy favoring amendment is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified, Howard v. County of San Diego, 184 Cal. App. 4th 1422, 1428 (2010).

In the context of summary judgment motions, requests for leave to amend are "routinely and liberally granted." Kirby v. Albert D. Seeno Constr. Co., 11 Cal. App. 4th 1059, 1069 (1992). Amendments after summary judgment motions have been filed are particularly appropriate where such amendments "are intended to repair complaints that are legally insufficient, in other words, those that would be subject to a motion for judgment on the pleadings." See College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.4th 704, 719, fn. 5 (1994). Furthermore, when considering challenges to the sufficiency of a pleading, it is an abuse of discretion to dismiss an action if it is reasonably possible that a defect in a complaint could be cured by an amendment. Kirby, 11 Cal. App. 4th at 1069. Thus, in Kirby, it was abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend where a reasonable probability existed that the appellants could amend the complaint to state facts which would have shown that claims were not barred by statute of limitations, due to the delayed discovery rule. Id. Once a motion to amend a complaint is granted, the filing of an amended complaint moots any motion directed at a prior complaint and it is error to grant summary adjudication on a cause of action contained in a previous complaint. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. App. 4th 1124, 1131 (2010).

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Here, the Court should follow the policy of "liberally and routinely" granting leave to amend and allow SAN PASQUAL to amend its complaint to address the defects alleged (albeit denied by Plaintiff) in the STATE's summary judgment motion. As in Kirby, in which leave to amend should have been granted because allowing amendment would have allowed the appellants to plead facts that could have supported a theory that would have supported their argument that the statute of limitations did not bar their claim, SAN PASQUAL should be granted leave to amend its complaint because doing so will allow SAN PASQUAL to remedy a supposed "defect" in the pleadings by including facts that clearly reflect that SAN PASQUAL's Breach of Contract Claims are timely and support the argument that the statute of limitations does not bar SAN PASOUAL's claims.

By allowing leave to amend now, and addressing these issues now, it will enable the court to more effectively deal with the parties' dispositive motions and prevent the need for further amendment before trial. Therefore, it is clearly in the "furtherance of justice" to permit SAN PASQUAL to amend its Complaint to include the facts supporting SAN PASQUAL's arguments regarding the STATE's position on the breach of the Compact.

III. LEAVE TO AMEND SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE IT WAS TIMELY MADE BY SAN PASQUAL AND WILL NOT PREJUDICE THE STATE

If, as here, a the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend. Morgan v. Sup. Ct., (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530. In addition, "as long as no prejudice to the defendant is shown, the liberal policy re amendment prevails and it is an abuse of discretion to refuse the amendment." The Rutter Group, California Practice Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial Chp. 6, § 6:653; see Mesler v. Bragg Mgt. Co., (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 297. Furthermore, "an otherwise proper amendment should not be refused solely because the case is on fast track. This is true even where the amendment will require a continuance of the trial date." The Rutter Group, California Practice Guide, Civil Proc. Before Trial ¶ 6:654; Honig v. Financial Corp. of America, (1992) 6 Cal. App. 4th 960, 967.

Even if, unlike here, the moving party delayed in seeking amendment but the delay has not misled or prejudiced the opposing side, the liberal policy of allowing amendments still prevails.

Higgins v. Del Faro, (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565 (holding it was abuse of discretion to deny amendment even as late as time of trial even though moving party had delayed where delay had not misled or prejudiced the opposing side); The Rutter Group, California Practice Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶ 6:659.

Here, SAN PASQUAL should be granted leave to amend the Complaint because SAN PASQUAL's motion is timely. SAN PASQUAL is relying upon the STATE's recent admissions that these proposed amendments to the Complaint would not cause the STATE to suffer any prejudice since the STATE asserts in its recent February 14, 2012 Motion for Summary Judgment that the two actions are "based on same facts" and the STATE recently asserted that that discovery into the underlying facts is unnecessary because the parties agree that the Compact requires the Commission to issue 40,201 Licenses and also because the parties have executed a Stipulation of Facts as to many of the underlying facts. Similarly, SAN PASQUAL could not have alleged facts relevant to C.C.P. § 355 previously because C.C.P. § 355 was not applicable until the Ninth Circuit's reversal on September 12, 2011 and the eventual dismissal of the Federal Action without prejudice on November 29, 2011. Therefore, SAN PASQUAL's request for leave to amend is timely and should be granted in accordance with California's liberal policy of allowing amendments to pleadings.

Furthermore, SAN PASQUAL should be granted leave to amend the Complaint because an amendment to the Complaint will not prejudice the STATE in any way. The allegations added by SAN PASQUAL in the Second Amended Complaint are facts well-known to the STATE as they have been part of the prior federal court litigation between SAN PASQUAL and the STATE, as well as relied upon by the STATE in other litigation. This enabled the STATE to find and preserve evidence related to this Action, including evidence related to the factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. The STATE itself has repeatedly asserted that no discovery is necessary in this Action since the facts of the dispute are well-known by both parties, and so the STATE cannot now claim that the basic factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint create any prejudice to the STATE. Therefore, because an amendment will cause no prejudice whatsoever to the STATE, SAN PASQUAL should be granted leave to amend in accordance with California's liberal policy of allowing amendments to pleadings.

IV. WHILE THIS MOTION IS NOT THE PROPER TIME TO RULE ON THE MERITS OF SAN PASQUAL'S INTENDED AMENDMENTS, LEAVE TO AMEND SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE ARGUMENTS PREDICATED ON SAN PASQUAL'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT HAVE MERIT

A. UNDER THE EQUITABLE TOLLING DOCTRINE, AN ACTION
CONTESTING THE COMMISSION'S JUNE 2002 ANNOUNCEMENT OF
ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE NUMBER OF AVAILABLE LICENSES
AND EACH SUBSEQUENT DRAW UTILIZING THE INCORRECT
NUMBER OF LICENSES WOULD STILL BE TIMELY PURSUED IN THIS
ACTION

In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the STATE wrongly asserts that its lone breach of the Compact occurred in June 2002 when the Commission announced its incorrect interpretation of Compact §4.3.2.2(a)(1) despite the fact that all of the elements for a breach of contract did or even could have occurred then. June 2002 is not the correct accrual date for breach of Contract but even if, assuming arguendo, it were, the Action would still be timely. While SAN PASQUAL continues to assert that the Compact creates a continuing obligation that the State repeatedly breached each time the Commission failed to issue all Gaming Device licenses authorized to be issued under the Compact, under the doctrine of equitable tolling, this Action may be amended to allege facts that would permit this Action to be a timely claim to pursue the STATE's erroneous interpretation in June 2002 and also to pursue damages for each subsequent Draw that the STATE denied SAN PASQUAL Licenses based upon that incorrect interpretation beginning thereafter in July 2003, with the first breach of contract that caused damages to be incurred, and accruing on the date of each independent unique breach, i.e. on October 22, 2004, October 7, 2005, August 16, 2006, October 10, 2007, and December 11, 2008.

The equitable tolling doctrine permits an action to be filed after the time period for which it normally must be commenced, as here, if the following three elements are met: 1) plaintiff provided timely notice of the claim, 2) the defendant's ability to defend the claim is not prejudiced and 3) the

plaintiff's conduct was reasonable and in good faith. *Addison v. State of California*, (1978) 21 Cal. 3d 313, 319.

The State asserts that the statute of limitations for this Action accrued on June 19, 2002 when the Commission announced its interpretation of the Compact, which SAN PASQUAL disputes, [because the June 2002 announcement was not a breach since all elements of a breach were not met at that time], but for purposes of illustrating how the tolling would apply will be assumed to be true for this limited purpose. SAN PASQUAL filed its Federal Action on May 3, 2006, which is within four years of the Commission's announcement of its incorrect interpretation, and thereby tolled the statute of limitations for claims based on the Commission's incorrect interpretation and the Draws conducted by the Commission in reliance thereon.

Thereafter, and while the Federal Action was still pending and thus while the statute of limitations was still being tolled, SAN PASQUAL filed this State Court Action on February 9, 2010. Therefore, since the STATE asserts in its Motion for Summary Judgment that this State Court Action is "based on same facts" as Federal Action, the STATE concedes that the filing of the Federal Action would toll the statute of limitations for this State Court Action.

California law has "a general policy which favors relieving plaintiff from the bar of a limitations statute when, possessing several legal remedies [plaintiff], reasonably and in good faith, pursues one designed to lessen the extent of [its] injuries or damages." *Addison*, 21 Cal. 3d at 317-18. In this instance, SAN PASQUAL possessed several legal remedies including commencing a federal action for pure declaratory relief or filing a state court action that sought monetary damages. *See Bertero v. National Gen. Corp.*, (1967) 254 Cal. App. 2d 126, 136 (comparing declaratory relief with an "alternative remedy, such as damages, injunctive relief and the like").

Initially, SAN PASQUAL chose the typically more expedient route of seeking pure declaratory relief in pursuing its federal action. *Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co.*, (2002) 28 Cal. 4th 888. 902 (noting that actions for pure declaratory relief "provide parties with a quick way of resolving disputes without the need to assert all claims based on the same cause of action.").

However, the State's frivolous argument in the Federal Action that SAN PASQUAL had no judicial remedy, which the Ninth Circuit wholly rejected, caused years of delay and thereby greatly

increased the damages suffered by SAN PASQUAL. After incurring such high losses, SAN PASQUAL then made the decision to file this State Court Action for damages since it became clear that the State would continue to attempt to delay SAN PASQUAL's efforts for an expedient court remedy, which it did at every point that it could.

Here, all three elements for equitable tolling are met. First, since SAN PASQUAL timely filed the Federal Action that the State now claims is "based on same facts" as this Action since that Federal Action was filed within four years of the Commission's June 2002 announcement of its incorrect interpretation. Thus, the STATE'S assertion the two actions are "based on same facts" is an admission that the STATE believes that the Federal Action gave it notice of the facts at issue in this Action.

Second, the STATE suffers no prejudice since the STATE was able to gather and preserve evidence related to this Action after being notified and served with the federal action. "The second prerequisite essentially translates to a requirement that the facts of the two claims be identical or at least so similar that the defendant's investigation of the first claim will put him in a position to fairly defend the second. "So long as the two claims are based on essentially the same set of facts timely investigation of the first claim should put the defendant in position to appropriately defend the second. Once he is in that position the defendant is adequately protected from stale claims and deteriorated evidence." Tarkington v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1494, 1504 (internal citations omitted). Here, the STATE cannot show any prejudice due to loss of evidence since the STATE alleges in its Motion for Summary Judgment that the two actions are "based on same facts," and also because the parties have in fact stipulated to the basic underlying facts and the State has repeatedly asserted that discovery should not be permitted into the parties' interpretations since those matters are resolved. Thus, the STATE suffers no prejudice in allowing this Action to continue.

Third, SAN PASQUAL has always acted reasonably and in good faith. Courts generally look to whether "a plaintiff delayed filing the second claim until the statute on that claim had nearly run," or "whether the plaintiff [took] affirmative action which misle[d] the defendant into believing the plaintiff was foregoing his second claim." *Tarkington v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.*,

172 Cal. App. 4th 1494, 1505, (2009). In this instance, SAN PASQUAL did not delay in filing this State Court Action since SAN PASQUAL filed this State Court Action while the Federal Action was still pending, and, in fact, over 20 months before the Federal Action became final. Additionally, SAN PASQUAL never took any affirmative action to state that it would not pursue this Action for damages and in fact repeatedly informed the State that its acts and omissions were causing SAN PASQUAL to suffer millions of dollars in damages.

The three prerequisites of equitable estoppel are met herein and therefore the statute of limitations for this State Court Action should be tolled during the pendency of the Federal Action, which was filed May 3, 2006 and was thus timely to contest the Commission's June 2002 announcement of its incorrect interpretation. Because this State Court Action was filed while the Federal Action was still pending and statute of limitations was being tolled, then even under the State's theory this Action is timely to challenge the Commission's June 2002 announcement. Therefore, consistent with the liberal policy demanding that leave be granted to ensure a trial on the merits, SAN PASQUAL respectfully requests Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint to allege facts to support the application of the equitable tolling doctrine so that SAN PASQUAL may refute the STATE's contention in its Motion for Summary Judgment that this State Court Action is barred by the statute of limitations.

B. <u>C.C.P. §355 PERMITS SAN PASQUAL TO FILE ITS FEDERAL ACTION IN STATE COURT UP TO ONE YEAR AFTER THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S REVERSAL AND THEREFORE, SAN PASQUAL MAY STILL TIMELY PURSUE AN ACTION BASED UPON THE COMMISSION'S ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION IN JUNE 2002</u>

In the Federal Action on September 12, 2011, due to the matter becoming moot, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the district court in the federal action between SAN PASQUAL and the STATE by vacating the judgment and remanding the matter back to the district court in order for the Federal Action to be dismissed without prejudice, as the parties requested in their Joint Stipulation. The parties agreed in the Joint Stipulation that the Federal Action became

moot because the STATE concurred with SAN PASQUAL that the Compact requires the Commission to issue a total of 40,201 Gaming Device licenses.

Because the Federal Action for Declaratory relief was the moot due to the parties no longer having a case or controversy, the federal courts were without subject matter jurisdiction of SAN PASQUAL's federal action. *Tilley Lamp Co. v. Thacker*, 454 F.2d 805, 808 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that "if there is no "case or controversy", the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim.). Thus, the Ninth Circuit's decision was not on the merits since it reversed the matter before either party submitted a brief based upon the parties' representation that the parties were in agreement that the Compact requires the Commission to issue 40,201 Gaming Device Licenses and thus the Ninth Circuit had no subject matter jurisdiction since there no longer was a "case of controversy." *Nichols v. Canoga Industries*, 83 Cal.App.3d 956, 967 (holding that when a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction it is "powerless to make a decision on its merits.").

C.C.P. §355 permits SAN PASQUAL to file the prior federal action as a State Court Action within one year of the Ninth Circuit's reversal since the district court judgment was reversed for being moot and not on the merits. To wit, C.C.P. §355 states that:

"If an action is commenced within the time prescribed therefor, and a judgment therein for the plaintiff be reversed on appeal other than on the merits, a new action may be commenced within one year after the reversal."

Courts have noted that the purpose of C.C.P. § 355 is "to avoid the harsh forfeiture of a plaintiff's rights where his first action, wherever it may have been attempted, has resulted in a judgment later reversed on appeal, or when the action has been thwarted on some procedural ground unrelated to the merits of the claim." Schneider v. Schimmels, 256 Cal.App. 2d 366, 370 (disapproved of on different grounds). Additionally, the Supreme Court has encouraged a liberal interpretation of statutory tolling provisions "[b]ecause the Legislature cannot predict all of the circumstances that come within the purpose of the tolling exceptions," and therefore "it is appropriate for courts to construe the statutory tolling scheme and implicit tolling exceptions to effect the ostensible legislative purpose." Lambert v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 53 Cal. 3d 1072, 1078-79.

While SAN PASQUAL disagrees with the STATE's argument that this Action is based upon a breach in June 2002 because not all of the elements of a breach had yet occurred, pursuant to C.C.P. §355, SAN PASQUAL may now pursue an action based upon the same facts as the Federal Action. Nichols v. Canoga Industries, 83 Cal.App.3d 956, 959 (holding that "the timely filing of a federal action under the described circumstances sufficiently asserts tolling of the statute of limitations upon the California cause of action so that the state cause is not barred.").

Since the Federal Action was filed on May 3, 2006, which is within four years of the Commission's announcement of its interpretation in June 2002, and concerned the June 2002 interpretation, SAN PASQUAL could now still file an action based upon the Commission's announcement of its interpretation in June 2002. Thus, it would simply be a matter of form over substance to require SAN PASQUAL to file a new action instead of simply proceeding with this Action and allowing SAN PASQUAL to amend its Complaint. However, it should be noted that out of an abundance of caution, SAN PASQUAL is filing a new action based upon the same facts of the Federal Action and pursuant to C.C.P. §355 and will then seek to relate that case to this Action. If this Motion is granted the other new Action can be related, consolidated, or perhaps become moot subject to dismissal.

C. THE 4 YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN C.C.P. §337 ALSO MAKES ACTION TIMELY

C.C.P.§ 337 provides a 4 year Statute of Limitations which the State now contends is applicable to the Breaches of Contract. Application of the 4 year Statute of Limitations to each of the independent unique Breaches of the Contract here reflects the Action was filed timely and the Amendment of the Complaint to explicitly allege each of the six (6) independent separate Breach of the Contract is appropriate to make abundantly clear that this lawsuit for Breach of Contract against the STATE is timely under all the theories.

V. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE EXISTING COMPLAINT ARE ALL IN THE FURTHERANCE OF JUSTICE AND SHOULD ALL BE GRANTED

A. Modifications to Allegations in the Original Complaint.

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other nonmaterial issues.

SAN PASQUAL's proposed Second Amended Complaint modifies the Title of Section 1.E (which was formerly 1.C) (Second Amended Complaint 10:1-59) to allude to the multiple breaches now being sought in the Second Amended Complaint. SAN PASQUAL's proposed Second Amended Complaint modifies the Title of Section 1.F (which was formerly 1.D) (Second Amended Complaint 10:1-59) to mention with more specificity the initial date of the Meet and Confer and to allude to all other attempts by San Pasqual to meet and confer. Paragraph 70 (formerly Paragraph 47) (SAC 21:9-13) was modified to now allege at least \$200,000,000 in damages and to request prejudgment and postjudgment interest. Additionally, the Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action have been deleted in the Second Amended Complaint due to the Court's ruling to sustain the Demurrer to those causes of action without leave to amend on October 13, 2011. Also, the First Paragraph of the Prayer for Relief (22:4-8) was modified to now request at least \$200,000,000 in damages and prejudgment

interest and postjudgment interest. There were other minor editorial changes regarding grammar and

B. New Allegations in the Proposed Second Amended Complaint.

San Pasqual has alleged DOE defendants. (SAC 2:16-17). San Pasqual has included allegations concerning the origination of the Dispute in June 2002 and the difference between that Dipsute, or "Wrong," and the actual injuries that San Pasqual suffered when it was denied Licenses subsequently. (SAC 6:6-13). The Second Amended Complaint contains new allegations in Section 1.D (contained on SAC 6:15 through 9:21) that support SAN PASQUAL's contention that the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling and *C.C.P.* §355 are applicable and thereby refute the STATE's contention in its Motion for Summary Judgment that this Action is barred by the statute of limitations and additionally allow SAN PASQUAL to pursue an Action based upon the Commission's incorrect interpretation of Compact §4.3.2.2(a)(1) and every Draw held subsequently in which the Commission utilized its incorrect interpretation of Compact §4.3.2.2(a)(1) regarding the number of Licenses available to be issued.

Paragraph 34 (SAC 14:9-10) now alleges each of the separate and independent breaches by the State when the Commission failed to issue San Pasqual the Licenses it requested at six different Draws. Paragraphs 35, 36 and 44 (SAC 14:18-28 and SAC 17:1-5) further outline the numerous meet

and cofner efforts by San Pasqual regarding its Dispute with the State over the number of available Licenses. The Second Amended Complaint contains new allegations in Section II (contained on SAC 17:7-14 through 18;20) that support SAN PASQUAL's contention that the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling and C.C.P. §355 are applicable to this Action and allow San Pasqual to timely seek the damages alleged in the Second Amended Complaint.

Paragraphs 65 through 70 (SAC 21:17 through 22:28) were added to support SAN PASOUAL's claim for damages based upon the Commission's failure to issue available Licenses to SAN PASQUAL on July 10, 2003; October 22, 2004; October 7, 2005; August 16, 2006; and October 10, 2007. Additionally, Paragraphs 73 through 77 (SAC 23:12 through 24:10) were added to support SAN PASOUAL's claim for damages based upon the Commission's failure to issue available Licenses to SAN PASQUAL on July 10, 2003; October 22, 2004; October 7, 2005; August 16, 2006; and October 10, 2007.

VI. CONCLUSION

It is hereby respectfully requested that leave to amend the complaint be granted; that it would be error and an abuse of discretion to deny said Motion—and that, the Second Amended Complaint be deemed filed and served as of the date of the granting of the motion.

Respectfully submitted,

SOLOMON, SALTEMAN & JAMIESON

DATED: April 16, 2012

Stephen Warren Solomon Stephen Allen Jamieson Ryan M. Kroll

Attorneys for Plaintiff SAN PASQUAL BAND OF

MISSION INDIANS

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DECLARATION OF RYAN MICHAEL KROLL

I, Ryan Michael Kroll, declare as follows

- I am an attorney at law duly admitted to practice before all the courts of the State of 1. California and I am a partner at SOLOMON, SALTSMAN & JAMIESON, attorneys of record herein for Plaintiff SAN PASQUAL Band of Mission Indians. I am over 18 years of age and am competent to testify as stated herein. The facts stated herein are of my own personal knowledge except where stated on information and belief, and where stated on information and belief, I believe them to be true.
- 2. This declaration is made in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. There is good cause for granting this Motion for Leave same and given the stated liberal policy of the courts in granting leave to amend, it is respectfully submitted that it would be an abuse of discretion to deny said Motion.
- 3. The purpose and effect of the proposed amendments is to incorporate additional facts into this lawsuit in order for SAN PASQUAL to make explicit allegations of fact that the Defendants know to exist and which otherwise refute the Defendants' contention in its Motion for Summary Judgment that this Action is barred because of the statute of limitations. Based upon the STATE's assertion in its recent Motion for Summary Judgment that this Action is "based on same facts" as SAN PASQUAL's prior Federal Action, SAN PASQUAL now seeks leave to file a Second Amended Complaint in order to plead facts that will refute the STATE's spurious argument that this Action, as pled in the First Amended Complaint, is barred by the Statute of Limitations. While SAN PASQUAL wholly disagrees with the STATE's contentions, SAN PASQUAL seeks leave in order to plead facts that will allow SAN PASQUAL to refute the STATE's contentions in its Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the doctrine of equitable tolling and also based upon C.C.P. §355and, based upon the STATE'S recent admissions, seek monetary damages for the STATE's failure to issue Licenses dating back to the July 2003 Draw, and to make clear that there allegations are made so that they may be proven at the time of trail.
- Specifically, the equitable tolling doctrine applies here because the STATE asserts in its Motion for Summary Judgment that the Federal Action and this Action in State Court are "based

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on same facts" and therefore the STATE had notice of the facts in this Action through the Federal Action filed by SAN PASQUAL against the STATE on May 3, 2006, the STATE is not prejudiced since the STATE was able to gather and preserve evidence related to this Action after being notified and served with the federal action, and SAN PASQUAL has always acted reasonably and in good faith. SAN PASQUAL's good faith is evidenced in particular by the fact that SAN PASQUAL did not delay in filing this Action, which was filed while the Federal Action was pending, and the fact that SAN PASQUAL has repeatedly informed the STATE that its acts and omissions were causing SAN PASQUAL to suffer millions of dollars in damages.

- Additionally, C.C.P. § 355 allows a party to file an action within one year of a reversal of a judgment, not based on the merits, in the party's favor where that party received a judgment that was reversed on appeal on grounds other than the merits. Because of the September 12, 2011 reversal by the Ninth Circuit when it vacated the district court judgment in SAN PASQUAL's favor and remanded the Federal Action back to the district court for dismissal without prejudice, SAN PASQUAL also seeks leave to amend the Complaint to allege facts to support its contention that C.C.P. §355 permits SAN PASQUAL to file an action based upon the allegations of the Federal Action that concerned the Commission's June 19, 2002 announcement of its incorrect interpretation of Compact §4.3.2.2(a)(1). Thus, since the STATE erroneously asserts that this Action, as pled in the First Amended Complaint, is seeking damages for a breach that occurred in June 2002, and while SAN PASQUAL continues to refute that the First Amended Complaint does not seek damages for a breach that occurred in June 2002, SAN PASQUAL seeks leave to file an amended complaint that alleges facts that would permit SAN PASQUAL to seek damages dating back to June 2002 in order to refute the STATE's assertions; and, more importantly, to seek and prove damages on the more accurate facts that, although no breach occurred in 2002 when the STATE announced its incorrect interpretation of the Contract, that a Breach of Contract did occur on each of the following dates: July 10, 2003, October 22, 2004, October 7, 2005, August 16, 2006, October 10, 2007, and December 11, 2008.
- 6. SAN PASQUAL has not been dilatory in filing this Motion for Leave to Amend. No prejudice will result to the STATE from granting this leave to file SAN PASQUAL's proposed

Second Amended Complaint because the new facts asserted in the Second Amended Complaint are well-known to the STATE, as they were part of the federal court litigation in which both parties were involved. These facts have been litigated and discussed amongst the parties over a period of years and there is no question that the STATE is well aware of the facts alleged in SAN PASQUAL's Second Amended Complaint. Given that the facts asserted in the Second Amended Complaint have always been known to the STATE, the STATE cannot now complain it has been surprised in any way.

PASQUAL's motion is timely. SAN PASQUAL is relying upon the STATE's recent admissions that these proposed amendments to the Complaint would not cause the STATE to suffer any prejudice since the STATE asserts in its recent February 14, 2012 Motion for Summary Judgment that the two actions are "based on same facts" and the STATE recently asserted that that discovery into the underlying facts is unnecessary because the parties agree that the Compact requires the Commission to issue 40,201 Licenses and also because the parties have executed a Stipulation of Facts as to many of the underlying facts. Similarly, SAN PASQUAL could not have alleged facts relevant to C.C.P. § 355 previously because C.C.P. § 355 was not applicable until the Ninth Circuit's reversal on September 12, 2011 and the eventual dismissal of the Federal Action without prejudice on November 29, 2011. Furthermore, the application of C.C.P.§337, i.e. 4 year Statute of Limitation for breaches of a written contract also apply to make each independent breach of the contract actionable. Therefore, SAN PASQUAL's request for leave to amend is timely and should be granted in accordance with California's liberal policy of allowing amendments to pleadings.

Respectfully submitted,

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on April 16, 2012, at Los Angeles, California.

Ryan Michael Kroll

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[PROPOSED] ORDER

GOOD CAUSE APPEARING THE	REOF leave of Court to file the Second Amended
Complaint is hereby granted and the Propose	ed Second Amended Complaint is deemed filed and
served as of this date.	
D	
Dated:, 2012	JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

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Compact (hereinafter referred to as the "Contract") with Defendant-State of California that is

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in effect. The Contract was executed on September 10, 1999, and took effect upon the publication in the Federal Register on or about May 16, 2000.

- 2. Defendant-STATE OF CALIFORNIA is a sovereign state of the United States. The STATE OF CALIFORNIA is a signatory to the Contract with Plaintiff-SAN PASQUAL.
- 3. Defendant-CALIFORNIA **GAMBLING** CONTROL COMMISSION (hereinafter "CGCC") is an agency of the State that, pursuant to Executive Order D-31-01, administers the gaming device license draw process under Section 4.3.2.2(a)(3), and controls, collects and accounts for all license fees under Section 4.3.2.2(a)(2); enforces the rights of the State of California to enforce the provisions of Sections 4.3.2.2(a)(1) through (3) and (e), and all subparagraphs thereunder, of the Contract; and ensures that the allocation of machines among California Indian Tribes does not exceed the allowable number of machines as provided in the Contract and shall determine whether the machine license draw(s) complies with the provisions of the Contract. At all times relevant to the facts and claims alleged in this Complaint, the CGCC was acting or purporting to act as an agent of the State and the Governor of California. (Defendants STATE OF CALIFORNIA and the CGCC are hereinafter collectively referred to as the "STATE."). DOES 1- 25 are fictional named Defendants whose identities and/or companies or liability have not yet been identified.

I. <u>FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS</u>

A. The Public Policy Objectives Of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act

- 4. This action seeks to protect a delicate, and now threatened, balance of Tribal and State Governmental interests embodied within the Contract, which was executed in 1999 pursuant to IGRA.
- 5. Congress enacted IGRA in 1988 in response to the United States Supreme Court decision in *California v Cabazon Band of Mission Indians*, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), which recognized the rights of Indian tribes to engage in certain kinds of gaming within California.
- 6. IGRA recognized that "numerous Indian tribes have become engaged in or have licensed gaming activities on Indian lands as a means of generating tribal governmental

revenue," 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1), and set forth "a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments." 25 U.S.C. §2702(1). Congress found that "Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity." 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5).

7. IGRA divides gaming into three classifications: Class I, comprising of social or traditional forms of gaming connected with tribal ceremonies or celebrations; Class II, encompassing bingo and similar or associated games, and non-banking card games (e.g., poker); and Class III, encompassing all other forms of gaming, including slot machines, banked card games (e.g. blackjack), lottery, horse racing, and the like, provided such gaming is permitted within the State. 25 U.S.C. § 2703. At issue in this Action is SAN PASQUAL's rights to operate Class III Gaming Devices (Slot Machines) and the damages SAN PASQUAL suffered because of the STATE's failure to issue SAN PASQUAL all available Gaming Device Licenses pursuant to its obligations under its Contract with SAN PASQUAL.

B. The State of California Drafted the Contract that Allows Class III Gaming
(Slot Machines) and Presented the Contract to SAN PASQUAL on a "Take It
or Leave It" Basis. Therefore, Any Ambiguity Contained in the Contract

Must Be Construed in Favor of SAN PASQUAL and Against the State

- 8. On September 10, 1999, SAN PASQUAL executed its Contract with the State of California that permits the operation of Class III gaming on Indian Lands.
- 9. The STATE unilaterally drafted the Contract and all of its provisions including, but limited to, Sections 4.3, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.2.2, 9.0, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4. The STATE then presented the Contract, in its final form, to SAN PASQUAL on the evening of September 9, 1999 on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. Therefore, any ambiguity contained in any provision of the Contract including, but limited to, Sections 4.3, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.2.2, 9.0, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4 must be construed in favor of SAN PASQUAL and against the STATE,

which was the drafter of the Contract. In addition, case law requires that the Contract be interpreted in an Indian Tribe's favor and therefore in favor of SAN PASQUAL.

- 10. The Contract at issue herein is a valid, binding agreement, in effect as a matter of tribal, federal and state law. SAN PASQUAL has performed all its material obligations thereunder. The Contract is set to expire on December 31, 2020. Not sooner than eighteen months of that termination date either party may request the other party to negotiate an extension of this Contract or to enter into a new contract. If the parties have not agreed to extend the termination date of the Contract or entered into a new contract by the termination date, then the termination date of the Contract shall be June 30, 2022, unless the parties agreed to an earlier termination date.
- 11. Explicitly by its terms, the STATE entered into the Contract with SAN PASQUAL "out of respect for the sovereignty of the Tribe; in recognition of the historical fact that Indian gaming has become the single largest revenue-producing activity for Indian tribes in the United States; out of a desire to terminate pending 'bad faith' litigation between the Tribe and the State; to initiate a new era of tribal-state cooperation in areas of mutual concern; out of a respect for the sentiment of the voters of California who, in approving Proposition 5, expressed their belief that the forms of gaming authorized herein should be allowed; and in anticipation of voter approval of SCA 11 [Prop. 1A] as passed by the California Legislature." (Contract, Preamble ¶D.)
- 12. Section 1.0(a) of the Contract states its terms are designed and intended, among other things, to "[e]vidence the goodwill and cooperation of the Tribe and the State in fostering a mutually respectful government-to-government relationship that will serve the mutual interests of the parties."
 - 13. The Contract provides in relevant part, as follows:
 - a. Contract §2.6 defines the term "Gaming Device" to mean a slot machine.
 - b. Contract §4.3.1(b) authorizes SAN PASQUAL to operate 350 Gaming Devices as a matter of right and without the need to obtain a Gaming Device License.

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- c. Contract §4.3.2.2 provides that SAN PASQUAL may acquire Gaming Device licenses to operate Gaming Devices in excess of 350. For each Gaming Device License obtained, SAN PASQUAL must pay the applicable fees to be deposited into the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund.
- d. Contract §4.3.2.2(a) limits SAN PASQUAL to operate no more than 2,000. Gaming Devices. In order for SAN PASQUAL to operate 2,000 Gaming Devices, it must obtain 1,650 Gaming Device Licenses since it is permitted to operate 350 Gaming Devices as a matter of right and without the need to obtain a Gaming Device License.
- e. Contract §4.3.2.2(a)(1) states that the number of Gaming Device Licenses available for all Compact Tribes in the aggregate is at least 40,201 Gaming Device Licenses.
- f. The Contract provides in §4.3.2.2(a)(3) that Gaming Device Licenses are to be "awarded" through a draw process. The STATE conducts this draw process in which Gaming Device Licenses are awarded.
- g. As of October 9, 2008, SAN PASQUAL had 1,222 Gaming Device Licenses issued to it by the STATE and was also authorized to operate 350 Gaming Devices as a matter of right and without the need to obtain a License. Thus, as of October 9, 2008, SAN PASQUAL could operate 1,572 Gaming Devices and was entitled to an additional 428 Gaming Device Licenses (to get to the 2,000 License individual limit) if there were sufficient Licenses available for a Draw after a result of a correct application of an aggregate limit contained in Contract § 4.3.2.2(a)(1).

<u>Inc</u>	orrect	Interpr	etation th	at Contr	act §4.3.2.2	2(a)(1)	authorize	d the Issu	ance
<u>of</u>	Only	32,151	Gaming	Device	Licenses.	This	Decision	Initiated	the
"D	ISPUT	E," but	there wa	s not y	et a Breac	h of t	he Contra	ct Since	SAN

- 14. On or around June 19, 2002, the CGCC, on behalf of the State of California, announced its incorrect interpretation that Contract §4.3.2.2(a)(1) authorized the issuance of only 32,151 Gaming Device Licenses, thus initiating the "DISPUTE" between the parties, creating the WRONG, but SAN PASQUAL had not, as of that date, sustained any monetary damages. As of that date, June 19, 2002, SAN PASQUAL had not yet demanded from the STATE, and been denied by the STATE CGCC, any additional Gaming Device Licenses due to the STATE'S incorrect calculation of the aggregate number of Licenses available, and therefore no Breach of the Contract had yet occurred.
 - Due to the CGCC, on behalf of the State of California, Incorrectly
 Interpreting Contract §4.3.2.2(a)(1), A "Controversy" Existed Between SAN
 PASQUAL and the State and Therefore, SAN PASQUAL Filed an Action
 Seeking a Judicial Declaration as to the Correct Number of Gaming Device
 Licenses Authorized to Be Issued to 1999 Compact Tribes pursuant to SAN
 PASQUAL's Contract
- 15. Because a "controversy" existed due to the incorrect interpretation by the CGCC, on behalf of the State of California, otherwise known as the DISPUTE or WRONG, SAN PASQUAL filed a lawsuit for Declaratory Relief on May 3, 2006 against the State of California, the CGCC, and Arnold Schwarzenegger, in his capacity as Governor of California, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California (Case No. 06-CV0988) (hereinafter the "Federal Action"). In the Federal Action, SAN PASQUAL sought a judicial declaration that the CGCC, on behalf of the State of California, incorrectly interpreted the State Aggregate Limit.

- 16. On March 20, 2007, the District Court in the Federal Action incorrectly granted the STATE'S Motion to Dismiss SAN PASQUAL's Second Amended Complaint for an alleged failure to join all Indispensable Parties per F.R.C.P. 19. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this erroneous decision on October 6, 2008 and remanded the matter back to the District Court.
- 17. On March 29, 2010, the District Court in the Federal Action granted SAN PASQUAL's Summary Judgment and thereby declared that the STATE's interpretation that Contract §4.3.2.2(a)(1) authorizes only 32,151 licenses was indeed erroneous. The STATE appealed the District Court judgment to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
- 18. On August 20, 2010, while the STATE'S appeal to the Ninth Circuit was pending, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision in *Cachil Dehe Band of Indians v. State of California et. al. (Colusa)* holding that the correct interpretation of § 4.3.2.2(a)(1) was not, as the STATE had suggested, 32,151, but rather 40,201. In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit also upheld the remedy ordered by the *Colusa* district court a license draw in which all Compact Tribes could participate in order to distribute the additional licenses made available by the new State Aggregate limit of 40,201.
- 19. On or about July 8, 2011, in the Federal Action now before the Ninth Circuit, SAN PASQUAL and the STATE submitted a Joint Stipulation in which the parties agreed to request that the Ninth Circuit dismiss without prejudice the Federal Action because the parties agree that Contract §4.3.2.2(a)(1) authorizes the issuance of 40,201 Licenses and therefore the Federal Action is moot since a controversy no longer exists.
- 20. On or about September 12, 2011, due to the matter becoming moot, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court by vacating the judgment and remanding the matter back to the district court in order for the Federal Action to be dismissed without prejudice.
- 21. Thereafter, on September 5, 2002, July 10, 2003, December 19, 2003, October 22, 2004, October 7, 2005, August 16, 2006, October 10, 2007, and December 11, 2008, the CGCC conducted Gaming Device License Draws utilizing 32,151 as the total number of

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Gaming Device Licenses available in the pool of Gaming Device licenses issued or available to be issued to California tribes with 1999 Compacts. At six (6) of these eight (8) Draws SAN PASQUAL demanded additional Licenses but was denied as a result of the CGCC utilizing and applying the incorrect calculations of aggregate Licenses at 32,151. Each of the six (6) separate Draws caused SAN PASQUAL to sustain separate unique damages on each of these six (6) occasions where the wrong aggregate number was used.

SAN PASQUAL requested but was denied 500 Licenses in the July 10, 2003 Draw due to the CGCC's incorrect interpretation that only 32,151 Licenses were available to be issued to 1999 Compact Tribes. This was the first (1st) unique Breach of the Contract, SAN PASQUAL requested 341 Licenses but was granted only 72 Licenses in the October 22, 2004 Draw due to the CGCC's incorrect interpretation that only 32,151 Licenses are available to be issued to 1999 Compact Tribes. This was the second (2nd) unique Breach of the Contract. SAN PASQUAL requested but was denied 333 Licenses in the October 7, 2005 Draw due to the CGCC's incorrect interpretation that only 32,151 Licenses are available to be issued to 1999 Compact Tribes. This was the third (3rd) unique Breach of the Contract. SAN PASQUAL requested but was denied 50 Licenses in the August 16, 2006 Draw due to the CGCC's incorrect interpretation that only 32,151 Licenses are available to be issued to 1999 Compact Tribes. This was the fourth (4th) unique Breach of the Contract. SAN PASQUAL requested but was denied 300 Licenses in the October 10, 2007 Draw due to the CGCC's incorrect interpretation that only 32,151 Licenses are available to be issued to 1999 Compact Tribes. This was the fifth (5th) unique Breach of the Contract. SAN PASQUAL requested but was denied 428 Licenses in the December 11, 2008 Draw due to the CGCC's incorrect interpretation that only 32,151 Licenses are available to be issued to 1999 Compact Tribes. This was the sixth (6th) and most recent unique Breach of the Contract, while based upon the same "dispute." Each of these breaches caused separate independent unique damages to accrue to SAN PASQUAL, and thus each breach independently created a separate claim or cause of Action for each for statute of limitations purposes.

- 23. The separate independent unique damages each caused damages to accrue, as of the date of that respective DRAW, in an amount equal to the product of multiplying the number of Licenses denied by the dollar value of each daily "win" generated by each slot machine times the number of days SAN PASQUAL would have operated that Gaming Device but for the denial on the date of that particular DRAW. As just one example, the damages caused by the Breach created on October 7, 2005 will be the product of multiplying 333 Licenses (denied that day) by \$250 (theoretical daily win used only for this example) which is \$83,250 per day. Then multiply \$83,250 by the number of days these Licenses were denied (assume 100 days for this example only), which equals approximately \$8,325,000 solely for that one Breach of the Contract. Each of the other five (5) breaches occurred on different dates of different DRAWS with different numbers of Licenses demanded and denied by the CGCC at each of those times. Each breach, therefore, has a unique separate independent date for accrual of the Breach of Contract cause of Action as to that particular breach.
- 24. Each of the six (6) independent unique DRAWS caused unique damages, and each was a Breach of the Contract arising from the "DISPUTE." This claim for compensation for the damages caused by each breach is timely brought in this Action. As the most recent example of these independent breaches, the breach that occurred on December 12, 2008 when the CGCC denied issuing the 428 Licenses demanded by SAN PASQUAL is set forth in detail below. Note, however, that each of the previous breaches have a similar analysis to be applied, albeit with different factual details for each breach, i.e. date of breach, amount of breach, accrual date of breach, calculation of dollar value of breach.

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The S	tate M	ost R	<u>ecently</u>	Breached	Its	Recur	ring (<u>Oblig</u>	ation	to Iss	ue A
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- 25. On October 9, 2008, the STATE mailed to SAN PASQUAL a Notice that the CGCC would conduct a public hearing on December 11, 2008 in order to determine how to issue available Gaming Device Licenses. In this October 9, 2008 Notice of Draw, the STATE erroneously declared that only 75 Gaming Device Licenses were available. The State's determination that only 75 Licenses were available was due to the STATE's incorrect application of Contract §4.3.2.2(a)(1) that sets forth the aggregate limit of Licenses available under the Contract. The STATE informed SAN PASQUAL that if it sought Licenses in this Draw, then it must submit its application on or before November 12, 2008.
- 26. On November 5, 2008, SAN PASQUAL submitted its application for 428 Gaming Device Licenses and concurrently submitted a cashier's check for \$535,000 in accordance with the Contract's requirement that SAN PASQUAL submit a prepayment of \$1,250 for each of the 428 requested Licenses.
- 27. Recognizing that the State erroneously contended that only 75 Gaming Device Licenses were available at the December 11, 2008 Draw and accordance with the Contract's suggestion that the parties "meet and confer" to informally try to resolve disputes, SAN PASQUAL submitted written notice of its concern that the State may not issue all available Licenses at the December 11, 2008 Draw. To wit, the November 5, 2008 letter from SAN PASQUAL to the STATE clearly articulates SAN PASQUAL's concern that:

"Although the CGCC has advertised only 75 Licenses are available, that is based upon the CGCC's erroneous interpretation of the Compact terms, and thus issuing to SAN PASQUAL any number of Licenses less than 428 Licenses

The suggestion to 'meet and confer" to informally try to resolve disputes was a permissive suggestion and not a mandatory requirement before filing an action.

will constitute a Breach of the Compact, which is a Breach of Contract.

The State of California has incorrectly interpreted the State Aggregate Limit of gaming device licenses as defined in Section 4.3.2.2 (a)(1) of the Compact. The State, acting through the CGCC, has incorrectly determined the State Aggregate Limit to be 32,151 gaming device licenses. However, under the express terms of Section 4.3.2.2 (a)(1) of the Tribal-State Gaming Compact, the correct State Aggregate Limit is at least 42,700 gaming device licenses. A correct interpretation of the Compact will yield enough available licenses to provide all 428 Licenses demanded herein.

We respectfully request that a copy of this letter be circulated to all Commissioners of the CGCC prior to the November 25, 2008 public hearing, and made part of the record at the November 25, 2008 and the December 11, 2008 public hearings.

Please also find enclosed SAN PASQUAL's Gaming Device License Application and Exhibit A thereto that requests the CGCC to issue 428 Gaming Device Licenses to SAN PASQUAL. SAN PASQUAL has also enclosed a cashier's check made payable to the CGCC in the amount of \$535,000 in accordance with the terms of the Compact for its request for 428 Gaming Device Licenses.

Please contact the undersigned if you have any questions or would like to discuss these issues further. We look forward to hearing from you."

- 28. Despite the receipt of this written notice, the STATE chose not to contact SAN PASQUAL with any questions and chose not to contact SAN PASQUAL "to discuss these issues further." SAN PASQUAL reasonably took the non-response from the State as an admission that the STATE understood SAN PASQUAL's concerns and that the STATE did not want to discuss these issues in order to try and resolve this dispute, and therefore SAN PASQUAL had fully complied with the Contract's suggestion that it "meet and confer" with the STATE.
- 29. On November 12, 2008, the STATE did request that SAN PASQUAL submit an amended Gaming Device License Application that reflected a demand for only 75 Licenses.

The STATE did not request any further information concerning the dispute as to the number of Gaming Device Licenses available at the December 11, 2008 Gaming Device License Draw. In response to the STATE's request and explicitly without waiving or releasing its rights to assert that more than 75 Licenses would be available at the December 11, 2008 Draw, on November 12, 2008, SAN PASQUAL did submit an amended application that requested only 75 Licenses solely in order to try to obtain 75 additional Licenses since each License is very valuable and SAN PASQUAL was required to, and did, try to mitigate its damages caused by the STATE's breach.

30. Again in accordance with the Contract's suggestion that the parties "meet and confer," SAN PASQUAL once again submitted written notice on November 12, 2008 of its concern that the State is unlawfully choosing not to issue all available Licenses at the December 11, 2008 Draw. To wit, the November 5, 2008 letter states that:

"Per the request made today, November 12, 2008, by CGCC Staff Management Auditor Frank Lechner, please find enclosed an Amended Gaming Device License Application. This Application reflects a demand by this Tribe for the 75 licenses the CGCC has advertised as available in the upcoming scheduled draw. By making this Amended Demand please note that the Tribe does not in any way waive or release its rights and remedies to its continued demand for all licenses necessary to bring the number of licenses held by the Tribe to a total of 2,000.

The Tribe continues to maintain its contention, and intention to exercise all available remedies, that the CGCC erroneously interprets the Compact terms. Thus issuing to SAN PASQUAL any number of Licenses less than 428 Licenses will constitute a Breach of the Compact, which is a Breach of Contract. Notwithstanding this contention, the CGCC has advertised that only 75 Licenses are available, and per the request of Mr. Lechner the enclosed Amended Demand is being submitted.

To reiterate, the State of California has incorrectly interpreted the State Aggregate Limit of gaming device licenses as defined in Section 4.3.2.2 (a)(1) of the Compact. The State, acting through the CGCC, has incorrectly determined the State Aggregate Limit to be 32,151 gaming device licenses.

However, under the express terms of Section 4.3.2.2 (a)(1) of the Tribal-State Gaming Compact, the correct State Aggregate Limit is at least 42,700 gaming device licenses. A correct interpretation of the Compact will yield enough available licenses to provide all 428 Licenses which would provide 2,000 devices to the Tribe.

We respectfully request that a copy of this letter, as well as all prior correspondence and Application materials, be circulated to all Commissioners of the CGCC prior to the November 25, 2008 public hearing, and made part of the record at the November 25, 2008 and the December 11, 2008 public hearings, as well as all other proceedings relative to the upcoming Gaming License draw."

- 31. After receiving this second written notice, the STATE again chose not to contact SAN PASQUAL with any questions and chose not to respond in any way to the issues and concerns raised by SAN PASQUAL. SAN PASQUAL reasonably took this second non-response from the State to its second written notice of SAN PASQUAL's concerns as a further admission that the STATE understood SAN PASQUAL's concerns and that the STATE did not want to discuss these issues and therefore SAN PASQUAL had fully complied with the Contract's suggestion that it "meet and confer" with the STATE.
- 32. The STATE held a public hearing on December 11, 2008 to determine how to issue available Gaming Device Licenses. The STATE incorrectly asserted on December 11, 2008 that only 32,151 Gaming Device Licenses were available and therefore incorrectly asserted that only 75 Licenses were available.² Thus, because the STATE unjustifiably asserted that only 32,151 Gaming Device Licenses were available in the aggregate for all Tribes, the State incorrectly asserted that it had issued all available Gaming Device Licenses and therefore did not issue SAN PASQUAL any of the 428 Gaming Device Licenses that were requested. Under the correct interpretation of the Contract, there were more than

² The process by which the STATE awarded Gaming Device Licenses in December 2008 occurred over a span of three days that included December 10, 11 and 12, 2008. Throughout the Complaint, SAN PASQUAL's use of December 11, 2008 is a collective reference to the relevant events that occurred on December 10, 11 and 12, 2008 whereby the STATE failed to issue SAN PASQUAL the 428 Gaming Device Licenses it requested.

enough Licenses available at the December 11, 2008 License Draw in order for the STATE to award 428 Licenses to SAN PASQUAL, as it had properly requested.

- 33. Because the STATE refused to issue all available Gaming Device Licenses on December 11, 2008, SAN PASQUAL only possessed Licenses for, and operated, only 1,572 Gaming Devices instead of the 2,000 Gaming Devices that it was authorized to operate under the Contract but for the STATE's refusal to issue all available Gaming Device Licenses and its Breach of Contract on December 11, 2008 and its refusal to meet and confer to try to informally resolve this dispute.
- 34. Other unique independent Breaches of Contract also occurred on July 10, 2003, October 22, 2004, October 7, 2005, August 16, 2006, and October 10, 2007.
- F. While Not A Mandatory Requirement Prior To Filing Suit, SAN PASQUAL "Met And Conferred" With The State Regarding The Allegations Contained Herein Beginning October 2005, And Many Times Before, During, and After the Federal Action and, Before and Since the State Action was Commenced.
 - 1. A Meet and Confer of the Dispute Between the Parties Took Place Many

 <u>Times from March 2006 to Present.</u>
- 35. Beginning in October 2005 and continuing thereafter including after the filing of this Action, SAN PASQUAL made numerous efforts to Meet and Confer with the State, including the submission of approximately 35 written notices about the Dispute to the State of California. Additionally, on at least the following dates the Parties engaged in meet and confer efforts, or attempted to do so, in an attempt to resolve the dispute: March 15, 2006, May 19, 2009, March 1, 2011, and March 24, 2011.
- 36. While the State has asserted as its defense that the Compact requires San Pasqual to meet and confer prior to filing this Action and therefore the State has the burden to prove that defense, the numerous actions by San Pasqual each individually and certainly collectively comply with the "meet and confer" provisions in the Compact, or, at minimum, substantially comply with those requirements.

2. The Government Claim Process, Which Is Also a Meet And Confer Process Created By The Legislature for Breach of Contract

- 37. The California Legislature created a "meet and confer" process (hereinafter the "Government Claim Process") wherein a claimant that alleges the State breached a contract, such as SAN PASQUAL, is required to file a claim with the California Victim Compensation and Government Claim Board before procedurally it may file an action for that claim. The purpose of filing the claim is to allow the State to review the claim, request from the claimant as much information as the State needs in order to evaluate the claim, allow the State to "meet and confer" with the claimant and then have the State make a decision as to whether to settle the claim or allow the claimant to file a civil action.
- 38. Despite Contract §9.2 stating that "[i]n no event may [SAN PASQUAL] be precluded from pursuing any arbitration or judicial remedy against the State on the grounds that [SAN PASQUAL] has failed to exhaust its state administrative remedies, SAN PASQUAL did timely and properly file on June 1, 2009 a Government Claim with the California Victim Compensation and Government Claim Board regarding the wrongful conduct of the STATE alleged herein in yet another good faith attempt to "meet and confer" with the State to try to resolve the issues short of litigation. While the Contract's suggestion in Section 9.1 that the parties "meet and confer" prior to filing an action is not mandatory and does not need to be complied with before filing a civil action, SAN PASQUAL's government claim provided written notice of the specific facts and issues relevant to SAN PASQUAL's claim, comporting with the Contract §9.1(a) suggestion that parties provide "a written notice setting forth, with specificity, the issues to be resolved."
- 39. On or about June 22, 2009, the State contacted SAN PASQUAL's counsel to request further information in order to evaluate the Claim for purposes of meeting and conferring on the Claim. The State requested only a copy of the Contract and SAN PASQUAL faxed a copy of the Contract. No other information was requested by the State in order to evaluate the Claim.

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- 40. On July 1, 2009, the State sent out notice to SAN PASQUAL's counsel with copies to Janelle Desomer at the Governors' Office, the Attorney General's office, and Cy Rickards at the CGCC regarding SAN PASQUAL's Government Claim. The July 1, 2009 letter stated the Claim was "accepted" by the State, requested no further information from SAN PASQUAL in order to meet and confer on the claims and then stated that the State "believes that the court system is the appropriate means for resolution of these claims."
- 41. On July 9, 2009, another letter was sent out by the STATE to SAN PASQUAL, with copies to the Governor, the Attorney General, and the CGCC (same individuals in each office) advising that the Claim would now be considered by the State on August 13, 2009 and that SAN PASQUAL's presence at this meeting to review its Claim was unnecessary because the Claim would be rejected. While the State had the opportunity to take SAN PASQUAL up on its offer to further discuss the issues in the Claim, the State chose not to negotiate or respond to the issues raised.
- 42. Instead, the State rejected SAN PASQUAL's claim at an August 13, 2009 meeting of the Victims Compensation and Government Claims Board and directed SAN PASQUAL to file a lawsuit within 6 months to pursue the claim. On August 20, 2009, the California Victim Compensation and Government Claim Board mailed to SAN PASQUAL notice that the STATE rejected SAN PASQUAL's Government Claim on August 13, 2009. SAN PASQUAL provided all information requested by the State and was ready, willing and able to further "meet and confer" with the State. However, as of July 1, 2009, the State clearly did not wish to further "meet and confer" and had made its final decision when the STATE explicitly stated that "the court system is the appropriate means for resolution of these claims." (Emphasis added).
- 43. Therefore, once again, SAN PASQUAL complied with the Contract's suggestion in Contract §9.1 that the parties "meet and confer" prior to filing this Action.

3. Despite All the Meet and Confer That Took Place, it is Clear the Efforts and Future Efforts, Were, Are, and Will be a Futile Act

44. Despite all the Meet and Confer that took place, it is clear the efforts and future efforts, were, are, and will be a futile act; nevertheless, if desired SAN PASQUAL will further engage in such further efforts.

II. THE CLAIM FOR EACH, AND/OR ALL, OF EACH INDEPENDENT BREACHES OF CONTRACT THAT OCCURRED IS TIMELY.

45. Whether applying the Statutes of Limitation Applicable to denial of Government Claims, or applying the 4 year Statute of Limitations set forth in CCP §337 or applying CCP 355 or applying the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling, the Cause of Action for each breach is timely made. While the facts reflecting the application of each statute and/or doctrine remain in dispute, the result is that all breaches are timely commenced, either on their own or by relation back, or both.

A. Under the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling, SAN PASQUAL's Filing of the Federal Action Tolled the Statute of Limitations as to the Facts Underlying the Federal Action

- 46. SAN PASQUAL timely filed the Federal Action on May 3, 2006 in the Southern District of California (Case NO. 06-CV-0988), which was within four years of the CGCC's June 19, 2002 announcement that the number of Gaming Device Licenses authorized by Contract §4.3.2.2(a)(1) was only 32,151.
- 47. The STATE now claims the Federal Action is "based on same facts" as this Action filed in State Court. Therefore, the STATE concedes that the Federal Action gave it notice of the facts at issue in this Action filed in State Court since the STATE contends that both actions are "based on same facts."
- 48. In the current Action, the parties have in stipulated to the basic underlying facts and the STATE has repeatedly asserted that discovery should not be permitted into the

parties' interpretations since those matters are resolved. Moreover, the STATE was able to gather and preserve evidence related to the interpretation of § 4.3.2.2(a)(1) after being notified and served with the federal action and has retained agendas, minutes and records of the various CGCC meetings at which the STATE failed to issue SAN PASQUAL its Licenses and is therefore not prejudiced by the filing of this Action in State Court.

- 49. With regard to its filing and pursuing the Federal Action and this Action in State Court, SAN PASQUAL acted at all times in Good Faith. SAN PASQUAL filed this Action in State Court while the Federal Action was still pending, and, in fact, over 20 months before the federal action became final. Additionally, SAN PASQUAL never took any affirmative action to state that it would not pursue this Action for damages and in fact repeatedly informed the STATE that its acts and omissions were causing SAN PASQUAL to suffer millions of dollars in damages. SAN PASQUAL attempted to resolve its claim for damages before filing this Action through the Government Claims process created by the California Legislature "to provide the public entity with notice of the proposed action so as to permit investigation and settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the expense of litigation. Scott v. County of Los Angeles, (1977) 73 Cal. App. 3d 476, 481. However, the STATE merely responded to SAN PASQUAL Government Claim by stating that "the court system is the appropriate means for resolution of these claims."
- 50. Code of Civil Procedures §355 also applies to allow this San Pasqual in this Action to pursue the earliest breaches based upon the above facts and circumstances.

III. DEFENDANTS DO NOT POSSESS GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY FROM A BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION AND THEREFORE SAN PASQUAL IS PERMITTED TO FILE THIS ACTION IN STATE COURT AND SEEK MONETARY DAMAGES

51. The STATE does not have Government Immunity from a Breach of Contract Cause of Action. No statute creates immunity for the STATE from a Breach of Contract

Cause of Action. No case has ever held that the State of California has immunity from a Breach of Contract Cause of Action.

- 52. The Government Claim Process referred to above does not otherwise change the maxim of law that the STATE does not have immunity from a Breach of Contract Cause of Action. As explained in *City of Stockton v. Superior Court*, (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 730, 737-42 the Government Claim process is a procedural requirement to be applied to torts, as well as contract claims, notwithstanding the recognition and confirmation in that Supreme Court decision that the STATE has never been protected by immunity for such breach of contract claims (in contrast to purely personal injury tort claims).
- 53. The STATE therefore has no sovereign immunity for this Breach of Contract with SAN PASQUAL, and this court therefore has jurisdiction over this Action and SAN PASQUAL's cause of action for Breach of the Contract because a compact is a contract, Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987), and the STATE does not have immunity from this Action alleging the STATE breached the Contract.
- 54. While the Contract contains a waiver of immunity by both the STATE and SAN PASQUAL, SAN PASQUAL is not relying upon that waiver to file this lawsuit because such reliance is not necessary. Because SAN PASQUAL is not relying upon the Limited Waiver contained in Contract §9.4, SAN PASQUAL is not restricted by the conditions imposed by the Limited Waiver, such as the restriction against monetary damages.
- 55. With regard to a Breach of Contract claim, the STATE only has immunity from suit in federal court, not because it is a breach of contract claim, but only because of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides the STATE with immunity from any action filed in a federal court (whether it is for Breach of Contract or any other claim) unless the STATE waives that Eleventh Amendment Immunity. Because the STATE has no immunity from a Breach of Contract claim in State Court and only possesses immunity from a federal Breach of Contract claim due to its general Eleventh Amendment immunity, the waiver of immunity in the Contract is only necessary to bring suit for an action arising under the Contract that is filed in federal court. Thus, the prohibition on monetary

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damages that appears solely in Contract §9.4, entitled "Limited Waiver of Sovereign Immunity," is applicable only when the STATE is sued in federal court by using the waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity contained in Contract §9.4.

- By its explicit terms, the waiver of immunity in the Contract is not the exclusive remedy for SAN PASQUAL to enforce the terms of the Contract. Because the STATE does not have immunity from a Breach of Contract cause of action filed in State Court, SAN PASQUAL may file this Action in State Court on that basis and without relying upon the waiver of immunity in the Contract and without the monetary damages prohibition contained in the Contract's Limited Waiver applying to this Action in State Court.
- Furthermore, Contract §9.3 explicitly permits SAN PASQUAL to file this Action for Breach of the Contract in State Court because it states "This Section 9.0 may not be construed to waive, limit or restrict any remedy that is otherwise available to either party." Because the STATE does not have immunity from a breach of contract cause of action, SAN PASQUAL has and always had available to it the right to file this Action for breach of the Contract in state court and seek monetary damages. Therefore, Contract §9.3 explicitly permits SAN PASQUAL to file this Action in state court and seek monetary damages.
- 58. SAN PASQUAL timely filed this Action in state court on February 9, 2010 regarding the State's breach of the Contract on December 11, 2008, as well as for all other unlawful conduct alleged herein.

III. **VENUE**

59. C.C.P. §395 states that venue is proper for a breach of contract cause of action in "the superior court in the county where the obligation is to be performed, where the contract in fact was entered into, or where the defendant or any defendant resides at the commencement of the action." The State conducts Gaming Device License Draws in the County of Sacramento, the Contract was entered into in the County of Sacramento, and the CGCC's office is in Sacramento County. Therefore, this action could be commenced or tried in Sacramento County under C.C.P. §395.

60. C.C.P. §401, however further states that "[w]henever it is provided by any law of
this State that an action or proceeding against the State shall or may be commenced in,
tried in, or removed to the County of Sacramento, the same may be commenced and tried in
any city or city and county of this State in which the Attorney General has an office."

61. The Attorney General has an office in Los Angeles County. Therefore, this Action was commenced in Los Angeles County pursuant to C.C.P. §401.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach of Contract against All Defendants)

- 62. SAN PASQUAL realleges all the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 61, inclusive, and hereby incorporate each of them by this reference.
- 63. SAN PASQUAL and the STATE OF CALIFORNIA entered into the Contract on or about September 10, 1999.
- 64. SAN PASQUAL has done everything that the Contract requires SAN PASQUAL to do.
- 65. On or about June 19, 2002, when the CGCC announced its interpretation that Contract §4.3.2.2(a)(1) authorized the issuance of only 32,151 Gaming Device Licenses, the STATE thereby announced its then present intention not to comply with the terms of the Contract.
- 66. For the July 2003 License Draw, all conditions required by this Contract for the STATE's performance had occurred including, but not limited to, SAN PASQUAL timely submitting its Gaming Device License Application for 500 Gaming Device Licenses and tendering to the STATE a prepayment of \$625,000 for the 500 requested Gaming Device Licenses. Therefore, STATE was required to issue SAN PASQUAL the additional 500 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the July 10, 2003 Gaming Device License Draw.

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- 67. For the October 2004 License Draw, all conditions required by this Contract for the STATE's performance had occurred including, but not limited to, SAN PASQUAL timely submitting its Gaming Device License Application for 341 Gaming Device Licenses and tendering to the STATE a prepayment of \$426,250 for the 341 requested Gaming Device Licenses. Therefore, STATE was required to issue SAN PASQUAL the additional 341 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the October 22, 2004 Gaming Device License Draw.
- 68. For the October 2005 License Draw, all conditions required by this Contract for the STATE's performance had occurred including, but not limited to, SAN PASQUAL timely submitting its Gaming Device License Application for 333 Gaming Device Licenses and tendering to the STATE a prepayment of \$416,250 for the 333 requested Gaming Device Licenses. Therefore, STATE was required to issue SAN PASQUAL the additional 333 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the October 7, 2005 Gaming Device License Draw.
- 69. For the August 2006 License Draw, all conditions required by this Contract for the STATE's performance had occurred including, but not limited to, SAN PASQUAL timely submitting its Gaming Device License Application for 50 Gaming Device Licenses and tendering to the STATE a prepayment of \$62,500 for the 50 requested Gaming Device Licenses. Therefore, STATE was required to issue SAN PASQUAL the additional 50 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the August 16, 2006 Gaming Device License Draw.
- 70. For the October 2007 License Draw, all conditions required by this Contract for the STATE's performance had occurred including, but not limited to, SAN PASQUAL timely submitting its Gaming Device License Application for 300 Gaming Device Licenses and tendering to the STATE a prepayment of \$375,000 for the 300 requested Gaming Device Licenses. Therefore, STATE was required to issue SAN PASQUAL the additional 300 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the October 10, 2007 Gaming Device License Draw.

- 71. All conditions required by this Contract for the STATE's performance had occurred including, but not limited to, SAN PASQUAL timely submitting its Gaming Device License Application for 428 Gaming Device Licenses and tendering to the STATE a prepayment of \$535,000 for the 428 requested Gaming Device Licenses. Therefore, STATE was required to issue SAN PASQUAL the additional 428 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the December 11, 2008 Gaming Device License Draw.
- 72. Based upon the CGCC's erroneous interpretation, the STATE failed to issue SAN PASQUAL 500 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the July 10, 2003 Gaming Device License Draw. SAN PASQUAL was harmed by the STATE's failure to issue SAN PASQUAL the 500 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the July 10, 2003 Gaming Device License Draw.
- 73. Based upon the CGCC's erroneous interpretation, the STATE failed to issue SAN PASQUAL 269 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the October 22, 2004 Gaming Device License Draw. SAN PASQUAL was harmed by the STATE's failure to issue SAN PASQUAL the 269 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the October 22, 2004 Gaming Device License Draw.
- 74. Based upon the CGCC's erroneous interpretation, the STATE failed to issue SAN PASQUAL 333 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the October 7, 2005 Gaming Device License Draw. SAN PASQUAL was harmed by the STATE's failure to issue SAN PASQUAL the additional 333 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the October 7, 2005 Gaming Device License Draw.
- 75. Based upon the CGCC's erroneous interpretation, the STATE failed to issue SAN PASQUAL 50 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the August 16, 2006 Gaming Device License Draw. SAN PASQUAL was harmed by the STATE's failure to issue SAN PASQUAL the additional 50 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the August 16, 2006 Gaming Device License Draw.

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76. Based upon the CGCC's erroneous interpretation, the STATE failed to issue SAN PASQUAL 300 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the October 10, 2007 Gaming Device License Draw. SAN PASQUAL was harmed by the STATE's failure to issue SAN PASQUAL the additional 300 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the October 10, 2007 Gaming Device License Draw.

77. The STATE failed to issue SAN PASQUAL any of the additional 428 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the December 11, 2008 Gaming Device License Draw. SAN PASQUAL was harmed by the STATE's failure to issue SAN PASQUAL the additional 428 Gaming Device Licenses requested by SAN PASQUAL at the December 11, 2008 Gaming Device License Draw.

78. As a direct and proximate result of such wrongful conduct by the STATE, SAN PASQUAL suffered and will continue to suffer in the future direct, incidental and consequential economic compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial, but at least two hundred million dollars (\$200,000,000), as well as prejudgment and postjudgment interest; and other damages in an amount subject to proof at trial.

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For the First Cause of Action Against All Defendants (Breach of Contract):

- 1. For all general, special damages, direct damages, incidental damages, and consequential damages, in an amount exceeding the jurisdictional minimum of this court, which amount is to be adduced according to proof at trial, but which shall not be less than two hundred million dollars (\$200,000,000); and,
- 2. For such other and future special and/or general damages in an amount subject to proof at trial; and,
- 3. For Pre-Judgment and Post Judgment interest at lawful rates; and,
- 4. For those Causes of Action allowing attorneys fees, reasonable attorneys fees; and,
- 5. For costs of suit; and,
- 6. For such other further and further relief as the court may deem proper.

DATED: April 16, 2012

SOLOMON, SALTSMAN & JAMIESON

Stephen Warren Solomon Stephen Allen Jamieson R. Bruce Evans Ryan M. Kroll

Attorneys for Plaintiff-SAN PASQUAL Band of Mission Indians

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