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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES ACRES,

BLUE LAKE RANCHERIA
TRIBAL COURT, the court of a
federally recognized tribe; LESTER
J. MARSTON, in his official capacity
as chief judge of the Blue Lake
Rancheria Tribal Court; ANITA
HUFF, in her official capacity as
clerk of the Blue Lake Rancheria
Tribal Court; and BLUE LAKE
CASINO AND HOTEL, a tribally
owned entity of the federally
recognized tribe, the Blue Lake
Rancheria,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 16-cv-0598-H-BLM

ORDER TRANSFERRING CASE TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

On April 6, 2016, Defendant Blue Lake Casino and Hotel ("BLC&H") moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, failure to exhaust tribal court remedies, and improper venue. (Doc. No. 9.) On April 6, 2016, Defendants Blue Lake Rancheria Tribal Court, Lester J. Marston, and Anita Huffjoined the motion. (Doc. No. 10.) On April 26, 2016, Plaintiff opposed the motion. (Doc. No. 11.) On April 29, 2016, the Court submitted the motion on the filings under Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). (Doc. No. 14.) On May 2, 2016, BLC&H replied. (Doc. No. 15.) On May 4, 2016, the Tribal Court, Marston, and Huffjoined BLC&H's reply. (Doc. No. 16.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court transfers

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27 28 this case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California and denies Defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice as to a renewed motion filed after the case is transferred.

BACKGROUND

On March 9, 2016, Plaintiff James Acres filed this case seeking declaratory and injunctive relief related to pending litigation ("the tribal court action") in Blue Lake Rancheria Tribal Court. (Doc. No. 1, "Compl."). Plaintiff is the president of Acres Bonusing, Inc. ("ABI"). (Id. ¶4 & n.1.) Defendant Blue Lake Rancheria Tribal Court is the tribal court of the Blue Lake Rancheria, a federally recognized tribe located in Humboldt County, California. (Id. ¶ 5.) Defendant Lester J. Marston is chief judge of the tribal court, Anita Huff is clerk of the tribal court, and BLC&H is a tribally owned entity of the Blue Lake Rancheria. (Id. ¶¶ 6–8.) In the tribal court action, BLC&H asserts a tort claim against Plaintiff for fraudulent inducement and claims against ABI for breach of contract, bad faith, unjust enrichment, and money had and received. (Id. ¶¶ 9–11 & pp. 50–56.) Plaintiff asks this Court to declare that the tribal court lacks jurisdiction over him and to enjoin Defendants from taking action against him in the tribal court. (Id. at 3.)

DISCUSSION

The general venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, provides that a civil action may be brought in

(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

Id. § 1391(b)(1)–(3).

Defendants argue that venue is not proper in this district because they do not reside in this district, they are not subject to personal jurisdiction here, and all of the

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events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred elsewhere. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 20–23; Doc. No. 10.) Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants do not reside here and are not subject to personal jurisdiction here. However, he contends that venue is proper in this district under § 1391(b)(2) because Defendants served him with the tribal court complaint here and his assets here might be sought to satisfy a judgment in the tribal court action. (Doc. No. 11 at 26–28.)

The Court agrees that venue is not proper in this district. Plaintiff's claims arise from Defendants' filing and handling of the tribal court action in Humboldt County, California. (Compl. ¶¶ 9–10, 25–70.) Service of the tribal court complaint in this district does not constitute a substantial part of his claims. See United Tactical Sys. LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 733, 753 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ("While Real Action argues the service of process on Real Action in California gives rise to the abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims, the act of serving process is insufficient to constitute a 'substantial part' of Real Action's claims."). That Plaintiff's assets here might be sought to satisfy a judgment in the tribal court action does not make them the subject of that action.

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) provides: "The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." District courts have discretion to dismiss or transfer under § 1406(a). See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2009), reh'g granted and opinion vacated on other grounds, 603 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2010); King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1992).

Exercising its discretion, the Court finds that transfer to the Northern District of California is in the interest of justice. Plaintiff could have brought this case there. Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over claims by non-Indians that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over them. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 324 (2008); Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock Land Use Policy

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1	Comm'n, 736 F.3d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 2013). While Defendants contend that this
2	Court lacks jurisdiction because they are entitled to tribal sovereign immunity, Plaintif
3	has alleged a colorable theory that Marston and Hicks are not immune under Ex Parte
4	Young. See Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Lee, 672 F.30
5	1176, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 2012); Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128
6	1133–34 (9th Cir. 1995). Tribal court exhaustion is "not a jurisdictional prerequisite."
7	Evans, 736 F.3d at 1302. The declarations Defendants submitted reflect that they are
8	subject to personal jurisdiction in Humboldt County, California. (Doc. No. 9-2 ¶ 3
9	Doc. No. 9-4¶2.) Humboldt County is located in the Northern District. See 28 U.S.C
10	§ 84(a). Venue is proper in the Northern District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) and (2)
11	because Defendants reside there and a substantial portion of the events giving rise to
12	Plaintiff's claims occurred there.
13	Accordingly, the Court transfers this case to the United States District Cour

for the Northern District of California. In light of the pending transfer, the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice as to a renewed motion filed after the case is transferred. The Court denies Plaintiff's requests for judicial notice at this time because they are moot.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court transfers this case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California and denies Defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice as to a renewed motion filed after the case is transferred.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 13, 2016

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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