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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Jack Duran, Jr. SBN 221704 Duran Law Office 4010 Foothills Blvd. S-103, #98 Roseville, CA 95747 Telephone: (916)779-3316 Facsimile: (916)520-3526 duranlaw@yahoo.com Attorney for Defendants CEDARVILLE RANCHERIA OF NOF CEDARVILLE RANCHERIA TRIBAL TRIBAL COURT JUDGE PATRICIA I	THERN PAIUTE INDIANS; COURT; and	
11	FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
12	SACRAMENTO DIVISION		
13		Case No. 2:16-cv-02438-WHO	
14	DUANNA KNIGHTON,	Case No. 2:10-cv-02438-WHO	
15	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION AND MOTION TO	
16	v.	DISMISS COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE	
17	CEDARVILLE RANCHERIA OF NORTHERN PAIUTE INDIANS;	RELIEF; SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES	
18	CEDARVILLE RANCHERIA TRIBAL COURT; PATRICIA R. LENZI	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1),(6)	
19 20	Defendants		
20		Time: 1:30 P.M.	
21		Courtroom: 2-17 TH Floor Judge: Hon. William H. Orrick	
22			
24			
25	TO THE COURT AND ALL P	PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:	
26	Please be advised that on February 8, 2017 at 1:30 pm, in Courtroom 2 of the United		
27	States District Court for the Northern District of California, located at 450 Golden Gate Avenue,		
28	- 1 - DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF HEARING		
	DEFENDA	INTS NOTICE OF HEAKING	

Ш

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San Francisco, California 94102 (Eastern District Court case assigned to visiting Judge Orrick), Defendants Cedarville Rancheria of Northern Paiute Indians, its tribal court, and its tribal judge Patricia R. Lenzi, will and hereby do move, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) & (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief on the following grounds: (1) sovereign immunity as to all three defendants, (2) Tribal Court is the proper jurisdiction as to all three defendants, (3) the complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted as to all three defendants, (4) the three defendants are not necessary or indispensable parties to the Court's review of the Tribal Court's finding of jurisdiction, (5) as to the Defendant Tribe, Plaintiff's claims are not ripe for adjudication; and (6) the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The motion is based on this notice, the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities, the oral argument on the hearing of this matter, all pleadings and records heretofore filed in this action, and all relevant matters subject to judicial notice.

Respectfully Submitted this December 16, 2016.

DURAN LAW OFFICE

<u>/s/Jack Duran</u> Jack Duran

Attorney for Defendants CEDARVILLE RANCHERIA OF NORTHERN PAIUTE INDIANS; CEDARVILLE RANCHERIA TRIBAL COURT; and TRIBAL COURT JUDGE PATRICIA R.LENZI

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION

The Cedarville Rancheria of Northern Paiute Indians, its Tribal Court, and its Tribal Court Judge Patricia Lenzi ("Defendants"), respectfully move this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunction Relief ("Complaint") under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) on the grounds that: (1) the doctrine of sovereign immunity shields Defendants from the Court's jurisdiction, (2) Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted, (3) jurisdiction exists under *Montana v United States*,(4) Defendants are not necessary or indispensable parties to this post-exhaustion review action pursuant to Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (5) as to the Defendant Tribe, Plaintiff's claims are not ripe for adjudication; and (6) the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Cedarville Rancheria of Northern Paiute Indians ("Tribe") is a federally recognized Indian Tribe with reservation lands within Modoc County California. On October 2, 2014, the Tribe filed suit against several defendants, including the Plaintiff here, Duanna Knighton. The Tribe brought suit in its Tribal Court before the Honorable Chief Judge and Defendant Patricia Lenzi. The complaint brought numerous civil claims related to Plaintiff Knighton's consensual relationship via long term employment with the Tribe.

Chief among those allegations in the Tribal Court action was that Plaintiff Knighton was a 15-year employee of the Tribe whose employment responsibilities occurred both on the Tribe's fee land and federal trust lands. The Tribal Court complaint makes allegations of employment fraud, inflation of Plaintiff Knighton's salary, over \$2 million in tribal investment losses, a negotiation and real estate purchase, negotiated by Plaintiff Knighton that was rife with conflicts DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS of interest resulting in the Tribe's alleged overpayment for the building. (See Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 1, and Tribe's Tribal Court Complaint.)

The Tribal Court complaint also alleges Plaintiff Knighton implemented an unauthorized retirement fund, funded by the Tribe without proper authorization, into which she placed her inflated salary and other converted tribal funds, in excess of the federal limits and tribal policy for retirement accounts. The Tribal Court complaint alleged Plaintiff Knighton refused to return \$29,000.00 plus in tribal funds that did not belong to her. She did all these things while in the employ of the Tribe, and within the jurisdiction of the Tribe's federal trust and fee lands.

II. PROCEDURAL SUMMARY OF THE UNDERLYING TRIBAL COURT CASE AGAINST PLAINTIFF KNIGHTON

On March 11, 2015, the Tribal Court found jurisdiction over Plaintiff pursuant to both Tribal law and pursuant to federal law, *Montana v United States*, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). (See Ex. 6, attached to Complaint).

On March 7, 2016, after Plaintiff Knighton appealed the Tribal Court's finding of jurisdiction to the Tribe's Appellate Division, the Tribal Appellate Court upheld the Court's jurisdiction and returned the case back to the Tribal Court. (See Ex. 10, attached to Complaint).

On or about April 29, 2016 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, Plaintiff Knighton filed a Motion to Dismiss with the Tribal Court, on the issue of failing to join a necessary or indispensable party in defendant RISE, Inc., whom the Tribal Court had previously dismissed. The Tribal Court, again, dismissed Plaintiff Knighton's motion, finding that defendant Rise was not indispensable or a necessary party to the Tribal Court litigation. (See Ex. 11, attached to Complaint).

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On September 15, 2016, the Tribe and Plaintiff Knighton stipulated to bypass the Tribe's appellate division in order for Plaintiff to seek post exhaustion review request of Tribal Court jurisdiction. (See Ex. 12, attached to Complaint).

On October 20, 2016, Plaintiff Knighton filed the instant action for declaratory and injunctive relief naming the Tribe, Tribal Court and Tribal Court Chief Judge, Patricia Lenzi, as defendants.

Plaintiff's exhibits to the complaint do not constitute the complete records in this case. Further, Plaintiff Knighton has included documents, such as Cedarville Rancheria's Administrative Policies and Procedures that were never presented to the Tribal Court for review. (See Ex. 2, attached to Complaint). These documents, however, further substantiate the Tribe's jurisdictional bases over Plaintiff Knighton.

Plaintiff Knighton alleges that because the current Tribal Court was not in existence at the time she was in the employ of the Tribe, the Tribal Court lacks jurisdiction over her. However, Defendant Tribe's Administrative Policies and Procedures confer jurisdiction not only to the Tribe, but more importantly, to the Tribal Council in cases where the Tribal Administrator is the focus of discipline. (See Ex.2, attached to Complaint, Cedarville Administrative Policies and Procedures at Section 1. B Grievance Steps, sub. (d).). Further, the Tribal Council is final arbiter of decisions concerning discipline pursuant to the Policies and Procedures. (*Id.* at E. Appeal Hearings (L)). Hence, even if no court was in existence at the time of Plaintiff Knighton's tenure as Tribal Administrator, the Tribal Council retained not only inherent tribal authority to discipline Plaintiff as a tribal employee, but authority enumerated within the Tribe's Administrative Policies and Procedures. In sum, Plaintiff Knighton's argument that she did not consent to tribal discipline is false because the administrative policies and procedures, of which she developed while Tribal Administrator, confer jurisdiction to the Tribe over employee discipline and or grievances.

III. ARGUMENT—SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

A. Sovereign Immunity shields Defendants from Suit

A motion to dismiss on tribal sovereign immunity grounds is properly brought under Rule 12(b)(1). *Breakthrough Mgmt. Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort* 629 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 2010); *Lewis v. Norton* 424 F.3d 959, 961 (9th Cir. 2005).

Federal courts have long recognized that Indian Tribes possess the sovereign immunity
from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers. *Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez*, 436 U.S.
49, 58 (1978). This immunity applies to all federal suits for damages, declaratory relief, and
injunctive relief unless there is an express tribal waiver or congressional abrogation. *Id.* at 58-59. *See Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala Band of Mission Indians*, 940 F.2d 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 1991).

Furthermore, the doctrine's ambit covers tribal officials and employees acting within the scope of their authority. *See Fletcher v. United States*, 116 F.3d 1315, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997); *Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe*, 779 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1985); *Romanella v. Hayward*, 933 F. Supp. 163, 167 (D. Conn. 1996); *Kizis v. Worse Diesel Int'l, Inc.*, 794 A.2d 498 (Conn. 2002).

The January 29, 2014 Federal Register of Lists of Federally Recognized Tribes and Entities Eligible to Receive Federal Benefits supports the Defendants' claim of sovereign immunity. (See Exhibit 1, List of Federally recognized Indian Tribes, Federal Register attached to J. Duran declaration). Hence, as a recognized Indian Tribe, Defendant Tribe is entitled to sovereign immunity against unconsented civil suit, including the instant action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Tribal Sovereign Immunity applies to suits for declaratory and -4-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS injunctive relief. People v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 595 F.2nd 1153 (1979). In that case the State of California, as plaintiff, sought declaratory relief against an Indian tribe. The Ninth Circuit held the tribe enjoyed sovereign immunity from unconsented suit absent a waiver by Congress, noting that the Courts have no choice but to recognize sovereign immunity. Id. at 57. See also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58-59 (1978); Imperial Granite v Pala Band of Mission Indians, 940 F.2nd, 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 1991).

Similar to the Tribe, Defendant Tribal Court enjoys immunity from suit in these circumstances. This immunity applies to all federal suits for damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief unless there is an express tribal waiver or congressional abrogation. Santa Clara Pueblo, supra, at 58-59; see Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala Band of Mission Indians, 940 F.2d 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 1991). Likewise, Judge Lenzi, who is sued in her official capacity only, is also immune from suit. If tribal officials are acting within the scope of their lawful authority and relief would run against the tribe itself, they share the tribe's immunity from suit. Imperial Granite Co., 940 F.2d at 1269; Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1324.

Here, the Tribal Court and Judge Lenzi acted within the scope of their authority granted by the Cedarville Rancheria Judicial Code, and plaintiff Knighton does not allege that they acted outside the scope of their lawful authority. Absent such allegations, tribal officials enjoy the same immunity from suit as the Defendant Tribe. United States v. Oregon (9th Cir. 1981) 657 F.2d 1009, 1012, fn. 8.

Defendants have not consented to declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendants have not waived their sovereign immunity, despite the stipulation to federal court review. Congress has not abrogated Defendants' sovereign immunity in this matter.

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- 5 -DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

B. This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Hear this Action Because Plaintiff, as an Employee of The Tribe, Consented to Jurisdiction

1. Consensual Relationship Between Plaintiff and Defendant Tribe A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is properly made on the basis that the complaint fails to establish grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction as a matter of fact. *Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States* 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3rd Cir. 2000). Although Plaintiff Knighton claims the Tribal Court has no jurisdiction to hear the underlying case, there is evidence to support tribal jurisdiction in the underlying matter. Although not mentioned in her complaint directly, only in attached Exhibits, the Tribe and Plaintiff Knighton were in a 15-year employment relationship. This undisputed fact triggers the first exception under *Montana v. United States*, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), which allows Tribes to regulate activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the Tribe, as by commercial dealings, including on fee lands.

Moreover, under Tribal Court Code section 201 *et seq.*, Plaintiff Knighton consented to Tribal Court jurisdiction when she entered into a consensual employment relationship with the Tribe. The Tribal Court is the exclusive venue for resolution of the Tribal Claims against Plaintiff Knighton under *Montana*. Even if *in arguendo*, the federal Court were to find the Tribe's Court Code inapplicable, or that the Tribal Court entity lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff Knighton, Defendant Tribe would have jurisdiction over Plaintiff based upon its inherent tribal authority and the *custom and tradition* of the Tribe or its Council resolving past employment disputes, independent or absent a Tribal Court. (See Declaration of Melissa Davis, Cedarville Rancheria Tribal Chairperson at ¶¶4-5) Jurisdiction can also be demonstrated through the Tribe's Administrative Policies and Procedures. (See Ex. 2,

> - 6 -DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

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attached to Complaint, Cedarville Administrative Policies and Procedures at Section 1. B Grievance steps, sub. (d)). These Procedures permit the Tribe's Council to be the final arbiter over disciplinary and grievance issues related to Tribal employment. The Council specifically has jurisdiction over matters involving the Tribal Administrator, a post Plaintiff Knighton previously held while employed by the Tribe. (*Id.* at E. Appeal Hearings (L)).

Since Tribal Court jurisdiction exists, jurisdiction here is improper.

2. Tribal Court Jurisdiction also Exists as to *Montana's* Second Prong — "Direct Effects"

Tribal Court jurisdiction also exists as to Plaintiff under *Montana*'s second prong — conduct that "has a direct effect or threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." *Montana*, 450 U.S. at 566.


As noted in Defendant Tribe's Tribal Court complaint against Plaintiff Knighton, upon which The Tribal Court held jurisdiction existed, Knighton's numerous alleged activities in defrauding the Tribe, directly imperiled the Tribe. In *Attorney Process and Investigative Services, Inc., v. Sac and Fox Tribe of Mississippi in Iowa*, 609 F.3rd 927 (8thth Cir. 2010), the 8th Circuit found direct effects *Montana* jurisdiction where a Tribe was imperiled by the alleged conversion of tribal funds if said conversion flowed directly from the defendant's conduct. Specifically, the Court held that the Sac and Fox Tribe in Iowa tribal court, which did not exist at the time the events giving rise to an intra-tribal dispute, had jurisdiction over Attorney Process under *Montana's* second prong, "direct effects." Id. at 927-28. The Court upheld a lower court finding that Attorney Processes' actions, in storming the Tribe's casino

and taking \$1,000,000 in cash, *directly imperiled* the Tribe's government and economic affairs under *Montana*.

Here, the facts are eerily similar, save Plaintiff Knighton was a 15-year trusted employee of the Tribe. Plaintiff Knighton's actions over those 15 years of employment, are alleged to have resulted in a massive fraud against the Tribe, including employment wage fraud, retirement fund fraud, conversion of tribal funds and mismanagement of \$2,000,000 in tribal investment funds, much of which were designated for tribal children's education.

While not rising to the level of outrageousness related to Attorney Processes' 30 agents storming a Tribal casino, Plaintiff Knighton's actions of raiding the Tribe's books and records to her financial benefit, were equally devastating to the Defendant Tribe. As the Tribe's administrator, Plaintiff Knighton was a trusted employee and in complete control of the Tribe's finances, books and records and could conceal her fraud. It was not until the Tribe authorized a forensic audit after Plaintiff left the Tribe's employment, that the Tribe discovered the depth and extent of Plaintiff's deception, and filed suit against her in Tribal Court to hold her accountable.

Although the Eighth Circuit remanded to the lower court the issue related to conversion and whether *Montana's* first prong applied, it held firm that jurisdiction under *Montana's* "direct effects" test had been met to confer tribal court jurisdiction. Here, the Tribal Court found jurisdiction over Plaintiff under both prongs of *Montana*—consensual relations and direct effects. These findings were upheld by the Tribe's Appellate Court.



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Thus, Tribal Court jurisdiction, under the second *Montana* prong, is proper.¹ This means jurisdiction is not proper here.

C. The Tribal Court And Judge Lenzi are Not Required or Necessary Parties For Post-Exhaustion Review of Court Jurisdiction Under Rule 19.

The Tribal Court and Judge Lenzi should be dismissed from this action because they are not "necessary or indispensable" to the post-exhaustion review of tribal court jurisdiction.

1. Party Joinder Analysis Under Rule 19

To determine if the absent party is necessary to the suit, the court must undertake another two-part analysis. First, the court must decide if *complete relief* is possible among those already parties to the suit. This analysis is independent of the question of whether relief is available to the absent party. *Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee*, 662 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1981). Next, the court must determine whether the absent party has a *legally protected interest* in the suit. This interest must be more than a financial stake, *Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Hodel*, 803 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986), and more than speculation about a future event. *Montana v. International Ass'n of Machinists*, 847 F.2d 620, 621 (9th Cir.1988).

a. Complete Relief is Obtainable Against Plaintiff Knighton

Rule 19(a) applies where joinder would have either of two effects. First, joinder must be ordered if complete relief cannot be accorded among the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). There is no suggestion that the Tribal Court or Judge's absence would preclude this Court from fashioning meaningful relief. *See Eldredge, supra*, 662 F.2d at 537 (while desirable to join all

¹ See United States v. Janis, 556 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir.2009) (defendant's "receipt and retention" of tribal funds transferred in violation of tribal policy was "conversion" under 18 U.S.C. § 1163).

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DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

4500 employees to eradicate sex discrimination, relief on plaintiff's claims against the defendant can be afforded by an injunction against that party alone).

A case from the 10th circuit also held that a Tribe was not a required or indispensable party to a case involving a tribal court order in *Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v Stidham*, 2014 WL 434542? (Tenth Cir. 2014). Certainly, should this Court determine subject matter jurisdiction exits, the indispensable party status of RISE, Inc. can be decided without the Tribal Court and Judge Lenzi as defendants here.

b. Neither the Court nor Judge Lenzi have a Legally Protected Interest in the Post-Exhaustion Review Litigation

Next, to determine if the Tribal Court and Judge are necessary parties, this Court should consider whether the absent party "claims an interest relating to the subject of the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2). If the interest requirement is not satisfied, the Court need not reach the other factors in clauses (2)(i) and (ii) of Rule 19. Here, neither the Tribal Court nor Judge Lenzi possess the requisite legally protected interest in the subject matter. *See* 3A *Moore's Federal Practice* ¶ 19.07[2.-0], at 19-99 (2d ed. 1986) (must be legally protected interest, not merely financial interest or interest of convenience).

The "subject matter" of the instant case concerns a Tribal Court finding of jurisdiction. The only interest the Tribal Court or Judge Lenzi have to the review is *related to future Court venue, e.g. whether the Knighton case remains in Tribal Court or is ordered to state court*. The Tribal Court and Judge Lenzi might be "interested" from the perspective of whether they will be

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required to rule on the litigation in the future, but nothing more. Additionally, neither the Tribal Court nor Judge Lenzi are subject to damages under the doctrine of *Ex Parte Young*, 29 U.S.123 (1908). Hence, no cognizable protectable interest exists as to the Tribal Court or Judge Lenzi. Finally, as noted previously, neither the Tribal Court nor Judge Lenzi are subject to injunctive relief due to their sovereign immunity. Thus, as no protectable tribal interest exists, the Court and Judge Lenzi should be dismissed from this declaratory and injunctive relief action.

D. The Complaint Should Also be Dismissed Under the Ripeness Doctrine.

Ripeness is designed to prevent a federal court from prematurely adjudicating matters by asking it to conduct a preliminary evaluation of: (1) the fitness of the issues for review, and (2) the hardship to the parties if consideration is withheld. *National Park Hospitality Ass 'n v. Department of the Interior*, 538 U.S. 802, 807-08 (2003).

Here, it is Black letter law that due to the Defendant Tribe's sovereign immunity and Plaintiff Knighton's failure to demonstrate a waiver of said immunity, this case will NEVER be ripe for Court adjudication. Further, as the claims against Plaintiff Knighton in the underlying Tribal Court are not federal questions, the Court, again, lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of the Defendant Tribe's claims against her.

As such Plaintiff Knighton's complaint is unripe. It is premature and should be dismissed.

IV. ARGUMENT—F AILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

A. Standard for Rule for 12(b)(6) Motions.

Dismissal under 12(b)(6) is proper where there is a "lack of cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." *Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept.*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The Court may properly dismiss the case where "plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

B. Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted.

Plaintiff has advanced untenable legal theories to support jurisdiction: 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 28 U.S.C § 2201. Section 1331, which grants jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the Constitution or federal law, is inapplicable because Plaintiff has not identified the federal statutory basis for her claims. *See Pit River Home & Agric. Coop. Ass 'n v. United States*, 30 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 1994). Although Plaintiff advances a claim for Post-Exhaustion review of the question of Tribal Court jurisdiction, it has not proffered any facts indicating or suggesting that the Tribe is responsible for the finding of jurisdiction or issued the order or intends to act against Plaintiff in any way, shape or form, requiring a declaratory relief finding or injunctive relief.

Other than the controversy between Plaintiff and Defendant Tribe that gives rise to the Tribe's underlying complaint against Plaintiff, the Tribe is not a party to any controversy related to the Court's review of the Tribal Court's jurisdictional finding. Further, the Tribe cannot provide relief because it did not issue the order against Plaintiff. As the Tribe cannot provide Plaintiff relief, there exists no present controversy, and Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon

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which relief can be granted. Her complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief must be dismissed.

Further, as explained above, the Tribal Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to *Montana v United States*, 540 U.S. 544 (1981) and its progeny. As such, since a proper Court exists to adjudicate the dispute between Plaintiff and the Defendant Tribe, this Court should dismiss the Tribe from this declaratory relief action, and also dismiss the action in its entirely as to all three defendants.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants ask that this Court grant their motion to dismiss.

Respectfully Submitted this December 14, 2016.

DURAN LAW OFFICE

By:

<u>/s/Jack Duran</u> Jack Duran Attorney for Defendants CEDARVILLE RANCHERIA OF NORTHERN PAIUTE INDIANS; CEDARVILLE RANCHERIA TRIBAL COURT; and TRIBAL COURT JUDGE PATRICIA R.LENZI

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