UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ASKER B. ASKER, BASSAM ASKAR, KOUSAY ASKAR, SHERA ASSHAQ, ALEXANDRA ASKAR, AWHAM ASKAR, JAMES E. GILLETTE, JR., THOMAS HORVATIS, and RICHARD WIGGINS, Plaintiffs, vs. SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA, INC., AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY, and The SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA TRIAL COURT, Hon. Moses B. Osceola, Tribunal Chief Judge, Defendants.	Case No. 0:17-cv-60468-BB

DEFENDANT'S, THE SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA TRIAL COURT,
MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT

Defendant, the SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA TRIAL COURT ("Tribal Court"), HON. CHIEF JUDGE MOSES B. OSCEOLA, by and through its undersigned counsel, and pursuant to, *inter alia,* Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) and S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.1, hereby respectfully moves this Honorable Court to enter an order dismissing the Complaint [ECF No. 1], filed by Plaintiffs for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, because, *inter alia*, it is premature, barred by tribal sovereign immunity, and Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their tribal court remedies, as explained in the Memorandum of Law in Support below.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

I. INTRODUCTION

There is no reason to "make a federal case" out of the simple Tribal Court discovery dispute that underlies this action.

This action is both premature and barred by tribal sovereign immunity. First, the Tribal Court is established as a branch of the government of the Seminole Tribe of Florida ("Tribe"), a federally recognized Indian Tribe. *See* 79 Fed. Reg. 4750 (Jan. 29, 2014) (providing periodic list of all federally-recognized tribes in the United States). The Tribal Court enjoys tribal sovereign immunity, and may not be sued without the Tribe's consent – which it has not provided. *Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc*., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998). Although Plaintiffs state that Chief Judge Osceola is presiding over the Tribal Court, they do not name him as a defendant or assert any claims against him. [*See* ECF No. 1]. Even if they did, such claims would be barred by official immunity. *Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) ("[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself") (citation omitted).

Second, this suit is barred because Plaintiffs have not exhausted their tribal court remedies.[1] If Plaintiffs have a dispute about the validity of a subpoena issued under the auspices of the Tribal Court, they should present that dispute to the Tribal Court in the first instance, as is required by *National Farmers Union Ins. Companies v. Crow Tribe*, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) and its

[1] Because Plaintiffs can cure the jurisdiction problem caused by the Tribal Court's sovereign immunity by amending their complaint to include a claim for injunctive relief against officials of the Tribal Court in their official capacity, it is also necessary to address the failure to exhaust tribal court remedies, which can only be cured by actually going to the Tribal Court and contesting the Subpoena there.

progeny, and by basic principles of courtesy and judicial economy. If Plaintiffs believe the Subpoena is unenforceable, overbroad or without jurisdiction, the correct course of action is for them to file a motion to modify or quash the subpoena in Tribal Court or to serve written objections and wait for a motion to compel – or, better yet, meet and confer with the issuers of the Subpoena and resolve their issues informally. Until the Tribal Court has had the opportunity to consider its own jurisdiction, the instant litigation is premature.

Finally, other than the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court, Plaintiffs' claims present no federal question.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Until the Tribal Court was served with this federal action, it had no knowledge of any dispute regarding the Subpoena Duces Tecum dated February 16, 2017 ("Subpoena") [ECF No. 1-2]. The Subpoena appears to have been served directly upon Plaintiffs by counsel for Seminole Tribe of Florida, Inc. ("STOFI") as part of post-judgment discovery in *Seminole Tribe of Florida, Inc. v. Evans Energy Partners*, 15-cv-0013 (Seminole Tr. Ct.) (hereinafter referred to as "*STOFI v. Evans Energy Partners*"). The Tribal Court has not received any motion to modify or quash the Subpoena, or any other communication from Plaintiffs besides service of this action, nor has the court received any other discovery motions in *STOFI v. Evans Energy Partners*. *See* Declaration from Mr. Stan Wolfe, Tribal Court Administrator, attached to this Motion as **Exhibit 1**, along with an official copy of the court docket *STOFI v. Evans Energy Partners,* attached to Exhibit 1 as **Exhibit 1-A**.[2]

[2] These are jurisdictional facts, and facts related to the exhaustion of tribal court remedies, and thus may be considered under a motion to dismiss. *See Internet Sols. Corp. v. Marshall*, 557 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009). A court docket is also a public record subject to judicial notice.

The underlying case, *STOFI v. Evans Energy Partners*, is a contract dispute. [*See* ECF No. 1-1, Exs. A and B]. The basis for Tribal Court jurisdiction is a provision in the contract at issue in that case which conferred jurisdiction over disputes upon the Seminole Tribe, "as specifically delegated under the provisions of the Council of the Amended Constitution and By Laws of the Seminole Tribe of Florida." [ECF No. 1-1, pp. 28-29, § 7.13]. The defendant in *STOFI v. Evans Energy Partners* failed to appear and resultantly that litigation reached a default judgment and is now undergoing post-judgment discovery. [*See* ECF No. 1-1; Wolfe Declaration Exhibit 1 at ¶ 5].

There is a status conference scheduled for April 26, 2017 in *STOFI v. Evans Energy Partners,* and during that conference the Tribal Court will have the opportunity to address the Subpoena and any other questions regarding the appropriateness of the discovery being conducted and to establish a schedule for the resolution of any discovery motions.

III. ARGUMENT

A. THIS CASE IS BARRED BY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.

The Tribal Court is a branch of the government of the Seminole Tribe of Florida, a sovereign government that may not be sued without its consent. "The Seminole Tribe of Florida is a federally recognized Indian tribe," *Contour Spa at the Hard Rock, Inc. v. Seminole Tribe of Florida*, 692 F.3d 1200, 1201 (11th Cir. 2012), and "[a]s a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity." *Kiowa Tribe*, 523 U.S. at 754.

Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts that suggest that the Tribal Court's sovereign immunity has been waived or abrogated here. [*See* ECF No. 1]. Instead, the Complaint alleges that "[a]t all times material hereto, Defendant Seminole Tribe of Florida Trial Court ("Tribal

Court"), Hon. Moses B. Osceola, Tribunal Chief Judge presiding, is a Seminole Tribal Entity formed and Organized under the Seminole Tribe of Florida Constitution article X." [ECF No. 1, ¶ 12]. In paragraph 13, Plaintiffs allege a basis for federal question jurisdiction, but they do not make any allegations that would support a finding that the Tribal Court's sovereign immunity has been abrogated or waived. [ECF No. 1, ¶ 13].

Plaintiffs also do not name any Tribal Court judges or other officials as defendants or request injunctive relief against any Tribal Court official. [*See generally* ECF No. 1]. Instead, Count I and the Prayer for Relief make it clear that Plaintiffs are requesting relief against the Tribal Court, as a branch of government, not against any Tribal official. *Id*. Plaintiffs have thus not satisfied the requirements to bring a claim under *Ex Parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), "for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief to stop ongoing violations of federal law." *Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth.*, 801 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2015).

"Tribal sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional issue," *Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida*, 685 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 2012), and thus this case must be dismissed under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

B. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO EXHAUST THEIR TRIBAL COURT REMEDIES.

"The existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require a careful examination ... [which] should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court itself." *Nat'l Farmers*, 471 U.S. at 856. Allowing a tribal court to consider its own jurisdiction before a federal court steps in is in keeping with the Congressional policy of "supporting tribal self-government and self-determination" and serves "the orderly administration of justice in the federal court . . . by allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed." *Id*. "[P]roper respect for

tribal legal institutions requires that they be given a "full opportunity" to consider the issues before them and to rectify any errors." *Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante*, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) (quotation omitted). "Exhaustion of tribal remedies is mandatory." *Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous. Auth.*, 540 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).

The proper procedure for raising objections to the Subpoena, including jurisdictional objections, is to file a motion to quash in Tribal Court or to otherwise contest the Subpoena.[3] This is not an arduous process. The Tribal Court has adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by reference unless and until the Tribal Court adopts different rule, although the Tribal Court reserves the right to interpret and apply them in accordance with its Tribal law and its own practices and circumstances. Declaration of Wolfe, Exhibit 1 at ¶ 7. Such a motion would also provide an opportunity for Plaintiffs to raise questions regarding whether the subpoena is overbroad or to request that the subpoena be modified, which does not raise a federal question or come under this Court's authority to determine the scope of the Tribe's jurisdiction.

In their Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 11], Plaintiffs argue that the Subpoena comes under one of the exceptions to tribal court exhaustion laid out in a footnote in *Nat'l Farmers*: "We do not suggest that exhaustion would be required where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith, or where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court's jurisdiction." *Nat'l Farmers,* 471 U.S. at 857 n.21. In particular, they argue that it is "patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions." [ECF No. 11].

[3] The Tribal Court cannot comment in advance on the likely outcome of such a motion.

This exception is not applicable here. First, this footnote is clearly written to protect parties from significant abuses of a tribal court system, and it is not clear that it would apply at all to a relatively quick and straightforward procedure such contesting a third-party subpoena, absent some showing of bad faith on the part of the Tribal Court. The burden of contesting the Subpoena in Tribal Court is *de minimus*, and, indeed, much lower than the burden of initiating a fresh action in federal court. But, even if the exceptions mentioned in *Nat'l Farmers* are applicable in general, they do not apply in this case.

The "patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions" exception only applies when there is no colorable argument that the Tribal Court has jurisdiction – a high bar for Plaintiffs. *Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous. Auth.*, 540 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Principles of comity require federal courts to dismiss or to abstain from deciding claims over which tribal court jurisdiction is 'colorable,' provided that there is no evidence of bad faith or harassment"); *Basil Cook Enterprises, Inc. v. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe*, 117 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Thus, exhaustion will be excused under the "patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions' exception only in those rare cases when a tribal court's civil jurisdiction is found by a federal court to be in patent violation of express federal law.").

The jurisdictional issues presented here are not so clean cut. Even assuming that the facts pleaded in the Complaint are true – an assumption which is not required for jurisdictional facts, *Internet Sols. Corp.*, 557 F.3d at 1295 – this case presents the question of whether a tribal court has authority to issue a third-party subpoena to a non-Indian when the Tribal Court indisputably has jurisdiction over the underlying action and over the parties to the underlying action but may not have jurisdiction over the Subpoena recipient. The principle case regarding tribal court jurisdiction, *Montana v. United States*, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), does not address the subpoena

power or the power to compel witnesses, and we have been unable to locate any cases that address these tribal jurisdiction issues it in the context of third-party subpoena. Far from being a clear cut jurisdictional issue, this case may present a question of first impression.

There are a handful of state cases that address whether a subpoena issued by a tribal court may be enforced in state court, and those cases have generally elected to treat tribal courts exactly as they would the courts of another state, enforcing and domesticating subpoenas in accordance with the procedure the state had adopted for out-of-state subpoenas. *See Red Fox v. Hettich*, 494 N.W.2d 638, 645 (S.D. 1993)[4] (citations omitted); *Tracy v. Superior Court of Maricopa Cty.*, 810 P.2d 1030, 1046 (Ariz. 1991) ("We conclude that substantial case authority, a proper methodology of statutory construction, the policy goals articulated by the legislature, and principles of comity, together with the specific objectives underlying Arizona's Uniform Act, all require us to read the term 'any territory,' as used in A.R.S. §§ 13–4091 through 13–4096, to include the Navajo Nation."). These cases decide the issue as a question of state law and public policy.

The reciprocal rule also applies, and states must treat Indian reservations as separate states for the purpose of the service of a state court subpoena, as this Court found in a recent unpublished opinion: "Cases considering service of process in the civil context, while not particularly analogous, nevertheless establish that an Indian reservation must be treated as a separate jurisdiction for purposes determining how service of process may be effectuated, and that the states must comply with their own rules governing extra-territorial service in this

[4] "We have previously said that the same due process standards which govern state court assertions of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants apply to tribal courts. Hettich was served notice of the tribal court proceeding via certified mail. This type of service is permitted by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Code, 2-102(4)(b)(4) and under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hettich acknowledged in his answer that he received notice of the claim. We conclude the reasonable notice requirement was met."

context." *Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States*, No. 00-3453CIV, 2000 WL 35623105, at *11, n.8 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2000). These cases are concerned with personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction, and are governed primarily by state and tribal law and by principles of comity, not by principles of federal Indian law. *Id*. They are ideally suited to be presented to the Tribal Court in the first instance.

Finally, although the Tribal Court has not yet heard evidence on whether the Subpoena recipient has contacts with the Tribe that would support Tribal Court jurisdiction under *Montana*, there is reason to believe that grounds for such jurisdiction may exist. Plaintiffs have alleged that American Express does no business on the Seminole Reservation, ECF No. 1, ¶ 21, but jurisdiction facts stated in the Complaint are not treated as true. *Internet Sols. Corp.*, 557 F.3d at 1295. American Express does business in a very wide range of locations, and it is not unlikely that this includes the Seminole Reservation. Plaintiffs are not, to the Tribal Court's knowledge, employees or representatives of American Express with particular knowledge regarding where it conducts its business. Plaintiffs have also not addressed the possibility that American Express may conduct business with the Tribe or a Tribally-owned business sufficient to support jurisdiction.[5] These factual issues would benefit from "allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal Court." *Nat'l Farmers*, 471 U.S. at 856.

Plaintiffs have not met the high bar of demonstrating that an assertion of Tribal Court jurisdiction would be so "patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions" that the Tribal Court cannot be afforded the opportunity to consider its own jurisdiction in the first instance. *Nat'l Farmers*, 471 U.S. at 857 n.21. Thus, this case should be dismissed.

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[5] It is also worthy of noting that the plaintiff in the underlying action is "Seminole Tribe of Florida, Inc. d/b/a Askar Energy," and the Plaintiffs in the instant action are almost all named "Askar," suggesting possible business connections between a Tribal entity and the Plaintiffs here that could reasonably be a predicate for jurisdiction.

C. THERE IS NO PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT.

Plaintiffs argue that the Subpoena violates the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C § 6801. But the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act does not create a private cause of action. *Wood v. Greenberry Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1186 (D. Haw. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by *Compton v. Countrywide Fin. Corp.*, 761 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2014); *Haberman v. MFS Inv. Mgmt.*, No. CA 14-11861-PBS, 2015 WL 1309235, at *4 (D. Mass. Mar. 24, 2015) (collecting cases).

In addition, as the Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction makes clear, this claim rests entirely on Plaintiff's challenge to jurisdiction of the Tribal Court. [*See* ECF No. 11]. The act clearly authorizes the release of private information "to comply with a properly authorized civil, criminal, or regulatory investigation or subpoena or summons by Federal, State, or local authorities; or to respond to judicial process or government regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over the financial institution for examination, compliance, or other purposes as authorized by law." 15 U.S.C.A. § 6802. Any challenge to the Tribal Court's jurisdiction should be brought in the Tribal Court in the first instance.

D. THERE IS NO FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION OVER THE REMAINING CLAIMS.

The remaining claims should be dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.

The question of whether the Subpoena is unduly burdensome is a question of either Tribal law or of state law in the state where the subpoena would be enforced. Although the Tribal Court uses the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that does not make their interpretation and application of them questions of federal law. State courts routinely copy sections of the

Federal Rules into their own rules of procedure, but that does not convert those rules into federal laws.

Similarly, the question of whether the Subpoena is consistent with Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution is not a question of federal law. It is a question of Florida law. There may be a federal law defense to this claim, namely that Florida law is not binding on a proceeding of the Tribal Court, but that would only give rise to federal question jurisdiction if the "state-law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state [and in this case Tribal] judicial responsibilities." *Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg*., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005). That is not the case here.

There is no guarantee that the federal issue would ever be reached. The Tribal Court may resolve this discovery dispute on other grounds, or may find that there is no need to reach the question of whether Florida law applies because the Subpoena is consistent with that law, or may find that this Florida law is consistent with the law or public policy of the Tribe, or may modify the Subpoena or issue an appropriate protective order and moot the issue. Only if the Tribal Court does none of those things will it be necessary to reach the question of whether Tribal Court subpoenas must comport with Florida privacy law. The Florida law claim here does not create federal question jurisdiction.

IV. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Defendant, SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA TRIAL COURT ("Tribal Court"), for the reasons stated above, respectfully requests that this Court enter an order dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint against it, and grant such other and further relief as this Court deems just and appropriate.

Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of April 2017.

/s/ Caran Rothchild
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of April 2017, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing **DEFENDANT'S, THE SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA TRIAL COURT, MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT** was filed with the Clerk of the Court via the CM/ECF filing system and electronically served and/or mailed via U.S. Certified Mail to the following:

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Defendant

/s/ Caran Rothchild
CARAN ROTHCHILD, ESQ.

Exhibit 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

ASKER B. ASKER, BASSAM ASKAR, KOUSAY ASKAR, SHERA ASSHAQ, ALEXANDRA ASKAR, AWHAM ASKAR, JAMES E. GILLETTE, JR., THOMAS HORVATIS, and RICHARD WIGGINS Plaintiffs, vs. SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA, INC., AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY, and The SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA TRIAL COURT, Hon. Moses B. Osceola, Tribunal Chief Judge, Defendants.	Case No. 0:17-cv-60468-BB

DECLARATION OF MR. GEORGE STANLEY WOLFE, JR.

I, George Stanley Wolfe, Jr., do hereby state and declare as follows:

1. I am the Director of the Administrative Office of the Seminole Court, located at 6300 Stirling Road, Hollywood, FL 33024. I have personal knowledge and am competent to testify as to all matters discussed herein.

2. My responsibilities include maintaining case records and court files for the Seminole Tribe of Florida Trial Court ("Tribal Court"), and supervising employees who maintain case records and court files.

3. My responsibilities are administrative, and I cannot comment upon the legal or factual foundation of any matter before the Court.

4. I certify that the case docket attached to this Declaration as Exhibit A is a true and accurate copy of the case docket for *Seminole Tribe of Florida, Inc. v. Evans Energy Partners*, 15-cv-0013 (Seminole Tr. Ct.). The clerk of the court, Ms. Luann Fuentes, pulled this copy of the docket report from our computer system at my request on March 29, 2017.

5. As of the signing of this Declaration, none of the Plaintiffs in the above-captioned matter have filed any motions or other documents with the Tribal Court in *Seminole Tribe of Florida, Inc. v. Evans Energy Partners*, 15-cv-0013 (Seminole Tr. Ct.). The Tribal Court has not received any discovery motions in that matter, nor has the defendant in the case ever appeared or communicated with the Tribal Court in any manner. As the docket report reflects, the case resulted in default judgment in favor of the plaintiff and is now in a post-judgment discovery phase.

6. None of the Plaintiffs in this Case No. 0:17-cv-60468-BB nor their counsel has ever contacted the Tribal Court in any manner and has not requested any relief from the Tribal Court regarding the subject-matter of their federal lawsuit or any other matter.

7. The Tribal Court has adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by reference unless and until the Tribal Court adopts different rule, although the Tribal Court reserves the right to interpret and apply them in accordance with its Tribal law and its own practices and circumstances.

I declare that under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: April 3, 2017

GEORGE S. WOLFE, JR., SEMINOLE TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR

Exhibit 1-A

SeminoleTribe of Florida, Inc STC - 16-CV-0013

Court: 16-CV-0013 Agency: Seminole Tribal Court

CaseID: 16-13
Type: Civil Received Date: 6/27/2016
Status: Open Status Date: 6/27/2016
Age: 275 days Active Age: 275 days

Involvements

Primary Involvements
SeminoleTribe of Florida, Inc Plaintiff
Evans Energy Partners, LCC. Defendant
Other Involvements
Homer Bonner Jacobs Plaintiff Attorney
Seminole Tribal Court (16-CV-0013)
Osceola, Hon. Moses - 1669 Judge
Barbour, Laura - 8510 Judicial Advisor

Case Status History

6/27/2016 1:16:00 PM | Open

Documents

6/27/2016 1:44:03 PM | Petition | 16-CV-0013 Petition for Declaratory Relief and Damages .pdf | Open | 6/27/2016
Notes: Received from Petitioner Attorney on 6/27/2016.
6/27/2016 1:47:31 PM | Summons | 16-CV-0013 Civil Summons.pdf | Open | 6/27/2016
Notes: Received from Petitioner Attorney on 6/27/2016.
8/8/2016 11:38:17 AM | Summons | 16-CV-0013 Proof of Service of Summons.pdf | Open | 8/8/2016
Notes: Received on 8/8/2016 via Email.
9/15/2016 4:58:29 PM | Motion | 16-CV-0013 STOFI's Motion for Clerk's Default.pdf | Open | 9/15/2016
Notes: Received via email on 9/15/16.
9/19/2016 11:19:25 AM | Order | 16-CV-0013 Order.pdf | Open | 9/19/2016
Notes: Sent via USPS Certified Mail on 9/19/2016.

Plaintiff, 70142870000100201113
9/20/2016
Delivered, To Mail Room

Defendant, 7014287000011120
9/22/2016
Delivered, Left with Individual
10/10/2016 11:46:17 AM | Order | 16-CV-0013 PROPOSED Order.pdf | Open | 10/10/2016
Notes: Received via Email
Received from Plaintiff via Global Email
11/1/2016 11:03:26 AM | Order | 16-CV-0013 Order (2).pdf | Open | 11/1/2016

Notes: Sent via USPS Certified Mail on 11/1/2016.

Plaintiff, 70153430000021406804
11/4/2016
Delivered, Front Desk/Reception

Defendant, 70153430000021406811
11/3/2016
Delivered, Left with Individual

12/29/2016 4:41:45 PM | Certificate of Service | 16-CV-0013 Certificate of Service .pdf | Open | 12/29/2016
Notes: Received via email on 12/29/16.
12/29/2016 4:46:18 PM | Entry of Clerk's Default | 16-CV-0013 PROPOSED Entry of Clerk's Default.pdf | Open | 12/29/2016
Notes: Received via email on 12/29/16.
1/9/2017 4:57:41 PM | Entry of Clerk's Default | 16-CV-0013 Entry of Clerk's Default.pdf | Open | 1/9/2017
Notes: Sent via USPS Certified Mail on 1/09/2017

Plaintiff, 70153430000214016934
Received by Peter Homer's Secretary. Return receipt not signed. 1/12/2016

Defendant, 70153430000021406927
1/12/14 Delivered
1/25/2017 10:06:34 AM | Order | 16-CV-0013 Order 1.25.2017.pdf | Open | 1/25/2017
Notes: Sent via USPS Certified Mail on 1/25/2017.

Plaintiff, 70153430000021406989
Received 1/27/2017

Defendant, 70153430000021407009
Received 1/27/2017
2/8/2017 4:40:12 PM | Notice of Hearing | 16-CV-0013 Notice of Hearing .pdf | Open | 2/8/2017
Notes: Sent via USPS Certified Mail on 2/13/2017.

Plaintiff, 70153430000021407085
February 10, 2017 , 11:08 am

Delivered, Left with Individual

Defendant, 70153430000021407078
February 10, 2017 , 2:35 pm

Delivered, Left with Individual

2/16/2017 11:33:40 AM | Notice | 16-CV-0013 STOFI's Notice of Serving Subpoena Duces Tecum.pdf | Open | 2/16/2017
Notes: Received from Plaintiff on 2/16/2017.
2/21/2017 1:35:58 PM | Subpoena | 16-CV-0013 Subpoena Duces Tecum.pdf | Open | 2/21/2017
Notes: Received from Plaintiff on 2/21/2017.
2/22/2017 11:51:17 AM | Motion | 16-CV-0013 Motion.pdf | Open | 2/22/2017
Notes: Received from Plaintiff on 2/22/2017.
2/22/2017 12:05:52 PM | Order | 16-CV-0013 Order Re-Scheduling Sttaus Conference.pdf | Open | 2/22/2017

Notes: Sent via USPS Certified Mail on 2/22/2017

Plaintiff, 70153430000021407115

February 24, 2017 , 1:24 pm
Delivered, Front Desk/Reception

Defendant, 70153430000021407108

February 28, 2017 , 2:24 pm
Delivered, Left with Individual

3/22/2017 9:50:44 AM | Order | 16-CV-0013 Order Rescheduling Status Conference.pdf | Open | 3/22/2017
Notes: Sent via USPS Certified Mail on 3/22/2017.

Plaintiff, 70153430000021407122

Defendant, 70153430000214406996
Received 3/24/2017

3/24/2017 8:26:59 AM | Order | 16-CV-0013 Order on Status Conference Discussion .pdf | Open | 3/24/2017
Notes: Sent via USPS Certified Mail on 3/23/2017.

Plaintiff, 70142870000100200994

Defendant, 70142870000100200987

Events

2/22/2017 2:00:00 PM | Status Conference | SeminoleTribal Court/Hollywood | Open
Osceola, Hon. Moses - 1669 (Judge)
Barbour, Laura - 8510 (Judicial Advisor)
Fuentes, Luann Marie - 14309
SeminoleTribe of Florida, Inc (Plaintiff)
Evans Energy Partners, LCC. (Defendant)
Notes: Motion to reschedule filed on 2/22/17.

3/22/2017 2:00:00 PM | Status Conference | SeminoleTribal Court/Hollywood | Open
Barbour, Laura - 8510 (Judicial Advisor)
Osceola, Hon. Moses - 1669 (Judge)
Fuentes, Luann Marie - 14309
Evans Energy Partners, LCC. (Defendant)
Homer Bonner Jacobs (Plaintiff Attorney)
SeminoleTribe of Florida, Inc (Plaintiff)
Notes: Recheduled on 3/22/2017.

4/26/2017 8:00:00 AM | Status Conference | SeminoleTribal Court/Hollywood | Open