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1 2 3 4 5 6	Charles R. Zeh, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 001739 The Law Offices of Charles R. Zeh, Esq. 575 Forest Street, Suite 200 Reno, NV 89509 Telephone: 775.323.5700 Facsimile: 775.786.8183 e-mail: crzeh@aol.com Attorneys for Yerington Paiute Tribal Court	
7	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
8	FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA	
9 10	BP America Inc., and Atlantic Richfield Company,	Case 3:17-cv-00588
11	Plaintiffs,	
12	vs.	Yerington Paiute Tribal Court's Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Yerington Paiute Tribe; Laurie A. Thom, in her official capacity as Chairman of the Yerington Paiute Tribe; Albert Roberts, in his official capacity as Vice Chairman of the Yerington Paiute Tribe; Elwood Emm, Linda Howard, Nate Landa, Delmar Stevens and Cassie Roberts, in their office capacities as Yerington Paiute Tribal Council Members; DOES 1-25, in their official capacities as decision-makers of the Yerington Paiute Tribe; Yerington Paiute Tribal Court; and Sandra-Mae Pickens, in her official capacity as Judge of the Yerington Paiute Tribal Court, Defendants.	and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
23	I. Introduction	
24	Plaintiffs, BP America, Inc., (BP) and Atlantic Richfield Company (ARC) filed an	
25	amended complaint, EC No. 37, in this action seeking to prevent the Yerington Paiute Tribe (the	
26	Tribe) and the other tribal defendants, including the Yerington Paiute Court, (the Tribal Court)	
27	from pursuit of the Tribe's underlying tribal action filed in the Tribal Court styled, Yerington	
28	Paiute Tribe v. BP America Inc. & Atlantic Richfield Co., Case No., YVC1017 (the Tribal Court	

Action). See, ECF No. 3-2. As can be seen, the Tribe is the only plaintiff in the Tribal Court action.

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In regards to the Tribal Court, little, if anything, was changed by the amended complaint filed herein. ECF No. 37. BP and ARC, the plaintiffs herein, still assert that: "The principal (sic) question in this case is whether the Tribal Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims brought by the Tribe the Tribal Court action." Comp. ECF No. 37, p. 4, ¶ 14. Arguing that the Tribal Court does not have jurisdiction over the Tribal Court action, the plaintiffs want this Court to enjoin the Tribal Court proceedings and relieve BP and ARC from having to contend with the

BP and ARC are still mistaken. While the plaintiffs' quote in paragraph 14 may be the principle question according to their view of the case before this Court, because the jurisdiction of this Court may not be pretermitted, see, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)("we are not free to pretermit the question" of jurisdiction), the question to be decided before all others is whether this Court has jurisdiction in the first place, to reach the question plaintiffs wish to propound.

As elucidated, below, this Court does not have jurisdiction over the Yerington Paiute Tribe by reason of tribal sovereign immunity, sovereignty which has not been waived for the Tribe or the Tribal Court by either Congress or the Tribe, itself. Since a waiver of sovereign immunity by Congress or the Tribe is the only avenue, see, Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754, 118 S.Ct. 1700, 140 L.Ed.2d 961 (1998); Imperial Granite Company v. Pala Band of Mission Indians, 940 F.2d 1269, 1271 (9th Cir., 1991), for subjecting the Tribe and its institutions such as the Tribal Court, to the jurisdiction of this Court, see, Boney v. Valline, 597 F.Supp.2d 11167 (D. Nev. 2009); Cook v. AVI Casino Enterprises, Inc., 548 F.3d 718 (9th Dir., 2008); Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir., 2006); Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous. Auth., 455 F.3d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 2006)(overruled on other grounds- by Marceau v. Blackfeet Housing Authority, 540 F.3d 916

¹By submitting this pleading, the Tribal Court reserves and does not waive its sovereignty and preserves all of its defenses to this dispute including challenges to the Court's jurisdiction, which the Tribal Court levies with this pleading.

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(9th Cir. 2008)(recognizing that tribal sovereign immunity "extends to agencies and subdivisions of the tribe"), the plaintiffs' amended complaint must be dismissed as to the Tribal Court without regard for the disposition of the question the plaintiffs prematurely pose.

Moreover, for reasons of the exhaustion of tribal remedies, the amended complaint should be dismissed or suspended, pending the disposition of the Tribal Court action, above.

Regardless, the absence of jurisdiction over the Tribal Court requires dismissal of the instant complaint against the Yerington Paiute Tribal Court.

II. THE STANDARD FOR DECIDING A MOTION TO DISMISS

In the face of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs' well pled facts are to be taken as true. See, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra at 678. There, the Court laid out the Court's definitive view of the standard by which the adequacy of the pleadings are to be judged when confronted by a motion to dismiss based upon subject matter jurisdiction involving public officials. And, as indicated, above, courts are not free to pretermit the question of subject matter jurisdiction. "Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived and should be considered when fairly in doubt." Id. at 671.

According to *Iqbal*, the plaintiffs must do more than offer a naked claim that the Court has jurisdiction over the Tribe to subject it to declaratory and injunctive relief. When assessing a complaint, *Iqbal* holds that a court is "'not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation...'"*Id.*, at 678. "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action will not do." *Ibid.* Furthermore, "...a complaint does not suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement." *Ibid.*

This is the context within which the adequacy of the pleadings must be assessed when a motion to dismiss for the want of jurisdiction based upon Tribal sovereign immunity from suit is before this Court. *See, Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center, Inc.*, 221 F.Supp.2d 271, 280, 281 (D.C.Conn., 2002). The plaintiffs must do more than offer a naked claim that the Court has jurisdiction over the Tribal defendants.

III. WHERE A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR THE WANT OF JURISDICTION IS BROUGHT, THE BURDEN IS UPON THE PARTY ASSERTING JURISDICTION TO AFFIRM THE COURT'S ABILITY TO HEAR THE CASE

Since Federal Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, it is presumed that a complaint lies outside the Court's jurisdiction and the "burden of establishing the controversy" rests with the party asserting jurisdiction. *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Inc. Co., of America,* 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); *Rightheaven, LLC. v. Newman,* 838 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1074 (D.Nev., 2011). Thus, while the Tribal Court has affirmatively placed the Court's jurisdiction at issue through the Tribe's sovereign immunity, the burden is upon the plaintiffs to establish subject matter jurisdiction of the Court. *See, Pistor v. Garcia,* 791 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012); *Stock West, Inc. v. Confederate Tribes,* 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir., 1989); *Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better Environment,* 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir., 2001) (the plaintiff is required to show this Court, "...affirmatively and distinctly, the existence of what was essential to federal jurisdiction..."). And, "[w]hen a district court is presented with a challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction, '[n]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to [a] plaintiff's allegations' *Robinson,* 586 F.3d *at* 685 (quoting, *Augustine v. United States,* 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir., 1983))." *Pistor, supra* at 1111.

IV. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT IS A FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTE OF BEING A FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBE

No elaboration is needed to recognize that Tribes retain their inherent sovereignty as distinct sovereign nations in matters of local governance. *Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez*, 436 U.S. 49, 55, 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1978). Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court revisited the question of Tribal sovereign immunity in *Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community*, 134 S.Ct. 2024 (U.S. 2014), 2014 U.S. LEXIS 3596, when the Court upheld the Sixth Circuit's decision that Tribal sovereign immunity barred the State of Michigan from suing Bay Mills to cease operation of a Class III Tribal casino on what the State claimed were non-Indian lands. Clearly, declaratory and injunctive relief was the subject matter of the dispute.

While the case involved an interpretation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), in order to reach the decision rendered, it was necessary for the court to squarely tackle the issue

of tribal sovereignty and the barrier it creates for haling tribes into court by aggrieved plaintiffs. The Court determined that tribal sovereign immunity "...protects Bay Mills from this legal action. Congress has not abrogated tribal sovereign immunity from a State's suit to enjoin gaming off reservation or other Indian lands." Bay Mills, supra, at 2028.

To reach this decision, Bay Mills explained that while Tribes are subject to the plenary authority of Congress, Tribes, nonetheless, "...remain 'separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution." See, Bay Mills, supra at 2030, quoting Santa Clara, supra, at 56. Thus, "...unless and 'until Congress acts, the tribes retain' their historic sovereign authority. *United States v.* Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)." Bay Mills, supra, at 2030. As a consequence, "[a]mong the core aspects of sovereignty that tribes possess -- subject, again, to congressional action -- is the 'common law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.' Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S., at 58." Ibid.

Thus, for the plaintiffs to hale the Tribe into court in this case, they must, first, show that either Congress unequivocally waived, see, Santa Clara Pueblo, supra, at 58, the Tribe's sovereign immunity, thereby exposing the Tribe's public fisc to the threat of a suit for damages or declaratory and injunctive relief. Or, the plaintiffs must show that the Tribe, itself, explicitly and unequivocally, see, Allen, supra at 1047, waived its sovereign immunity, thereby consenting to be haled into Court to the same effect. Those are the only two avenues open to plaintiff for haling the Tribe into court. See, Kiowa, supra, at 754. ("...an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity." (Emphasis added)). A failure by the plaintiffs to make either showing ousts the Court of jurisdiction to hear this dispute against the Tribe and also, the Tribal Court.

Tribal Sovereignty Is Co-Extensive With The United States And Protects A. Tribes Even When Exceeding Their Authority to Act

As a corollary to the Tribe's status "... as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights in matters of local self-government," Santa Clara Pueblo, supra, at 55, the Tribe's sovereign immunity from suit is also co-extensive with the United States. Tribes are immune from suit, just as the United States is immune from suit. See,

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Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Board of Equalization, 757 F.2d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir., 1985), quoting *Kennerly v. United States*, 721 F.2d 1252, 1258 (9th Cir., 1983) ("The common law immunity of [Indian tribes] is co-extensive with that of the United States...").

Tribal sovereign immunity, therefore, protects Tribes even when acting outside their authority. See, Chemehuevi, supra, at 1052 ("The tribe remains immune from suit regardless of any allegation that it acted beyond its authority or outside of its powers."). Importantly, also, Tribal sovereign immunity applies to a Tribe's commercial as well as governmental activities. See, Cook, supra at 725. Punitive damages are also unavailable against the sovereign at common law. See, City of Newport v. Fort Concerts, 453 U.S. 247 (1981).

The Umbrella of Sovereign Immunity That Emanates From В. the Tribe Extends To Tribal Institutions

Tribal sovereign immunity includes an umbrella of protection which extends to the agencies and instrumentalities of the Tribe. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441 (1908) is the seminal case addressing suits against the sovereign. Its doctrine, however, "... has no application in suits against the States and their agencies, which are barred regardless of the relief sought." Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, 862 F.3d 1236, 1251 (10th Cir., 2017). The same principle holds for the Tribe's entities, agencies and departments. See, Native American Distributing v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288, 1292(10th Cir., 2008); Allen, supra, at 1047 (casino functioning as an arm of the Tribe enjoys Tribal sovereign immunity from suit); Cook, supra at 725, 726 (tribal casino); Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of the Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d 315, 321 (10th Cir., 1982)(inn operating as a sub-entity of the Tribe and not a separate corporate entity enjoyed tribal sovereign immunity from suit), Garcia v. Akwesasne Housing Authority, 105 F.Supp.2d 12, 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y., 2000), affirmed in rel. part, vacated in part by Garcia v. Akwesasne Housing Authority, 268 F.3d 76 (2nd Cir., 2001). See also, Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Museum & Research Ctr. Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 271, 277, (D. Conn. 2002) (sovereignty extends to agencies or entities of the Tribe); Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 358 (2nd Cir., 2002); Dillon v. Yankton ///

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Sioux Tribal Housing Authority, 144 F.3d 581 (8th Cir., 1998) (housing authority immune from 1 2 suit based upon the Tribe's sovereignty). 3 C. To Be Effective, Any Waiver of Tribal Sovereignty Must Be Unequivocally Expressed; Waivers By Implication Do Not Pass 4 Muster. Any Claim, Therefore, A Tribe Has Waived Sovereign Immunity Must Meet This High Standard Before A Party Is Allowed 5 To Hale The Tribe, And Perhaps, Other Tribal Defendants, Into **Court To Be Sued** 6 7 As explained, both Congress and the Tribe may waive a Tribe's sovereignty. In either 8 case, however, the waiver must be unequivocally expressed. See, Allen, supra, at 1047. "Like 9 the United States, an Indian tribe can consent to suit, but such consent must be unequivocally 10 indicated." Chemehuevi, supra, at 1052, 1053. "Congress, no less than a tribe itself, cannot 11 imply a waiver of sovereign immunity but must unequivocally express it." Ibid. A waiver, 12 therefore, of sovereign immunity will not be implied. See, Santa Clara Pueblo, supra, at 58. 13 Thus, in Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, 525 U.S. 255, 261, 119 S.Ct. 687, 142 14 L.Ed.2d 718 (1998), in a case discussing the United States' immunity, applicable here, since the 15 Tribe's sovereignty is co-extensive with the immunity of the United States, the Court stated: 16 We have frequently held, however, that a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign....Such a waiver 17 must also be 'unequivocally expressed' in the statutory text....Respondent's claim must meet this high standard. (Internal citations omitted). 18 19 See also, Garcia, supra, at 15, 16, applying this principle within the context of a purported 20 waiver of tribal sovereignty. 21 Therefore, to proceed with this dispute, plaintiffs have the burden of meeting this "high 22 standard" by showing the presence of an express and unequivocal waiver of the Tribe's sovereign 23 immunity, Congressional, Tribal or both. Waivers by implication do not pass muster. See, 24 Santa Clara Pueblo, supra at 58. This is a standard, however, the plaintiffs' complaint is 25 incapable of surmounting. 26 /// 27 ///

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V. THIS DISPUTE PROVIDES NO EXCEPTION TO THE UMBRELLA OF PROTECTION FROM SUIT BY REASON OF THE TRIBE'S SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY WHICH PROTECTS THE TRIBE, AND THROUGH IT, THE TRIBAL DEFENDANTS AND, THEREFORE, THE COURT IS OUSTED OF JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS DISPUTE AS FRAMED BY THE PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT

It is conceded that the Tribe, alone, brought suit in the Yerington Paiute Tribal Court, alleging, *inter-alia*, the intrusion upon the Tribe's land, in its water, and in the air, of hazardous materials and waste which the Tribe alleges, threatens the very fabric of the Tribe, its government, and the health and welfare of its members. Tribal Comp., Exhibit A, ECF No. 3-2. The defendants, in the Tribal Court action, then, brought this suit seeking to bar the Tribal Court action from proceeding, there. Amended Comp., ¶B, p. 20, ECF No. 37.

BP and Arco, the plaintiffs, herein, concede the following undisputed facts:

- 1. The Yerington Paiute Tribe is a Federally recognized Tribe. Amended Comp., ¶ B, p. 20, ECF No. 37.
- 2. The Yerington Paiute Tribe is the only plaintiff in the Tribal Court proceedings. Amended Comp., ¶ 1, p. 2, ECF No. 37.
- 3. The Yerington Paiute Tribal Court is an integral part of the governance of the Tribe. Amended Comp., ¶ 10, p. 3, ECF No. 37. "The Tribal Court is the judicial arm of the Tribal government, and is located at 171 Campbell Lane, Yerington, Nevada 89447." Amended Comp., ¶ 10, p. 3, ECF No. 37.
 - 4. The amended complaint² is devoid of any allegation that Congress has abrogated

²This is most telling. The Tribal Court made clear in both its motion to dismiss, ECF No. 28/28.1, the original complaint, ECF No. 1, and it opposition to the plaintiffs' original motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 2, that the complaint and motion for preliminary injunction were devoid of any information that either Congress or the Tribe had waived Tribal sovereign immunity. The Tribal Court made clear when moving to dismiss the original complaint and when opposing the original motion for a preliminary injunction, it would rely upon the absence of information that the Tribe or Congress had abrogated the Tribe's sovereign immunity from suit, to assert that this Court lacked jurisdiction over the Tribal Court. Having been forewarned by the Tribal Court, then, of the absence of any showing the Tribe's sovereign immunity had been abrogated, the plaintiffs should have and could have clearly cured this glaring jurisdictional problem for them in their amended complaint, ECF No. 37, and amended motion for a preliminary injunction., ECF No. 38. They have not cured this problem in their amended pleadings and this leads inexorably to the conclusion that neither the Tribe nor Congress has abrogated the Tribe's sovereign immunity from suit and, therefore, any attempt by the plaintiffs, here, to urge this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the Tribal Court must fail by reason of the Tribe's sovereign

immunity from suit.

the Tribe's sovereign immunity from suit.

- 5. The amended complaint is devoid of any allegation that the Tribe has waived its sovereign immunity.
- 6. The amended complaint is devoid of any allegation that Congress or the Tribe has waived the Tribal Court's sovereign immunity from suit.
- 7. The amended complaint is devoid of any discussion of Tribal sovereign immunity and its impact on the jurisdiction of the Court for haling the Tribal Court before this Court and subjecting it to declaratory and injunctive relief.
 - A. There Being No Waiver of Sovereignty By The Tribe, the Yerington Paiute Tribe Must Be Dismissed From the Federal Complaint With Prejudice

From the undisputed facts, it is clear, the Tribe remains Federally recognized as a Tribe, a point the plaintiffs have conceded. Amended Comp., ¶ 1, p. 2, ECF No. 37. Clearly, they must make this concession. *See*, 82 FR 4915, p. 4919, 01/17/2017.

From any fair reading of the plaintiffs' complaint, it is abundantly clear it contains no suggestion that the Tribe has waived its sovereignty or that the Federal government has taken any steps to abrogate the Tribe's sovereignty immunity from suit. In a word, the complaint is silent on the subject. To be sure, the complaint alleges under the Federal question doctrine that the Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Amended Comp., ¶ 14, p. 4, ECF No. 37. Indeed, this Court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. That is not to say, however, such inquiry allows the Court to pretermit a jurisdictional challenge due to sovereign immunity. *See, Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak*, 501 U.S. 775, 786, 111S.Ct. 2578 (1991)(while granting Federal court jurisdiction, generally, "...no one contends that § 1331 suffices to abrogate immunity to all federal questions.") That is, § 1331 is not, itself, a waiver of sovereign immunity.

There is nothing in the record before this Court that amounts to an explicit waiver in writing of the Tribe's sovereign immunity from suit. As an explicit waiver of sovereignty by either the Tribe or Congress is the only avenue, for haling the Tribe into this Court by the

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plaintiffs, Kiowa, supra at 754, and, as it is their burden to show that such an explicit waiver of sovereignty exists, Allen, supra at 1047, there is no plausible basis for asserting jurisdiction over the Tribe and haling it before this Court to defend against the plaintiffs' complaint, herein. See, *Bay Mills, supra* at 2028, 2030.

The fact that the Tribe initiated suit against the plaintiffs in Tribal Court does not alter this conclusion. A Tribe that initiates a lawsuit to protect its interests does not waive its sovereignty from attack, even if it were in the form of a compulsory counterclaim. See, Oklahoma Tax Comm'n. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509, 510, 111 S.Ct. 905 (1991). The suit, therefore, against the Tribe must be dismissed with prejudice for the want of jurisdiction due to the Tribe' sovereign immunity from suit. Mills Bay, supra at 2028, 2030, *Kiowa, supra* at 754.

В. Because The Tribe Is Immune From Suit By Reason of Its Inherent Sovereign Status, Because, Unless Waived, Its Immunity Extends to Agencies or Tribal Departments or Elements of Its Government and Because the Tribe Has Not Waived Sovereignty As To Its Tribal Court the Complaint Against the Tribal Court Must Be Dismissed With Prejudice For the Want Of Jurisdiction Due to Tribal Sovereignty

The analysis, here, builds upon the immediately preceding discussion which establishes that the Tribe has not waived its sovereignty and is immune from suit in this case. The Court lacks jurisdiction to permit the plaintiffs from proceeding against the Tribe. As established in Section IV.B., supra, it is beyond dispute that the umbrella of sovereign immunity foreclosing jurisdiction also extends to agencies or entities or other divisions/arms of the governance of the Tribe. See, Native American Distributing, supra at 1292; Norton, supra at 1251.

Inasmuch as the plaintiffs' complaint fails to even hint at a waiver of sovereignty and the Tribe, itself, is clearly immune from suit by reason of its sovereignty, the plaintiffs have supplied the Court with no plausible basis for the exercise of its jurisdiction over the Tribal Court. The Tribe, itself, has not waived sovereignty for the purpose of permitting suit to be brought in this or any other Court against the Tribal Court. The plaintiffs' amended complaint makes clear, the Tribal Court is an extension of the Tribe and integral to its governance. Amended Comp., ¶ 10, p. 3, ECF No. 37. Without question, then, the plaintiffs have failed in their burden to make out a

case for the exercise of jurisdiction in these proceedings against the Tribal Court and the case should, therefore, be dismissed for the want of jurisdiction over the Tribal Court due to Tribal sovereign immunity from suit. *See*, Section IV.B.

VI. TRIBAL COURT EXHAUSTION ALSO REQUIRES DISMISSAL OF THE PLAINTIFFS' FEDERAL COURT COMPLAINT (THE INSTANT DISPUTE).

In the event the Court determines that tribal sovereignty does not preclude the Court from asserting jurisdiction over the Tribal Court to permit this case to go forward, that is still not the end of the matter. Tribal Court exhaustion also obtains to leave this case before the Tribal Court, dismissing these proceedings against the Yerington Paiute Tribal Court.

On this point, the Tribal Court concurs with and adopts the analysis set forth in the points and authorities supporting the Tribal Judge's motion to dismiss the amended complaint discussing exhaustion, set out at pages 14 through 16, ECF No. 41. Those pages are attached hereto, as Exhibit 1.

The Tribal Court would only add that where, as here, the Tribal Judge argues the second *Montana* exception to tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians where the non-Indian's conduct "...threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security or, the health or welfare of the Tribe[,]" *Montana v. United States*, 450 U.S. 544, 566, 101 S.Ct. 1245 (1981), the issue before this Court for purposes of the application of the deference to the Tribal Court to make that determination is not for this Court to decide, now, whether the Tribal Court actually has jurisdiction over the plaintiffs, herein, the defendants in the Tribal Court proceedings. Rather, the only question before this Court, presently, is "merely whether ...[the Tribal Court] can 'make a colorable claim that [it has] jurisdiction.' [*Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham*, 762 F.3d 1226, 1240 (10th Cir., 2014]." *Norton, supra* at 1246.

Clearly, the Yerington Paiute Tribe (the Tribe), the plaintiff, before the Tribal Court, has met this standard. The plaintiff alleges harm to the Tribe of epic proportions. That is to say, the Tribe's complaint alleges conduct resulting in harm that is severe, catastrophic, and a threat to tribal governance, as well as the health and welfare of the Tribe's membership. *See*, Tribal Comp., ECF No. 3-2, ¶¶ 3, 8, 9, 10, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 29, 36-39, 41, 61 and 69. These

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allegations are sufficient to place the Tribe's complaint, below, squarely within the second prong of *Montana*. *See, Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock Land Use Policy Comm'n.*, 736 F.3d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir., 2013); *Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Ct.*, 566 F.3d 842, 846 (9th Cir., 2009); *FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes*, 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 161387 (D. Idaho, Sept. 28, 2017).

That is to say, these allegations in the Tribe's complaint pending before the Tribal Judge mean the Tribal Court complaint plausibly smacks of jurisdiction over the non-Indian defendants, there. *See, Montana v. EPA*, 137 F.3d 1135, 1139040, (9th Cir., 1998). As such, the principles of comity and tribal self governance apply to give the Tribal Judge at least the chance to assess the plausibility of jurisdiction in the Tribal Court. *See, Iowa Mut. Ins., Co. v. La Plante*, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987)(citations omitted); *Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians*, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985); *Boozer v. Wilder*, 381 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir., 2004). "Whether such allegations are sufficiently catastrophic would benefit from full consideration in the Tribal Court." *Norton, supra* at 1246.

The Tribal Court, through the Tribal Court Judge Sandra Mae-Pickens, should be given the opportunity, therefore, to assess jurisdiction of the Tribal Court over ARC and BP in the Triba's case in the Tribal Court. The Tribal Court, itself, should, therefore, not be haled into this Court, either, for the same reasoning.

CONCLUSION

As for the Tribal Court, the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. There is no plausible basis for the exertion of jurisdiction in this matter over the Tribal Court. It is an integral part of the Yerington Paiute Tribe's government, as the plaintiffs admit, their complaint in no way suggests a Congressional or Tribal waiver of the Tribe's sovereign immunity that it inherently possesses, and as a result, the Court is ousted of jurisdiction over the Tribal Court by reason of sovereign immunity. Should this Court find, however, it retains jurisdiction over the Tribal Court, the case should nevertheless not proceed in this Court in order to allow the Tribal Court Judge Sandra-Mae Pickens, the opportunity to assess the Tribal Court's jurisdiction over the Tribal Court case on the grounds of exhaustion of tribal remedies.

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2	As to the Tribal Court, however, at bottom, the instant matter before this Court should be
3	dismissed with prejudice. The Tribal Court seeks all other relief deemed necessary in the
4	premises.
5	Dated this 30 th day of November, 2017. The Law Offices of Charles R. Zeh, Esq.
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7	By: /s/Charles R. Zeh Esq. Charles R. Zeh, Esq.
8	Attorneys for Yerington Paiute Tribal Court
9	Thorneys for Termston Tuesde Court
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1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 2 I hereby certify that service of the foregoing Yerington Paiute Tribal Court's Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 3 Relief, was made through the court's electronic filing and notice system (CM/ECF) or, as appropriate, by first class mail from Reno, Nevada, addressed to the following on November 30, 4 2017. Kyle Wesley Brenton Adam S Cohen 5 Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP 1550 Seventeenth St., Ste 500 1550 Seventeenth St., Ste 500 6 Denver, CO 80202 Denver, CO 80220 7 Robert A Dotson Constance L. Rogers Dotson Law Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP 8 One East First Street, Ste 1600 1550 17th Street, Suite 500 Reno, NV 89501 Denver, CO 80202 9 Daniel T. Hayward Jill Irene Greiner 10 Laxalt & Nomura Ltd **Dotson Law** 9600 Gateway Dr One East First Street Reno, NV 89521 11 City Hall Tower, 16th Floor Reno, NV 89501 12 Robert F. Saint-Aubin Saint-Aubin Chtd. Kenzo Sunao Kawanabe 13 3753 Howard Hughes Pkwy, Suite 200 Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP Las Vegas, NV 89619 1550 Seventeenth St., Ste 500 14 Denver, CO 80202 Michael Angelovich 15 Austin Tighe NiX, Patterson & Roach, LLP 16 3600 N. Capital of Texas Hwy Bldg. B., Suite 350 17 Austin, TX 78746 18 Dated this 30th day of November, 2017. 19 An Employee of the 20 Law Offices of Charles R. Zeh, Esq. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

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Case 3:17-cv-00588-LRH-WGC Document 53-1 Filed 11/30/17 Page 15 of 15 Exhibit List Excerpts of Defendant Sandra-Mae Pickens' Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, ECF No. 41 3 pages 1. S:\Clients\Yerington Paiute\BP American\Pleadings\PAs to Dismiss Amended Complaint R3.wpd