Case 1:18-cv-04712-RMI Document 8 Filed 09/25/18 Page 1 of 7 Thomas Weathers (CA 171422) THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS EAGLE WEATHERS, P.C. 1000 Fourth St., Suite 500 San Rafael, CA 94901 Phone: (415) 526-4707 3 Fax: (415) 453-0549 Email: tom@thomasweatherslaw.com 4 5 Attorneys for Defendants 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 CHRISTIAN LUIZ Case No.: 18-CV-04712-RMI 11 **DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS** 12 Plaintiff, FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND FAILURE TO 13 VS. STATE A CLAIM 14 NORTHERN CIRCLE INDIAN HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al. 10/30/18 Date: 15 Time: 10:00 a.m. Location: Eureka-McKinleyville Courthouse Defendants. 16 Hon. Robert M. Illman 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 MOTION TO DISMISS

Luiz v. Northern Circle Indian Housing Authority, et al.; Case No. 18-cv-04712-RMI

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS

TO PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEY OF RECORD:

You are hereby notified that on October 30, 2018 at 10:00 a.m., in the Eureka-McKinleyville Courthouse, 3140 Boeing Ave., McKinleyville, CA 95519, Defendants will specially appear and move to dismiss this lawsuit pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This action is barred by tribal sovereign immunity. In addition, Plaintiff cannot seek a writ of habeas corpus because he is not detained. Defendants will ask this Court to dismiss this matter with prejudice.

This Motion is based on this notice of motion and motion, the memorandum of points and authorities in support, the declaration of Darlene Tooley in support, the records and pleadings in this action, and such other and further matters this Court may consider.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

I. STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED

- 1. Whether this Court should dismiss this matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Defendants enjoy tribal sovereign immunity?
- 2. Whether this Court should dismiss this matter for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Plaintiff is not detained for habeas corpus relief?

II. INTRODUCTION

This is a tribal workers' compensation case. Having lost in the tribal forum, Plaintiff
Christian Luiz now wants this Court to intercede, reverse the decision of the tribal hearing officer,
and remand this matter to a state administrative forum to reargue the case under the guise of a writ
for habeas corpus. This he cannot do. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the tribal

4

5

6 7 8

10 11

12

13

14 15

16 17

18

19

20

21 22

24

25

23

26

27

28

employer is immune from suit. Also, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for habeas corpus relief because he is not detained. This Court should dismiss this matter with prejudice.

III. BACKGROUND

The following facts are not in dispute and are set forth in the Declaration of Darlene Tooley filed herewith. Defendant Northern Circle Indian Housing Authority is a tribally designated housing entity established in 1979 to access, construct, and manage low-income housing for member tribes. It is organized for the governmental purposes of qualifying for funding under the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act ("NAHASDA") to provide housing.

The member tribes established the Housing Authority by a tribal ordinance adopted by each tribe. The Housing Authority is currently governed by a Board of Commissioners appointed by the member tribes. Each member tribe appoints two commissioners. The Housing Authority is located on trust land on the Pinoleville Rancheria near Ukiah, CA. There are currently seven member tribes.

The Housing Authority enjoys the sovereign immunity of its member tribes. The IRS determined that the Housing Authority qualifies as a political subdivision of its member tribes, based, in part, on a determination by the Bureau of Indian Affairs that the Housing Authority exercises sovereign governmental powers on behalf of its member tribes.

Plaintiff Luiz was a non-native employee of the Housing Authority. He worked 18 years as an IT professional for the Housing Authority before his claimed injuries earlier this year. He filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with the Housing Authority for an injury to his neck and shoulder that turned out to be a large disc herniation. The cause was unknown. The claim administrator denied the claim under the plan because injuries such as this arising from an obscure or unknown cause were excluded from coverage.

Luiz then appealed to a tribal hearing officer. After review of the documentary evidence, the hearing officer affirmed the denial because the alleged injury was excluded from coverage under the plan. The hearing officer found no credible evidence that anything about Luiz's work activity was the cause of the Luiz's large cervical disc herniation. Plaintiff Luiz then filed an Application for

6 7 A.

8 9

10 11

12

14

13

15 16

17

18 19

20

21 22

23

24

25 26

27

28

Adjudication of Claim with the California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. The Housing Authority filed a petition to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. That motion is scheduled to be heard on October 11, 2018.

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT

"Tribal sovereign immunity is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, which may be challenged by a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)." Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 2007). As a court of limited jurisdiction, the federal court is presumed to lack subject matter jurisdiction unless the party asserting jurisdiction

This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Based on Tribal Sovereign Immunity

establishes otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). When a defendant moves to dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the court possesses jurisdiction. Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). "In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the

court may rely on and refer to evidence outside the pleadings." Gristede's Foods, Inc. v.

Unkechauge Nation, 660 F. Supp. 2d 442, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).

Generally, a federal court lacks jurisdiction over an Indian tribe because of tribal sovereign immunity. Alvarado v. Table Mt. Rancheria, 509 F.3d 1008, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2007). "Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). "Tribal sovereign immunity is not dependent on a distinction between on-reservation and off-reservation conduct nor is it dependent upon a distinction between the governmental and commercial activities." Ingrassia v. Chicken Ranch Bingo & Casino, 676 F. Supp.2d 953, 957 (E.D. Cal. 2009). For example, tribal sovereign immunity extends to "suits on contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and whether they were made on or off a reservation." Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998).

17 18

16

20

19

22

21

24

23

25 26

27

28

A tribe's sovereign immunity will extend both to tribal governing bodies and to tribal agencies which act as arms of the tribe. Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006). "It extends to agencies and subdivisions of the tribe, and has generally been held to apply to housing authorities formed by tribes." Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous. Auth., 455 F.3d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (vacated in part on different grounds). It has long been the rule that a tribal housing authority enjoys the sovereign immunity of its tribe. See, e.g., Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 2000) (housing authority as arm of tribe enjoys the full extent of the tribe's sovereign immunity); Dillon v. Yankton Sioux Tribe Hous. Auth., 144 F.3d 581, 583-84 (8th Cir. 1998) (housing authority as agency of tribe enjoys sovereign immunity); Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 670-71 (8th Cir. 1986) (tribal housing authority possesses attributes of tribal sovereignty and is immune from suit).

Tribal immunity also protects tribal insurers from lawsuit. See Koscielak v. Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty., 811 N.W.2d 451, 458 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012) (insurer not obligated to pay if tribe not obligated to pay because of sovereign immunity); Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, 46 P.3d 668, 686 (N.M. 2002) (lawsuit against tribe's insurer dismissed because tribe necessary and indispensable party that cannot be joined because of sovereign immunity). The federal courts have already held that the Housing Authority's workers' compensation insurer – AMERIND Risk – is also immune from suit. See Amerind Risk Mgmt. Corp. v. Malaterre, 633 F.3d 680, 688 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that AMERIND Risk is entitled to sovereign immunity).

So, "[s]uits against Indian tribes are . . . barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991). Waiver of sovereign immunity may not be implied but must be expressed unequivocally. Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Kescoli v. Babbitt, 101 F.3d 1304, 1310 (9th Cir. 1996). "There is a strong presumption against waiver of tribal sovereign immunity." Demontiney v. United States, 255 F.3d 801, 811 (9th Cir. 2001). "The plaintiff bears the burden of showing a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity."

Ingrassia, 676 F. Supp.2d at 956-57. If there is no express and unequivocal waiver of immunity by the tribe or abrogation of tribal immunity by Congress, the tribe cannot be sued. Stock West Corp. v. Lujan, 982 F.2d 1389, 1398 (9th Cir. 1993).

Here, this Court has no jurisdiction. Defendants enjoy sovereign immunity from suit. The Housing Authority is a governmental entity of its member tribes created under tribal law by tribal ordinance adopted by each member tribe. Each member tribe intended for the Housing Authority to share in its immunity and operate as a political subdivision as determined by the IRS. Also, the member tribes exercise exclusive control over the Housing Authority through the Board of Commissioners. The Housing Authority is organized for the governmental purposes of qualifying for funding under the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act to provide housing. As such, it enjoys the sovereign immunity of its member tribes.

Plaintiff concedes this point and admits under penalty of perjury in his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus that Defendants Northern Circle Indian Housing Authority and its insurer, AMERIND Risk/Berkeley Risk Administrators, enjoy sovereign immunity from suit. (See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") at 1:23-26 and 3:2-3). Luiz has not alleged (and cannot prove) any waiver of that immunity. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction.

B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Indian Civil Rights Act

To circumvent sovereign immunity, Plaintiff seeks habeas corpus relief under the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA") contending he has been denied due process and equal protection of the laws. (See Petition at 3:8-12). But Plaintiff cannot seek such relief because he is not detained.

Although the ICRA lists a number of substantive rights afforded to individuals that might restrict the power of tribal governments, the ICRA does not establish or imply a federal civil cause of action to remedy violations except for writ of habeas corpus. Shenandoah v. Halbritter, 366 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2004). "The only express remedial provision available to a party seeking relief in federal courts for an alleged violation of the ICRA is through application for habeas corpus relief under 25 U.S.C. § 1303." Snow v. Quinault Indian Nation, 709 F.2d 1319, 1323 (9th Cir. 1983).

"ICRA only provides a basis for an individual to bring a habeas corpus civil claim." Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, 157 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998). "ICRA provides no private right of action against a tribe or tribal officials and may only be enforced in tribal court or by means of a petition for habeas corpus in federal court." Pitre v. Shenandoah, 633 F. App'x 44, 45 (2d Cir. 2016). "The only avenue available to a party who seeks relief in the federal courts for an alleged violation of the ICRA is through an application for habeas corpus relief under 25 U.S.C. § 1303."

Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian Cmty. of Fort Belknap Reservation, 642 F.2d 276, 278-79 (9th Cir. 1981).

Section 1303 provides that the "privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe." 25 U.S.C.S. § 1303. "The term 'detention' in the statute must be interpreted similarly to the 'in custody' requirement in other habeas contexts." <u>Jeffredo v. Macarro</u>, 599 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2010). However, "[a]t the time Congress enacted the ICRA, 'detention' was generally understood to have a meaning distinct from and, indeed, narrower than 'custody.'" <u>Tavares v. Whitehouse</u>, 851 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2017). "Specifically, 'detention' was commonly defined to require physical confinement." <u>Id.</u>

Here, Luiz has not alleged that he has been detained because he is not detained. He never was in custody and never physically confined. This is not a tribal criminal matter; this is a tribal civil workers' compensation matter. Luiz disputes the decision of the tribal hearing officer denying him benefits. Habeas corpus does not apply to this matter. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court should dismiss this matter with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.

Thomas Weathers

Attorney for Defendants