

1 A year after Final Decision No. I and the entry of the Permanent Injunction, Judge Boldt
2 unambiguously confirmed his intention with respect to the retention of continuing jurisdiction
3 under Paragraph 25(a)(6). In a 1975 hearing related to claims that the Puyallup Tribe was
4 fishing beyond its adjudicated fishing places, Judge Boldt explained that the Court’s findings on
5 usual and accustomed places in Final Decision No. I were neither comprehensive nor final
6 “because there was not the time nor the necessity during the trial to try to identify all of the
7 hundreds of specific places in the area.” The Court further explained it was “open to any tribe to
8 seek to have the areas identified in the main decision extended or further restricted”:
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11 THE COURT: First, all who participated in the trial of this case I am sure will
12 recall that the anthropological experts for both plaintiffs and defendants agreed that the
13 Indian tribes fished so fully over the Puget Sound area, that it would require special
14 research by them to be able to identify more than a few of the principal places and areas
15 that were usual and accustomed places. And that was what was done. A few of the
16 specific places and areas were identified in the findings of fact and conclusions of law in
17 the case. **But it was clearly understood that further places that couldn’t be identified
18 as usual and accustomed places by any particular tribe or tribes should be included
19 as and when evidence sufficient to sustain that showing was presented. That is
20 number one.**

21 **It is open to any tribe to seek to have the areas identified previously in the
22 main decision extended or further restricted, because there was not the time nor the
23 necessity during the trial to try to identify all of the hundreds of specific places in
24 this area. It would have been impossible under the trial conditions which involved
25 so many pressing urgent issues.**

26 . . .

27 **To my mind there is nothing to prevent the Puyallups or any other tribe from
28 applying for extension of the limits previously provided in United States v.
Washington and submitting a memorandum in support of the application sufficient to
justify hearing thereon. We can’t have hearings all the time just because somebody
wants one. We are going to have a prima facie showing made at the time of such
application showing that there is some merit to the application and that it ought to receive
a full hearing.**

Transcript of Proceedings Sept. 10, 1975, Dkt. 1769 at 80-81 (Emphasis added).

Paragraph 25(a)(6) should be implemented in accord with Judge Boldt’s intentions until
and unless the Court amends Paragraph 25 to revise the scope of the continuing jurisdiction it

1 retains. *See Muckleshoot Tribe v. Lummi Indian Tribe*, 141 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1998)
2 (judgments should be construed “so as to give effect to the intention of the issuing court.”).
3 Although the Court has twice revised Paragraph 25(a)(6) to add procedural requirements, the
4 Court has never amended the scope of the Court’s continuing jurisdiction retained in Paragraph
5 25.
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7 In 1993, Judge Rothstein proposed sun-setting the case and terminating continuing
8 jurisdiction. After seeking input from the parties, she concluded that the case needed to continue,
9 ruling that “if there ever was a case where there is a role of the Court for continuing
10 jurisdiction . . . this is it.” Dkt. 13,440 at 6. She subsequently revised Paragraph 25 by adding
11 pre-filing procedural requirements for invoking the Court’s continuing jurisdiction, while leaving
12 the substantive scope of continuing jurisdiction wholly unchanged. *See Order Modifying*
13 *Paragraph 25 of Permanent Injunction*, 18 F.Supp. 3d 1172, 1213 (Aug. 24, 1993). Similarly, in
14 2011, this Court revised Paragraph 25 to add additional procedural requirements but noted that
15 the new procedures were not intended to change the substance of the Court’s continuing
16 jurisdiction. *See Supplemental Order on Paragraph 25 Procedures* at ¶ 9, 20 F. Supp. 899, 960
17 (Nov. 9, 2011).
18

19 In *Muckleshoot v. Lummi*, *supra*, the Court of Appeals disapproved the use of
20 supplemental findings in connection with the interpretation and application of existing orders in
21 a Paragraph 25(a)(1) proceeding where the parties’ ability to present evidence was limited, but
22 specifically noted the availability of supplemental findings under the decree in other
23 circumstances. *Id.* at 1360. Nothing in *Muckleshoot v. Lummi* amends Paragraph 25(a)(6) to
24 limit the continuing jurisdiction of the court to hear claims to usual and accustomed places
25 beyond those determined in Final Decision No. I.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November 14, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing MUCKLESHOOT TRIBE’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS. Notice of this filing will be sent to all parties by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court’s system.

DATED this 14th day of November, 2018.

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