

1 Vanya S. Hogen, pro hac vice
 2 Colette Routel, pro hac vice
 3 Leah Jurss, pro hac vice
 4 HOGEN ADAMS, PLLC
 5 1935 W. County Road B2, Suite 460
 6 St. Paul, MN 55113
 7 Phone: (651) 842-9100
 8 vhogen@hogenadams.com
 9 colette.routel@mitchellhamline.edu
 10 ljurss@hogenadams.com

11
 12 Michele Fukawa, WSBA #46592
 13 Kalispel Tribe of Indians Legal Office
 14 934 South Garfield Road
 15 Airway Heights, WA 99001
 16 Phone: (509) 789-7600
 17 mfukawa@kalispeltribe.com

18
 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 20 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
 21

22 KALISPEL TRIBE OF INDIANS and
 23 SPOKANE COUNTY,
 24 Plaintiffs,

25
 26 -vs-

27
 28 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
 29 THE INTERIOR, et. al.
 30 Defendants,

31
 32 SPOKANE TRIBE OF INDIANS,
 33 Intervenor-Defendant.

No. 2:17-CV-0138-WFN

KALISPEL TRIBE’S
 MOTION FOR SUMMARY
 JUDGMENT

Oral Argument Requested

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1 The Administrative Record in this case reveals the Department of the
2 Interior's pre-judged decision to allow the Spokane Tribe to develop a multi-
3 million dollar gaming complex just two miles from the Kalispel Tribe's sole
4 significant source of revenue for its tribal government. By predetermining the
5 outcome, creating impossible standards, and ignoring all economic presentations of
6 harm, the Department failed to comply with its statutory, regulatory, and trust-
7 responsibility requirements.

8 **I. Introduction**

9 In 1988, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"),
10 Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721), as a
11 carefully constructed compromise that balanced the competing interests of federal,
12 state, and tribal governments. One way Congress balanced those interests was to
13 limit Class III (Las Vegas-style) gaming to lands either within the boundaries of or
14 contiguous to an Indian reservation, or lands held by the United States in trust for
15 the benefit of a federally recognized Indian tribe or tribal member as of October
16 17, 1988, IGRA's enactment date. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a). While it was believed that
17 these geographic and temporal limitations would properly balance competing
18 interests, Congress also realized that they might unintentionally restrict tribes that
19 at the time of IGRA's enactment, had a limited land base due to historical
20 circumstances outside of their control. As a result, Congress included several

1 exceptions in IGRA that would authorize gaming on later-acquired trust lands.
2 Exceptions were provided, for example, for tribes that had been terminated by the
3 United States and later restored to federal recognition, tribes that had only recently
4 become recognized by the federal government, or tribes acquiring land through a
5 land-claims settlement. *Id.* § 2719(b)(1)(B).

6 The IGRA exception at issue in this case is the so-called “two-part
7 determination.” *Id.* § 2719(b)(1)(A). To qualify for this exception, the Secretary of
8 the Interior must determine that allowing a gaming establishment on off-
9 reservation lands acquired in trust after October 17, 1988 “would be in the best
10 interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the
11 surrounding community.” *Id.* Even then, gaming is only permitted on those lands if
12 the Governor of the State concurs in the Secretary’s determination. *Id.* In light of
13 the overall context of IGRA, federal officials have read this exception narrowly.
14 As a result, two-part determinations have been sparingly granted, typically in
15 special circumstances where a tribe does not possess lands that could support a
16 gaming establishment, yet the tribe does not fit any of the other exceptions found
17 in IGRA. Before the Spokane Tribe’s application, only 13 two-part determinations
18 had been granted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“Bureau” or “BIA”), and only
19 five of those decisions had been concurred in by the State’s Governor, resulting in
20 a gaming establishment. AR0042252–53-UR.

1 One of the few two-part determinations granted by federal officials was for
2 the Plaintiff Kalispel Tribe of Indians (“Kalispel” or “Kalispel Tribe”). While the
3 Kalispel Tribe possesses a small reservation in Pend Oreille County, Washington,
4 the reservation is virtually undevelopable because it is situated between a
5 mountainside and a river, located almost entirely within a floodplain. AR0042244-
6 UR; AR00042276–77-UR. Thus, in 1997, when the BIA agreed that Kalispel’s
7 289-acre parcel in Airway Heights satisfied the requirements of Section
8 2719(b)(1)(A) of the IGRA, it did so out of necessity.¹ Kalispel had no on-
9 reservation gaming facility, and no other means of pursuing economic
10 development. AR0039935–36; AR0012004.

11 On February 24, 2006, nine years after granting Kalispel’s two-part
12 determination, the neighboring Spokane Tribe (“Spokane Tribe” or “Spokane”)
13 submitted a request for its own two-part determination. AR0012459–62. When
14 Spokane filed its request, there seemed little chance of it being granted. Since the
15 nineteenth century, the Spokane Tribe has possessed a reservation that is more than
16 157,000 acres, making it one of the largest Indian reservations in the Pacific

¹ The Bureau also issued a proclamation making Kalispel’s Airway Heights lands part of its reservation. Proclaiming Certain Lands as Reservation for the Kalispel Tribe in Washington, 61 Fed. Reg. 55,992 (Oct. 30, 1996).

1 Northwest. AR0001701. And at the time of its request, the Spokane Tribe already
2 operated two casinos: (1) Two Rivers Casino, located within its reservation, and
3 (2) Chewelah Casino, located off-reservation on a parcel of land taken into trust
4 before October 1988. AR0042248-UR; AR0012482; AR0017031. While Spokane
5 could certainly increase its gaming revenue by opening a new casino in a more
6 densely populated area, this is true for most federally recognized tribes; after all,
7 many Indian reservations are located in rural areas with low population densities.
8 This fact alone has never warranted granting a two-part determination.

9 Additionally, the Spokane Tribe proposed to build its new casino, hotel,
10 convention center, and retail complex on a parcel of land adjacent, and later
11 annexed to, the city of Airway Heights—just two miles from Kalispel’s existing
12 casino. *See* AR0012459–62; AR0042244-UR; AR0021341. The Bureau has never
13 approved a two-part determination for an Indian tribe so close to an existing tribal
14 casino because the approval cannot be “detrimental to the surrounding
15 community.” AR0042252–53-UR (listing prior two-part determinations and
16 identifying the nearest tribal competitor as over 20 miles away from the applicant
17 tribe’s site); 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A). Spokane is a small, saturated gaming
18 market; there are already six casinos within a two-hour drive of the city.
19 AR0002833–34. Adults within a two-hour drive from the Airway Heights casino
20 already spend, on average, hundreds of dollars each year at one of the area casinos,

1 and they are severely constrained in their ability to spend more due to their limited
2 disposable income. *See id.* (noting that the approximately 654,000 adults in the
3 market have a per capita income averaging \$23,500, yet the casinos have gross
4 gaming revenues of almost \$329 million). While there is always some hope that
5 congregating casinos in a particular location will result in increased tourism, even
6 Spokane’s overly generous projections anticipated just 10% of its new casino
7 revenues would come from patrons outside the local gaming market. AR0036560.

8 In response to Spokane’s request for a two-part determination, the Kalispel
9 Tribe took the unprecedented step of hiring gaming experts to conduct market
10 studies to quantify the expected impact on their gaming revenues, and the data
11 underlying those studies was fully disclosed to the Bureau. AR0042223–24-UR.
12 Those experts projected impacts on Kalispel’s gaming revenues of catastrophic
13 proportions. AR0005263, AR0005320, AR0005347. Despite this, the BIA granted
14 Spokane’s two-part determination. *See* AR0063807–10. In doing so, Bureau
15 officials violated federal law by deciding from the beginning of the process—
16 before any environmental or economic analysis—that they would not only support
17 Spokane’s request, but they would do whatever it took to fast-track the application
18 through the review process required by the National Environmental Policy Act
19 (“NEPA”) and IGRA to ensure that it landed on the desk of a favorable Governor.

20 **II. Factual Background**

1 **A. Rush to the Governor’s Desk.**

2
3 Christine Gregoire became the Governor of Washington in January 2005.
4 Apparently, contacts with the Governor’s office led the Spokane Tribe to believe
5 that she would respond favorably to a request for an off-reservation casino. As a
6 result, Spokane submitted a letter in February 2006 requesting that the Bureau
7 determine that its land in Airway Heights was eligible for gaming under 25 U.S.C.
8 § 2719(b)(1)(B), AR0012459, and it hired a contractor to begin gathering
9 information for the environmental review process, AR0012645.

10 But the Spokane Tribe did not follow the established process. Applications
11 for two-part determinations require the submission of several documents designed
12 to describe the proposed project in detail. AR0010623–37. This level of detail is
13 necessary to ensure that nearby governments, including Indian tribes, can engage
14 in meaningful consultation with the federal government regarding the project. *See,*
15 *e.g.,* AR0012518; AR0012517. In fact, the Spokane Tribe did not submit the
16 required documents for almost six years. AR0010541; AR0036535. At least some
17 of this delay was because Spokane was not sure the size or type of facility it was
18 proposing to build. *E.g.,* AR0012654.

19 As a result, there was widespread confusion over what project was being
20 proposed, whether Spokane had a two-part application pending, whether the
21 Northwest Regional Office (“NWRO”) of the Bureau or the National Indian

1 Gaming Commission (“NIGC”) would become the lead agency for the
2 environmental-review process, and whether it was proper to publish a scoping
3 notice in the Federal Register before receipt of a fully documented two-part
4 determination petition. *E.g.*, AR0012499; AR0012464; AR0012480; AR0012473;
5 AR0012484; AR0012487.

6 The Bureau did not receive a fully documented request for a two-part
7 determination from Spokane until February 29, 2012, when the Spokane Tribe
8 filed the paperwork required by Part 292 of the Code of Federal Regulations. *See*
9 AR0036535. Despite this and over the objection of the Kalispel Tribe, the Bureau
10 published notices that it was engaging in the NEPA scoping process in 2009,
11 AR0012564, and the agency began working on the request in earnest in March
12 2011, after completing the scoping report, AR0021015.

13 By now, the Spokane Tribe was concerned that time was of the essence.
14 Governor Gregoire’s term would expire in January 2013, and there was no way to
15 know whether the next Governor would be as favorable to their request. B.J.
16 Howerton, Environmental Services Manager for the NWRO, decided to deviate
17 from the agency’s typical procedures to fast-track the Spokane application.
18 Typically, the NWRO’s realty personnel handle the two-part determination
19 process, while Dr. Howerton coordinates the environmental review required by
20 NEPA. *See* AR0010523. But Dr. Howerton decided to start the two-part

1 determination process on his own. He enlisted the help of Spokane’s contractor—
2 Analytical Environmental Services (“AES”)—to conduct the government-to-
3 government consultations required under Section 20 of IGRA, and in April 2011,
4 he sent out government-to-government consultation letters under Stanley Speaks’
5 signature. AR0010522; AR0010534.

6 Dr. Howerton never informed Sherry Johns, the Realty Specialist for the
7 NWRO, that he was proceeding with Spokane’s request for a two-part
8 determination. In fact, she was not aware that a formal request had been made until
9 April 30, 2012, after a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (“DEIS”) had
10 already been issued and more than one year after the Section 20 consultation
11 process had begun. AR0010521; AR0010399. When Dr. Howerton’s deception
12 was eventually discovered, he dishonestly claimed that he had been authorized to
13 conduct the process by Gregory Argel because Sherry Johns was on medical leave.
14 AR0010521–22; AR0010521; AR0010511.

15 Howerton candidly admitted, however, that his main goal was to expedite
16 the NEPA and two-part determination process because the Spokane Tribe had
17 indicated that the current Governor was favorable to their application, and a
18 subsequent Governor might not be. In an email to Sherry Johns, Howerton stated
19 that he “need[ed] to keep the process moving forward on an expedited pace”
20 because he knew time was of the essence given the necessity of obtaining the

1 Governor's concurrence. AR0010512. He told Ms. Johns: "[t]hat is one reason
2 why I was doing your work in your absence and keeping the 2-part determination
3 process moving forward on an expedited pace." *Id.* Sherry Johns confirmed that
4 this was her goal as well. In an email requesting documents from Howerton she
5 explained: "[i]f I do not receive the [documents] in a timely manner, I will not be
6 able to expedite the 2-part determination recommendation memorandum and the
7 Tribe stated that time is of the essence because of Governor's concurrence. The
8 current Governor is favorable; however, the next Governor may not be."
9 AR0010513.

10 The record is replete with references to the Governor's position on
11 Spokane's application (both favorable and neutral), and the need to expedite the
12 process so that it would land on her desk before the end of her term. *E.g.*,
13 AR0012650; AR0010696 (email from AES contractor Ryan Lee to B.J. Howerton
14 referring to a conference call where an "accelerated" version of the NEPA schedule
15 and a "typical" schedule were discussed); AR0010697 (accelerated schedule
16 showing delivery of the Record of Decision ("ROD") package on September 10,
17 2012); AR0010698 (typical schedule showing delivery of the ROD on February
18 10, 2013, which would be after Governor Gregoire left office); AR0010599 (email
19 from Douglas Wolf in the Interior Solicitor's Office stating that the Spokane Tribe
20 "has worked hard to convince ASIA, OIG, and SOL that they need to have [the]

1 most expedited schedule possible”).

2 A decision would never be put to the Governor, however, if the BIA did not
3 approve the two-part determination in the first instance. *Cf.* 25 U.S.C.
4 § 2719(b)(1)(A). Yet this fact was never discussed, or in doubt, in the
5 correspondence found in the Administrative Record. In fact, by April 2012, federal
6 officials had already begun drafting a favorable two-part determination. *See*
7 AR0010511 (noting that one of the questions to be answered in the two-part
8 determination memorandum would be whether “a gaming establishment on the
9 newly acquired land [would] not be detrimental to the surrounding community?”
10 and indicating that “the Contractor and I have already made a rough draft on this
11 topic”). They did so before receiving any comments from the Kalispel Tribe or
12 other interested parties. Comments on the DEIS were not due until May 16, 2012.
13 AR0010557. By August 2, 2012, the NWRO was already asking if it could forward
14 the two-part-determination recommendation, or if it was required to wait until the
15 EIS was complete. AR0065818.

16 Because the outcome of the Spokane Tribe’s application was predetermined
17 from the very beginning, and because federal officials knew that the Kalispel Tribe
18 would oppose the project, they tried to limit Kalispel’s involvement. Kalispel
19 asked that the scoping process be reinitiated with sufficient detail about the project
20 that was being proposed, and that another off-reservation location—one not within

1 two miles of Kalispel’s existing casino (which would draw from exactly the same
2 market)—be considered. *See* AR0012518; AR0012517 (September 15, 2009
3 memorandum from Kalispel requesting meeting regarding deficiencies in the
4 Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement); AR0012482
5 (May 12, 2010 briefing paper noting Kalispel’s desire for an alternative site that
6 would have less detrimental effects on the surrounding community). But when
7 Spokane, which had aggressively pushed to get the scoping notice published in the
8 first instance, AR0012613, heard that the BIA was suggesting a second scoping
9 hearing, it balked, and the BIA decided to move forward, AR0012484.

10 Kalispel was not offered the ability to be a cooperating agency for NEPA
11 purposes even while every other local government was extended such an
12 opportunity. AR12419. Because Kalispel was denied cooperating-agency status, it
13 generally only had access to information and data contained in the Scoping Report,
14 DEIS, the Final EIS (“FEIS”), and other public documents. *E.g.*, AR0012517. Yet
15 nearly all of the work on the project was done through conference calls, email
16 exchanges and behind-the-scenes meetings that cooperating agencies participated
17 in. *E.g.*, AR0005691; AR0065545; AR0012311; AR0043850. In fact, reporters had
18 more access to information regarding the timing and status of the Spokane project
19 than Kalispel did. AR004194; AR0005699; AR0006425; AR0009609; AR0009667.

20 **B. Review of Impact to Kalispel Gaming Revenues.**
21

1 Not realizing that federal officials had long ago decided to grant Spokane's
2 request, Kalispel expended resources to hire gaming industry-experts to analyze
3 the impact that the proposed Spokane casino would have on their revenue. The
4 analysis established that Kalispel's gaming revenue and profit would dramatically
5 fall if the Spokane casino opened. AR0005299 (indicating a very significant
6 decrease in 2020 revenues). In addition, Kalispel had just expanded its casino
7 operations and taken on a significant bank loan. The financial analysis indicated
8 that Kalispel would default on the financial covenants contained in its bank loan if
9 Spokane's casino in Airway Heights were to open. AR0005323; AR0005353.
10 Finally, Kalispel would not have sufficient gaming revenues to fund existing tribal
11 services and programs because gaming was its sole significant revenue source.
12 AR0005324, AR0005331.

13 AES, the contractor hired by Spokane to complete the environmental
14 assessment for the project, hired the Innovation Group to respond to Kalispel's
15 comments. The Innovation Group projected a smaller—but still dramatic—
16 decrease in Kalispel's gaming revenues in 2020. AR0063870 (projecting major
17 loss in gaming revenues). The Innovation Group claimed, however, that the decline
18 would be temporary, because the market would “grow” with the addition of a new
19 casino.

20 The Bureau has a legal obligation to independently evaluate the work of

1 contractors it hires to conduct the environmental review process. To this end, early
2 in the process, Steven Payson, a BIA economist, was consulted. Payson reviewed
3 the administrative FEIS and sent an email to which he attached his “[t]houghts on
4 the Spokane gaming issue,” which he noted was probably “not quite what any of
5 you expected” and he suspected they would find it “interesting” or “different.”
6 AR0008982. Paula Hart then forward this email and document to others, noting
7 that it was indeed “interesting,” and “[o]n the last page Steve is making the
8 argument that Kalispell [*sic*] is making some very interesting policy suggestions.”
9 *Id.* It seems then that Payson agreed with Kalispel’s analysis, but we will never
10 know, because the agency has refused to release the attachment being discussed,
11 claiming that it is protected by deliberative-process privilege, even though it was
12 completed almost three years before the two-part determination was finalized. *See*
13 ECF No. 70 at 1–2. Regardless, the BIA did not ask Payson to do any more work
14 on the project; no further correspondence was sent to him that appears in the
15 administrative record. *See* AR0007761 (email from Payson two months later
16 asking, “Did you want me to do more analysis?”).

17 It was not until 2014, more than a year after the FEIS was issued, that the
18 BIA consulted its own on-staff financial analyst, Tom Hartman. Hartman had been
19 sent early emails about whether the NIGC or BIA would serve as the lead agency
20 during the environmental-review process, AR0012473, but he had not otherwise

1 been involved in the project. Now, in February 2014, an email sent to Hartman
2 from Troy Woodward established the dilemma that was before the agency:

3 the Kalispel Tribe, which has a very large casino within 2 miles of the
4 proposed Spokane casino in Airway Heights, WA, has alleged that if Spokane
5 opens then Kalispel will necessarily default on its debt obligations.
6

7 Similar to the Menominee application, Spokane counters that the Kalispel
8 economic data is flawed because they assume Kalispel's gaming is 100% of
9 the available market and that the methodology of the study is flawed because
10 it does not adequately analyze the available gaming market. Spokane further
11 alleges that Kalispel would not default on its debt and would not have to cut
12 back on tribal government services because they have a financial cushion, as
13 evidenced by the per capita payments they make to their members.
14

15 AR0004833–34. Hartman responded by noting that the agency was “back to the
16 gray area” of what was and was not “detrimental” to the local community, but he
17 agreed to review the documentation and submit his analysis. *Id.*

18 Hartman sent the BIA a two-page memorandum in June 2014, claiming that
19 “[f]inancial projections based upon distance and demographic data are not an
20 accurate technique for analyzing competitive results” even though they were
21 “commonly used.” AR0003574. In Hartman's opinion, such projections depend on
22 too many assumptions and small changes in the assumptions would completely
23 change the result. Notably, Hartman did not endorse the analysis prepared by the
24 Innovation Group, which relied on such data and assumptions. Instead, he stated:

25 The Kalispel Tribe has presented an analysis, and the Spokane Tribe has
26 responded with challenges to many of the assumptions. If the OIGM went
27 through the assumptions item by item, accepting some and rejecting others,

1 the resulting financial analysis might not be a more reliable prediction of the
2 future. Some assumptions regarding total market growth would dominate the
3 end result, yet there would be little basis for deciding on a prediction for
4 market growth other than guessing.

5
6 *Id.* In other words, the Innovation Group’s claims that the opening of a new
7 Spokane casino in Airway Heights would expand the market were, in Hartman’s
8 opinion, simply based on guesswork.

9 Elsewhere, Hartman concluded that “[n]ew entrants [into the market] did not
10 regularly cause established casinos to *fail*.” *Id.* (emphasis added) He also says: “I
11 do not think that the likely outcome of a casino in Airway Heights developed by
12 the Spokane Tribe will be a *devastating impact* on the existing casino owned by
13 the Kalispel Tribe.” *Id.* (emphasis added). The test established by IGRA, of course,
14 does not require that Kalispel’s multi-million-dollar gaming enterprise fail for the
15 off-reservation gaming request to be considered “detrimental” to the surrounding
16 community. Hartman also based his analysis on markets such as Las Vegas,
17 Nevada, and Connecticut, and concluded that “[c]learly the distance from a
18 residence to a casino is not the dominate factor in these customer’s decision to
19 gamble.” *Id.* In doing so, however, he failed to acknowledge that these locations
20 are in or near major metropolitan areas that attract millions of tourists each year;
21 Airway Heights is simply not a comparable market.

22 The BIA apparently did not like Hartman’s analysis as it did not confirm the

1 supremacy of the Innovation Group’s position. As such, it decided to ignore it. It
2 did not go through Kalispel’s and the Innovation Group’s assumptions “item by
3 item”—it just adopted the Innovation Group’s analysis. Nowhere did the BIA
4 acknowledge that both of its in-house experts disagreed with the analysis it relied
5 on, which was submitted by Spokane’s paid contractor. Hartman’s memo never
6 saw the light of day until this Court compelled its production. *See* ECF No. 38 at
7 6–7.

8 **C. The Real Decision.**

9
10 In the end, federal officials did not seriously consider any of the information
11 Kalispel submitted. The process in the BIA NWRO was skewed to reach a
12 particular result from the very beginning. When the matter was eventually sent to
13 Washington D.C. for final approvals and Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs
14 Kevin Washburn was briefed on the matter (which happened through a series of
15 one-page briefing memos, AR0000948; AR0000956, AR0007464; AR0007466;
16 AR007643; AR0007644), he was informed that federal officials had previously
17 granted Kalispel’s request for a two-part determination and that that decision
18 supposedly led to devastating impacts on the Spokane Tribe’s existing gaming

1 facilities, cutting their revenues from \$5 million to just \$20,000 annually.²
2 AR0007727–29; AR0007730; AR0007734–35. Apparently believing that two
3 wrongs *do* make a right, the government decided that it was only fair that Spokane
4 be granted a two-part determination virtually next door to Kalispel’s casino, so that
5 the two tribes could compete head-to-head for revenue. This, of course, is not the
6 standard contained in IGRA.

7 **III. The Department failed to comply with IGRA, NEPA, and the Trust**
8 **Responsibility.**
9

10 Because neither NEPA nor IGRA provide separate standards of review, the
11 Tribe’s claims are reviewed under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5
12 U.S.C. §§ 701–706. In administrative record review cases, summary judgment is
13 the “mechanism for deciding the legal question of whether the agency could
14 reasonably have found the facts as it did.” *Occidental Eng’g Co. v. I.N.S.*, 753 F.2d
15 766, 770 (9th Cir. 1985); *see also Wild Fish Conservancy v. Irving*, 221 F. Supp.
16 3d 1224, 1231 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment
17 of alleged ESA and NEPA violations under the APA standard); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

18 Section 706(2) of the APA directs courts to consider whether an agency’s

² There is no factual support for this allegation. Spokane’s casinos have faced numerous dramatic revenue swings—both up and down—since Kalispel’s Airway Heights Casino opened. AR0031318–45.

1 action was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
2 accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). In establishing standards for the
3 review of agency actions, the Supreme Court has directed courts to consider
4 whether the agency

5 has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
6 failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
7 for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
8 implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product
9 of agency expertise.

10
11 *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S.
12 29, 43 (1983).

13 The Supreme Court has recognized that any other approach in evaluation of
14 an agency decision “would not simply render judicial review generally
15 meaningless, but would be contrary to the demand that courts ensure that agency
16 decisions are founded on a reasoned evaluation of the relevant factors.” *Marsh v.*
17 *Oregon Natural Res. Council*, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (internal marks removed).
18 Despite deference owed to an agency, courts will not “rubber-stamp . . .
19 administrative decisions that [they] deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or
20 that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.” *NRDC v. Pritzker*, 828
21 F.3d 1125, 1139 (9th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted).

22 **A. The Department violated IGRA by disregarding detriment to the**
23 **surrounding community and prejudging Spokane’s application.**
24

25 **1. Two-part determinations are to be rarely granted.**

1 While IGRA was enacted to provide a statutory basis for the operation of
2 gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting “tribal economic development,
3 tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government,” 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4), it
4 generally bans off-reservation gaming and carefully circumscribes it to limited
5 exceptions. For a two-part determination, the Secretary must determine that “a
6 gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the
7 Indian tribe and its members *and would not be detrimental to the surrounding*
8 *community.*” 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The Assistant
9 Secretary, in an article penned before his appointment, wrote of this exception that
10 “the discretion granted therein is quite limited, effectively to non-controversial
11 applications.” Kevin K. Washburn, *Agency Conflict and Culture: Federal*
12 *Implementation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act by the National Indian*
13 *Gaming Commission, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Department of Justice,*
14 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 303, 332 (Spring 2010).

15 The regulations implementing the two-part-determination language define a
16 “nearby Indian tribe” to include “an Indian tribe with tribal Indian lands located
17 within a 25-mile radius of the location of the proposed gaming establishment.” 25
18 C.F.R. § 292.2. Kalispel, whose trust land housing its Northern Quest Resort &
19 Casino (“Northern Quest Casino”) sits just two miles from Spokane’s Off-
20 Reservation Casino site, AR0063869, easily meets this definition.

1 Unfortunately, neither IGRA nor the regulations define what “detrimental to
2 the surrounding community” means, *see* 25 U.S.C. § 2703; 25 C.F.R. Part 292, and
3 the legislative history for IGRA is similarly silent. In promulgating the two-part-
4 determination regulations, the Department indicated it would “consider detrimental
5 impacts on a case-by-case basis, so it is unnecessary to include a standard.”
6 Gaming on Trust Lands Acquired After October 17, 1988, 73 Fed. Reg. 29,354,
7 29,456 (May 20, 2008).

8 Section 292.18 of the IGRA regulations requires that an application for a
9 two-part determination contain seven categories of information, including the
10 following:

11 (a) Information regarding environmental impacts and plans for mitigating
12 adverse impacts, including an Environmental Assessment (EA), an
13 Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), or other information required by the
14 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); . . .

15 (c) Anticipated impacts on the economic development, income, and
16 employment of the surrounding community; [and]

17 (d) Anticipated costs of impacts to the surrounding community and
18 identification of sources of revenue to mitigate them[.]

19
20 25 C.F.R. § 292.18.³ The Assistant Secretary’s decision here failed to properly

³ Section 292.19 requires the BIA regional director to consult with “[a]ppropriate State and local officials” and “[o]fficials of nearby Indian tribes.” The Secretary

1 consider at least these factors and established an impossible bar—that a nearby
2 Indian tribe show that opening of the proposed casino would result in closure of an
3 existing casino—to ever find that a new casino would be “detrimental to the
4 surrounding community.” *See* AR0063895.

5 **2. The Department improperly evaluated the harm to the “surrounding**
6 **community,” and particularly to the Kalispel Tribe.**

7
8 **a. The Department adopted a standard for “detrimental to the**
9 **surrounding community” that can never be met.**

10
11 In the Assistant Secretary’s decision analyzing 25 C.F.R. § 292.18(c)
12 “[a]nticipated impacts on the economic development, income, and employment of
13 the surrounding community,” there is but one summary paragraph about Kalispel:

14 The Tribe’s Northern Quest Casino and Resort currently conducts class II
15 gaming. Potential adverse impacts to the Kalispel Tribe’s casino will be
16 mitigated as described in the Final EIS. As discussed in more detail below,
17 the Kalispel Tribe’s Northern Quest Casino and Resort will experience some
18 market decline, but that decline will be mitigated by the length of time it takes
19 to construct and develop the Spokane Tribe’s Project, and will likely recover
20 over time as the market grows with the introduction of a second casino in the
21 area.

22
23 AR0063851. And Kalispel is literally not even mentioned in the Assistant
24 Secretary’s discussion of § 292.18(d) regarding “[a]nticipated costs of impacts to
25 the surrounding community and identification of sources of revenue to mitigate

must then make a decision based on information received through these
consultations along with the tribe’s application. 25 C.F.R. § 292.21(a).

1 them.” AR0063852–55.

2 Rather, the Assistant Secretary discusses Kalispel in a section of his decision
3 regarding consultation with the surrounding community. *See generally*
4 AR0063863–72. That section, which is simply a summary of the comments the
5 various local governments (including Kalispel) submitted during the consultation
6 process and the Department’s response to them, shows that the Assistant Secretary
7 was really just going through the motions—listing the back-and-forth between the
8 Department and Kalispel and parroting language from prior decisions.

9 Case in point, the Department reiterated—as it has in several other two-part
10 determinations—that “[m]ere competition to Kalispel’s Northern Quest Casino
11 from the Spokane Tribe’s proposed casino in an overlapping gaming market is not
12 sufficient, in and of itself, to conclude that it would result in a detrimental impact
13 on the Kalispel Tribe.” AR0063865 and n.296 (citing Two-Part Determinations for
14 Enterprise and North Fork Rancherias). In those earlier decisions, the Department
15 said, “The Department will not approve a tribal application for off-reservation
16 gaming where a nearby Indian tribe demonstrates that it is likely to suffer a
17 detrimental impact as a result.” AR0042231-UR (quoting Enterprise and North
18 Fork decisions). Notably, the Department left that language out of its decision in
19 this case.

20 Instead, in its Record of Decision, the Department suggested that *closure* of

1 a nearby casino, or failure to generate any cash flow, would be the only measure of
2 “detriment” when it comes to competitive effects:

3 As concluded [in the FEIS], anticipated substitution effects would not result
4 in the closure of any of the competing gaming facilities. In fact, it is likely that
5 existing regional casinos would continue to generate positive cash flows.

6
7 AR0063895. But even under the Department’s analysis, Kalispel’s Northern Quest
8 Casino is expected to dramatically decline.

9 Because neither Congress nor the Department has defined “detriment,” it
10 must be given its ordinary meaning. *FDIC v. Meyer*, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (“In
11 the absence of [a statutory] definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance
12 with its ordinary or natural meaning.”). “Detriment” means “[a]ny loss or harm
13 suffered by a person or property.” *Black’s Law Dictionary* 515 (9th ed. 2009). And
14 while the D.C. Circuit has held that a new casino need not have “no unmitigated
15 negative impacts whatsoever,” *Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior*,
16 879 F.3d 1177, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“*Stand Up III*”) for it to not be “detrimental
17 to the surrounding community,” the record shows that the impacts of the Spokane
18 casino on Kalispel are far greater—and have been shown with far greater
19 evidence—than in any prior case.

20 In *Stand Up for California!*, the Department had issued a decision to take
21 land into trust for the North Fork Rancheria and a two-part determination to permit
22 the North Fork Rancheria to place a casino on that land, which is 39 miles from the

1 existing casino of the Picayune Tribe. *Id.* at 1180; *Stand Up for California! v. U.S.*
2 *Dep't of Interior*, 204 F. Supp. 3d 212, 267 (D.D.C. 2016) (“*Stand Up II*”). Along
3 with several community groups, the Picayune Tribe challenged the Department’s
4 two-part determination. The Circuit Court upheld the decision, giving less weight
5 to the Picayune Tribe’s concerns regarding detriment to its existing casino because
6 it was outside the 25-mile range to be considered a “nearby Indian tribe” by the
7 Department. *Stand Up III*, 879 F.3d at 1189. The District Court also quoted the
8 ROD approvingly: “It is rational and in keeping with congressional intent to accord
9 weight to an entity’s concerns in proportion to the entity’s physical proximity to
10 the development in question.” *Stand Up II*, 204 F. Supp. 3d at 270.

11 Under that same framework, the Kalispel Tribe’s concerns should be given
12 great weight. Kalispel’s Northern Quest Casino is far closer to the proposed new
13 casino than in any other two-part determination. AR0042228–29-UR. In fact,
14 before this case, the closest nearby casino impacted by a two-part determination
15 was 11 times further away—or 22 miles. *Id.* Here, Northern Quest Casino is so
16 close to the Spokane Tribe’s proposed casino that a person could literally *walk*
17 from one to the other.

18 In the North Fork case, the Picayune Tribe’s casino was in an “overlapping
19 gaming market” with the proposed North Fork casino. *Stand Up III*, 879 F.3d at
20 1189. The Department had “concluded that the Picayune’s casino could

1 successfully absorb the expected competitive effects,” and the Court of Appeals
2 found that “[g]iven the reduced weight the Department permissibly assigned the
3 Picayune’s concerns, it concluded—appropriately in our view—that the casino’s
4 potential effects on the tribe were insufficient to render the casino detrimental to
5 the surrounding community overall.” *Id.* at 1190.

6 Despite the Assistant Secretary’s repetition of the “overlapping gaming
7 market” phrase here, AR0063865, Northern Quest Casino is in the *same* gaming
8 market as the proposed Spokane casino, *see* AR004690; AR0063869.

9 Unfortunately, as Assistant Secretary Washburn pointed out in testimony before
10 the House Natural Resources Committee when he was an academic:

11 [T]he economic well-being of many tribes depends on having a monopoly or
12 a quasi-monopoly in the market they serve. From an economic standpoint,
13 new casinos often cannibalize the business of existing casinos. While
14 competition is generally a positive value in business because it leads to a
15 higher quality product (or a higher quantity of product at a lower price),
16 competition is not necessarily advantageous in gaming.

17
18 *Department of the Interior’s Recently Released Guidance on Taking Land into*
19 *Trust for Indian Tribes and its Ramifications, Oversight Hearing Before the H.*
20 *Comm. on Natural Res.*, 110th Cong. 68 (2008) (prepared statement of Prof. Kevin
21 Washburn).

22 The fact is that even under the Innovation Group’s calculations, Northern
23 Quest Casino is predicted to suffer a major loss in gaming revenues. AR0063870.
24 Using those same calculations, that loss, in turn, will result in a cut to the Kalispel

1 Tribe's government budget of *all payments to tribal members*, which are
2 specifically contemplated by IGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3), *plus* a significant cut
3 in other government funding. AR0063870; *see also* AR0007511.⁴

4 In *Stand Up II*, the Court agreed with the Secretary that Picayune's casino
5 was in an "overlapping" market with the proposed North Fork's casino, rather than
6 the same market, 204 F. Supp. 3d at 271, and reiterated its view from the
7 preliminary-injunction proceedings earlier in the case that the "Picayune Tribe had
8 'offered no concrete alternative analysis of [the preferred alternative's] economic
9 impacts that would suggest that a gaming complex on the Madera Site would
10 impair the Picayune Tribe's ability to remain profitable and self-sufficient,'" and
11 that "'absent any evidence supporting the prediction that development of the
12 [North Fork] site would have a destructive competitive impact upon the Picayune
13 Tribe, the plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed in arguing that the Secretary's analysis
14 of the economic effects on the Picayune Tribe was improper.'" *Id.* The Court
15 concluded that the Picayune Tribe had "pointed to no alternative analysis
16 concluding that the proposed casino would put [the Picayune casino] out of
17 business or have any 'destructive competitive impact' on the Picayune Tribe." *Id.*

⁴ Under the analysis submitted by Kalispel, the preferred alternative will result in a
>50% cut to the Tribe's governmental revenue. AR0005339.

1 at 272. Kalispel, conversely, has pointed to credible “alternative analysis” that
2 shows the proposed Spokane casino will have a “destructive competitive impact”
3 on the Kalispel Tribe. *See* AR0005320–46; AR0005263–319; AR0005347–64;
4 AR0006427–32; and AR0002832–53.⁵ And the Department’s own analysis
5 demonstrates a “destructive competitive impact.”

6 The reality is that if the demonstrable impacts to the Kalispel Tribe’s casino
7 are not enough to render the Spokane casino “detrimental to the surrounding
8 community overall,” no Tribe will ever be able to demonstrate detriment, and
9 Congress’s direction will be meaningless. Closure is not the only—or even a
10 reasonable—measure of detriment, and because the Department imposed that
11 standard on Kalispel, the Court should vacate the Decision.

12 **b. The Department relied on factors it was not intended to**
13 **consider.**

14
15 A full look at the record (or as full a look as the Kalispel Tribe has been
16 given) shows that the Department had made its decision to grant Spokane’s
17 application long before it even received and rejected Kalispel’s detailed economic

⁵ This analysis formed the basis of an article later published in a peer-reviewed journal. *See* Clyde W. Barrow, David R. Borges, and Alan P. Meister, *An Empirical Framework for Assessing Market Saturation in the U.S. Casino Industry*, 20 *Gaming L. Rev. & Econ.* 397 (2016).

1 analysis. Indeed, the fix was in even before Spokane submitted its formal
2 application. What really drove the Department's decision was a factor nowhere
3 referenced in IGRA or the Department's implementing regulations, namely the
4 Department's sense that it *had* to grant the Spokane Tribe's application because it
5 had granted one for the Kalispel Tribe:

6 We note that it would be deeply ironic to allow the Kalispel Tribe to develop
7 a casino within the Spokane Tribe's aboriginal area, while denying the
8 Spokane Tribe the opportunity to use its own aboriginal lands for the same
9 purpose.

10
11 AR0063809.

12 This "deep irony" is not part of the calculus for a two-part determination
13 under IGRA, however. A tribe *does not have to have a historical connection* to the
14 land for a two-part determination. 73 Fed. Reg. at 29,368 ("The two-part
15 Secretarial Determination does not require a tribe to have an ancestral tie to the
16 lands they seek to acquire."); *see also* AR0063838. Thus, although Kalispel *did*
17 have historical ties to the Northern Quest site, AR0063839, the fact that the
18 Spokane Tribe has greater ties to the Airway Heights area than Kalispel does
19 should not have been considered. And reliance on a "factor[] Congress did not
20 intend it to consider" is a basis to set aside an agency's decision, *Club One*
21 *Casino, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior*, 328 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1041 (E.D. Cal.
22 2018) (quoting *Defenders of Wildlife v. Zinke*, 856 F.3d 1248, 1256-57 (9th Cir.
23 2017)). Moreover, "if the record shows that the agency prejudged the issues, then

1 deference to the agency’s decision is diminished.” *Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Salazar*,
2 875 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1245 (D. Colo. 2012).

3 The day he issued the Decision, ASIA Washburn called the Kalispel Tribal
4 Chairman to tell him the bad news. In that call, Mr. Washburn told Chairman
5 Nenema “you knew I was going to approve,” Decl. of Glen Nenema at ¶ 5, and “I
6 can’t disapprove after another Tribe was approved for gaming on their ancestral
7 lands,” *id.*⁶ The administrative record backs up what the Assistant Secretary said:

⁶ Although the “focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence,” *Camp v. Pitts*, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973), courts may consider additional evidence when “supplementation is necessary to determine if the agency has considered all factors and explained its decision.” *San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell*, 747 F.3d 581, 603 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). Chairman Nenema’s declaration references communications from the Department that demonstrate its prejudgment in this matter, and the Court may consider the declaration to properly evaluate what factors the Department considered and the reasoning for its decision. *See Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior*, No. 09-C-496, 2010 WL 4628916, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 4, 2010) (quoting *USA Group Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley*, 82 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 1996)).

1 the Department was acting all along to help Spokane get an off-Reservation casino
2 and it really didn't matter how thorough the Kalispel's comments and analysis
3 were. *See* Factual Background, *supra* at II.A. The Department's consideration of
4 factors outside those Congress directed it to consider provides another basis to
5 vacate the Decision.

6 **B. The Department violated NEPA.**

7
8 The National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") requires that before a
9 federal agency engages in any "major Federal actions significantly affecting the
10 quality of the human environment," it must evaluate the environmental and
11 socioeconomic impacts of the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332; *Lands Council v.*
12 *Powell*, 395 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004). The environmental impact statement
13 ("EIS") is the "detailed statement" that must "provide [a] full and fair discussion"
14 of significant project impacts. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1; 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); *Native*
15 *Ecosystems Council v. Tidwell*, 599 F.3d 926, 936 (9th Cir. 2010). The EIS is
16 designed to serve two purposes:

17 First, [i]t ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available,
18 and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant
19 environmental impacts. Second, it guarantees that the relevant information
20 will be made available to the larger audience that may also play a role in both
21 the decisionmaking process and the implementation of that decision.

22
23 *Dep't of Transp. v. Public Citizen*, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004) (quoting *Robertson v.*
24 *Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989)).

1 NEPA is a procedural statute. It requires an analysis of impacts to the human
2 environment, but it does not compel a particular decision once those impacts have
3 been analyzed. Thus, NEPA's efficacy is entirely dependent on gathering
4 information on potential impacts early on, so that this information can influence
5 decision-making. *Andrus v. Sierra Club*, 442 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (confirming that
6 the NEPA analysis must occur at the "earliest possible time to insure that planning
7 and decisions reflect environmental values"); 43 C.F.R. § 46.400 (Department's
8 regulations requiring an EIS to be prepared "before making a decision on whether
9 to proceed with the proposed action"). Courts must be vigilant to ensure that
10 NEPA does not become a meaningless paper-pushing activity designed to justify
11 "prejudged political conclusion[s]." *Int'l Snowmobile Mfrs. Ass'n v. Norton*, 340 F.
12 Supp. 2d 1249, 1261 (D. Wy. 2004). It must be pursued "objectively and in good
13 faith, not as an exercise in form over substance, and *not as a subterfuge designed*
14 *to rationalize a decision already made.*" *Metcalf v. Daley*, 214 F.3d 1135, 1142
15 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added); *see also* 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(g) ("[EIS] shall
16 serve as the means of assessing the environmental impact of proposed agency
17 actions, rather than justifying decisions already made.").

18 The NEPA process begins with a statement of purpose and need that the
19 proposed action seeks to address. While agencies have some discretion in defining
20 a project's purpose and need statement, the agency cannot use "unreasonably

1 narrow terms.” *City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.*, 123 F.3d 1142,
2 1155 (9th Cir. 1997); *see also Friends of Southeast’s Future v. Morrison*, 153 F.3d
3 1059, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 1998) (evaluating statement of purpose and need using a
4 reasonableness standard). An agency cannot “define the project’s objectives in
5 terms so unreasonably narrow that only one alternative would accomplish the goals
6 of the project.” *HonoluluTraffic.com v. Fed. Transit Admin.*, 742 F.3d 1222, 1230
7 (9th Cir. 2014). Rather, the purpose and need statement must be broad enough so
8 that the agency can “[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable
9 alternatives.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a).

10 The alternatives analysis is described as the “heart of the environmental
11 impact statement.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. The Ninth Circuit has explained that the
12 EIS must “[d]evote substantial treatment to each alternative considered in detail . .
13 . so that reviewers may evaluate their comparative merits.” *Southeast Alaska*
14 *Conservation Council v. FHA*, 649 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011). The
15 “touchstone” for courts reviewing challenges to an EIS under NEPA “is whether
16 an EIS’s section and discussion of alternatives fosters informed decision-making
17 and informed public participation.” *Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. BLM*, 531 F.3d
18 1114, 1143 (9th Cir. 2008).

19 Federal agencies may work with outside contractors to gather the
20 information necessary to prepare an EIS. But the agency must “independently

1 evaluate” all information and “take responsibility for [the] scope and contents” of
2 the EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c). Outside contractors are typically funded by the
3 project proponent, and agency oversight of the contractor’s work is necessary to
4 “ensure[] the objectivity and integrity of the NEPA process.” *Alliance for the Wild*
5 *Rockies v. Pena*, No. 2:16-CV-294-RMP, 2018 WL 4760503, at *8 (E.D. Wash.
6 Oct. 2, 2018).

7 The Department of Interior violated these core principles of NEPA here.
8 While the scoping process identified a reasonable purpose and need statement, the
9 agency did not consider all reasonable alternatives. Even though it was apparent
10 from the very beginning that the largest impacts of the proposed project would be
11 caused by the chosen site’s close proximity to both the Kalispel Tribe’s Northern
12 Quest Casino, and to the Fairchild Air Force base, the agency never seriously
13 considered a different off-reservation location. To the contrary, the agency
14 redrafted the purpose and need statement *after* the scoping report was complete,
15 simply to confirm that the agency would only consider the Airway Heights
16 location. It improperly redefined the project’s purpose and need statement so “that
17 only one alternative would accomplish the goals of the project,”
18 *HonoluluTraffic.com*, 742 F.3d at 1230, because the agency had already decided to
19 approve Spokane’s request and place that decision on Governor Gregoire’s desk
20 before the end of her term.

1 The entire NEPA process was used “as a subterfuge designed to rationalize a
2 decision already made.” *Metcalf*, 214 F.3d at 1142. It failed to achieve its goal of
3 providing decisionmakers and the public with a description of impacts for all
4 reasonable alternatives. And when Kalispel submitted several economic analyses
5 demonstrating the devastating impacts the project would have on its ability to
6 provide governmental services to its members, the Department relied on a hired
7 contractor – the Innovation Group – to analyze those impacts. The Department did
8 not exercise “oversight” over the Innovation Group’s analysis. Instead, it claimed
9 that it did not have anyone on its staff that could analyze this data, and it hid from
10 public view the opinions of two Department employees that it did consult.

11 **1. The Department created an unreasonably narrow purpose-and-need**
12 **statement and failed to consider all reasonable alternatives because it**
13 **had predetermined the process’ outcome.**
14

15 When the BIA released its scoping report for the Spokane Tribe’s proposed
16 project in March 2011, the purpose and need statement was as follows:

17 The purpose and need for the Proposed Action is to improve the Tribe’s short-
18 term and long-term economic condition and promote its self-sufficiency, both
19 with respect to its government operations and its members.
20

21 AR0021025. Despite this relatively broad statement, the scoping report proposed
22 only three alternative projects, along with the statutorily-required no-action
23 alternative. AR0020125–27. Alternative 1 was a “Proposed Casino and Mixed Use
24 Development” that would include a 118,687 square foot casino, 300-room hotel, a

1 spa, restaurants, convention space, retail development, and other amenities.

2 AR0021026. Alternative 2 was a “Reduced Casino and Mixed Use Development,
3 which would eliminate the hotel and spa facilities and include a smaller, 73,000
4 square-foot casino, as well as restaurants, a convention center, retail development
5 and other amenities. *Id.* Alternative 3 would not include any casino and would be
6 limited to a hotel, convention center, indoor water park, spa, retail space, and other
7 amenities. There was also a fourth, no-action alternative. *Id.*

8 The scoping report only considered three other potential projects, which it
9 quickly eliminated. Two of those projects involved proposed expansions of the
10 Spokane Tribe’s existing Two Rivers and/or Chewelah Casinos. The other
11 considered and rejected alternative was for an alternative off-reservation location.
12 Because Kalispel’s Northern Quest Casino is just two miles from the Spokane
13 Tribe’s Airway Heights location, these casinos would necessarily draw from the
14 exact same market, making it very likely that approval would be “detrimental to
15 the surrounding community.” The harm to Kalispel, however, would likely
16 decrease as the distance between the two casinos increased. Yet the Department
17 never seriously considered such an alternative. Nowhere is there a discussion, for
18 example, of the Spokane Tribe purchasing land. Furthermore, Spokane was
19 working with a third-party casino developer/ manager, yet even though it is fairly
20 common for the developer/ manager to purchase the land on which the casino will

1 be built, the Department did not inquire into the land owned by the developer/
2 manager or land that they could acquire.

3 Even though a significant alternative to the proposed project was a casino at
4 another off-reservation location, separated from both Fairchild Air Force Base and
5 the Northern Quest Casino, the BIA chose to eliminate this possibility rather than
6 attempt an analysis. By this time, two years had passed since Spokane submitted its
7 first letter requesting a two-part determination, and while this delay was largely
8 caused by the Tribe's lack of concrete development plans and decision to change
9 environmental contractors, Governor Gregoire only had one year left of her term.
10 AR0012459, AR0012654. Spokane believed that she would approve their two-part
11 determination request, and the Department was prepared to ensure that it would
12 land on her desk in time. AR0010512; AR0010513; AR0010599.

13 Because “[t]he range of alternatives that must be considered in the EIS need
14 not extend beyond those reasonably related to the purposes of the project.” *Laguna*
15 *Greenbelt, Inc. v. U. S. Dep’t of Transp.*, 42 F.3d 517, 524 (9th Cir. 1994), the
16 Department simply rewrote the purpose and need statement. In January 2012, when
17 the Department issued its DEIS, the purpose and need statement had been
18 dramatically altered from the Scoping Report. The federal government’s purpose
19 remained broad: to support tribal self-sufficiency. But the Spokane Tribe’s need
20 was now limited to the particular parcel in Airway Heights. It included the

1 “[d]esire to further develop the Tribe’s property adjacent to the City with tribal
2 economic enterprises,” and the “[p]otential profitability of Class III gaming in
3 Airway Heights.” AR0033241, AR0033275.

4 The FEIS retained the Spokane Tribe’s narrow purpose and need. In
5 response to comments claiming that this was unduly restrictive, the Department
6 claimed:

7 The Tribe, as the applicant, has preferences as to the means of providing an
8 adequate revenue source. When a proposed action is triggered by an
9 application from a private applicant, it is appropriate for the lead agency to
10 give substantial weight to the goals and objectives of that private actor. . . . It
11 would not be consistent with the government-to-government relationship, or
12 the basic fiduciary responsibilities of the federal government, for the BIA to
13 ignore the purposes of the tribal government and substitute purposes that it
14 feels are more appropriate. In addition for the need of a reliable and significant
15 revenue source, the Tribe expressed the need to further develop the proposed
16 project site . . .

17
18 AR0016290. The Department admitted that it rejected off-reservation locations
19 because “the Tribe expressed the need to further develop the proposed project
20 site,” and “[a]ny off-site alternative would inherently fail to meet that need.”

21 AR0016291–92.

22 The Department’s position is wrong as a matter of law. Even when a project
23 is being proposed by a private party, it is the *agency* that must define the purpose
24 and need, and it cannot do so based solely on private goals. 46 Fed. Reg. 18,027
25 (Mar. 23, 1981) (“Reasonable alternatives include those that are *practical or*
26 *feasible* from the technical and economic standpoint and using common sense,

1 rather than simply *desirable* from the standpoint of the applicant”). In *Nat’l Parks*
2 & *Conservation Ass’n v. BLM*, the Ninth Circuit held that the agency should
3 consider the project proponent’s objectives, but “[r]equiring agencies to consider
4 private objectives . . . is a far cry from mandating that those private interests define
5 the scope of the proposed project.” 606 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2010); *see also*
6 *Simmons v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs*, 120 F.3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 1997) (“An
7 agency cannot restrict its analysis to those alternative means by which a particular
8 applicant can reach *his* goals”) (emphasis in original); *Van Abbema v. Fornell*, 807
9 F.2d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he evaluation of ‘alternatives’ mandated by
10 NEPA [must] be an evaluation of alternative means to accomplish the *general* goal
11 of an action; it is not an evaluation of the alternative means by which a particular
12 applicant can reach his goals.”) (emphasis in original). While other agencies have
13 decided, through regulation, to provide a private proponent’s goals with more
14 weight, “the Department of Interior has promulgated no regulations emphasizing
15 the primacy of private interests.” *Nat’l Parks*, 606 F.3d at 1071 (citing 40 C.F.R.
16 § 1502.13). Additionally, the Bureau’s NEPA Guidebooks from 2005 and 2012 do
17 not indicate that the agency will give increased weight to a project proponent’s
18 purpose and need. *E.g.*, Indian Affairs NEPA Guidebook, 59 IAM 3-H (August
19 2012).

20 The Ninth Circuit recently reminded agencies that “in defining the purposes

1 and need of a project . . . they may not define the project’s objectives in terms so
2 unreasonably narrow, that only one alternative would accomplish the goals of the
3 project.” *HonoluluTraffic.com*, 742 F.3d at 1230. But that is precisely what the
4 BIA did in crafting the Spokane Tribe’s purpose and need statement. By including
5 the “[p]otential profitability of Class III gaming in Airway Heights” within the
6 statement, the federal defendants eliminated the possibility that any economic
7 development other than gaming, and any location other than Airway Heights, could
8 accomplish the goals of the project.

9 In contrast, in *Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of Colusa Indian*
10 *Community v. Zinke*, 889 F.3d 584, 603–04 (9th Cir. 2018), where the Ninth
11 Circuit held that the purpose-and-need statement was not unreasonably narrow, the
12 statement itself considered a wide range of goals for the Estom Yumeka Maidu
13 Tribe of the Enterprise Rancheria’s project, including restoring an equal amount of
14 lost trust land (without naming a specific location), providing employment
15 opportunities, improving the socioeconomic status of the tribe, allowing tribal-
16 member self-sufficiency, funding local agencies and services, making donations,
17 and “[e]ffectuat[ing] the Congressional purposes set out in [IGRA].” *Id.* at 603. A
18 purpose of effectuating the purposes of IGRA, as one of many expected purpose-
19 and-needs, is far broader than the BIA’s purpose here to specifically consider the
20 potential profitability of “*Class III gaming*” on a *particular* tribal property in

1 Airway Heights. AR0033241, AR0033275

2 Because the BIA unreasonably restricted its purpose-and-need statement, it
3 failed to “[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives.”
4 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a). It prematurely eliminated reasonable alternatives from the
5 detailed study otherwise required, including the development of a project
6 elsewhere on the Spokane Tribe’s 157,376-acre reservation, expansion of existing
7 facilities, or, development of another off-reservation location. *See NRDC v. U.S.*
8 *Forest Serv.*, 421 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that because inadequate
9 measurements were used to determine market demand, and certain alternatives had
10 been rejected based on the faulty data, especially because the agency had been
11 aware of its own misinterpretation of a key report it was relying upon, the EIS was
12 “inadequate in its consideration of alternatives, violating NEPA”). Because “an
13 agency must look at every reasonable alternative, with the range dictated by the
14 nature and scope of the proposed action, and sufficient to permit a reasoned
15 choice,” *Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma*, 956 F.2d 1508, 1502 (9th Cir.
16 1992), “[t]he existence of a viable but unexamined alternative renders an
17 environmental impact statement inadequate.” *NRDC*, 421 F.3d at 813 (quoting
18 *Citizens for a Better Henderson v. Hodel*, 768 F.2d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1985)).

19 Also because of the narrowly drawn purpose-and-need statement, the non-
20 gaming alternative and no-action plan were inappropriately excluded from full

1 consideration, because if the potential profitability of Class III gaming was a stated
2 need for the project, then a non-gaming, or no action alternative, could never meet
3 the project's stated needs. Thus, while the FEIS purports to evaluate three
4 alternatives, plus a no-action plan, in actuality, it only considered two⁷ that would
5 actually meet the project's stated needs. By manipulating the alternative analysis in
6 this way, the Department acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in violation of its
7 requirements under NEPA.

8 **2. The Department relied on inaccurate and incomplete data to**
9 **determine the socioeconomic impact on the Kalispel Tribe and it failed**
10 **to adequately supervise and independently evaluate its contractor.**
11

12 The Ninth Circuit has specifically cautioned that because any agency has a
13 responsibility to ensure its action is "fully informed and well considered," "[a]n
14 EIS that relies upon misleading economic information may violate NEPA if the
15 errors subvert NEPA's purpose of providing decisionmakers and the public an
16 accurate assessment upon which to evaluate the proposed project." *Natural Res.*
17 *Def. Council*, 421 F.3d at 811 (quoting *Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. NMFS*, 235 F. Supp.

⁷ And even then, the Department did not conduct a proper analysis since while it provided a specific percentage for the decline in Kalispel revenues for the preferred alternative, it did not engage in this analysis for the other alternatives. *See California v. Block*, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th Cir. 1982).

1 2d 1143, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 2002)). Additionally, the agency cannot rely solely on
2 paid contractors to perform the NEPA analysis. It must “engage in adequate
3 independent oversight over the preparation of . . . the DEIS or the FEIS.” *Cachil*
4 *Dehe Band*, 889 F.3d at 608 (9th Cir. 2018); *see also* 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c).

5 With respect to the impact that the West Plains project would have on the
6 Kalispel Tribe, the Department adopted the economic conclusions of the
7 Innovation Group, a paid subcontractor, in its DEIS and FEIS. It was only *after* the
8 publication of the FEIS that the Department decided to submit the materials to its
9 own in-house financial experts. In 2014, Tom Hartman, a financial analyst for the
10 Department, was presented with the materials submitted by both Kalispel’s
11 experts, and the Innovation Group. Even though the Innovation Group claimed that
12 any impact to Kalispel would dissipate over time due to growth in the market,
13 Hartman concluded it was impossible to confirm this and that there was “little
14 basis for deciding on a prediction for market growth other than guessing.”
15 AR0003574. He opined that if the Office of Indian Gaming Management “went
16 through the assumptions item by item, went through the assumptions item by item,
17 accepting some and rejecting others, the resulting financial analysis might not be a
18 more reliable prediction of the future.” *Id.* In doing so, Hartman made clear that the
19 Department *had not already engaged in this analysis*; it had instead adopted the
20 Innovation Group’s analysis by whole cloth.

1 When Kalispel submitted a Market Saturation Analysis in 2015 to further
2 demonstrate the fallacy in the Innovation Group’s market growth claims, the
3 Department did not submit this study to Hartman or any other financial analyst to
4 conduct an independent evaluation. Instead, subsequent emails made it clear that
5 the Department lacked the expertise to appropriately review the analysis. An email,
6 from Troy Woodward to B.J. Howerton, “suggest[s] your office work with the
7 contractor to provide a review and assessment because we do not have a financial
8 analyst on staff in DC that can do the analysis.” AR0002830. Later, it was an AES
9 contractor that replied, stating that the Innovation Group would prepare the
10 response. AR0002789. Just nine days later, the AES contractor sent the Innovation
11 Group response to the Department, specifically noting that B.J. Howerton had “not
12 yet reviewed this draft.” AR0002774. When the ROD was issued, it relied on the
13 Innovation Group’s analysis. Because of this lack-of-oversight and wholesale
14 acceptance of its contractors’ analyses, the Department has failed to comply with
15 its duties under NEPA, this Court should overrule the findings as arbitrary,
16 capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not in accordance with the law. 5 U.S.C.
17 § 706(2).

18 **C. The Department violated its trust responsibility to the Kalispel Tribe.**

19 “[A] trust relationship exists between the United States and Indian Nations,”
20
21 *Marceau v. Blackfeet Housing Auth.*, 540 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2008), and the

1 trust responsibility is “one of the primary cornerstones of Indian law,” *Dep’t of*
2 *Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n*, 532 U.S. 1, 11 (2001) (quotation
3 omitted). “It is fairly clear that any Federal government action is subject to the
4 United States’ fiduciary responsibilities toward the Indian tribes.” *Nance v. EPA*,
5 645 F.2d 701, 711 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing *Seminole Nation v. United States*, 316
6 U.S. 286, 297 (1942)). When tribal resources are involved, “the most exacting
7 fiduciary standards” are required, especially where the government has been given
8 “pervasive control” over that resource. *Seminole Nation*, 316 U.S. at 297; *Blackfeet*
9 *Housing Auth.*, 540 F.3d at 922.

10 By failing to complete the two-part determination under IGRA using its
11 identified standards, and by pressing through the NEPA analysis with an
12 unreasonably narrow purpose-and-need statement and an inadequate alternatives
13 analysis, the Department’s decisions cannot withstand judicial scrutiny under the
14 APA. When considered in light of the trust responsibility, this failure becomes
15 abundantly clear. “Actions that might well be considered within an agency’s
16 discretion because not ‘arbitrary or capricious,’ as stated in the APA, may
17 nevertheless be held to violate the Secretary of the Interior’s trust responsibility to
18 tribes.” Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, § 5.05[3][c] (2012 ed.)

19 Because of this trust responsibility, when analyzing Spokane’s two-part
20 determination application, the Department should have given special weight to the

1 detrimental effects that Kalispel Tribe would suffer as a result of the proposed
2 project. Similarly, a key component of NEPA's alternative analysis is an
3 evaluation of the environmental consequences of a project, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.15–
4 16, which in this case included the socioeconomic effects of the decision on
5 Kalispel, AR0017204; AR0017216–17. By failing to give any greater weight to
6 these provisions than would be for any other community member or agency, the
7 Department has violated its trust responsibility to the Kalispel Tribe. *Cf. Gros*
8 *Ventre Tribe v. United States*, 469 F.3d 801, 810 n.10 (9th Cir. 2006); *Nance*, 645
9 F.2d at 711; *Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Lujan*, 851 F.2d 1152, 1154 (9th Cir.
10 1988); *Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Lujan*, 804 F. Supp. 1281, 1285 (D. Mont.
11 1991).

12 **IV. Conclusion**

13 Kalispel requests that this Court grant its motion for summary judgment by
14 declaring that both the two-part determination and the ROD were arbitrary,
15 capricious, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance with the law, under IGRA and
16 NEPA, and in violation of the Department's trust responsibility to Kalispel. This
17 court should thus "hold unlawful and set aside agency action" by issuing a
18 permanent injunction vacating the two-part determination and ROD until
19 compliance with IGRA, NEPA, and the trust responsibility. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
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FOR THE PLAINTIFF KALISPEL TRIBE
OF INDIANS

/s/ Michele Fukawa
Michele Fukawa, WSBA #46592
Kalispel Tribe of Indians Legal Office
934 South Garfield Road
Airway Heights, WA 99001
Phone: (509) 789-7600
mfukawa@kalispeltribe.com

Vanya S. Hogen, pro hac vice
Colette Routel, pro hac vice
Leah K. Jurss, pro hac vice
Hogen Adams, PLLC
1935 W. County Road B2, Suite 460
St. Paul, MN 55113
Phone: (651) 842-9100
vhogen@hogenadams.com
colette.routel@mitchellhamline.edu
ljurss@hogenadams.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on December 14, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF System, which in turn automatically generated a Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) to all parties in the case who are registered users of the CM/ECF system. The NEF for the foregoing specifically identifies recipients of electronic notice.

Dated: December 14, 2018

/s/ Michele Fukawa
Michele Fukawa, WSBA #46592
Kalispel Tribe of Indians Legal Office
934 South Garfield Road
Airway Heights, WA 99001
Phone: (509) 789-7600
mfukawa@kalispeltribe.com