UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

CARMEN TAGEANT,)
Plaintiff,) CASE NO. C19-1082-JLR
٧.) SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
) September 5, 2019
MICHAEL ASHBY, et al.,) 10:00 a.m.
Defendants.)) MOTION FOR) EMPLOYMENT) CERTIFICATION

VERBATIM REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE THOMAS S. ZILLY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

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For the Defendant

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1	September 5, 2019 10:00 a.m.
2	PROCEEDINGS
3	THE CLERK: Case No. C19-1082, Carmen Tageant versus
4	Michael Ashby, et al.
5	Counsel, please make your appearances for the record.
6	MR. NEDDERMAN: Tom Nedderman on behalf of defendant
7	Michael Ashby.
8	THE COURT: Thank you.
9	MS. LAMBERT: Good morning, Your Honor. Michelle
10	Lambert on behalf of the United States.
11	MR. GALANDA: Good morning, Your Honor. Gabriel
12	Galanda on behalf of plaintiff Carmen Tageant. And I
13	apologize, Your Honor. She's stuck in traffic, trying to be
14	here along with family, and I suspect she will be here in
15	moments.
16	THE COURT: All right. Counsel, we will proceed
17	because, as always around here, we're on a rather tight
18	schedule.
19	This is a motion that's brought by Chief Ashby, and,
20	therefore, I'll hear from, I guess, Mr. Nedderman first. I'm
21	going to ask you some questions, and then give you a brief
22	opportunity to argue.
23	I've had an ample amount of time to review this, and I
24	thought it was an interesting question. I have not been
25	asked to consider this before. So know that the court has

read everything that you filed. I note that there was a late 1 2 filing yesterday of two affidavits. They appear to pertain to a case that -- or a situation that arose quite a while 3 ago, and I don't see where it has any bearing on the issues 4 5 that are before me, which is questions of federal certification. So I wouldn't spend much time addressing 6 7 that. Mr. Nedderman, I'll hear from you first, please. Mr. Galanda, would you like to introduce your client, 9 since she's now arrived? 10 MR. GALANDA: Yes, Your Honor. 11 For the record, plaintiff Carmen Tageant has just arrived, 12 and she's seated with me at counsel table. 13 14 THE COURT: Thank you. Please proceed. 15 MR. NEDDERMAN: Thank you. 16 17 As you know, this is our motion to certify federal employment for Chief Ashby. 18 The background of it is, tribal employees may be deemed 19 federal employees while --20 THE COURT: I'm aware of the background, sir. 21 22 MR. NEDDERMAN: Yeah, okay. So if the court had specific questions, I guess I could address those. 23 THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that there's some 24

things that you all agree on, and I want to make sure that

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that's clear on the record. The first of which is, the events here occurred -- this is, apparently, on January 5, 2018, and that the Nooksack Tribe Election Office is not located on the reservation.

MR. NEDDERMAN: That is correct.

THE COURT: All right. And the most recent statement of Ninth Circuit law that I can find is the *Shirk* case, which is a 2014 case. Are you familiar with that case?

MR. NEDDERMAN: I am familiar with the case.

THE COURT: Judge O'Scannlain took great privilege in rewriting the English language, drawing a bunch of very technical distinctions. But, basically, it seems to me, what that case stands for is the proposition that you need to address this in two parts. The first is, is the -- you each call it by a different name, but I'm going to call it the "638 contract," which is really the key document in this. And then, secondly, if you get by that step, then you look to the scope of employment. Is that how you read the law?

MR. NEDDERMAN: It is; there's two steps.

THE COURT: All right. So let's have you concentrate on the first step, because that seems to be where the U.S. Attorney decided that your client was not entitled to certification.

In the contract, as I have had the opportunity to review it, I look, first, to the statement of work in Section 2.

MR. NEDDERMAN: Yes. I think that's on page 12 of 67.

THE COURT: Page 12 of 67. And it's got, as Section A, sort of a statement of purpose. Then Subsection B, "Services shall be provided in accordance with defined authority," and then it lists 12 different things that I could look to to see what is covered by the contract, what's to be enforced. And then Section C has got some exceptions to that. Neither side particularly argues that the exceptions are important, but that seems to be something else that needs to be discussed.

And then, finally, Section 11, which is the Federal Tort Claims Act section, and in that I found that it was subparagraph A, Federal Tort Claims Act coverage, that seems to be the key issue in this complaint.

So is my framework for analysis correct?

MR. NEDDERMAN: I believe it is.

THE COURT: All right. Then help me, sir, because your brief cites two bases for finding that the chief's conduct was covered, and that's on your brief in several places, but, basically, you say on page 3 that I should look at his job description, and then on page 5, that your other explanation for why there would be coverage would be standard operating procedures for the tribal officers.

Help me understand why either of those is a basis for

coverage under the contract when they're not enumerated in Section 2.

MR. NEDDERMAN: Well, I think I focused more in the reply on the contract itself and these exceptions that were spelled out on page 13 of 67. The statement of work, and that's really what I've focused on, it talks about "services shall provide for the protection of lives and property for persons visiting or residing within the exterior boundaries of the Nooksack Indian Reservation." So it's talking about events that happen within the reservation.

And then it talks about exceptions. It gives six exceptions, but not limited to those six exceptions, where --

THE COURT: Well, tell me, are you claiming under any of those exceptions?

MR. NEDDERMAN: Well, I guess the one that's the most analogous would be No. 6, where an officer would go off reservation, interview victims, witnesses.

Again, this -- this happened about a mile and a half off the reservation. This was the Elections Board Office. There was an election upcoming. This involved Chief Ashby protecting and securing the elections process, and also protecting the property --

THE COURT: I understand that, sir, but I don't see where No. 6, which is interviewing victims -- well, the alleged victim --

MR. NEDDERMAN: No. I guess the only point of 6 is 1 2 it's off reservation, and it's an activity that relates back 3 to something that happened on the reservation. Certainly the election is something that happens within the boundaries of 4 5 the tribe, and the Elections Office just happened to be off reservation. 6 7 THE COURT: Well, in offenses committed in Indian territory is that particular exception. I understand the 8 election can take place, but this is an allegation that the 9 chief assaulted someone off reservation. That's not 10 connected to an election in terms of -- they're not putting 11 the election on trial; they're talking about the conduct of 12 your client. 13 14 MR. NEDDERMAN: That is true, but, of course, he 15 denies the allegations. THE COURT: I understand that. 16 17 MR. NEDDERMAN: But the purpose of him being in that location was to protect the Elections Office, which is tribal 18 property, as well as the elections process. 19 THE COURT: Well, interviewing --20 21 MR. NEDDERMAN: I'm not saying that. 22 THE COURT: Please don't interrupt me. MR. NEDDERMAN: I didn't mean -- sorry. I apologize. 23 THE COURT: Interviewing victims, that doesn't count; 24

witnesses, that doesn't count; suspects involved or alleged

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to be involved, that doesn't -- "in offenses committed in Indian Country," and the offense here is the alleged assault. That's, as I understand it, what's on trial in Whatcom County.

MR. NEDDERMAN: I'm sorry. My point was, I'm not -- I guess I wasn't being clear. I'm just suggesting that there are examples given here where events happen off reservation, and I was simply pointing out that that gives an example, where an officer would be off reservation, where he would still be in the scope of his employment, and that it falls within the two-point or the two-step approach that <code>Shirk</code> evaluated, namely the first step.

THE COURT: Well, I was entertained by

Judge O'Scannlain's careful parsing of the English language.

I guess I have to give him credit for saying, you know, he's adopted the Supreme Court's view of interpretation, which is you're supposed to give meaning to all of the words that are there. In the beginning part of C, long before we get into the six examples is, "when operating within the scope of this contract."

MR. NEDDERMAN: Right.

THE COURT: Well, operating within the scope of this contract is -- how does that cover -- I mean, it's not in any of the documents that are found in part B, "Services shall be in accordance with defined authority."

What you argue in your briefing is that it was either the job description, or it was standard operating procedure, and I don't see either of those listed, and I don't see how you can now say, well, a clause that begins "when operating within the scope of this contract" will subsume information that's not listed in the contract, namely the job description or the standard operating procedures.

MR. NEDDERMAN: Well, it seems that the -- when the U.S. Attorney was ultimately deciding on whether to accept the tender, they focused simply on the location of where the event occurred. They did not dispute that he was within the scope of his employment under the contract.

THE COURT: I agree that was the interpretation of the U.S. Attorney, but that doesn't get you over the first step, the first hurdle, which is, you've got to be operating within the parameters of the contract, and scope of employment is, basically, limited in the scope of the contract to the enumerated documents that are found in B.

I've wasted a bunch of your time here. Why don't you tell me what you'd like me to know that we haven't covered yet.

MR. NEDDERMAN: No, I think we've covered it.

Although, I mean, I haven't studied all 12 of the services provided and whether specifically he fits in within one of those 12.

THE COURT: I actually did, and I can't find anything

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that suggests that. And I would think the Assistant United
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    States Attorney, who is sitting here, would have done the
    same thing, and her conclusion was it's not within the scope
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    of the contract.
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             MR. NEDDERMAN: But it certainly covers law
    enforcement and the protection of lives and property, and the
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    chief of police was protecting the tribe's property.
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             THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir.
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             MR. NEDDERMAN:
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                             Thank you.
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             THE COURT: Mr. Galanda, you're winning here. Do you
    want to be heard?
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             MR. GALANDA: I would, Your Honor, but I'd defer to
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    Ms. Lambert, since she's opposed the motion in chief.
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             THE COURT: Ms. Lambert, do you want to be heard?
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             MS. LAMBERT: Does the court have any questions for
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    the United States?
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             THE COURT: No.
             MS. LAMBERT: Then we'll rest on our papers.
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             MR. GALANDA: Does the court have any questions of
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    the plaintiff, Your Honor?
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             THE COURT: Well, I'd like you to respond to what
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    Mr. Nedderman said.
             MR. GALANDA: I'd be happy to. Thank you, Your
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    Honor.
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        We agree with Your Honor that the Shirk analysis and
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two-prong test applies. We also agree that Mr. Ashby fails to overcome the first prong. But at least indulging the analysis of both prongs, *Shirk* counsels this court to emphasize the plain language of the contract in looking at both prongs, both the contractual analysis and the employment analysis.

And if you read the contract, as Your Honor has, in total, you will appreciate, as I believe Your Honor has, that the scope of work of Mr. Ashby and other Nooksack police officers is confined to Nooksack Indian Country or the Nooksack Indian Reservation.

Sections C(a)(13) --

THE COURT: You need to slow down, sir. First, the court reporter is going to glare at you, and second, you won't have a transcript unless you slow down.

MR. GALANDA: Great.

So Section (C)(a)(13), (C)(b)(2)(A), (C)(2)(g), (C)(13)(c), or (C)(i)(3)(C), excuse me, or (CM), those are all provisions of the contract that expressly discuss terms of art, which are Indian Country or Nooksack Indian Reservation, and as Your Honor has already observed, it's undisputed that this did not happen either on Nooksack Reservation lands -- in fact, Mr. Nedderman just conceded it happened over a mile away from the Nooksack Indian Reservation -- nor did it happen in Indian Country as defined

by 18 U.S.C. 1151.

Looking to the second prong, this is a unique 638 contract in that just beyond the provisions and the statement-of-work provisions Your Honor has cited, there are, essentially, 33 pages in a 67-page agreement that is the Nooksack police force's scope of work, which also incorporates all those other federal laws, manuals, and policies. That is a much more detailed analysis than we saw in *Shirk* or *Allender*, or any other case discussed by the parties.

In fact, I have -- if it's helpful to Your Honor, I have the tribe's 638 contract with IHS, which has a very general scope of work, such as provide dental assistance, provide medical assistance, provide such other medical care. Here, you have 33 pages of very specific statements or scope of work, all of which is confined to Indian Country of the Nooksack Tribe or the Nooksack Indian Reservation.

So turning to the second prong, you can give great weight to the scope of work that is set forth in that contract, assuming they overcome the first prong, which they don't. You can also look to the job description of Mr. Ashby, which talked about the fact that the interim police chief's authority is limited to tribal law enforcement within its jurisdiction. That's at Docket 71 at page 2, paragraph 4.

THE COURT: Mr. Galanda, I'm going to interrupt you. Since I'm likely not going to get to the scope-of-work issue

because I can't get by the first hurdle, I wouldn't spend a lot of time on it.

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MR. GALANDA: Great. Well, I'll just conclude in saying, even if you got to the second prong, and you looked again at the 33-page statement of work, which you already have, meaning beyond just the section that we've been focusing on, or you were focusing on with Mr. Nedderman, you also look at his job description, at the defendant's invitation, and then you look at state law, and not necessarily state employment law, but you look at Eriksen. Eriksen makes plain that the Nooksack Tribal Court, in a case arising from Whatcom County -- excuse me -- the Nooksack Tribal Police, in a case arising in that jurisdiction, has no authority whatsoever off of Nooksack Indian Country or Nooksack Reservation lands. So if you got to the second prong -- I'm encouraging here you might not -- the contract, the job description itself, and state law on Mr. Ashby's jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction would also defeat the plaintiff, or, I suppose, the moveant's burden to establish jurisdiction under Shirk.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Nedderman, you get the last word, since you're the moving party.

MR. NEDDERMAN: Thank you.

Again, looking at Section 2, which is the statement of work, and then Section B, which talks about the various --

that lists the 12 different categories, and I would argue that the elections, the tribal elections falls under the Nooksack Tribe Constitution, which is number one. And I'm sure if I studied these a little more, I could find some other categories of which Chief Ashby's presence in the elections office it falls under.

And again, I remind the court that he was simply there to protect the property of the tribe. He was off reservation.

There are exceptions to the scope with respect to it having to be in Indian Country and on the reservation.

And the six examples are only for -- they're not exclusive. And I believe our reply brief specifies why this falls under this contract -- why his activities fall under the 638 contract.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

The following will constitute the opinion of the court in lieu of a written decision:

We are here for defendant Ashby's motion for certification of employment, which is found at Docket No. 6. The Federal Tort Claims Act case that's before me involves an off-reservation incident in which then-interim chief of police, Michael Ashby, secured the Nooksack Tribe's Election Office, which is outside of either the reservation or Indian Country, allegedly causing damage and injury to plaintiff Carmen Tageant.

Ms. Tageant filed a complaint on January 10, 2018, in
Washington State Superior Court for Whatcom County. The
United States subsequently removed the action to the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington.
That's found at Docket 1.

In terms of the law in this matter, the parties are not in dispute. A party seeking review of a denial of certification may petition the court to find that he or she was acting within the scope of their office or employment.

The party seeking review of a denial of certification bears the burden of presenting evidence and disproving the decision by a preponderance of the evidence. That's the *Green v. Hall* case from the Ninth Circuit in 1993.

My decision today is guided by the most recent opinion from the Circuit, which is not all that recent. It being *Shirk*, 773 F.3d 999.

The court, in reaching its conclusions, has examined all 67 pages of the contract but paid special attention to Section 2, part A, being the general purpose; part B, being the defined authorities which are to be followed, which are defined as "defined authority, procedures, and guidelines," and therefore, in effect, 12 of them listed; and then, C, some exceptions to the scope of work, which involve, basically, outside of Indian Country.

Both sides agree that the real battleground in this is

Section 11(a), which reads, for purposes of FTCA coverage, the contractor, which, in this instance, the tribal police, and its employees, including individuals performing personal services contracts with the contractor to provide health care services -- and I believe this is really the critical language -- are deemed to be employees of the federal government while performing work under this contract.

It seems to me that the plaintiff in this matter, which technically would be -- I guess I should say the defendant in this matter, which would be Chief Ashby, confuses these two concepts. The first is Section 11(a), which says, "Under the contract," and repeatedly in the briefing, Chief Ashby argues that's scope of employment.

As counsel has noted in their reply in response to arguments raised by the plaintiff, there is an effort to try and say, Well, there is, this work was being performed under the contract. I can find no support for that. It's outside the reservation, it's outside Indian Country, and saying that it's in his job description or it's standard operating procedure somehow loops it back to be under Section 2 is simply not factually or legally supportable.

The last question left for me, then, is the language that's in 2(c), which are a series of exceptions. A careful examination of those exceptions is guided by the guidance given to me, that I should not allow the exceptions to

consume the specific detail of the contract.

Those different situations talk about traveling and transporting off reservation, and the one that, perhaps, arguably, gets closest is No. 4, traveling to and from Indian Country to service facilities located outside Indian Country. But, once again, that language is "traveling to and from." It doesn't say once you get off or outside Indian Country that you continue to have federal employment or federal designation.

Therefore, it is the decision of this court that the motion to certify is denied. I order this case to be remanded to Whatcom County, and the federal action is dismissed with prejudice.

That will constitute the ruling of the court.

Mr. Nedderman, it was your motion. Do you have anything further you wish to address?

MS. LAMBERT: I do not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Lambert?

MS. LAMBERT: No. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Galanda?

MR. GALANDA: Your Honor, will that ruling be reflected in some sort of minute order in the docket?

THE COURT: It will simply say that the motion is denied for the reasons stated during the hearing.

MR. GALANDA: Thank you, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: If there's nothing further, we will be in
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     recess.
                (The proceedings concluded at 10:28 a.m.)
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CERTIFICATE

I, Nancy L. Bauer, CCR, RPR, Court Reporter for the United States District Court in the Western District of Washington at Seattle, do hereby certify that I was present in court during the foregoing matter and reported said proceedings stenographically.

I further certify that thereafter, I have caused said stenographic notes to be transcribed under my direction and that the foregoing pages are a true and accurate transcription to the best of my ability.

Dated this 5th day of September 2019.

/S/ Nancy L. Bauer

Nancy L. Bauer, CCR, RPR Official Court Reporter