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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

ELILE ADAMS,

Petitioner,

v.

RAYMOND DODGE, et al.,

Respondents.

NO. 2:19-cv-1263 JCC

**RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS’  
RETURN TO SECOND AMENDED  
PETITION FOR WRIT OF *HABEAS  
CORPUS* AND MOTION TO  
DISMISS**

**I. FACTS**

**A. RESPONDENT DODGE ILLEGALLY ASSERTS JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONER’S CHILD,  
AS VENDETTA.**

In 2014, Manuel Galindo, the father of Petitioner Elile Adams’ then baby daughter Z. A.-  
G., initiated a parenting action against Ms. Adams in Whatcom County Superior Court  
 (“Superior Court Parenting Action”).<sup>1</sup> The Superior Court issued two Orders on January 13,  
 2015, each asserting its “jurisdiction over the child”; and a third Order on May 8, 2015, ruling

<sup>1</sup> Declaration of Elile Adams (“E. Adams Decl.”), Ex. A  
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS’ RETURN TO SECOND AMENDED  
PETITION FOR WRIT OF *HABEAS CORPUS* AND MOTION TO DISMISS - 1

1 that “Ms. Adams is, and shall remain, [the] primary residential parent” for the child and  
 2 awarding Mr. Galindo visitation (“Superior Court Parenting Order”).<sup>2</sup>

3 Ms. Adams and Mr. Galindo adhered to the Superior Court Parenting Order until March  
 4 of 2017.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile, Respondent Nooksack Tribal Court Chief Judge Raymond Dodge  
 5 developed a vendetta against Ms. Adams’ father, George Adams.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Adams appeared before  
 6 him on November 9, 2016, as a traditional spokesperson for Tribal Elder Margretty Rabang,  
 7 who, according to the U.S. Department of Interior (“DOI”) in late 2016, was unlawfully facing  
 8 eviction pursuant to “invalid” orders issued by Respondent Dodge.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Adams spoke that day  
 9 for Ms. Rabang because Respondent Dodge, as Nooksack Tribal Attorney in February 2016,  
 10 caused the Tribe to disbar her lawyers of record, Galanda Broadman, PLLC<sup>6</sup>; and, as purported  
 11 Chief Judge by late 2016, caused the firm’s appearance notice for her to be “REJECTED” in  
 12 clear violation of a September 21, 2016, Tribal Court of Appeals ruling allowing the firm to  
 13 “practice before the Nooksack Tribal Court.”<sup>7</sup> Mr. Adams shamed Respondent Dodge for his  
 14 unethical behavior, speaking exclusively in his Lhéchelesem tongue.<sup>8</sup> It was then when  
 15 Respondent Dodge established his vendetta against Mr. Adams, which he would fulfill against  
 16 Ms. Adams and her child.<sup>9</sup>

17 On March 17, 2017, Ms. Adams sought a protection order against Mr. Galindo from the  
 18 Tribal Court, given Mr. Galindo’s history of physically and verbally abusing her, causing  
 19 property damage to their former home together, expressing suicidal ideation, and threatening to

20 <sup>2</sup> *Id.*, Exs. B at 2, ¶2.5; C at 2, ¶3.5.

<sup>3</sup> E. Adams Decl., ¶4.

21 <sup>4</sup> *Id.*, ¶¶3, 12; Declaration of George Adams (“G. Adams Decl.”), ¶3.

<sup>5</sup> Declaration of Gabriel S. Galanda (“Galanda Decl.”), Ex. A.

22 <sup>6</sup> Mr. Galanda traveled from Seattle to Deming that day to represent Ms. Rabang but Nooksack police would not  
 allow him in the courtroom. Galanda Decl., ¶2.

23 <sup>7</sup> *Id.*, Exs. B, C, D, E. The Nooksack Tribal Court of Appeals has since ceased to exist, after the Nooksack Tribe  
 sued its own appeals court in October 2016 and enjoined it from further operation. *Id.*, Ex. L. As Tribal Attorney,  
 Respondent Dodge caused former Tribal Court Chief Judge Susan Alexander to be “terminated,” before replacing  
 24 her as Chief Judge weeks later. *Id.*, Ex. E.

<sup>8</sup> E. Adams Decl., ¶¶3, 12; G. Adams Decl., ¶3

<sup>9</sup> *Id.*

1 take their child back to Mexico with him.<sup>10</sup> Respondent Dodge issued the temporary protection  
 2 order.<sup>11</sup> Then, on March 30, 2017, Respondent Dodge, himself, initiated a second parenting  
 3 action (“Tribal Court Parenting Action”) and entered a “Parenting Plan, Visitation Schedule”  
 4 Order (“Tribal Court Parenting Order”).<sup>12</sup> Respondent Dodge *sua sponte* converted Ms. Adams’  
 5 plea for domestic protection into a child custody action.<sup>13</sup> Tellingly, the caption of that order  
 6 indicates it was not “Proposed by Mother[,] Father [or] Jointly”—it was proposed and entered by  
 7 Respondent Dodge himself.<sup>14</sup> Respondent Dodge did so knowing his judgeship and orders were  
 8 “invalid” at that time, according to DOI.<sup>15</sup>

9 That same day, Ms. Adams filed the Superior Court Parenting Order in the Tribal Court  
 10 Parenting Action, objecting to Respondent Dodge’s asserted jurisdiction.<sup>16</sup> Respondent Dodge  
 11 knew or should have known that he also lacked jurisdiction to assert jurisdiction over Ms.  
 12 Adams’ daughter due to the pre-existing Superior Court Parenting Order, as a matter of  
 13 Washington’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Chapter 26.27 RCW  
 14 (“UCCJA”). RCW 26.27.211; RCW 26.27.041(b) (applying UCCJA to tribal courts).  
 15 Respondent Dodge proceeded anyway, and now assumes the incorrect legal “opinion that the  
 16 Court possessed the authority to modify a Whatcom County Superior Court order involving  
 17 custody matters pertaining to minor child Z. A-G” without ever communicating with the  
 18 Superior Court.<sup>17</sup> RCW 26.27.211; *In re Marriage of Susan C. and Sam E.*, 114 Wn. App. 766,  
 19 777, 60 P.3d 644 (2002).

21 <sup>10</sup> E. Adams Decl., ¶8.

22 <sup>11</sup> *Id.*, Ex. D.

23 <sup>12</sup> *Id.*, Ex. E.

<sup>13</sup> *See id.*

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* Respondents’ assertion that “Petitioner herself initiated the child custody action in Nooksack Tribal Court that led to the criminal case against her” is a bold-faced lie. Dkt. # 25 at 5; E.Adams Decl., ¶9.

<sup>15</sup> Galanda Decl., Ex. A.

<sup>16</sup> E. Adams Decl., Ex. F.

<sup>17</sup> Galanda Decl., Ex. G at 6.

1 The Whatcom County Superior Court recently ruled in the 2014 Superior Court Parenting  
 2 Action that “this Court has never declined jurisdiction” and that Mr. Galindo and Ms. Adams’  
 3 “appearance and participation in the Nooksack Tribal Court custody proceedings does not waive  
 4 or divest this Court of its continuing and exclusive jurisdiction.”<sup>18</sup> Declaring “that this Court  
 5 retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the custody of [Z. A.-G.] pursuant to the  
 6 [UCCJA],” the Superior Court invalidated the Tribal Court Parenting Order.<sup>19</sup> Indeed,  
 7 Respondent Dodge has lacked subject mater jurisdiction throughout the nearly three years of  
 8 controversy that now culminates with Ms. Adams’ *habeas corpus* petition.

9 **B. RESPONDENT DODGE HAILS MS. ADAMS TO TRIBAL COURT ALMOST MONTHLY, FOR  
 10 31 MONTHS.**

11 Since March 30, 2017, Ms. Adams has appeared before Respondent Dodge in either the  
 12 Tribal Court Parenting Action or its related criminal matter **at least 21 times**.<sup>20</sup> He has issued no  
 13 less than **twenty orders against her** in in the Tribal Court Parenting Action—many “*sua*  
 14 *sponte*.”<sup>21</sup> Despite her March 30, 2017, jurisdictional objection, Ms. Adams generally adhered to  
 15 both the Superior Court and Tribal Court Parenting Orders until January 2019, when her  
 16 daughter “bec[ame] extremely emotional when it came time to leave for the exchanges” with Mr.  
 17 Galindo, which Ms. Adams reported to Tribal authorities was due to “abuse of the child by her  
 18 father.”<sup>22</sup> Mr. Galindo last sought to visit Ms. Adams’ daughter on February, 2, 2019; she has  
 19 not heard anything from him since April 20, 2019, at 9:30 AM, when he last text messaged her  
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22 <sup>18</sup> E.Adams Decl., Ex. F.

<sup>19</sup> *Id.*

23 <sup>20</sup> *Id.* Ms. Adams was compelled to appear, and appeared, before Respondent Dodge almost monthly for nearly  
 24 three years; on March 30, November 8, December 13, 2017, January 10, February 14, March 14, April 11, May 9,  
 June 13, August 8, October 10, November 14, December 19, 2018, and January 9 and 30, March 6 and 14, and May  
 20, June 5, September 12, October 9 and November 1, 2019. Dkt. # 5 at 8-21, 42-45; E.Adams Decl., ¶12.

<sup>21</sup> *See generally* Dkt. # 25-2 at 8-21, 42-45.

<sup>22</sup> Dkt. # 25-2 at 53-54.

1 about visitation.<sup>23</sup> As Ms. Adams now testifies: “This controversy has always felt like it could be  
2 titled, *Raymond Dodge v. Elile Adams*, but that is especially true since February of 2019.”<sup>24</sup>

3 On February 19, 2019, Respondent Dodge requested that Nooksack police “investigate  
4 possible custodial interference violation(s) with regard to” Ms. Adams.<sup>25</sup> Three days later, Ms.  
5 Adams was cited with “TEN COUNTS” of custodial interference.<sup>26</sup> Ms. Adams was charged  
6 with four counts of custodial interference and one count of contempt of court on March 19, 2019,  
7 in *Nooksack Indian Tribe v. Elile Adams*, No. 2019-CR-A-004 (“Tribal Court Criminal  
8 Matter”).<sup>27</sup> Ms. Adams appeared before Respondent Dodge on May 20, 2019, where she pleaded  
9 not guilty to all five counts and received a public defender; and on June 5, 2019 for a pre-trial  
10 hearing.<sup>28</sup> Respondent Dodge presided over both the Tribal Court Criminal Matter and Tribal  
11 Court Parenting Action for the next eight months, despite his appearance of impartiality given (a)  
12 his dispute with Ms. Adams’ family and, more importantly, (b) his knowledge of facts from both  
13 the Tribal Court Parenting Action that he commenced and the requested criminal investigation he  
14 requested of her.<sup>29</sup>

15 On May 14, 2019, Ms. Adams filed a “Voluntary Non Suit of Elile Adams”<sup>30</sup> in the  
16 Tribal Court Parenting Action, submitting that: “During the time when I filed my original  
17 petition asking for [a protection order] the Nooksack Tribal Court was and is now  
18 nonfunctional.<sup>31</sup> This Tribal Court has neither subject matter jurisdiction, nor personal  
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21 <sup>23</sup> E.Adams Decl., ¶13.

22 <sup>24</sup> *Id.*

23 <sup>25</sup> *Id.* at 53.

24 <sup>26</sup> *Id.* at 62 (emphasis in original).

25 <sup>27</sup> *Id.* at 59-61.

26 <sup>28</sup> *Id.* at 42-45.

27 <sup>29</sup> Dkt. # 25-2 at 53.

28 <sup>30</sup> Ms. Adams has not had civil counsel in the Tribal Court Parenting Action since May 14, 2019, when her lawyer  
withdrew. E.Adams Decl., ¶16.

29 <sup>31</sup> Galanda Decl., Ex. A.

jurisdiction over me, nor over Mr. Galindo, nor our child.”<sup>32</sup> She was correct, insofar as Respondent Dodge never had subject matter jurisdiction—the Whatcom County Superior Court did, pursuant to the UCCJA.<sup>33</sup>

**C. MS. ADAMS IS ARRESTED AND IMPRISONED BECAUSE WHILE SHE WAS ON CANOE JOURNEY SHE MISSED ONE COURT DATE, WHICH HER PUBLIC DEFENDER ATTENDED FOR HER.**

From July 1 to 29, 2019, the Adamses participated and paddled in the Northwest Tribes’ annual Canoe Journey, which culminated at Lummi Nation on July 29.<sup>34</sup> On July 11, 2019, Ms. Adams’ public defender appeared before Respondent Dodge for Ms. Adams in a pre-trial hearing in the Tribal Court Criminal Matter because she was gone for Canoe Journey; Respondent Dodge threatened to “issue a warrant or her arrest” if she did not present herself to the Tribal Court by July 18, 2019.<sup>35</sup> On July 11 and 18, Ms. Adams was with her daughter and father away from Nooksack, taking part in preparations regarding a newly carved cedar canoe, Northern Quest, which they would soon paddle along the waters of the Puget Sound, to Lummi.<sup>36</sup> On July 19, 2019, Respondent Dodge issued a Warrant of Arrest against Ms. Adams for failure to appear.<sup>37</sup> The Adamses returned home, exhausted from Canoe Journey and unpacked, on July 29, 2019.<sup>38</sup>

The very next morning, July 30, 2019, while the Adamses were relaxing at home, which is situated on off-reservation Nooksack allotted lands, Tribal police officers arrived and arrested

<sup>32</sup> E.Adams Decl., Ex. G at 2.

<sup>33</sup> *Id.*, Ex. F.

<sup>34</sup> E.Adams Decl., ¶¶17-20; G. Adams Decl., ¶¶4-5; Lacey Young, *Nearly 100 Canoes Arrive at Lummi Nation – the Final Stop of Annual Tribal Canoe Journey*, BELLINGHAM HERALD (Jul. 26, 2019), available at: <https://www.bellinghamherald.com/news/local/article233142846.html>.

<sup>35</sup> Dkt. # 25-2 at 41. Respondent Dodge picks and chooses when Ms. Adams must personally appear in the Tribal Court Criminal Matter. *See id.* at 21 (“the Court informed Ms. Adams that her attendance . . . would not be required”).

<sup>36</sup> E.Adams Decl., ¶¶17-20; *see also* G. Adams Decl., ¶¶4-5.

<sup>37</sup> Dkt. # 25-2 at 40.

<sup>38</sup> E.Adams Decl., ¶20; G. Adams Decl., ¶5

1 Ms. Adams.<sup>39</sup> By 11:12 a.m., a Nooksack officer transported a handcuffed Ms. Adams to the  
 2 Whatcom County Jail, despite plainly lacking jurisdiction to detain or transport Ms. Adams  
 3 beyond Nooksack allotted or trust lands.<sup>40</sup> *State v. Eriksen*, 25 P.3d 1079 (Wash. 2011).  
 4 Whatcom County booked Ms. Adams into custody or “FTA Contempt” in the Tribal Court  
 5 Criminal Matter, pursuant to a fee-for-service jailing agreement between the Nooksack Tribe and  
 6 Whatcom County that does not assure prisoners any civil rights protections vis-à-vis each  
 7 jurisdiction.<sup>41</sup> Whatcom County Sheriff’s Deputy David Kimball commented to her: “I have  
 8 never seen a charge like his before. It is a bogus charge.”<sup>42</sup>

9 Ms. Adams spent two hours in an isolation cell, with her arms still handcuffed behind her  
 10 back, causing her to experience carpal tunnel syndrome numbness, as well burning sensations of  
 11 pain, before she was placed in cellblock “3K” with the general inmate population.<sup>43</sup> Twenty  
 12 other women were in the same cell.<sup>44</sup>

13 Meanwhile, by 2:15 PM that same day, Respondent Dodge decided to finally rule on Ms.  
 14 Adams’ May 14, 2019, motion for “Voluntary Non Suit” in the Tribal Court Parenting Action,  
 15 denying her request and explaining that “[o]n this date a warrant for Ms. Adams [sic] arrest in a  
 16 pending criminal matter was executed. Ms. Adams is currently in custody.”<sup>45</sup> Respondent  
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20 <sup>39</sup> *Id.* The facts of Nooksack officers’ assault, battery, and false detention, arrest, and/or imprisonment of the Adams  
 that morning are chronicled in the E.Adams Decl., ¶¶21-47, the G. Adams Decl., ¶¶6-10, and the Galanda Decl.,  
 ¶10, but those facts are not necessary to this Response.

21 <sup>40</sup> E.Adams Decl., ¶34; Dkt. # 25-2 at 38.

22 <sup>41</sup> Dkt. # 14; Galanda Decl., Ex. H. The federal Bill of Rights does not apply to prisoners like Ms. Adams while on  
 Nooksack Indian country, and Whatcom County has no policy or procedure to ensure that prisoners accepted into its  
 custody from a tribal jurisdiction have been afforded any constitutional protection. Dkt. # 14; *Talton v. Mayes*, 163  
 23 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (within Indian country, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not apply to the actions of  
 tribal governments)

24 <sup>42</sup> E.Adams Decl., ¶37.

<sup>43</sup> *Id.*, ¶38.

<sup>44</sup> *Id.*

<sup>45</sup> *Id.*, Ex. H.

1 Dodge piled on a new Criminal Summons in the Tribal Court Criminal Matter that same  
2 afternoon, and had Nooksack police serve her with it at home the very next day.<sup>46</sup>

3 At 7:57 p.m. on July 31, 2019, Whatcom County Jail personnel released Ms. Adams after  
4 her father posted her \$500.00 bail, ordering her to appear before the Nooksack Tribal Court in  
5 the Tribal Court Criminal Matter on August 21, 2019.<sup>47</sup> That same day, Whatcom County issued  
6 a \$500.00 check to the Tribal Court, transferring Ms. Adams' bail monies—and thus her  
7 custody—to Respondents.<sup>48</sup> *Hensley v. Municipal Court*, 411 U.S. 345 (1973). Respondent  
8 Tribal Court Clerks Betty Leathers and Deanna Francis received, and control, Ms. Adams' bail  
9 monies.<sup>49</sup>

10 **D. RESPONDENT DODGE DENIES MS. ADAMS' RIGHT TO COUNSEL; SUES MS. ADAMS**

11 On August 7, 2019, Respondent Dodge caused an association notice filed by Mr. Galanda  
12 on behalf of Ms. Adams in the Tribal Court Parenting Action to be “REJECTED,” denying Ms.  
13 Adams her right to civil counsel of her choosing, at her own expense.<sup>50</sup> Respondent Dodge also  
14 caused an association notice that Mr. Galanda filed in the Tribal Court Criminal Matter to be  
15 “REJECTED,” further denying her right to counsel.<sup>51</sup> Both rulings further violated a September  
16 21, 2016, Tribal Court of Appeals ruling allowing the firm to “practice before the Nooksack  
17 Tribal Court.”<sup>52</sup>

18 On August 9, 2019, Ms. Adams filed a Whatcom County Superior Court tort lawsuit  
19 against Respondent Dodge in his personal capacity.<sup>53</sup> He answered that suit on September 17,  
20

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
22 <sup>46</sup> *Id.* Ex. I; E.Adams Decl., ¶48. The Summons is not included in the “true and accurate copy of the Nooksack  
Court file” on file at Dkt. # 25-2. *Cf.* Dkt. # 25-2 at 2; *id.*, at 8.

23 <sup>47</sup> Galanda Decl., Ex. H.

24 <sup>48</sup> *Id.*; Dkt. # 25-2 at 22.

25 <sup>49</sup> Dkt. # 25-2 at 22.

<sup>50</sup> Galanda Decl., Ex. J.

<sup>51</sup> *Id.*, Ex. K.

<sup>52</sup> *Id.*, Ex. C at 2.

<sup>53</sup> *See* Dkt. # 25-2 at 15, ¶¶1-5.



1 2019, and counterclaimed for libel against Ms. Adams because she told a local blog that “Dodge  
2 has made my life a living nightmare.”<sup>54</sup>

3 By October 2, 2019, Ms. Adams moved to recuse Respondent Dodge from the Tribal  
4 Court Criminal Matter, citing her Superior Court suit against him and his counterclaim against  
5 her.<sup>55</sup> Although Respondent Dodge and Nooksack police excluded Mr. Galanda from entering  
6 the Courthouse with Ms. Adams or representing her on October 9, 2019, that day Respondent  
7 Dodge finally recused himself from the Tribal Court Criminal Matter, and Respondent Pro Tem  
8 Judge Rajeev Majumdar was assigned to preside over the matter.<sup>56</sup> On November 1, 2019, Ms.  
9 Adams appeared before Respondent Majumdar, who continued the case at her and the  
10 Prosecutor’s request given this federal *habeas corpus* proceeding.<sup>57</sup>

11 **E. NOOKSACK JUDICIARY REMAINS CORRUPT.**

12 During the lifespan of this controversy, the following proclamations have been made  
13 about Respondent Dodge and the Nooksack Judiciary:

- 14 • On March 24, 2017, the National Indian Court Judges Association Board of Directors  
15 (“NAICJA”) wrote Respondent Dodge while jettisoning him from the association:

16 NAICJA does not view your Nooksack Tribal Court judicial appointment as  
17 valid. Further, while you have occupied the position of Chief Judge at  
18 Nooksack, proceedings do not appear to have been conducted in compliance with  
19 the federal [Indian Civil Rights Act] or fundamental tenets of due process at law.  
20 . . . NAICJA can only support members who are legitimate and comport with . . .  
21 core tenet[s] of tribal democracy and judicial integrity.<sup>58</sup>

- 22 • On April 10, 2018, the Washington State Bar Association (“WSBA”) commented that the  
23 Nooksack “justice system” is “probably not worthy of that description.”<sup>59</sup>

24 <sup>54</sup> E. Adams Decl., ¶¶48-50.

25 <sup>55</sup> Dkt. # 25-2 at 15, ¶¶1-5.

<sup>56</sup> *Id.* at 19-14; Galanda Decl., ¶14.

<sup>57</sup> *Id.* at 6.

<sup>58</sup> Galanda Decl., Ex. M.

<sup>59</sup> *Id.*, Ex. N.

1 • On June 11, 2018, DOI expressed the United States’ continued concern about the need  
2 for “respect for the rule of law” at Nooksack.<sup>60</sup>

3 • On March 9, 2018, Ninth Circuit Senior Judge Richard Clifton commented that  
4 Respondent Dodge and his civil RICO co-conspirators’ record of “ignoring orders from the  
5 Tribe’s own court of appeals which it said the rule of law had ‘completely broken down’ [and]  
6 withdrawing from the established appellate court” is “a record a tin-pot dictator of a banana  
7 republic might be proud of.” *Rabang v. Kelly*, No. 17-35427 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2018), Dkt. # 32.

8 • On July 31, 2018, this District Court rejected Respondent Dodge’s contention that ““the  
9 cloud over the Tribe’ has been lifted” by DOI’s recognition of the Tribe on March 9, 2018,  
10 commenting that the “well documented” allegations against him and his co-conspirators “are  
11 highly concerning.” *Rabang v. Kelly*, No. 2:17-cv-00088-JCC (W.D. Wash.), Dkt. # 166 at 8.

12 Today, there is no public indication that the Nooksack appellate court again exists; or if it  
13 does exist, that it is worthy of again being regarded as impartial.<sup>61</sup>

## 14 II. LAW AND ARGUMENT

### 15 A. PROPER RESPONDENTS

16 The federal Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) provides that the writ of *habeas corpus*  
17 “shall be available to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his  
18 detention by order of an Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1303. In *Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez*, the  
19 U.S. Supreme Court recognized that Indian tribes, as sovereigns, possess immunity from suit and  
20 it held that, in light of such immunity, the ICRA does not “authorize the maintenance of suits  
21 against a tribe nor does it constitute a waiver of sovereignty.” *Walton v. Pueblo*, 443 F.3d 1274,  
22 1278 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978)). Additionally, “the ICRA does not create a

23  
24 <sup>60</sup> *Id.*, Ex. O.

<sup>61</sup> See Galanda Decl., Ex. S; *cf. id.*, Ex. P (publishing Tribal appellate rules as of June 1, 2017), with  
<https://nooksacktribe.org/departments/nooksack-tribal-court/> (not listing any Tribal appeals court or procedures).

1 private cause of action against a tribal official.” *Id.* at 1278. “**The one exception to this**  
2 **holding is the ICRA’s waiver of tribal immunity as to *habeas corpus* actions.” *Alexander v.*  
3 *Salazar*, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1339 (E.D. Okla. 2010) (emphasis added); *see also Wilson v.*  
4 *Umpqua Indian Dev. Corp.*, No. 17-0123, 2017 WL 2838463, at \*6 (D. Or. June 29, 2017) (“The  
5 ICRA narrowly waives tribes’ immunity in federal court when violations of the ICRA are  
6 asserted through petitions for *habeas corpus*.”).**

7         The question is not one of immunity, as framed by Respondents, but of “custody.” “The  
8 proper respondent in a federal *habeas corpus* petition is the petitioner’s immediate custodian. A  
9 custodian is the person having a day-to-day control over the prisoner. That person is the only  
10 one who can produce ‘the body’ of the petitioner.” *Brittingham v. United States*, 982 F.2d 378,  
11 379 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). Thus, in *Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians*,  
12 it was held that “[a]n application for a writ of *habeas corpus* is never viewed as a suit against the  
13 sovereign, simply because the restraint for which review is sought, if indeed illegal, would be  
14 outside the power of an official acting in the sovereign’s name.” 85 F.3d 874, 899 (2d Cir.  
15 1996). In *Reimnitz v. State’s Attorney of Cook Cty.*, 761 F.2d 405, 408-409 (7th Cir. 1985),  
16 Judge Posner explains that’s what is important “is not the quest for a mythical custodian, but  
17 that the petitioner name as respondent someone (*or some institution*) who has . . . the power to  
18 give the petitioner what he seeks if the petition has merit—namely, his unconditional freedom”  
19 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, to the extent that Respondents submit that the Tribe, as an  
20 institution, should be dismissed, Ms. Adams is fine with that—provided someone she has named  
21 give her the unconditional freedom she seeks.

22         With regard to those remaining respondents, some courts have held “that  
23 the proper respondent to a *habeas* petition is the custodian who can ‘bring the party before the  
24 judge.”” *Valenzuela v. Silversmith*, No. 10-1127, 2011 WL 13284740, at \*11 (D.N.M. Sept. 1,

1 2011), *aff'd*, 699 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshal Serv.*,  
2 474 U.S. 34, 38 (1985)). Others have held that the proper respondent is, again, “someone (or  
3 some institution) who has both an interest in opposing the petition if it lacks merit, and the power  
4 to give the petitioner what he seeks if the petition has merit—namely, his unconditional  
5 freedom.” *Liska v. Macarro*, No. 08-1872, 2009 WL 2424293, at \*5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2009)  
6 (quotation omitted); *see also Reimnitz*, 761 F.2d at 408-409 (citing *Hensley*, 411 U.S. at 351)  
7 (court itself is the proper respondent). Still others have held that “the official with authority to  
8 modify the tribal conviction or sentence” is the proper respondent. *Garcia v. Elwell*, No. 17-  
9 0333, 2017 WL 3172826, at \*2 (D.N.M. May 25, 2017).

10 Here, Ms. Adams has named the Nooksack Tribal Court Clerks (who may administer  
11 orders to bring Petitioner before the judge, and who are in control of her \$500 cash bail), the  
12 Nooksack Tribal Court itself (an institution that has an interest in opposing her Petition and the  
13 power to give Petitioner the relief she seeks), and Tribal Court Judges Raymond Dodge and  
14 Rajeev Majumdar (who possess authority to modify the orders detaining Petitioner).<sup>62</sup> In their  
15 Motion to Dismiss, Respondents point the finger at one another: Respondents appear to concede  
16 that Tribal Court Judges—Respondents Dodge and Majumdar—qualify as Ms. Adams’  
17 immediate custodians, but submit that neither the Tribal Court Clerks nor the Tribal Court itself  
18 similarly qualify.<sup>63</sup> Respondents Dodge and Majumdar, on the other hand, disagree and urge that  
19 either the Tribal Court itself or its Clerks are proper Respondents.<sup>64</sup>

20 Ms. Adams stands by her decision to name each Respondent. But as long as one of the  
21 named Respondents possesses authority to release Ms. Adams from custody, and “someone”  
22 among them gives her unconditional freedom, it does not really matter to her. Thus, to the extent  
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24 <sup>62</sup> Dkt. # 25-2.

<sup>63</sup> Dkt. # 25, at 10-11.

<sup>64</sup> Dkt. # 28, at 8-10.

1 that Respondents wish to dismiss those Respondents who truly lack authority to release her from  
 2 Tribal custody, Ms. Adams does not object—so long as the person(s) with the authority to grant  
 3 *habeas* relief remains a Respondent.

4 **A. THE TRIBAL EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY; COMITY IS UNWARRANTED**

5 Respondents do not dispute the underlying merits of Ms. Adams’ Petition—because they  
 6 cannot. Instead, they submit that this Court does not possess jurisdiction to entertain her Petition  
 7 because she has not availed herself of remedies available vis-à-vis the Tribal Court.  
 8 Respondents are mistaken.

9 The “exhaustion rule” derives from the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in *National*  
 10 *Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians*, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). There, the High Court  
 11 held that federal courts should refrain from considering the merits of a civil action involving an  
 12 Indian tribe until available tribal remedies have been exhausted. *Id.* at 853-57. This exhaustion  
 13 rule requires “that tribal appellate courts must have the opportunity to review the determinations  
 14 of the lower tribal courts.” *Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante*, 480 U.S. 9 (1987). The rule requires  
 15 federal courts to allow tribal courts a full opportunity to determine the existence and extent of its  
 16 own jurisdiction in the first instance, regardless of the basis of jurisdiction that may exist in  
 17 federal court. *Id.* at 16. Once remedies have been fully exhausted, a tribal court’s determination  
 18 of tribal jurisdiction presents a federal question subject to consideration in federal court.  
 19 *Yellowstone County v. Pease*, 96 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir.1996).

20 The exhaustion rule, however, is not jurisdictional as Respondents claim<sup>65</sup>—and it is not  
 21 unyielding. “The Supreme Court has stated that the doctrine of abstention is an extraordinary and  
 22 narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
 24 <sup>65</sup> Exhaustion is not, as Respondents misapprehend, “a jurisdictional requirement.” Dkt. # 25, at 4; *cf. United States*  
 25 *v. Ray*, No. 11-5056, 2011 WL 2490001, at \*2 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 21, 2011) (“[E]xhaustion is required as a matter of  
 comity and is not a jurisdictional prerequisite.”). Given the record before this Court, as discussed above, the  
 Nooksack Tribal Court does not deserve any form of comity.

1 it,” *United States v. Plainbull*, 957 F.2d 724, 727 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted), and that  
 2 “mandatory deference does not follow automatically from an assertion of tribal court  
 3 jurisdiction.” *Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., Inc.*, 947 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir.1991). Where  
 4 exhaustion “is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith, **or** where the action  
 5 is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, **or** where exhaustion would be futile,”  
 6 the exhaustion rule does not apply. *National Farmers Union*, 471 U.S. at 856 n.21 (citations  
 7 omitted) (emphasis added). “Thus, a plaintiff may overcome the administrative exhaustion  
 8 requirement by qualifying for one of the three aforementioned exceptions.” *Roach v. HCAL*  
 9 *Corp.*, No. 05-1212, 2005 WL 8173344, at \*2 n.1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2005). Here, Ms. Adams  
 10 qualifies for all three; this Court need only find one exception to refuse to extend comity to the  
 11 Nooksack Tribal Court in these facts.

12 **1. The Nooksack Tribal Court Plainly Lacks Jurisdiction.**

13 When it is “plain” that a tribal court lacks jurisdiction, “the otherwise applicable  
 14 exhaustion requirement *must* give way.” *Strate v. A-1 Contractors*, 520 U.S. 438, 459 n.14  
 15 (1997) (emphasis added). Here, there are at least three reasons that Respondents lack jurisdiction  
 16 for purposes of exhaustion exception.

17 First, “the mandatory exhaustion requirement . . . does not apply when the dispute is not a  
 18 ‘reservation affair’ and did not ‘arise on the reservation,’” as here. *Crawford v. Genuine Parts*  
 19 *Co.*, 947 F.2d 1405, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1991). Without citing to evidence, Respondents submit  
 20 that Ms. Adams was arrested by tribal police “on Nooksack tribal land.”<sup>66</sup> The record evidence  
 21 shows, however, that Ms. Adams was arrested at “7094 Mission Road Apartment #4 in Everson,  
 22  
 23  
 24

25 <sup>66</sup> Dkt. # 25, at 3. Respondent cites to “[reference],” but Petitioner is unsure as to what this is referring to. *Id.*

1 WA”—which is Nooksack allotted—not “tribal” or on-reservation—land and, in any event, is  
 2 **not** located on within the exterior boundaries of the Nooksack Indian Reservation.<sup>67</sup>

3 Second, writ of *habeas corpus* is the appropriate relief where a Petitioner is arrested by  
 4 officers with “no jurisdiction to arrest.” *Campbell v. Waite*, 88 F. 102, 103 (8th Cir. 1898). It is  
 5 clear, and has been for some time, that **“the powers of tribal law enforcement officers” do not**  
 6 **extend “outside the reservation.”** *Eriksen*, 259 at 1083. Ms. Adams’ arrest “did not ‘arise on  
 7 the reservation,’” *Crawford*, 947 F.2d at 1407, and because Nooksack officers lacked jurisdiction  
 8 to do anything but detain her, *Eriksen*, 259 P.3d at 1083, “the otherwise applicable exhaustion  
 9 requirement *must* give way.” *Strate*, 520 U.S. at 459 n.14 (1997) (emphasis added).<sup>68</sup>

10 Third, the Tribal Court never had subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Adams’ daughter  
 11 and, thus, over criminal custodial interference charges against Ms. Adams. The Whatcom  
 12 County Superior Court “never declined jurisdiction” over Z. A.G.; it still has “continuing and  
 13 exclusive jurisdiction.”<sup>69</sup> As such, the Tribal Court has plainly lacked subject matter jurisdiction  
 14 in both the Tribal Court Parenting Action and the Tribal Court Criminal Matter that stemmed  
 15 therefrom. *See In re Marriage of Greenlaw*, 869 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Wash. 1994) (“A Washington  
 16 court which enters a child custody decree continues to have jurisdiction to modify that decree so  
 17 long as one of the parties remains in the state and so long as the child’s contact with the state  
 18 continues to be more than slight.”).

## 19 **2. The Nooksack Tribal Court Is Not A Fair And Neutral Forum.**

20 A tribal court acts in bad faith when it fails to provide “a fair and neutral proceeding.”  
 21 *Acres v. Blue Lake Rancheria*, No. 16-5391-WHO, 2017 WL 733114, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24,

22 <sup>67</sup> Dkt. # 25-2, at 29; Galanda Decl., Ex. Q.

23 <sup>68</sup> The Washington State Supreme Court described the fix to these types of jurisdictional challenges as follows:  
 24 “these issues must be addressed by use of political and legislative tools, such as cross-deputization or mutual aid  
 25 pacts, to ensure that all law enforcement officers have adequate authority to protect citizens’ health and safety in  
 border areas.” *Eriksen*, 259 at 1084. The Tribe and Whatcom County are aware of those tools, *see* Dkt. # 14, but  
 have not deployed them to ensure the likes of Ms. Adams’ health and safety.

<sup>69</sup> E.Adams Decl., Ex. F.

1 2017); *see also Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev., LLC v. 'Sa' Nyu Wa Inc.*, 715 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th  
 2 Cir. 2013) (“[I]t must be the Tribal Court that acts in bad faith to avoid the requirement to  
 3 exhaust tribal court remedies.”). To highlight the indicia of bad faith, Respondent Dodge:

- 4 • Initiated the Tribal Court Parenting Action *sua sponte* on March 20, 2017, despite being  
 5 told of the Superior Court Parenting Order.<sup>70</sup>
- 6 • Has summoned Ms. Adams to his courtroom at least 21 times—almost monthly—since  
 7 March of 2017, despite knowing he lacked jurisdiction from the beginning.<sup>71</sup>
- 8 • Denied Ms. Adams her due process right to counsel in the Tribal Court Parenting Action  
 9 and the Tribal Court Criminal Matter; both since July 30, 2019.<sup>72</sup> *See Goldberg v. Kelly*,  
 10 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (“[T]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail  
 11 if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”); and
- 12 • Physically excluded Ms. Adams’ counsel from the Nooksack Courthouse, also since July  
 13 30, 2019.<sup>73</sup>

14 Respondents claim that “Petitioner has not taken any action to avail herself o the tribal court  
 15 remedies since her release rom the Whatcom County Jail on July 30, 2019.”<sup>74</sup> That is too cute by  
 16 half insofar as she has *repeatedly* been denied the right to legal counsel since July 30, 2019.<sup>75</sup>  
 17 Practically speaking, there is no right for Ms. Adams to be heard in *habeas* at Nooksack with her  
 18 lawyer illegally excluded from tribal courthouse. *Goldberg*, 397 U.S at 270.

19 All the while, it is not merely Ms. Adams claiming that the Tribal Court is not fair or  
 20 neutral on Respondent Dodge’s watch. NAICJA says Respondent Dodge does not conduct  
 21 proceedings “in compliance with the federal ICRA or fundamental tenets of due process at

22 \_\_\_\_\_  
 23 <sup>70</sup> E. Adams Decl., Ex. F.

<sup>71</sup> *Id.*, ¶12.

<sup>72</sup> Galanda Decl., Exs. J, K.

<sup>73</sup> Galanda Decl., ¶14.

<sup>74</sup> Dkt. # 25, at 3.

<sup>75</sup> Galanda Decl., Exs. J, K; ¶14.



1 law.”<sup>76</sup> The WSBA says Nooksack is “probably not worthy” of being called a ‘justice  
2 system.”<sup>77</sup> DOI has doubts that there is any “respect for the rule of law” at Nooksack.<sup>78</sup> And at  
3 last word from the Nooksack Court of Appeals: “at Nooksack the rule of law is dead.”<sup>79</sup>

4 **3. Exhaustion Would Be Futile.**

5 “[I]f a functioning appellate court does not exist, exhaustion is per se futile.” *Johnson v.*  
6 *Gila River Indian Cmty.*, 174 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing *Krempel v. Prairie Island*  
7 *Indian Community*, 125 F.3d 621, 622 (8th Cir. 1997)). At last public word about the Nooksack  
8 Court of Appeals, the Nooksack Tribe enjoined it out of existence—meaning the Tribe sued, and  
9 enjoined, its own appellate court.<sup>80</sup> There is no indication that any Nooksack appellate court has  
10 been brought back to life or, if it has, that is too is anything but unfair and biased.<sup>81</sup>

11 **III. CONCLUSION**

12 Ms. Adams’ release is warranted because she has demonstrated a clear case on the merits,  
13 she is subject to severe restraints on her individual liberty, and all three of the exceptions to tribal  
14 court exhaustion apply to the facts of her case. Ms. Adams respectfully requests that her Petition  
15 for Writ of Habeas Corpus be GRANTED as to her ongoing detention and that Respondents be  
16 directed to release Ms. Adams from custody immediately.

17 A proposed Writ of Habeas Corpus accompanies this Response.

18 ///

19 ///

20 ///

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
22 <sup>76</sup> Galanda Decl., Ex. M.

<sup>77</sup> *Id.*, Ex. N.

<sup>78</sup> *Id.*, Ex. O.

<sup>79</sup> *Id.*, Ex. Q at 2.

<sup>80</sup> *Id.*, Ex. L.

<sup>81</sup> See Galanda Decl., Ex. S; *cf. id.*, Ex. P (publishing Tribal appellate rules as of June 1, 2017), with  
24 <https://nooksacktribe.org/departments/nooksack-tribal-court/> (not listing any Tribal appeals court or procedures).

1 DATED this 9th day of December 2019.

2 GALANDA BROADMAN, PLLC

3 s/Gabriel S. Galanda

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, Wendy Foster, declare as follows:

1. I am now and at all times herein mentioned a legal and permanent resident of the United States and the State of Washington, over the age of eighteen years, not a party to the above-entitled action, and competent to testify as a witness.

2. I am employed with the law firm of Galanda Broadman PLLC, 8606 35<sup>th</sup> Avenue NE, Ste. L1, Seattle, WA 98115.

3. Today, I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the parties registered in the Court's CM/ECF system.

Signed at Seattle, Washington, this 9<sup>th</sup> day of December 2019.

s/Wendy Foster

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Wendy Foster