ORDER REGARDING REPRESENTATION OF INDIAN ALLOTTEES ~ 1

20

21

MOSE SAM; SHERMAN T.

WAPATO; SANDRA COVINGTON;

GABRIEL MARCELLAY; LINDA

MILLS; LINDA SAINT; JEFF M. 1 CONDON; DENA JACKSON; MIKE 2 MARCELLAY; VIVIAN PIERRE; SONIA VANWOERKON; WAPATO 3 HERITAGE, LLC; LEONARD WAPATO, JR.; DERRICK D. ZUNIE, II; DEBORAH L. 4 BACKWELL; JUDY ZUNIE; 5 JAQUELINE WHITE PLUME; DENISE N. ZUNIE; **CONFEDERATED TRIBES** 6 COLVILLE RESERVATION; and 7 ALLOTTEES OF MA-8, also known as Moses Allotment 8. 8 Defendants.

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

Pursuant to this Court's prior Order, the parties have submitted supplemental briefing regarding the legal representation of the individual Indian allottees in this matter. The Court requested this briefing to determine whether the Government has a legal obligation to provide private attorneys to the named Indian allottee Defendants and, if so, whether the Government has complied with that obligation. The Court has considered the supplemental briefing, the extensive record in this matter, the relevant case law, and is fully informed.

BACKGROUND

This case involves land known as Moses Allotment 8, or "MA-8." When this litigation began, Plaintiffs Grondal and the Mill Bay Members Association (together "the Mill Bay Members") did not dispute that the land, while allotted,

21

remained in trust status. *See* ECF No. 1. However, after the Government and the Confederated Tribes of the Colville ("the Colville") moved to eject Plaintiffs Mill Bay Members from the land, and after the Ninth Circuit held that the Mill Bay Members' lease had expired¹, the Mill Bay Members, along with Defendant/ Cross-Claimant Wapato Heritage, LLC, began to argue that the land had lost its trust status, and that the land is instead held in fee by the individual Indian allottees. Therefore, they claim that the Government has no authority to eject the Mill Bay Members, even though their lease expired. *See*, *e.g.*, ECF No. 295 at 1 (containing Plaintiffs' argument that "[g]enuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the United States has standing to eject and sue on behalf of the landowners").

When the dispute regarding MA-8's trust status arose, the individual Indian allottee Defendants were not represented by counsel. Because the status of the allotted land would be determined through this litigation, the Court at that time became concerned about the allottees' lack of representation. ECF No. 345. The Court ordered the Government to take numerous steps to ensure that the individual landowners who wanted independent legal representation would receive it. *See id*. The Court refused to set a briefing schedule until these matters were addressed. *Id*. That was in February of 2016.

¹ Wapato Heritage, LLC v. United States, 637 F.3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011).

1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |

In September of 2019, this case was transferred. However, the Mill Bay Members and Wapato Heritage argue that the pending motions still may not be resolved because the Government has failed to find and provide representation to each of the individual Indian allottee Defendants. To resolve the issue of representation raised by the Mill Bay Members and Wapato Heritage, the Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the issue. ECF No. 389. The Court explained that it would decide the pending motions after resolving the representation issue. *Id*.

In their supplemental briefing, Plaintiffs Mill Bay Members and Defendant/
Cross-Claimant Wapato Heritage argue that the Government, as part of its trust
obligation, must provide representation to the individual allottees. The Mill Bay
Members and Wapato Heritage claim that the Government and the Colville have a
conflict of interest with the individual allottees. Thus, they contend that the
Government must find and provide private legal counsel for each individual Indian
allottee Defendant before the Court may resolve the pending motions in this
matter. The Mill Bay Members and Wapato Heritage essentially argue that a
conflict of interest exists because individual allottees may want to argue, contrary
to the Colville and the Government, that the land is fee land, rather than trust land.

The Colville and the Government claim that there is no legal or factual basis supporting the Mill Bay Members' and Wapato Heritage's argument. They assert that the Government is fulfilling its trust responsibility by seeking the ejectment of

trespassers on Indian trust land, and, to the extent that the individual Indian allottees want to argue that the land has fallen out of trust status, the Government has no trust obligation to represent them individually. The Government and the Colville also argue that, factually, there is no conflict of interest, asserting, "The United States has continually protected the trust status of MA-8, consistent with its duty and the position of every individual *Indian* allottee that has stated a position in this case." ECF No. 398 at 2 (emphasis in original) (citing ECF Nos. 311, 314, 318, 320, 322, 323, 324, and 131 at 6–7). Additionally, in a footnote, the Government asserts that the Mill Bay Members and Wapato Heritage do not have standing to raise this representation issue on behalf of the Indian allottees, some of whom have appeared in this case. *Id.* at 2 n.1.

DISCUSSION

Representation of Individual Allottees under 25 U.S.C. § 175

The Mill Bay Members and Wapato Heritage argue that the Government has a duty to provide independent counsel to each of the individual Indian allottees pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 175. That statute provides, "In all States or Territories where there are reservations or allotted Indians the United States attorney shall represent them in all suits at law and in equity." 25 U.S.C. § 175. Although the statute uses mandatory language, a long line of precedent explains that the statute is discretionary. *See Sinsical v. United States*, 208 F.2d 406, 409–410 (9th Cir.

4

5

6

8

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

1953); United States v. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty., 391 F.3d 53, 56 (9th Cir. 1968).

The Ninth Circuit recently has reiterated that 25 U.S.C. § 175 is not mandatory, and that the statute does not require the Government to provide private counsel to individual Indian allottees. Crow Allottees Ass'n v. BIA, 705 Fed. Appx. 489, 492 (9th Cir. 2017). In Crow Allottees Association v. BIA, individual Indian allottees challenged a water compact entered into by the Crow Tribe, the State of Montana, and the United States. Crow Allottees Ass'n v. BIA, No. CV 14-62–BLG–SPW, 2015 WL 4041303, at *1 (D. Mont. June 30, 2015). The allottees argued that the Government failed to negotiate the water compact in their best interests. See Crow Allottees Ass'n, 705 Fed. Appx. at 492. On appeal, they claimed that, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 175, the Government was required to provide them with independent legal counsel to represent their individual interests and rights. Id. The Ninth Circuit expressly rejected that argument, stating: "Section 175 provides no basis for Plaintiffs' argument that they are entitled to private legal counsel at the Government's expense." Id. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit explained, "to the extent that Plaintiffs might seek representation by the United States Attorney (which they do not claim to do), 'we have held that the statute (section 175) is not mandatory." Id. (citing Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty., 391 F.3d at 56).

Neither the Mill Bay Members nor Wapato Heritage have cited binding

1 2 precedent requiring the Government to represent individual allottees, or to provide 3 private counsel to represent individual allottees. Ninth Circuit precedent is clear 4 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

that 25 U.S.C. § 175 does not provide a legal basis for the Mill Bay Members' and Wapato Heritage's argument that the Government must furnish private attorneys for the allottees. See id. Accordingly, the Court rejects that argument.

Inherent Power

Defendant/ Cross-Claimant Wapato Heritage also argues that the Court has inherent power to require the Government to provide private counsel to the allottees in this matter and to ensure that counsel is available to represent the allottees. ECF No. 404 at 21. However, the cases that Wapato Heritage cites for this proposition are inapposite, as they interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Under Section 1915, the Court has discretion to appoint counsel to a party who has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). No applications to proceed in forma pauperis have been filed in this matter. Section 1915 does not require this Court, or the Government as a function of its historic trust relationship with Indian tribes, to provide private legal counsel to the individual Indian allottees under these facts. Therefore, Wapato Heritage's argument is rejected.

Instrument of Injustice

Wapato Heritage claims that "if this case were to proceed without independent counsel for the landowners, the Court would become an instrument of

ORDER REGARDING REPRESENTATION OF INDIAN ALLOTTEES ~ 7

1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 3 |

injustice, not only as to the individual Indian landowners, but as to Plaintiff and Wapato Heritage as well." ECF No. 404 at 19. Wapato Heritage asserts that the Government has acted in bad faith and contrary to its trust obligations. *Id.* It argues that the Court must require the Government to provide counsel to each Defendant, or else become an agent of injustice. *Id.*

The Court is not persuaded. The Government has taken steps to notify the individual Indian allottees of this litigation and to find counsel for individuals who responded and requested private representation. *See* ECF Nos. 333 and 347. Due to the Government's actions, two *pro bono* attorneys appeared on behalf of the allottees who requested private counsel.² Additionally, the individual allottees who have appeared in this action have sided with the Government and the Colville, undercutting Wapato Heritage's argument that the Government's and the Colville's position conflicts with the allottees' interests. *See* ECF No. 344 (individual allottees' motion to join Federal Defendants' motion for summary judgment re ejection).

Moreover, as the Colville explain, there are many reasons that the nonappearing allottees may have decided not to litigate this case, which involves a highly fractionated allotment. As the Colville assert:

² The Court acknowledges that these attorneys have since withdrawn, and the parties that they represented are now proceeding *pro se*.

4

5

6

8

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

It is not surprising the allottees have forgone private attorney representation in this case. First, they have small (in most cases tiny) interests in MA-8. ECF No. 347 at 2–4. Second, they have no control over the property. Third, their minority interests have been and continue to be represented by the United States. Fourth, . . . the allottees have no legal right to federally-furnished private attorneys.

ECF No. 399 at 6-7.

Furthermore, the argument that the Government is acting contrary to its trust responsibilities in this matter is strained. The Government and the Colville have filed a motion for summary judgment requesting the ejectment of the Mill Bay Members from MA-8. When ejecting trespassers from Indian trust land, the Government is fulfilling an essential trust obligation. "The protection of Indian land against trespass was one of the first responsibilities assumed by the Federal Government. The promise of such protection for lands retained by the Indian tribes was an important quid pro quo in the process of treaty-making by which the United States acquired a vast domain." Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Federal Indian Law 175 (2016) (quoting Flexi S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law xii (1941 ed.)). Plaintiffs have occupied MA-8 with an expired lease for over ten years while this litigation has been pending. The Court will become an instrument of injustice if it delays a resolution of this matter any longer, without legal authority requiring it to do so. As the preceding paragraphs explain, no legal

authority requires the Government to provide independent counsel to individual allottees in this matter.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Government is not required to take further action to provide independent counsel to individual allottee Defendants. The Court will proceed to resolve the remaining motions in this case, beginning with the fully briefed motion for summary judgment. The pending motion for summary judgment was briefed in 2012. Thus, any party may, within fourteen days of the date of this Order, submit a supplemental brief that identifies any new, relevant precedent or facts that were not previously briefed. Any supplemental brief submitted shall not exceed fifteen pages, shall draw the Court's attention to cases that have been decided since the motion for summary judgment in this matter was filed, and shall briefly explain the relevance of those recent cases.

IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Clerk is directed to enter this

Order and provide copies to counsel and to the *pro se* Defendants, and set a fourteen day case management deadline.

DATED March 26, 2020.

s/Rosanna Malouf Peterson
ROSANNA MALOUF PETERSON
United States District Judge

ORDER REGARDING REPRESENTATION OF INDIAN ALLOTTEES ~ 10