THE HON. JOHN C. COUGHENOUR

### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

Petitioner,
v.

RESPONDENTS' RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S APRIL 13, 2021 REPORT AND RESPONDENTS.

Respondent.

RESPONDENTS' RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S APRIL 13, 2021 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

## I. Introduction.

Respondents Leathers, Francis, the Nooksack Tribal Court, and the Nooksack Indian Tribe submit the following Response to Petitioner's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's April 13, 2021 Report and Recommendation. Petitioner raises two arguments that have already been addressed in this action. First, she argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in not concluding that the State of Washington has exclusive jurisdiction over off-reservation trust land of the Nooksack Indian Tribe. Second, Petitioner argues that the Nooksack Tribal Court is not entitled to comity because it has denied her due process. These are refrains of earlier arguments, but Respondents will treat them briefly below.

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### Tribal Court has Concurrent Jurisdiction. II.

The overwhelming view among state courts, federal courts, tribal courts, the United States Department of the Interior and legal scholars is that P.L. 280 was not intended to and in fact did not affect civil or criminal tribal court jurisdiction. The plain language and clear legislative intent of P.L. 280 was to strengthen law enforcement in Indian country. The statute fails to address tribal court jurisdiction at all, clearly indicating the intent that it remain undisturbed.<sup>2</sup>

Petitioner, however, argues that the State of Washington assumed exclusive criminal jurisdiction under Public Law 280.<sup>3</sup> However, this is not the position of the State of Washington. The Supreme Court of Washington has repeatedly held that its criminal jurisdiction is concurrent with tribes in off-reservation trust lands.4

As recently as 2015, the Washington Supreme Court confirmed as much. In State v. Shale,5 a Yakama tribal member living on the Quinault Reservation was charged with failure to register as a sex offender in state court. He argued that the State lacked criminal jurisdiction because the offense occurred on the reservation. The Court closely examined Washington's P.L. 280 assumption and noted:

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See, e.g., Native Village of Venetie v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 562 (9th Cir. 1991); State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d 373, 850 P.2d (Wash. 1993); Op. Sol. Int., M - 6907 (11/14/78); Cohen, Federal Indian Law, § 6.04(3)(c) (2012 and Supp. 2019); and V. Jimenez and S. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 1627 (1998).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Cohen, supra, at § 6.04(c)(3). Petitioner has addressed this argument at length in previous filings and does not intend to address it here.

Petitioner cites 18 U.S.C. § 1162(c) for the proposition that Washington state criminal jurisdiction is exclusive. That section, however, does not apply to the State of Washington. It reads: "[t]he provisions of sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall not be applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of this section as areas over which the several States have exclusive jurisdiction." Subsection (a) lists only the so-called "mandatory" P.L. 280 states: Alaska, California, Minnesota, Oregon, Nebraska, and Wisconsin.

The scope of a state's assumption under P.L. 280 is a question of state law.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> 182 Wash, 2d 882, 345 P.3d 776 (2015).

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... we find Shale's argument that State courts only have concurrent jurisdiction with tribal courts when such jurisdiction has been explicitly granted by statute unavailing. *Public Law 280 and RCW 37.12.010 together do grant such jurisdiction.*<sup>6</sup>

Shale thus expressly states the Washington Supreme Court's view that its jurisdiction is concurrent with tribal courts. Shale also cited with approval State v. Moses, previously discussed by Respondents, for the proposition that tribes and the State can have overlapping criminal jurisdiction.

In *Moses*, the Washington Supreme Court concluded its criminal jurisdiction is *concurrent* with tribal courts in off-reservation trust lands. Discussing the differences between Washington and Colorado state court jurisdiction, the Court noted:

Colorado and Washington have not taken similar approaches to concurrent state and tribal jurisdiction. Once Congress made it possible to do so, Washington assumed partial, nonconsensual, *concurrent* jurisdiction over tribal reservations in 1963.<sup>9</sup>

Accordingly, the Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that its criminal jurisdiction under P.L. 280 assumption is concurrent with tribes. Both *Shale* and *Moses* cited *State v. Schmuck*, <sup>10</sup> previously discussed by Respondents. In that case, the Washington Supreme Court expressly stated the issue as whether Washington's assumption of jurisdiction under P.L. 280 divested the tribe of any inherent jurisdiction. That is precisely Petitioner's argument here. The Court unanimously rejected this argument, saying:

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> 182 Wash.2d at 895, 345 P.3d at 782, fn. 11 (citations omitted). As noted above, the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of Washington's P.L. 280 assumption in RCW Chapter 37 is binding.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> 145 Wash.2d 370, 37 P.3d 1216 (2002).

<sup>8 182</sup> Wash.2d at 890 (citing State v. Moses, 145 Wash.2d at 374).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> 145 Wash, 2d at 378, 37 P.3d at 1219 (citing Pub.L.280, 67 Stat. 588)(emphasis added).

<sup>10 121</sup> Wash.2d 373, 850 P.2d 1332 (1993), cert. den'd 510 U.S. 931 (1993).

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The State does not have the authority to divest the Tribe of its sovereignty; tribal sovereignty can be divested only by affirmative action of Congress.... Both the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have concluded that Public Law 280 is not a divestiture statute. ... Accordingly, we hold that RCW 37.12.010, enacted pursuant to Public Law 280, does not divest the Suquamish Indian Tribe of its inherent authority to stop and detain a non-Indian...<sup>11</sup>

Schmuck, like Moses and Shale after it, therefore presents a clear statement by the Washington Supreme Court that Washington's P.L. 280 assumption does divest tribes of their inherent authority over their own territory, including off-reservation trust lands, and that state criminal jurisdiction is concurrent with tribal authority. As they are bound to do, lower Washington courts agree. For example, in State v. Depoe, 13 construing Shale, the appellate court described P.L. 280 this way: "Congress authorized certain states to impose concurrent state court jurisdiction in Indian country without tribal consent." Washington courts are unanimous that state criminal jurisdiction is concurrent with tribes on off-reservation trust land.

### III. Petitioner has Been Afforded Due Process.

Petitioner's second argument, like the first, is a rehash of previous arguments. She claims the Nooksack Tribal Court is not entitled to comity as it has denied her due process, as her criminal case in tribal court has not been acted on. However, Petitioner has consented to repeated continuances.<sup>15</sup> The record reflects that not only did Respondent consent to the continuance of her criminal case but did so expressly for the purpose of allowing *this litigation* to go forward. She

<sup>11 121</sup> Wash.2d at 396, 850 P.2d at 1344 (emphasis added).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Petitioner also cites an old attorney general opinion for the conclusion that state criminal jurisdiction is exclusive under P.L. 280, AGO 63-64, No. 68 (11/8/63). Despite repeatedly opportunities, not only has the Washington Supreme Court not relied on that opinion, it has never even mentioned it. Nor has any lower court reported decision. The implication is clear.

<sup>13 188</sup> Wash. App. 1012 (Wash. App. 2015).

<sup>14 188</sup> Wash. App. at 1013 (emphasis added).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> See attached Declaration of D. Francis and exhibit.

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therefore cannot be heard to complain of denial of due process when she has consented to a delay for tactical purposes. To argue otherwise here is the height of hypocrisy.

#### IV. Conclusion.

Petitioner again argues that the State of Washington has exclusive criminal jurisdiction over off-reservation tribal lands. This is contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority and to the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of its own statute. Petitioner also argues that she should be excused from exhausting tribal court remedies because her tribal court criminal case has been delayed. However, she has repeatedly consented to continuances in the case. One wonders if she is agreeing to continuances simply to be able to argue denial to due process to this Court. This arguments smacks of bad faith and should be rejected.

WHEREFORE, Respondents Leathers, Francis, the Nooksack Tribal Court, and the Nooksack Indian Tribe oppose Petitioner's Objections to the Judge Magistrate's April 13, 2021 Report and Recommendation.

NOOKSACK INDIAN TRIBE

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## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

On May 7, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing Response to Petitioner's Objections to the Report and Recommendation dated April 13, 2012 with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF System, which will send electronic notification of such filing to the following parties:

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18	Signed under penalties of perjury and the laws of the Un	ited States of America this 7 <sup>th</sup> day of May,		
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