STATE OF MICHIGAN THIRTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT INGHAM COUNTY

JLLJ DEVELOPMENT LLC, and LANSING FUTURE DEVELOPMENT II, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

v File No. 21-189-CB Hon. Joyce Draganchuk

KEWADIN CASINOS GAMING AUTHORITY,

Defendant.

MOTION TO DISMISS

BEFORE THE JOYCE DRAGANCHUK, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

Lansing, Michigan - Wednesday, June 23, 2021

APPEARANCES:

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OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER/RECORDER
30TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT
LANSING, MICHIGAN

assets that can be used. There's no assets that can be used. We all know how this is done, which is you go and you find an investor who's willing to put up the money. And if they — if you can get an investor who's willing to put up the money, then you can give them a share of the profits down the road to compensate them for that risk.

And that's what they did here. They took a huge risk. Getting a casino built in down state Michigan, as they said in their complaint, their own complaint, is a hard thing to do. There was a lot -- were a lot of hurdles to get through. And that's why they had the big payday if it worked. And now they want the big payday even though it hasn't worked. And they don't get that because they agreed that they would only get compensated from those profits.

So the waiver of sovereign immunity we believe is clear and unambiguous. If, as Mr. Broder says, it's ambiguous, it still has to be interpreted in favor of the Tribe because of the substantial case law that says that waivers of sovereign immunity have to be waived -- or have to be construed in front of the Tribe -- in favor of the Tribe.

The one last point I want to make is just Tribes all the time waive sovereign immunity. The fact that -- the case law is when the Tribes believe they haven't is not indicative of the path that ties to regularly based sovereign immunity. There's regular suits where it's not an issue.

It's only in this type of a case where somebody's trying to come back in and get something that they did not negotiate for, a broad waiver of sovereign immunity to get at all the Tribe's assets that there's an issue.

The Plaintiffs here, we would note, are basically nonrecourse entities also. And that's one of the things that is frustrating is that they're complaining that the Tribe and their entity is nonrecourse loan. But what we've got here are people who created these one — one purpose corporations, put in whatever assets they wanted to put into those corporations, but we can't bring a claim against their corporations because the corporations are these single entity — or single transaction entities. They know how to do the nonrecourse for their benefit. And now they're complaining the Tribe is doing it for its benefit, and that they agreed to it and they shouldn't have now, they say, because they want the big payday.

So we are very frustrated with the language that they're using in trying to denigrate the Tribe and denigrate the attorneys for a case where they knew what they agreed to and they need to live with it. So we would ask that the court dismiss this case.

THE COURT: All right, thank you. Well, as I indicated at the beginning, this is the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. It is, in actuality, a Motion for Summary

Disposition. According to the motion, it's brought under (C)(4), subject matter jurisdiction. But that -- I could not find any briefing on that, so I'm not considering it under (C)(4).

It was also brought under (C)(10), according to the motion. But it wasn't briefed, again, as a (C)(10) motion, and it wasn't properly supported as a (C)(10) motion, so I'm not considering it a (C)(10) motion.

What it is is a (C)(7) motion, which is how it was briefed, and that is that the -- the assertion of sovereign immunity with respect to the Tribe. So proceeding on those grounds I think it would be wise to start with some guiding principles in this area.

First, in order to relinquish its immunity, of course a Tribe's wavier has to be clear. A wavier can't be implied. It has to be unequivocally expressed. But even though it must be unequivocally expressed, it doesn't really require the particular words, sovereign immunity, be used in order to constitute an unequivocal express waiver of sovereign immunity.

I also learned from looking at the cases that were cited by both sides that the contract provisions themselves may suffice to work as an express waiver of sovereign immunity where -- in cases where those exact words are not used. So what I'm alluding to is the Bates Association case,

the Michigan Court of Appeals case, talked about the U.S. Supreme Court case, C & L Enterprises, where the sovereign immunity was found to be waived. It didn't say the Tribe expressly waives sovereign immunity, but it did -- the contract said Oklahoma law would govern and that the Oklahoma courts had jurisdiction. So the U.S. Supreme Court, as was discussed in the Bates case by the Michigan Court of Appeals, found that that was -- that satisfied an express waiver of sovereign immunity.

I saw that again in a case that was unpublished. This is a Michigan Court of Appeals case from 2015. And as an unpublished case, of course it's of little -- it's not binding, but it was still informative, along with the other cases that are binding. And that is Star Tickets versus Chumash Casino Resort, and it applied those same principles that you don't have to actually say we waive sovereign immunity, but the contract itself and the language of the contract may operate as such a waiver.

So in that case the contract contained the language that it was enforceable against any party and any court of competent jurisdiction within Kent County. And it also said the parties consented and submitted to the personal jurisdiction of Michigan for purposes of enforcing the agreement. And then, finally, it also said the agreement was governed by the laws of Michigan. So again, those

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contractual provisions operated as an express waiver of sovereign immunity.

So with those principles in mind, I would conclude that the Term-Key Agreements alone are far more expansive in waiving sovereign immunity than just Section 6.3 alone describes. And of course an entire contract always has to be examined. You can't just pull out one section and ignore everything else, so I examined the entire contract.

And Section 5.3.1.3 entitled Election of Remedies provides as follows, and this is a little long but I think it's important. So it provides, "Notwithstanding any term or provision of any of the Transaction Documents to the contrary, Developer may exercise any and all rights and remedies existing or available to Developer under any of the Transaction Documents, or under applicable law including, without limitation, the rights and remedies of a secured party with respect to the Operating Profits and Equipment under the Tribe's UCC provisions.

In the event Developer shall elect to selectively and successively enforce its rights under applicable law or under any one or more of the Transaction Documents, such action shall not be deemed a waiver or discharge of any other right or remedy existing or available to Developer under any applicable law or under the Transaction Documents; nor shall such action discharge any lien, encumbrance, or other

security interest granted to Developer under the Transaction Documents."

Going on, Section 5.3.3.2 Cumulative Remedies provides, "The remedies provided for in this section 5.3 shall be cumulative to the extent permitted by applicable law, and may be exercised partially, concurrently, or separately. The exercise of one or more remedies shall not be deemed to preclude the exercise of any other remedies." That ends the quote from the agreement.

So except for the nonrecourse provision, which I will speak to in a moment, Section 6.3 which expressly mentions sovereign immunity, is actually quite consistent with the very broad wavier in Section 5.3 that applies, notwithstanding any term or provision of any of the Transaction Documents to the contrary.

Section 6.3.1 provides, "That any dispute shall be resolved first pursuant to applicable federal law; second, pursuant to applicable state law; and third, pursuant to the laws of the Tribe if neither federal nor state law applies." Further, it says that, "The parties designate the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan as the forum for any litigation."

It seems to me that we have an illustration here by what the Plaintiff did as to how this language applies. The Plaintiff followed it and adhered to that language in this

case, giving federal law the first shot. The Plaintiff filed suit in federal court. However, not a great surprise, the federal court found that federal law did not apply because there was no federal jurisdiction. There were only state law claims and there was no doorway to federal court in the action. So the case got dismissed, and then this suit followed in an effort to apply state law.

That's exactly what Section 6.3.1 says that any dispute is resolved first by applicable federal law, second pursuant to applicable state law. What could that possibly mean when if all you have are state law claims you're never getting in the door, or much past the door, of federal court.

It obviously means that you take a shot at federal court and if there's -- but if that doesn't work because there's no applicable federal law, which there was not according to the federal court, then you go to state law. If you go to state law you have to go to state court. Because if there's no doorway into federal court, then that's the next option per the contract of the parties. So this suit followed in an effort to apply state law.

Section 6.3.2 merely affirms that the waiver in Section 6.3.1 applies. And then it goes on to affirm that it is an express and explicit waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to the Gaming Authority only. And that is the only Defendant here, so not a problem with that language.

So with all of that said, the applicable language in the notes is consistent with the Turn-Key Agreement. The notes say, "The borrower hereby expressly grants to the lender an irrevocable limited waiver of its sovereign immunity from suit with respect to any dispute, claim, or controversy between the lender and the borrower arising out of or relating in any way to this note or any actions contemplated to be taken in accordance herewith, collectively a claim, in furtherance of the foregoing waiver. And with respect to any claim the borrower hereby consents with respect to any claim to be sued in, one, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, or two, any court of general jurisdiction in the state of Michigan."

And that ends the quote. It doesn't end the whole language in the contract, but it's the applicable language. It goes on to say further, "Upon default, the lender shall have all rights and remedies provided in this note, or in any other agreements between borrower and lender and applicable law." So I read that as the same broad and expansive express waiver of sovereign immunity that's contained in the Turn-Key Agreements.

The only thing that is remaining to be addressed is the nonrecourse provision in the Turn-Key Agreements.

Section 6.3.3, *Procedural Requirements* is the title, provides that the waiver of sovereign immunity is effective only if

every one of three conditions is met. And the third requirement limits funds to satisfy any judgment Developer secures to the operating profits and the equipment. So that's the part where — that limitation seems to fly in the face of the language in the other Transaction Documents that expressly and irrevocably waive sovereign immunity and grant the Developer all of its rights and all of its remedies in the event of default.

And that conflict has to be addressed. And I would resolve it with any of these three approaches. The first is that in the event -- and this is Section 5.1 of the Turn-Key Agreement -- in the event of a default under the Turn-Key Agreement that constitutes a default under all the Transaction Documents.

And Section 5.3.1.3 of the Turn-Key Agreement provides under *Election of Remedies*, "Notwithstanding any term or provision of any of the Transaction Documents to the contrary, Developer may exercise any and all rights and remedies existing or available to Developer under any of the Transaction Documents or under applicable law."

There is no comparable notwithstanding any other term or provision language with respect to the nonrecourse provision. So that's one way of looking at it. That alone does not have to be dipositive because I think there's two other ways of looking at it.