1	SCHLEIER LAW OFFICES, P.C.	
	4600 E. Shea Blvd., Suite 208	
2	Phoenix, Arizona 85028	
3	Telephone: (602) 277-0157	
	Facsimile: (602) 654-3790	
4	TOD F. SCHLEIER, ESQ. #004612	
_	BRADLEY H. SCHLEIER, ESQ. #011696	
5	Attorneys for Plaintiffs	
6	DUTTILE CUREDIOD COURT OF THE CTATE OF A DIZONA	
_	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA	
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF APACHE	
8	IN AND FOR THE COUNT FOR AFACHE	
	Christi El-Meligi, a single woman; Netrisha	) Case No.: S0100CV202100183
9	Dalgai, a single woman,	)
10		)
10	Plaintiffs,	PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO
11	v.	DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
12		
12	Navajo Health Foundation – Sage Memorial	)
13	Hospital, Inc., an Arizona corporation; ABC	
1.4	Corporations I-X; Jane Does I-X,	)
14	Defendants	
15	Defendants.	
		)
16		
17	Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, hereby file their Response to Defendant Sage	
18	Memorial Hospital's (hereinafter "Sage") Motion to Dismiss and request the Court to deny	
18	said Motion because Sage fails to satisfy the six-part test of tribal control recently announced	
19	said Wotton because Sage rans to satisfy the six-part test of titoal control recently announced	
20	by the Arizona Supreme Court in <i>Hwal'Bay Ba: J Enterprises, Inc. v. Jantzen</i> , 248 Ariz. 98,	
20	104 (2020) (hereinafter "Hwal'Bay"). This Response is supported by the following	
21		
22	Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the declarations of Plaintiffs and accompanying	
44	exhibits.	
23		

### 2

3

4567

9 10

8

12

11

13 14

15 16

17

18

19 20

21

22

2324

25

#### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

#### A. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard.

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be either facial, where the inquiry is confined to the allegations in the complaint, or factual, where the court is permitted to look beyond the complaint to extrinsic evidence. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir.2004). On a facial challenge, all material allegations in the complaint are assumed true, and the question for the court is whether the lack of federal jurisdiction appears from the face of the pleading itself. See Wolfe, 392 F.3d at 362; Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Telephone Electronics, 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.1979). When a defendant makes a factual challenge "by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction." Safe Air For Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.2004). In the absence of a full-fledged evidentiary hearing, disputes in the facts pertinent to subject-matter are viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir.1996). The disputed facts related to subject-matter jurisdiction should be treated in the same way as one would adjudicate a motion for summary judgment. *Id*.

### **B.** Factual Background.

Plaintiff Christi El-Meligi, a nontribal member, served as Defendant Sage's Chief Executive Officer initially by a third-party management company from September 26, 2013 until the termination of her employment on October 4, 2021. (Declaration of Christi El-Meligi, Exhibit A, ¶1). Plaintiff Netrisha Dalgai, a tribal member, served as Defendant Sage's Chief Operating Officer initially by a third-party management company from January 2016 until the termination of her employment on October 4, 2021. (Declaration of Netrisha Dalgai, Exhibit B, ¶1). CEO El-Meligi and COO Dalgai, along with two independent contractors, were responsible for the day-to-day operation of Sage pursuant to Section V, ¶1-

5 of Sage's Bylaws prior to their termination in October 2021. (*Id.*; Attachment 1 to Exhibit A – Sage Bylaws).

Sage was founded, developed, and built in 1930 by the Presbyterian Board of Home Missions. The hospital and healthcare campus are located in Ganado, Arizona and the land on which the hospital is located was deeded by the United States of America to the Woman's Board of Home Missions of the Presbyterian on February 4, 1920 in fee simple. The current hospital which resides on the mission's land was built in 1963 along with other buildings that make up the current healthcare campus, many of which are 100 years old. Healthcare has been provided on the land as Sage Memorial Hospital for over 100 years. (See Exhibits A and B, ¶2).

The Presbytery handed the hospital over to Sage to operate as a private entity and Sage was incorporated pursuant to the laws of the State of Arizona on October 24, 1978. (See Exhibits A and B, ¶3; Attachment 3 to Exhibit A - Sage Articles of Incorporation). It is a hospital licensed by the Arizona Department of Health Services and is required to comply with all Arizona statutes. Even though the hospital is managed by an all Navajo Board of Directors, it has never been the intent or desire for the organization to be incorporated or registered with the Navajo Nation Business Regulatory Office as a Navajo entity. Sage is not registered or certified (incorporated) with the Navajo Nation Division of Economic Development and is not listed on the Business Regulatory Department business resource list. (See *Id.* ¶3; Attachment 4 to Exhibit A – Navajo business regulations source list).

In 2003 the Board of Directors and hospital executives made the decision to contract with the United States Government to increase the organization's funding as Sage was experiencing financial difficulty. In order to have the ability to enter into a contract with the U.S. Government's department of Indian Health Services ("IHS"), a healthcare entity must obtain the tribe's authorization known as "tribal designation." Each tribe has its own process for granting this authorization. The Navajo Nation requires an entity to obtain written support from the communities where it will be providing healthcare. These communities are known as

Chapters on the Navajo Nation. Sage successfully obtained the support in the form of resolutions from each Chapter indicating that the Chapters were in support of Sage receiving authorization for Sage to enter a contract with IHS which would provide the extra funding which Sage desperately needed. (See Exhibits A and B, ¶4).

These authorizations are typically long term since the contracts entered into between the healthcare organizations (Sage) and the U.S. Government (IHS) are for three-year increments. Sage first obtained a contract with IHS in 2009, over thirty years after it was incorporated in the State of Arizona. Even though Sage had not obtained authorization from the Navajo Nation Council or entered into its first contract with IHS to receive funding, Sage provided healthcare to the community as a continuation of the Presbytery's mission. (See Exhibits A and B, ¶5).

The Navajo Nation is governed by Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches, and its 110 subordinate local "Chapters," each a unit of local government. 26 N.N.C §2(6); 2 N.N.C. §1. Although Sage's Bylaws stated that Sage's eight (8) Chapters (Ganado, Wide Ruins, Kinlichee, Cornfields, Greasewood Springs, Steamboat, Nazlini, and Klagetoh) are to recommend candidates for the Board of Directors, (Bylaws at Art. III), the eight Chapters are currently not represented by a selective representative from each chapter. Currently, there are five (5) Board members – Delores Noble, Veronica Clark, and Andrew Simpson reside in the Steamboat chapter area; Maybelle Kelewood resides in the Kinlichee chapter area; and Aaron Long resides in the Klagetoh chapter area. The Chapters have long been requesting they each have a representative on the Board of Directors from each of the eight Chapters, but the Board has not complied with their requests. The Chapters have also requested the Board provide reports to them, but this has not occurred. Consequently, the eight Chapters do not collectively govern Sage. (See Exhibit A, ¶6 and Exhibit B, ¶5).

#### C. Standard of Review.

"Indian tribes as 'domestic dependent nations,' are immune from lawsuits in state and federal court, unless that immunity is waived by the tribe or abrogated by Congress... Sovereign

immunity applies to a tribe's commercial and government activities, conducted both on and off the reservation." *Hwal'Bay* at 102. The Arizona Supreme Court noted that it had not established a definitive test to identify when tribal subordinate organizations are "arms of the tribe" and no nationwide consensus exists on the appropriate inquiry. The *Hwal'Bay* Court was guided by the California Supreme Court decision in *People v. Miami Nation Enters.*, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 837, 386 P. 3d 357, 366-368 (2016) which extensively analyzed the various tests utilized by various courts under "arms of the tribe" doctrine.<sup>1</sup>

The Arizona Supreme Court stated subordinate economic organizations of tribes also have sovereign immunity, if, but only if, they meet a six-factor test of tribal control. The Court's six factors are (1) the entity's creation and business form, (2) the entity's purpose, (3) the business relationship between the tribe and the entity, (4) the tribe's intent to share immunity with the entity, (5) the financial relationship between the entity and the tribe, and (6) whether immunizing the entity furthers federal policies underlying sovereign immunity. *Hwal'Bay* at 104-106. The entity (Sage) has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it is a tribe's subordinate economic organization for sovereign immunity purposes. *Id.* at 102.

Sage relies on a fourteen year-old case which previously held Sage "as an arm of a sovereign Indian tribe" in *E.E.O.C. v. Navajo Health Found.-Sage Mem'l Hosp., Inc.*, 2007 WL 2683823 at \*1 (D.Ariz. Sept. 7, 2007). The issue in that case was whether the Defendant fell within the "Indian Tribe" exemption from Title VII. In concluding the Navajo Nation exercises sufficient control over the hospital to render it a tribal entity for purposes of Title VII, Judge Campbell relied upon the facts presented to him in that case that Sage's Board of Directors

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In *Miami Nation*, the defendants included several tribal business entities affiliated with two federally recognized tribes that were allegedly involved in illegal lending practices. (*Miami Nation*, *supra*, 2 Cal.5<sup>th</sup> at p. 230, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 837, 386 P.2d 357). The California Supreme Court held that these affiliated entities were not immune from suit as "arms of the tribe" under a newly devised five-factor test that "takes into account both formal and relationship aspects between tribes and their affiliated entitles" and placed the burden of proof on the entity claiming immunity. (*Ibid*.)

1 | im
2 | re
3 | 20
4 | ei
5 | C
6 | H
7 | M
20
9 | un

included one representative from each of eight Chapters. However, as Plaintiffs' Declarations reveal, unlike the factual situation Judge Campbell found significant on the issue of control in 2007 in his ruling, all eight Chapters are not currently represented by a member from each of the eight Chapters, demonstrating limited control by each of the eight Chapters. Moreover, Judge Campbell did <u>not</u> apply the six-factor test recently announced by the Arizona Supreme Court in *Hwal'Bay* and his ruling predated the influential Tenth Circuit decision in *Breakthrough Management Group., Inc. v. Chukchansis Gold Casino and Resort*, 629 F.3d 1173 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2010). Consequently, because the Arizona Supreme Court established a new test in *Hwal'Bay* under Arizona state law, this Court is now required to evaluate each of the six-factors to determine whether Sage is "an arm of the tribe" for tribal immunity analysis under state law.

- D. Based upon the Six-Factors Announced *Hwal'Bay*, Sage Does Not Have Derivative Immunity and This Court Therefore Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
  - 1. Sage's Creation and Business Form Clearly Demonstrate it is Not a Subordinate Economic Organization.

This Court must consider "who created the entity, under what authority, and the entity's structural form ...." under the first *Hwal'Bay* factor. In considering the "method of creation of the economic entities," courts focus on the law under which the entities were formed. *Breakthrough* at 1191. Formation under tribal law weighs in favor of immunity. *Miami Nation*, *supra*, 2 Cal.5<sup>th</sup> at p. 245, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 837, 386 P.2d 357. Sage is not registered or certified (incorporated) with the Navajo Nation Division of Economic Development and is not listed on the Business Regulatory Department business resource list. (Exhibits A and B, ¶3 and Attachment 4 to Exhibit A).

The *Hwal'Bay* Court noted that incorporation weighs <u>heavily</u> against a finding the corporation is a subordinate economic organization because incorporation established the entity as "separate and distinct" from the tribe and furthers a policy underlying sovereign immunity by insulating the tribe's assets from corporate liability. *Id.* at 104-105. Although Sage cites cases on pages 7-8 of its Motion which have held state incorporation is not detrimental to a tribal

immunity, these cases are inapposite because they disagree with key language from *Hwal'Bay* which warns that incorporation weighs heavily against finding sovereign immunity.

Indeed, it is undisputed that Sage was formed under state law in Arizona as opposed to laws governing the tribe. Sage was incorporated as an Arizona corporation pursuant to Arizona's corporation statutes in 1978 and has remained an Arizona corporation through the present. The general powers of an Arizona corporation are outlined in A.R.S. § 10-302. Pursuant to that section, each corporation has the power to sue and be sued and defend in its corporate name.

In Somerlott v. Cherokee Nation Distributors, Inc., 686 F.3d 1144, 1154 (10th Cir. 2012), the Tenth Circuit noted that "United States sovereign immunity does not extend to its sub-entities incorporated as distinct legal entities under state law." 686 F.3d at 1150. In applying the same principle to tribal sovereign immunity, the court declined to apply the "arm of the tribe" factors, and instead stated that the "separate legal entity organized under the laws of another sovereign...cannot share in the [tribe's] immunity from suit." Id. The subordinate economic entity test is inapplicable to entities organized under state law, because such entities are under the authority of the state under which they are incorporated, not an Indian tribe. Id. at 1149–50; see also, Miami Nation Enters., 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 837, 386 P.3d 357, 372 (2016) ("creation of a separate legal entity pursuant to state law, rather than tribal law, weighs heavily against a finding that an entity related to an Indian tribe is an arm of the tribe protected by sovereign immunity"); Airvator, Inc. v. Turtle Mountain Mfg. Co., 329 N.W.2d 596, 602-04 (N.D. 1983); Wright v. Prairie Chicken, 579 N.W.2d 7, 10 (S.D. 1989).

Based on the above, the Court should find this factor weighs in favor of finding Sage is not an arm of the tribe.

# 2. Sage's Purpose Does Not Dictate that it is a Subordinate Economic Organization Entitled to Tribal Immunity.

The second *Hwal'Bay* factor focuses on "whether the entity exists solely as a profit-making venture that merely generates revenue for the tribe or its members, or whether it

assists the tribe in carrying out its governmental functions, such as promoting tribal or economic development, preserving cultural autonomy, or funding governmental services." *Hwal'Bay* at 105. Sage serves neither purpose. "If the entity's purpose is solely to engage in commercial activity, this factor weighs against immunity." *Id.* Sage solely engages in commercial activity, *i.e.*, operating a hospital as a nonprofit corporation. Article IV of its Articles of Incorporation states its initial business: "Said corporation is organized exclusively for charitable, scientific, educational, old age homes, and charitable hospitals, including for such purposes the making of distributions to organizations that qualify as exempt organizations under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (or the corresponding provisions of any future U.S. Internal Revenue Law)." (See Exhibit A, Attachment 3).

There is no language in Sage's Articles of Incorporation or bylaws which indicate Sage is to promote tribal or economic development, preserve cultural autonomy or fund governmental services. Moreover, it is clear that Sage does not exist solely as a profitmaking venture which generates revenue for the tribe or its members. (See Exhibit A, ¶7, Exhibit B, ¶6).

Indeed, none of Sage's revenue is provided to the tribe. From the federal government's annual budget, a certain amount is allotted to each IHS Area office which then divides this funding to allot to each tribe based upon the population of the area. The funds are allotted to IHS area offices located throughout the United States to fund healthcare for qualified tribal members; the Navajo Area Office is the office which provides funding for healthcare to Sage. These area offices divide monies up between any IHS government run and owned hospitals or healthcare facilities and any private facilities which contract with IHS for funding (known as 638 facilities). These facilities must meet the qualifications of P.L. 93-638 to be able to enter what is known as an ISDEAA (Indian Self Determination Education Assistance Act) contract with IHS. The funds do not belong to and

are not "given" to the Navajo Nation, they are allotted or "given" to the IHS Area Office which provides the funding to Sage. (Exhibit A, ¶8, Exhibit B, ¶7).

Plaintiffs do not deny that Sage is the vehicle under which funds to provide healthcare to Navajo Nation tribal members. However, the Navajo Nation itself receives none of Sage's revenues and its articles and bylaws contain no language about tribal economic development or preserve cultural autonomy. Moreover, denying immunity to Sage would not hinder tribal cultural autonomy and self-determination because Sage was created for commercial reasons, *i.e.*, to operate a hospital. This factor favors no tribal immunity or is neutral.

# 3. The Business Relationship Between the Navajo Nation and Sage Demonstrates Sage is Not Economically Subordinate to the Navajo Nation.

Under this factor, the court examines the structure, management, and ownership of the entity. Relevant considerations include the entity's formal governance structure, the extent to which it is owned by the tribe, and the entity's day-to-day management. Although Sage does have five Navajo Board members, the Sage Board meets only quarterly and occasionally has special Board meetings to cover specific topics on an agenda. Moreover, as noted earlier, all eight Chapters are not represented on Sage's Board, which has long been the subject of serious disagreement between Sage's Board and the absent Chapters. (Exhibit A, ¶9, Exhibit B, ¶8).

Prior to their termination, Plaintiffs were responsible for the day-to-day operations of Sage, along with two non-tribal member independent contractors. As noted in *Hwal' Bay*, "If the tribe retains some ownership and formal control of the entity but has contracted out its management, this factor may weigh either for or against immunity." Here, the Sage Board exercises little or no control over the day-to-day operations of Sage, but contracted out its management to Razaghi Healthcare in early 2008. Subsequently, the day-to-day operations were supervised by Plaintiffs and two other independent contractors after Razaghi Healthcare's management contract was terminated in August 2018. Essentially, the Board has not operated the day-to-day operations since at least 2008. (Exhibit A ¶10, Exhibit B,

¶9). Because the Board exercises little or no control over Sage's day-to-day operations, Plaintiffs submit this weighs against immunity.

# 4. The Evidence Clearly Demonstrates the Tribe Did Not Intend to Share Its Immunity with Sage.

Under the fourth *Hwal'Bay* factor, the Court looks to declarations and actions which demonstrate an intent to share the Tribe's immunity. The Court should be less inclined to conclude that an entity shares a tribe's immunity if the tribe itself did not intend this result. *Id.* at 105. The *Hwal' Bay* Court specifically noted that an entity's obligation to indemnify and hold the tribe harmless for the entity's tort liability, or the procurement of liability insurance protecting the tribe and entity from the entity's negligence, evidences the tribe's expectation that the entity would be responsible for its torts. *Id.* 

Here, the record is devoid of evidence demonstrating the tribe's intent. Sage's Articles of Incorporation and its Bylaws are silent as to the tribe's intent to share its immunity with Sage.

Moreover, the fourth factor strongly factors against a finding of tribal immunity for Sage. The *Hwal'Bay* Court emphasized that if an entity purchases liability insurance which protects the tribe from negligence, this is evidence of the tribe's expectation that Sage would be responsible for its torts. It is undisputed Sage has always maintained its own insurance policies to protect itself from liability just as any private healthcare facility in any metropolitan city would be required to do. Sage receives protection for malpractice for its medical staff through the United States FTCA through an executed contract with IHS. It has also maintained a separate malpractice insurance for its medical staff. Additionally, Sage maintains Directors' and Officers' liability insurance and the policy provides employment practices liability coverage. The Navajo Nation in no way provides any insurance or coverage in the event of liability to benefit Sage. (Exhibit A, ¶11, Exhibit B, ¶10; Attachment 5 to Exhibit A, Sage Insurance Policies).

1
 2
 3

Sage's procurement of extensive liability insurance coverage and the absence of any intent of the Navajo Nation to share its immunity with Sage heavily favors a finding that Sage is not entitled to tribal immunity.

## 5. The Financial Relationship Between Sage and Its Member Chapters Weighs Against Sovereign Immunity.

The fifth *Hwal'Bay* factor looks to "whether the tribe's assets are protected from judgments" or "whether enforcement of any judgment...would 'effectively strike a blow against the tribal treasury' due to the tribe's heavy dependance on entity revenues to fund governmental functions." *Hwal'Bay* at 106 (quoting *Miami Nation Enters.*, 2 Cal.5<sup>th</sup> at 248).

As *Hwal'Bay* noted when discussing *Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co.*, 160 Ariz. 251, 258 (1989), extending immunity to Sage is not necessary to protect tribal assets due to the existence of liability insurance. As noted in Section 4 above, Sage carries Directors and Officers Liability insurance and its insurance policy includes employer practices liability insurance. (Exhibits A and B). Consequently, Sage's claim on page 14 of its Motion that "judgments against Sage Memorial would be paid from funds it otherwise must use to provide governmental healthcare services...Monetary suits against Sage Memorial would strike a blow to the Navajo Nation's share of funds for providing services to its members," is simply specious.

Indeed, if Sage found itself in any type of litigation and had to pay a settlement, the Navajo Nation Government would have absolutely no business relationship, no obligation and no liability regarding Sage's business dealings or operations. Sage has lost many legal cases and/or paid many settlements over the years. This does not impact the Navajo Nation whatsoever. Sage is a private business. (Exhibit A, ¶12, Exhibit B, ¶11).

Sage has absolutely no financial relationship with the Navajo Nation. As noted above, none of Sage's funds received from IHS or any of its additional third-party funding sources are provided to the Navajo Nation. Nor would the Navajo Nation Government suffer if it revoked Sage's authority (tribal designation for the purpose of contracting with IHS) to

1 contract with IHS for funding which is utilized to augment Sage's funding for its operations. Should Sage or the Navajo Nation revoke Sage's authorization which would result in the 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

termination of Sage's contract with IHS, the funds that are allocated and given to Sage as part of the contract would simply be redistributed to the other Navajo Area healthcare facilities to be utilized within their organizations to continue ongoing healthcare services to the Navajo people. Although Sage contends that if it lost funds through a legal settlement or termination of its IHS contract, the patients in Sage's service area would no longer be able to receive healthcare, this is false as Sage would still continue to operate regardless of its funding source. IHS funds allocated to the Navajo Area Office are based on population of the area as a whole, therefore, the amount the Navajo Area IHS Office receives remains the same and is not given back to the U.S. Government. If one of the IHS contracts is terminated with one of the healthcare facilities on the Navajo Nation, the funds it receives are redistributed to the other area healthcare facilities. Sage would continue to operate if it lost its tribal designation from the Navajo Nation based upon its collections from third-party revenue. (Exhibit A, ¶13, Exhibit B, ¶12).

Because none of Sage's revenues flows to the Navajo Nation and a judgment against Sage would not affect the tribal treasury, this factor weighs in favor of a finding of no tribal immunity for Sage. "Arm of the tribe" tribal immunity here would not affect the Navajo Nation's financial interests and is a factor against a finding of tribal immunity.

#### 6. Whether Immunizing Sage Furthers Federal Policies Underlying Sovereign Immunity.

For the sixth Hwal'Bay factor, the Court simply observed: "Although policies underlying sovereign immunity are embedded in the other five factors, a court should still separately consider whether recognizing immunity for the entity would further those policies." *Hwal'Bay* at 106. Those policies include: '[p]rotection of tribal assets, preservation of cultural autonomy, preservation of tribal self-determination, and promotion of commercial dealings between Indians and non-Indians." Dixon v. Picopa Const. Co., 160 Ariz. 251, 258

(1989). Plaintiffs submit none of those policies would be furthered by granting Sage tribal immunity. Due to insurance coverage, the Navajo Nation's tribal assets are protected, granting immunity will not preserve cultural autonomy or tribal self-determination and would not promote dealings between Indians and non-Indians.

Indeed, the majority of the *Hwal'Bay* factors which the Arizona Supreme Court established to determine whether an entity is a subordinate economic organization of a tribe weigh heavily against granting tribal immunity. Sage was incorporated and operates under the laws of the State of Arizona on private Arizona land and was never incorporated with the Navajo Nation. (Factor 1). Because it is incorporated under Arizona state law, "that fact 'weighs heavily' against a finding it is a subordinate economic organization... This is so because incorporation establishes the entity as 'separate and distinct' from the tribe, may imply a waiver of immunity, and itself furthers a policy underlying sovereign immunity by insulating the tribe's assets from corporate liability." *Hwal'Bay* at 104-105.

Sage's Bylaws state the Board is to be Navajo tribal members and are to be nominated and recommended by the Navajo Nation Chapters within Sage's service area. However, the Board of Directors has not been provided full representation to all eight Chapters for over a decade. The entire Board consists of five (5) members and the Bylaws have not established enough Board seats for each of eight Chapters to have representation. The current Board of Directors reside in only three of the eight Chapter areas. Therefore, other than Sage's request from the eight Chapters for a supporting resolution for the purpose of contracting with IHS, all of the Chapters do not control Sage. There is a paucity of evidence that the purpose for which Sage was formed was to promote tribal or economic development or preserve cultural autonomy, although it is a vehicle for receiving funding from IHS to fund healthcare for tribal members as a commercial, non-profit operation. "If an entity's purpose is solely to engage in commercial activity, this factor weighs against immunity." Hwal'Bay at 105. Consequently, Factors 2 and 3 weigh in favor of finding Sage is not a subordinate economic organization entitled to tribal immunity.

Sage's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws reflect no intent to share the Navajo Nation's tribal immunity. (Factor 4). As noted in *Hwal'Bay*, one of the primary purposes of tribal immunity is to protect the tribal treasury. It is undisputed Sage has procured malpractice and Directors' and Officers' liability insurance and thus any judgment against Sage will not "effectively strike a blow against the tribal treasury." Hwal' Bay at 106. Thus, Hwal'Bay Factors 4 and 5 "weigh heavily" against finding Sage is a subordinate economic organization of the Navajo Nation because it would not be liable for any judgment against Sage.

#### E. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs request the Court deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. As demonstrated above, most of the Hwal'Bay factors weigh heavily in favor of a finding of no tribal immunity for Sage.

DATED this 28th day of January 2022.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

SCHLEIER LAW OFFICES, P.C.

/s/ Tod F. Schleier Tod F. Schleier Attorney for Plaintiffs

The foregoing was e-filed and emailed to:

Geoffrey Strommer, Esq. Akilah Kinnison, Esq. 215 SW Washington, Suite 200 Portland, OR 97204

21

Kenneth Brendel, Esq. 22 Mangum, Wall, Stoops & Warden 112 N. Elden Street 23

P.O. Box 10

Flagstaff, AZ 86002 Attorneys for Defendant

25

24

/s/ Cindy J. Anderson