



## CANARY JURISPRUDENCE

into a major test of the balance of power on

## LIPHANT V. SUQUAMISH TRIBE, 1978

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cramped office on the main Street of this tiny Puget Sound community, have the authority to arrest non-Indians on the reservation?

And once arrests are made, does the Suquamish trial court, which is usually convened by turning an office table sideways and clearing away the coffee pot, have the authority to try non-Indians—who have no direct voice in the making of Suquamish law—and sentence them to jail?

Those two questions, presented to the nation's highest court in an era of unprecedented controversy over Indian claims to land and its resources, contain a staggering array of legal implications—"so far reaching," said a Tacoma city official, "that you don't even want to contemplate it."

If the Suquemish are granted criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the decision might well

See INDIANS, A4, Col. 1



By Jerry Oay for The Washington Post Non-Indian Oliphant, Supreme Court petitioner.

construction and policing of streets and highways, sho

In terms of policy considerations, it makes no sense to allow 50 to 150 Indians to set up a "tribal court" and assume jurisdiction - whether concurrent or not - over more than 2,800 non-Indians who live within the technical boundary of the reservation, and who own in fee most of the land.

I realize that Indian law is indeed "a law unto itself", and often seems incompatible with broader public interests. I am inclined to accept a large measure of autonomy where the issue JUSTICE LEWIS POWELL:

MEMO TO CLERK

ion of tribal history, culture and the

rights of Indians. But this case involves the attempt by a

Because I think this is a difficult case, I would recommend that you awart the dissent before voting. This is a fairly feeble recommendation, however, because my instinctive feeling is that the majority's result is the correct one.

And because of the problems that would attend an attempt to say that Congress actually withdress indian criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, I do not think I could write a decent concurrence along those lines. Buzz told me that he read OWELL CLERK MEMO

POWELL CLERK MEMO TO JUSTICE POWELL

19th century treaty, in addition to

all the legislative history of the 19th century Indian






NTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION SINFORCE THE CONSTITUTION

## HE PURPOSE OF THE CONSTITUTION

PROTECT PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECT LIBERTY

STABLISH SOCIAL CONTRACT



GLAVERY INDIAN KILLING AND DIGPOGGEGGION


STATES' RIGHTS


INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, NOT HUMAN RIGHTS

ENABLE GOVERNMENT TO ENFORCE GOCIAL CONTRACT WITHOUT LIMITS

> EXCLUDE WOMEN, UNPROPERTIED MEN, INDIANG, AND FOREIGNERS

LIMIT GOVERNMENT POWER OVER BENEFICIARIES OF GOCIAL CONTRACT





JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court

On the far end of the Trail of Tears was a promise. Forced to leave their ancestral lands in Georgia and Alabama, the Creek Nation received assurances that their new lands in the West would be secure forever. In exchange for ceding "an their land. East of the Mississippi river, the U.S. government agreed by treaty that "[t]he Creek country west of the Mississippi shall be solemnly guarantied to the Creek Indians." Treaty With the Creeks, Arts. I, XIV, Mar. 24, 1832, 7 Stat. 366, 368 (1832 Treaty). Both parties settled on boundary lines for a new and "permanent home to the whole Creek nation," located in what is now Oklahoma. Treaty With the Creeks, preamble, Feb. 14, 1833, 7 Stat. 418 (1833 Treaty). The government further promised that "[no] State or Territory [shall] ever have a right to pass laws for the government of such Indians, but they shall be allowed to govern themselves." 1832 Treaty, Art. XIV, 7 Stat. 368.



## THE CORRECT ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT SEPARATION OF POWERS DEFERENCE TO CONGRESS

COMPLIANCE WITH DEFAULT INTERPRETATIVE RULES

VOID POLITICAL AND POLICY JUDGMENTS

CCEPT TRIBAL NATIONS AS CO-EQUAL SOVEREIGNS

ENFORCE THE DUTY OF PROTECTION



