IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA MISSOULA DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO.:
9:25-cv-00217-KLD

RYNE MATHIAS,
Petitioner/
Plaintiff,

v.

JAMIE BALDWIN,
Respondent/
Defendant.

Response in Opposition
to **MOTION for REMAND**
of Civil Rights Removal under
28 U.S.C. §1443(1)
From CSKT Tribal Court
Cause No. 24-0105-CS

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RYNE MATHIAS, Petitioner/ Plaintiff,	**CIVIL ACTION NO.:** **9:25-cv-00217-KLD**
v.	**Response in Opposition to MOTION for REMAND 28 U.S.C. §1443(1)**
JAMIE BALDWIN, Respondent/ Defendant.	From CSKT Tribal Court **Cause No. 24-0105-CS**

DID PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY EVEN READ THE TITLE of DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF REMOVAL:
"A RULE 11(b)(2) ARGUMENT to EXTEND, MODIFY, or REVERSE EXISTING LAW, and/or to MAKE NEW LAW APPLYING, CONSTRUING, or REDEFINING CIVIL RIGHTS REMOVAL under 28 U.S.C. §1443(1)"

1. I, the undersigned Respondent/Defendant Jamie Baldwin, hereby file this my response in opposition to Ryne Mathias' Document 5, "Motion for Remand and Brief" concerning my Notice of Removal according, under and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1443(1) "Civil Rights Removal."

TIMELINESS under 28 U.S.C. §1446(b)(3)

2. Petitioner's Motion for Remand depends entirely upon a strategy of intentional disregard of content, hoping that the Court will do the same.

3. Petitioner's Motion depends entirely on 28 U.S.C. §1446(b)(1) and for obvious reasons never mentions 28 U.S.C. §1446(b)(3):

> **(3) Except as provided in subsection (c), if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.**

28 U.S.C.A. § 1446 (West)

4. As Exhibit A to my Notice of Removal (Document 1, filed December 18, 2025), I specifically identified the parenting plan issued on December 8, 2025 as the triggering "other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is ***or has become*** removable." (I place bold emphasis on the words "***or has become***" removable to show that the removal statute recognizes that litigation is a dynamic, one might even say "Hegelian dialectic" process or thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, in which "reality" is constantly changing due to the actions of the parties and the court.

5. It was only the entry of Judge Bryan DePuis' December 8 "synthesis" which completely disregarded my and my son's rights to equal protection under the laws, and illustrated this was a result of systemic intertribal, i.e. racial (blood based) and political (tribal membership) prejudice against me and my son.

6. In addition, as I clarified in ¶¶42-46 of my Notice of Removal, at 10-11:

> **TRIBAL IDENTITY is the FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF RACE**
>
> It was only on Tuesday, 16 December 2025, when I met with Tribal Attorney Remington Christopher O'Conlough that I became fully aware how serious and systemic CS&KT Tribal Court Discrimination against ANY OUTSIDER really is.
>
> CS&KT Tribal Court has flagged my case with "Conflict of Interest" because my son and I are enrolled members of the Navajo Tribe---and so CS&KT Tribal Attorneys are barred from representing me "because I am a non-CS&KT tribal member" (i.e., the functional equivalent of a "non-white" within the meaning and purpose of 42 U.S.C. §§1981-1982 and all other civil rights phrased in terms of race).
>
> This is more extreme than any form of racial discrimination of which I am aware in American history.
>
> Even in the "Old South"---white lawyers were never expressly barred from representing black clients in any court of any state.

7. In other words, it was even after December 8, 2025, when I spoke to Tribal Attorney O'Conlough, that I had full notice that my rights were subject to automatic denial based on my Navajo Tribal (Racial and Political) identity.

8. Consistent with the meaning and purpose of the Civil Rights Removal Statute, I filed my Notice of Civil Rights Removal only upon realization that, in the Confederates Salish & Kootenai Tribal Courts, I face a systemic (and systematic, unescapable) denial of equal protection must be manifest in a formal expression of Tribal law and appeared to me with relative clarity prior to proceeding further.

9. My invocation of civil rights removal on December 18, 2025, was based on objective legal standards, not merely on my subjective perceptions of bias.

10. This is exactly the scenario and situation envisioned by the Supreme Court in ***State of Ga. v. Rachel***, 384 U.S. 780, 86 S.Ct. 1783, 16 L.Ed.2d 925 (1966), except for the substitution of the word "Tribal" for "State."

11. Petitioner/Plaintiff Motion and Brief does not address my Notice of Removal at all. The words "civil rights," "28 U.S.C. §1443(1)," "denial of equal protection," and "motion to extend, modify, or reverse existing law, or to make new law" do not appear anywhere in Justin Kalmbach's Document 5. It truly appears that Mr. Kalmbach never read my Notice of Removal, and hopes that the Court will follow him in ignoring every word I wrote.

12. If it were possible to strike a Motion, I would move to Strike Petitioner Ryan Mathias' Motion for Remand on the grounds of "insufficient defense" (a defense that legally cannot be a defense), but Ruel 12(f) applies only to "pleadings." Still, I ask this Court to take note that Justin Kalmbach's motion is "completely improper" because it does not address the substance of my Notice of Removal, including my Rule 11(b)(2) arguments concerning THE ABSOLUTE AND VITAL NECESSITY OF IMMEDIATE FEDERAL SUPERVISION OVER THE ABUSES OF THE TRIBAL COURTS.

13. I hereby give notice that I intend to file a separate complaint for Civil Rights Injunction and to fashion special remedies under 42 U.S.C. §§1983-1988(a), not merely as an alternative basis for assumption of Federal Jurisdiction, but in addition and supplement to support my Notice of Removal and the arguments herein advanced.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK & TIMING REQUIREMENTS

14. Unlike, for example, Bankruptcy Rule 9027, 28 USC 1443(1), the civil rights removal statute, contains no specific timing provisions.

15. The statute provides only the substantive grounds for removal, allowing removal of civil actions "against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof." 28 USCA § 1443.

16. I, Jamie Baldwin, am clearly a citizen of the United States and I and my son are clearly individual persons residing within the U.S. Jurisdiction, and we are entitled to equal protection of the laws.

17. But we do not receive, have never received, and cannot reasonably ever expect to enforce our rights to equal protection of very specific rights to disability accommodation on the one hand and to representation by counsel on the other, within the CS&KT Tribal Court framework.

18. But the absence of special timing language in section 1443 does not necessarily mean that civil rights removal cases are subject to the standard federal removal timing provisions rather than any alternative and situationally dependent set of procedural deadlines, such as those applicable, as noted, under U.S. Bankruptcy Rule 9027.

19. I recognize that Civil Rights Removal is an underused and "disfavored" statutory right and procedure, and that is why I have framed my Notice of Removal as my good faith effort to extend, modify, or reverse existing law, or to make new law for the improvement of the Tribal Courts, and the extension of full Federal Civil Rights to individuals, like myself and my son, who are involuntarily governed and held to the jurisdiction of Tribal Courts.

20. I recognize, for example, that there has never been a successful civil rights removal in the 9th Circuit, and I am seeking declaratory judgment to change the law to make removal from Tribal Court possible.

21. Equal rights to remove will enhance the standing and constitutional legitimacy of the Tribal Courts, and so will be a benefit to all Native Americans who seek to maximize Tribal Sovereignty and immunity.

22. Equal rights to remove will also discourage the kind of discrimination against non-tribal members who may be forced into tribal court from which I, Michael Wayne Futrell, and Jeffery Newton have all recently suffered.

LATER-ASCERTAINED REMOVABILITY UNDER SECTION 1446(b)(3) in the NINTH CIRCUIT

23. When a case is not initially removable but becomes removable based on subsequently discovered information, defendants must proceed under 28 USC 1446(b)(3).

24. This provision states that "if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable." 28 USCA § 1446.

25. In ***Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp.***, the 9th Circuit stated that "when the defendant receives enough facts to remove on any basis under section 1441, the case is removable, and [section 1446]'s thirty-day clock starts ticking" ***Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp.***, 445 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir., 2006). In ***Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P.***, the 9th Circuit emphasized that "a defendant should not be able to ignore pleadings or other documents from which removability may be ascertained and seek removal only when it becomes strategically advantageous for it to do so" ***Roth v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center, L.P.***, 720 F.3d 1121 (2013).

26. This principle applies equally to civil rights removal cases, as there is no statutory exception providing special timing accommodations for discovering equal protection violations after initial service.

27. The triggers, however, for Civil Rights Removal must be treated as a kind of "discovery rule" analogous to injury in tort. Like lung cancer resulting from cigarettes, the perpetrators of Tribal Court discrimination and oppression will conceal their oppressive conduct, and will resist all attempts at disclosure. But under the present circumstances, there should be warning signs at the entrance to the CS&KT Tribal Territory (Flathead Reservation):

> "YOU ARE ENTERING A TRIBAL COURT JURISDCITION WHERE YOU WILL NOT ENJOY EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OR LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: YOU MAY BE SUBJECT TO TRIAL WITHOUT ANY RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL AND DENIED EVEN SUCH BASICS AS THE PROTECTION OF THE ADA (AMERICANS WITH DISABILITY ACT)."

28. I submit that my removal, within 10 days of discovering the problematic laws, regulations, and customs, practices, and policies having the force or effect of law within the CS&KT Tribe, is very timely indeed.

29. Petitioner's absurd Motion for Remand MUST BE DENIED.

30. The conditions to which I and my son have been subjected in the CS&KT Tribe constitute extraordinary circumstances of racial-political discrimination which are incompatible with the U.S. Constitution and Laws.

DISREGARD FOR A CHILD WITH SPECIAL NEEDS VIOLATES FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION

31. I am the natural mother of a minor child, ERM, a boy with special needs, 3 years old who suffers from Level 3 (the highest level, severe) Autism and diagnosed non-verbal.

32. My son's federally secured rights to disability accommodation under the ADA, and my civil rights, have been and will continued to be systemically denied and disregarded in the CS&KT Tribal Court on the grounds of my Tribal (i.e. "Racial") Identity.

33. I object and dispute (and have always, consistently disputed) the CS&KT Tribal Court's jurisdiction; my own and my son's (ERM's) Tribal Membership is in the Navajo Nation.

34. I am an enrolled Navajo, as is my son, with Certificates of Indian Blood to prove our genetic (i.e. racial) identity, and I assert my ancestral tribe's right to my own and my son's genetic and cultural heritage, and my right to return with my Navajo son to the Navaho Nation in Arizona.

THE PURPOSES of CIVIL RIGHTS REMOVAL, according to *GEORGIA v. RACHEL*, 384 U.S. 780, 86.S.Ct. 1783 (1966)

35. ***Georgia v. Rachel*** (supra) provides the Supreme Court's controlling decision upholding Civil Rights Removal. Any civil rights removal must meet the exacting terms of this decision, and I believe my case does.

36. ***Georgia v. Rachel*** holds that where there is a clear collision between state and federal law, federal law precludes state actions under state law, quoting ***Hamm v. City of Rock Hill***, 379 U.S. 306, 85 S.Ct. 384, 13 L.Ed.2d 300 (1965). ***State of Ga. v. Rachel***, 384 U.S. 780, 785, 86 S. Ct. 1783, 1786, 16 L. Ed. 2d 925 (1966)

37. By my Notice of Civil Rights Removal, and by this opposition to remand in defense of that motion, I submit that the rule of *Georgia v. Rachel* can and must be extended to Tribal Law, and that the word "state" in 28 U.S.C. §1443(1) can and should be extended, as a matter of statutory construction, to Indian Tribal Courts (*id.*)

38. First and foremost, I submit that there is a "clear collision between state and federal law" in that (1) the Tribal Court's failed or refused to provide accommodations to my minor son's disabilities, (2) the Tribal Court, as a matter of express Tribal law and policy, has made sure that I, as a non-member of the Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribe, cannot have access to representation by counsel in Tribal Court, because Tribal Lawyers may only represent Tribal members, and non-Tribal lawyers or advocates may not appear in Tribal Court.

39. In the Civil Rights Act of 1964, providing for removal of cases to enforce rights under "any law providing for *** equal civil rights," quoted language ***does not manifest any congressional intent to limit scope of removal to rights recognized by statutes existing in 1875, but permits removal in cases involving rights under both existing and future statutes providing for equal civil rights." Georgia v. Rachel,*** 384 U.S. @789, 86 S.Ct. 1788.

40. Under the principles announced by ***Rachel,*** I am entitled and must be allowed to remove this case (1) because of the Tribal Court's 8 December 2025 Parenting Plan disregarding my son's equal rights to special accommodations for disability and (2) because of the Tribal Court's denial of my right to be represented by ANY counsel under ANY circumstances on account of my race (non-CS&KT Tribal) and Political (Navajo National) affiliation.

41. The CS&KT Tribe, and the Navajo Nation, along with most recognized and even most unrecognized Tribal Nations under Title 25 of the US Code, define and allow "political" membership in Tribes only as a direct and positive correlation of blood and descent, and for this reason, all inter-tribal discrimination should be defined as "racial."

42. I seek, by my notice of removal, applying both the letter and spirit of 42 U.S.C. §1988(a) quoted above, to negate and reverse that special insular wall of protection for constitutional review (especially for racial identity discrimination) which cases like ***Morton v. Mancari***, 417 U.S. 535, 94 S.Ct. 2574, 51 L.Ed. 2d 290 (1974) and ***Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez***, 436 U.S. 49, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) appear to have built in order to effectively exempt people subjected to the jurisdiction of Title 25 Tribes from full, normal, constitutional scrutiny and protection.

43. The Old South's definition of a phenotypically "white" person as a "negro" based on "one drop of blood" is recognized as a basis for long-standing, unconstitutional, racial discrimination.

44. For example, the foundational case ***Moreau v. Grandich***, 114 Miss. 560 (1917) established that "any appreciable amount" (i.e. "one drop") of African ancestry would classify a person as "colored" for legal purposes, and this "Jim Crow" law parallels the standard applicable (against me) in the CS&KT Tribe---in that I am Navajo [1].

---

1. [1]Mississippi maintained different racial classification standards for different legal contexts: marriage prohibitions applied the one-eighth rule from the 1890 Constitution, while school segregation and other civil rights determinations used the much stricter "any appreciable amount" standard. The general trend of Mississippi racial

45. In light of the issuance of "Certificates of Indian Blood" (CIB) as a basis for Tribal membership, Court decisions such as ***Morton v. Mancari*** holding that Tribal membership is a purely political rather than racial denomination are patently incoherent and lacking in rational basis.

46. I submit that these cases were misguidedly designed to maximize tribal autonomy, when equality with the states would be more positive for tribal integrity, and to permit unconstitutional racial discrimination on and between Indian Tribes which is absolutely illegal elsewhere. This is another plain "collision".

47. One reason why Civil Rights Removal has never been upheld in the Ninth Circuit is that statute-based racial discrimination, such as existed

---

classification law through the 20th century was toward increasingly restrictive application of the "one-drop rule."

Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in ***Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co***. provides detailed documentation of Mississippi's racial legal framework. 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Justice Brennan's opinion documented numerous Mississippi statutes requiring racial separation, including laws mandating segregation in various public accommodations and facilities. However, even this exhaustive review focused entirely on segregation requirements without addressing how Mississippi legally determined who qualified as "Negro" or "white."

BUT THE CS&KT TRIBE HAS AND APPLIES STRICT FORMULAS WHICH DO NOT PROVIDE ME AND SON ANY RECOGNITION OF OUR RIGHTS.

throughout the history of many states in the United States, especially in the South and Midwest, simply never existed in the West (except perhaps with application to the Chinese in the 19th Century, but these statutes were repealed prior to the beginning of the modern Civil Rights era in 1954).

48. ***Georgia v. Rachel*** is most often cited for the idea that Civil Rights Removal is not allowed except in cases of "rights specifically defined in terms of racial equality, i.e. providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality." 384 U.S. 789-791, 86 S.Ct. 1789.

49. ***The Confederated Salish & Kootenai have denied my right to equal access to their courts, and equal access to offer and present evidence, and hence equal access to justice, generally defined, on the grounds of an explicit and "Flathead Reservation" jurisdiction wide policy of discrimination against non-CS&KT members, defined based on blood quantum.***

50. In so doing, CS&KT Tribal Court denies to Navajo Nation Tribal members, such as me and my son, our Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection, as well as our statutory rights under 42 U.S.C. §1981, on the grounds of race.

51. As ironic as it sounds, within the context of the CS&KT Tribal Court, ONLY CS&KT Tribal members are "White" people within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1981, and Navajo Nationals like me and my son are non-whites.

NO WAIVER

52. I admit that have objected to CS&KT Tribal Court jurisdiction in this case prior to December 8, 2025, but it was only after on and after that date that I was informed that, effectively I had no rights at all.

53. My previous objections did not constitute waiver of my right to civil rights removal in this case.

54. I applied for and was denied legal representation in the CS&KT Tribal Courts on the grounds that, even if my income met qualifications for free assistance, Tribal Attorneys had to reserve themselves and their services for my son's father, an enrolled member of the Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribe.

55. Earlier this year (2025), I asked Malia Hamel [the CS&KT Tribal Clerk of Court, (and a relative cousin of my son's father's family, and step-daughter of Bradley A. Pluff, Chief Judge of the CS&KT Tribal Court, and her mother is a case worker of the Tribal Healing Court [for substance abuse])], for a list of attorneys that could help me.

56. I was given a list and called probably 100 lawyers (including 52 on the CS&KT Tribal lawyers and even some in my native state of Arizona)(see Exhibit C to my Notice of Removal, Document 1, Filed December 18, 2025).

57. The list that was provided by the Tribal Court of licensed Tribal attorneys included many inactive attorneys and all but one non-family law specialists. Outsiders all informed me they could not help me in a family Tribal Court case. This included even their public defenders (who are apparently available to handle child custody as well as criminal cases).

58. In other words, I am a clear victim of an official policy of intertribal discrimination based on cultural, genetic, and geographic origin (="race" = "radix"---meaning "my roots.").

59. So I started looking for nontribal attorneys, outside of the tribe. No non-tribal attorney anywhere was willing to take my case, either.

60. I intended to file a motion to dismiss as I believe there is a conflict of interest here, but then I met Michael W. Futrell and learned of his Notice of Removal on Civil Rights grounds, also alleging that the Tribe and Tribal Court or Tribal members all acted in concert to deny HIM representation in Court as a non-tribal member as well.

61. In his case, he appears to be subject to discrimination as a white [non-Indian]. But paradoxically, I as a Native American of the Navajo Tribe get

exactly the same "racial" discrimination as he does even though I am not racially (i.e. genetically or culturally, or by birth and place of origin) "white".

62. I went to the final parenting hearing in Tribal Court on December 4, 2025 and Judge Dupuis never considered my son's Level 3 Autism or special needs generally AT ALL.

EXHIBIT A: DOES THE CS&KT TRIBAL GOVERNMENT & COURT SYSTEM EFFECTIVELY CONSTITUTE A FEUDAL SYSTEM OF FAMILIES AND GUILDS RATHER THAN A REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT?

63. The CS&KT Tribal Court appears to be controlled by one or more closely allied extended families who work together to exclude other individuals, even other non-CS&KT Native Americans, like me, from full benefits and equal access to or participation in the Tribal justice system.

64. Furthermore, **the CS&KT Tribal Court uses admission to the Tribal Bar as an instrument of oppression**: the exclusion of non-members, and in fact even the exclusion of members NOT EMPLOYED BY THE TRIBE, constitutes an unparallelled monopolistic and/or closed shop" labor rule which does not appear to exist anywhere else in the United States.

65. No other jurisdiction limits bar membership to government employes.

66. If the control of the tribal government and courts by families appears Feudal rather than Republican in nature, the CS&KT Laws as described in

Stacey Stinger's letter to me (attached as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference), appears to resemble most closely a Mediaeval Guild practice.

67. Since I have not been able to obtain counsel, I decided to attempt to obtain legal education for myself directly relevant to the oppression to which I have been subjected.

68. To wit, I have applied for a Letter of Admission to the National Tribal College at the University of Wisconsin Law School.

69. I sent a letter to the Tribal Court on January 8, 2026, requesting a letter from the Tribal Court stating that I would be "eligible to practice law before the CS&KT Tribal Court after successful completion of the National Tribal Trial College Certificate in Tribal Court Legal Advocacy." See Exhibit A.

70. Stacey Stinger, Tribal Court Administrator of the Tribal Court of the Confederate Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Nation, on January 13, 2026, informed me as follows:

> **The CSKT Laws Codified, § 1-2-504 outlines the requirements for tribal advocates admission to practice in the CSKT Tribal and Appellate Courts.**
>
> > **An individual employed by the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes as a Tribal Court advocate (hereafter "advocate") shall be admitted to practice before the Tribal Court upon employment and certification by a Tribal attorney that the advocate is qualified to represent**

> **individuals in actions and proceedings before the Tribal Court.**
>
> **The tribal advocate must be an employee of CSKT and supervised by an attorney employed by the Tribes in order to be admitted to practice in Tribal Court. The Court provides an application for tribal advocates at https://cskt.org/tribal-court/, numbered [TCF 0157].**
>
> **In your case, if you are a CSKT employee working in a CSKT department that requires you to practice before the Tribal Courts that is overseen by a Tribal attorney, then you may be eligible to apply for admission in the Tribal Court using form [TCF 0157], attached.**

Exhibit A: January 13, 2026---Stacey Stinger to Jamie Baldwin

71. This kind of "double-closed" system, first closed to non-tribal members and then second limited to EMPLOYEES of the CS&KT Tribe (who may have multiple "built-in" conflicts of interest as Tribal Employees), is patently UNAMERICAN and denies constitutional rights even to CS&KT members by requiring attorneys to be biased, by the terms of their employment, to the families who control the CS&KT Tribal Government.

72. CS&KT Tribal Court Policy is, in short, completely "Feudal" and utterly inconsistent with a Republican Form of Government, in that a large number of the residents and even non-residents of the Tribal Territory, subject to the Tribal Court's aggressive quest for expanding jurisdiction, HAVE NO SAY IN THE APPOINTMENT OR SELECTION OF TRIBAL COURT JUDGES.

TRIBAL BAR ADMISSION LIMITATIONS ARE OPPRESSIVE AND ANTITHETICAL TO THE DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION OF THIS COUNTRY

73. The pervasive racial and/or political bias and overweeningly prejudicial policy of the CS&KT Tribal Court came to light when illustrated and encapsulated by Judge Bevra Jacobson during hearing on my application for renewal of a protective order for my benefit.

74. In that hearing, Judge Jacobson stated that I am merely "a guest here" and that I needed to respect the proceedings of the [CS&KT] Tribe because I was "foreign" (i.e. a Navajo, a non-CS&KT Tribal Member, an equal target for discrimination with members of the White Majority (cf. 42 U.S.C. §1981).

75. These two factors, control by a small number of families, plus treating other U.S. Citizens, and even other non CS&KT Native Americans, as "foreigners" not having equal rights, together with the denial of equal access to the courts in violation of the 14th Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §1981, give rise to another question, namely, does the CS&KT Tribal Government, as its authority is implemented against non-members in Tribal Court, constitute a violation of Article IV, Section 4, namely the guarantee of a Republican Form of Government?

76. Should ***Luther v. Borden*** 48 U.S. 1, 7 How. 1, 12 L.Ed 581 (1849) now be overturned and disregarded as an archaic constitutional error, as have

other decisions by former Chief Justice Roger B. Taney such as ***Scott v. Sanford*** 60 U.S. 393, 19 How. 393, 15 L.Ed 691 (1857)?

77. Federal courts have consistently held that the Constitution generally does not constrain tribal governments, which operate as separate sovereigns with inherent powers of self-government predating the Constitution.

78. While the Supreme Court has defined republican government as requiring "the right of the people to choose their own officers for governmental administration," ***Duncan v. McCall,*** 139 U.S. 449, 11 S.Ct. 573, 35 L.Ed. 219 **(1891),** this standard has never been applied to tribal governments.

79. I submit that these traditions are both wrong: the Constitution of the United States, as well as the statutes of the United States, should protect me and my son as we are American Citizens.

80. I submit that the Republican Form of Government, should, like Civil Rights Removal, and in particular Civil Rights removal from Tribal Courts, be allowed to correct massive abuses in CS&KT Tribal Courts.

81. Remand or abstention by this Federal Court pending Exhaustion of Tribal remedies by rehearing and appeal will result in irreparable injury to my special needs (ADA protected) son's rights to physical, psychological, and general healthcare, which requires immediate attention.

82. I have consulted a number of lawyers (including those recommended by the CS&KT Tribal Court) who have refused to take my case or defend me--and I have actually paid and retained two of them who withdrew immediately on becoming more fully informed concerning the case.

83. As noted above, my status is "flagged" and the case is shown as "on critical alert due to conflict of interest" because "alien" (non-CS&KT) Tribal Enrollment.

CHALLENGING CS&KT UNDER ARTICLE IV, §4

84. The strongest arguments for overturning Chief Justice Taney's 1848 decision in ***Luther v. Borden*** center on the Supreme Court's subsequent transformation of the political question doctrine, constitutional developments since 1849, and the decision's fundamental incompatibility with modern constitutional principles.

85. A hundred and thirteen years later, under Chief Justice Earl Warren, ***Baker v. Carr***, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) established that political question analysis must be conducted case-by-case using six specific factors rather than through categorical exclusions, directly undermining ***Luther v. Borden***, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) approach regarding federal recognition of state governments under the Guarantee Clause.

86. ***Bush v. Gore***, 531 U.S. 98, 121 S.Ct. 525, 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (2000) demonstrated that courts can and must review election legitimacy disputes when constitutional rights are involved.

87. The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause created individual voting rights requiring judicial enforcement that did not exist when ***Luther v. Borden*** was decided.

88. Additionally, the decision's circular reasoning that courts cannot question government authority because judicial power derives from government creates a logical impossibility that would immunize any governmental action from judicial review.

89. Modern federalism principles and the limitation of executive recognition power to foreign governments further undermine the decision's foundational assumptions about federal executive authority over state government legitimacy.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

90. The Supreme Court's decision in ***Baker v. Carr***, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691 (1962) fundamentally transformed the political question doctrine in ways that directly challenge ***Luther v. Borden's*** constitutional analysis regarding federal recognition of state governments. The Court established that

> the doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political questions,' not one of 'political cases.' The courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority.

This statement in ***Baker v. Carr*** represents a dramatic departure from ***Luther v. Borden's*** approach of treating government legitimacy disputes as solely within the purview of political branches.

91. ***Baker v. Carr***, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) created a sophisticated six-factor framework for analyzing political questions: "(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or (4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or (5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or (6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."

92. Critically, the Court emphasized that "unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non-justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence."

93. This framework requires individualized analysis rather than the approach employed in ***Luther v. Borden***, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).

94. The Court explicitly rejected broad categorical approaches, stating that its review revealed "that in the Guaranty Clause cases and in the other 'political question' cases, it is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the 'political question.'" This analysis suggests that ***Luther v. Borden's*** approach was overly broad even for its time.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1849

95. The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally altered the constitutional landscape in ways that undermine ***Luther v. Borden's*** foundational assumptions. The Equal Protection Clause created individual voting rights that require judicial enforcement, directly contradicting the notion that all election-related disputes are non-justiciable political questions.

96. ***Bush v. Gore***, ***supra*** provides the clearest example of how modern constitutional law has moved beyond ***Luther v. Borden's*** restrictions.

97. The Supreme Court directly reviewed and resolved an election legitimacy dispute, holding that "when contending parties invoke the process

of the courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront." The Court found that "equal protection applies as well to the manner of [the franchise's] exercise.

98. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State (OR INDIAN TRIBES) may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another."

99. The Court's analysis in ***Bush v. Gore*** demonstrates that modern constitutional law recognizes justiciable individual rights in electoral processes that override concerns about political questions. The Court's Equal Protection analysis provides manageable standards for reviewing electoral processes and government legitimacy claims.

CIRCULAR REASONING AND ANALYTICAL FLAWS

100. ***Luther v. Borden***, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) contains a fundamental logical flaw that renders its reasoning untenable.

101. The Court held that "judicial power presupposes an established government capable of enacting laws and enforcing their execution, and of appointing judges to expound and administer them." The Court reasoned that "if the authority of that government is annulled and overthrown, the power of its courts and other officers is annulled with it."

102. This creates a circular reasoning problem that would immunize any government from judicial review simply by virtue of its control over the courts.

103. As the Court stated, "if a State court should enter upon the inquiry proposed in this case, and should come to the conclusion that the government under which it acted had been put aside and displaced by an opposing government, it would cease to be a court, and be incapable of pronouncing a judicial decision upon the question it undertook to try."

104. This reasoning conflates the threshold question of justiciability with the substantive merits analysis. The ***Baker v. Carr***, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) framework requires courts to analyze justiciability factors before reaching the merits, but ***Luther v. Borden's*** approach makes justiciability depend on the ultimate conclusion about which government is legitimate. This improperly merges distinct analytical steps and creates an analytical framework that defeats judicial review by definition.

EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT CIVIL RIGHTS REMOVAL and/or a Civil Rights Injunction

105. I am aware that Civil rights removal of proceedings from tribal courts to US District Courts has heretofore never been allowed to succeed in Montana or any other jurisdiction.

106. I submit that the systemic intertribal discrimination inherent in the CS&KT Tribal Court system operates as the functional equivalent of racial discrimination, in that it is based on similar bases of cultural, genetic, and geographic origin identity as more general concepts of "race"---and so, within the strict meaning of prior Supreme Court holdings, I am entitled to remove this case under 28 U.S.C. §1443(1).

107. However, I recognize that this must and will be a "case of first impression."

108. I submit that a comprehensive review of CS&KT Tribal Government over non-tribal members violates the Republican form of government clause, and that this case, and my companion's cases removing parties Michael Futrell and Jeffery Newton) can and should establish new law.

109. I have read and reviewed the Federal removal statutes, including the civil rights removal statute 28 U.S.C. § 1443, and I understand that these (on their face) apply exclusively to proceedings commenced in "state court" and do not extend to tribal courts under the express language of both 28 USCA § 1443 28 USCA §1441.

110. However, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA, 25 U.S.C. §1911(a) effectively classifies and treats tribal jurisdiction as the functional and legal

equivalents of states for purposes of analyzing and assigning child domicile and residence.

111. Even my Tribal Judge, Bryan Dupuis' jurisdictional recitation, on Page 1 of Exhibit A to my Notice of Removal, that I, "the child's mother... ha[ve] lived on the Flathead Reservation for at least 90 days prior to the filing of this petition" parallels and reflects the jurisdiction basis for residence under the UCCJEA (Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act).

CONCLUSIONS

112. Just as I have, above, outlined the parallels between this case and ***State of Georgia v. Rachel*, supra,** I ask this Court to compare my situation to the Supreme Court's holding in ***City of Greenwood v. Peacock***, 384 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1966):

> **this case constitutes one of those:**
>
> **. . . . rare situations where it can be clearly predicted by reason of operation of pervasive and explicit state or federal law that these rights will inevitably be denied by very act of bringing defendant to trial in state court. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1443(1).**

Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 828, 83 S.Ct. 1800, 1812, 16 L.Ed.2d 944 (1966).

113. Accordingly, I here submit best argument be under Rule 11(b)(2) to extend, modify, or reverse existing law, or to make new law to permit this removal to go forward and be sustained.

114. The existence of this policy confirms the existence of a systemic anti-Republican, equality violating and denying "insider-managed" official law or else a custom, practice, and policy supported by rules enforcing intertribal, i.e. "racial" discrimination.

115. Such intertribal, i.e. "racial" discrimination violates the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. §1981, and is in fact completely consistent with the essential official and systemic racial grounds for Civil Rights Removal articulated by the Supreme Court in the venerable cases of ***Greenwood v. Peacock***, 384 U.S. 808, 828, 83 S.Ct. 1800, 1812, 16 L.Ed.2d 944 (1966) and ***State of Georgia v. Rachel***, 384 U.S. 780, 86 S.Ct. 1783, 16 L.Ed.2d 925 (1966).

116. Indian Tribes governed by Title 25 should be brought into conformity with national civil rights laws, and removal is the most efficient, practical, and rational means to achieve this end.

117. The historical consistency and lack of deviation from injustice over time does not, however, constitute a constitutional amendment or modify the guarantees of fundamental rights:

> The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution. That responsibility, however, "has not been reduced to any formula." ***Poe v. Ullman,*** 367 U.S. 497, 542, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Rather, it requires courts to exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect. See *ibid.* That process is guided by many of the same considerations relevant to analysis of other constitutional provisions that set forth broad principles rather than specific requirements. History and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. See ***Lawrence v. Texas*** 539 U.S. 558, at 572, 575, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003). That method respects our history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the present.
>
> The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution's central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 663-664, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2598, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015).

118. I raised some or all of these arguments in my December 18, 2025, Notice of Removal, but Mr. Kalmbach, on behalf of the Petitioner, ignored them all.

119. I ask the Court to take my claims serious: there are systemic problems arising from racial discrimination under the guise of inter-tribal political discrimination in the CS&KT Tribal Courts and Government as a whole, but

the confusion of Tribal and Political Identity is itself a violation of equal protection, since we are all Citizens of the United States.

120. It is time to address the liberty interests and rights to equal protection of "aliens" or "guests" in Tribal Courts, and to integrate the Tribal Court system into full equality subject to the fundamental guarantees of the U.S. Constitution without any special privileges to discriminate or oppress or deny the equal protection of the laws under any grounds, and that is the facial guarantee of 28 U.S.C. §1443(1), whose plain language does not require, much less authorize, any sort of racial discrimination, including intertribal discrimination, but was designed to outlaw the same.

121. I, your undersigned removing defendant/respondent Jamie Baldwin, hereby submit that the strongest Rule 11(b)(2) argument for extending removal jurisdiction rests on constitutional equal protection principles and the fundamental right to federal forum access for federal claims aligned with the 14th Amendment and statutory guarantees of 42 U.S.C. §§1981-1982.

122. This argument operates on several levels that, while not yet accepted by any court, present nonfrivolous constitutional theories for legal extension.

123. Equal Protection Analysis: The current removal framework creates a classification system where defendants facing identical federal claims

receive different procedural rights based solely on whether the case was filed in state court versus tribal court.

124. This disparity lacks rational justification under current equal protection doctrine.

125. While courts have so far rejected racial discrimination arguments in the tribal context, citing the "quasi-sovereign status" of tribes under federal law, ***Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Montana, in and for Rosebud County***, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) the removal disparity affects all defendants regardless of race or tribal membership and pertains to access to federal forums for federal claims rather than tribal sovereignty principles.

126. Article III Federal Question Jurisdiction: The Constitution grants federal courts jurisdiction over all cases "arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties." USCA CONST Art. III § 2, cl. 1. As grounds supporting my removal here, I submit that Congress' ICWA must be applied and construed consistently with these guarantees, and that equal protection, in the absence of the safety valve of removal to Federal Court under 28 U.S.C. §1443(1), is impossible.

127. The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that federal courts are the preferred forum for federal questions, and the removal statutes were

designed to ensure defendants could access federal forums when federal law governs their disputes.

128. This is especially true since Title 25 Tribal Courts have been held to lack competence to adjudicate constitutional and civil rights (see above).

129. The arbitrary denial of this access based on court system rather than claim substance contravenes Article III principles.

130. Due Process Forum Access: Where specific conflicts of interest or bias concerns exist—such as the plaintiff Ryne Mathias' close relative Melia Hamel serving as Tribal Clerk of Court (while also related to the Chief Judge)—due process may require access to an alternative forum.

131. Federal courts have recognized that tribal court proceedings must afford "basic tenets of due process" or judgments will not be recognized. ***FMC Corporation v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes,*** 942 F.3d 916 (9th Circuit, 2019).

132. The combination of structural conflicts and the complete absence of any alternative forum access creates due process concerns that could support removal jurisdiction.

133. The removal statutes contain internal evidence supporting extension to tribal courts through proper constitutional interpretation. Section 1442(d) specifically defines "State court" to include "a tribal court" in the context of

federal officer removal, 28 USCA §1442 demonstrating that Congress knows how to include tribal courts when it intends to do so.

134. This creates an argument that the exclusion from general removal statutes reflects drafting oversight rather than intentional limitation.

135. Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine: Courts must interpret statutes to avoid constitutional problems where possible.

136. Given the equal protection and due process concerns created by the current removal gap, and the heavy burden imposed by the "Tribal Exhaustion" doctrines, extending the removal statutes to include tribal courts would eliminate potential constitutional violations while serving the underlying congressional purpose of ensuring federal forum access for federal statutory and especially claims for the enforcement of fundamental constitutional rights.

137. The net result would be the improvement and empowerment of Tribal Courts by setting them up as equal in dignity to state courts.

138. While no court has accepted removal from tribal courts, the recognition of interpretive difficulties in this area provides a foundation for Rule 11(b)(2) arguments. In ***Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley***, 115 F.3d 1498 (10th Circuit, 1997), the Tenth Circuit noted that **"statutory silence"** on tribal court removal "cannot be converted into an **'express jurisdictional**

prohibition' on the exercise of tribal adjudicatory authority," suggesting courts recognize the removal gap creates interpretive difficulties rather than clear congressional intent to exclude tribal courts.

139. The current federal removal framework creates substantial disparity between tribal court and state court defendants: both those facing federal claims or those seeking the protection and security from local power-elite prejudice and political manipulation (such as I am in my present situation).

140. Defendants or respondents subject to race-based ("tribal") discrimination in tribal courts (as I am) are denied the removal rights available to all state court defendants, potentially leaving them without access to federal forum for federal questions.

141. For defendants in a position similar to mine, this could mean being forced to litigate federal civil rights issues in a forum with actual or apparent conflicts of interest (extended family control of the Tribal Courts) while similarly situated state court defendants would have automatic removal rights, or waiving these rights all together.

REMAND MUST BE DENIED WHERE PETITIONER'S COUNSEL "MISSED THE MARK"

142. There is a Greek word ***hamartia*** (**ἁμαρτία**, from **ἁμαρτάνειν** ***hamartánein***), which means "to miss the mark" or "to err".

143. This word, in the original text of the New Testament is often mistranslated into English as "sin."

144. Petitioner's counsel Justin Kalmbach's Motion for Remand epitomizes ***hamartia***, in that he completely misses the mark.

145. I ask in the title of this my Response in Opposition whether Petitioner's counsel had even read my Notice of Removal.

146. I would ask the Court to consider that either Justin Kalmbach did not read my Notice of Civil Rights Removal or he made the strategic decision that to completely ignore the actual content of what I wrote was so much safer.

147. To address the abuses of the CS&KT Tribal Court and in particular the structural denial of the right to counsel to non-Tribal members is a very serious and very difficult issue.

148. I am a Native American myself, and I support the maximization of Tribal Autonomy and Sovereignty---but I submit that this must be done within the structure of boundaries of the U.S. Constitution and Statutory Law, including specific grants of civil rights such as the ADA, vital to my son.

149. ***Hamartia*** Can encompass character flaws (arrogance, pride, greed) or simply a mistake made in ignorance---Ryne Mathias' Motion for Remand shows elements of all of these paths to "missing the mark."

150. The truth is that NOT ONE LINE of the Motion for Remand in Document 5 addresses any of the serious issues raised in my Notice of Civil Rights Removal: intertribal racial-political discrimination, the need to integrate tribal courts into the constitutional justice system on equal standing with the states, the dangers to people like me, Michael Wayne Futrell, and Jeffery Newton of "abstention" policies which leave the Tribal Courts to oppress anyone they wish.

151. And above all, Ryne Mathias' Motion for Remand, written by consummate CS&KT Tribal Bar Insider Justin Kalmbach, ignores all the dangers and abuses of "insider trading" in power by the membership limitations of the CS&KT Tribal Bar.

152. And finally, never once does Justin Kalmbach acknowledge my plea, under Rule 11(b)(2), that this Court take a hard look at Civil Rights Removal and see that it MUST be applied to Tribal Courts as well as State Courts, because current practice permits the Tribal Governments and Courts, as islands immune from Constitutional review, to commit SYSTEMIC RACIAL and POLITICAL DISCRIMINATION otherwise INTOLERABLE in the USA.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

153. For all the above-and-foregoing reasons, I, your undersigned removing Defendant Jamie Baldwin, move and pray that this Court will DENY Petitioner's "insufficient" Motion for Remand on the grounds that it does not address the substance of my Notice of Civil Right Removal at all.

154. I ask this Court to affirm my Civil Rights Removal and allow this case to proceed for review of civil rights violations, and denial of my son's rights to accommodation for disability in any parenting plan, in Federal Court.

155. Civil Rights Removal is a safety valve that can and MUST be allowed.

156. WHEREFORE, I, the undersigned Defendant/ Respondent in this case, on my own behalf, and on behalf of my minor son, earnestly and in good faith and conscience move this Court to DENY Ryne Mathias' Document 5 Motion for Remand and sustain this Notice of Civil Rights Removal and so to allow my removal to stand, and to sustain Federal Jurisdiction over this case on the above-described, ***Greenwood v. Peacock*** grounds; those grounds are, precisely: that I cannot obtain a fair trial and will be automatically and systemically denied my right to equal protection of the laws in the CS&KT Tribal Court controlled by friends and relatives of an unfair plaintiff.

157. As articulated above, the existence of a policy of "flagging" non-tribal members to ensure that Tribal attorneys and advocates do not represent them constitutes an extraordinary circumstance, a (tribal-dependent-nation-wide) jurisdictional wide policy of infringement on rights.

158. There is no principled difference between this CS&KT Tribal policy and a law which would prevent white lawyers from representing black (or for that matter, Native American) clients.

VERIFICATION & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

159. I, Jamie Baldwin, acknowledge, affirm, certify, and swear under my oath and penalty of perjury that I have read the above-and-foregoing document and that all averments of fact set forth therein are true and correct according to my personal knowledge.

160. I specifically affirm and certify that Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the letter I received by hand from Stacey Stinger on January 13, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

Tuesday
January 20, 2026

Jamie Baldwin
P.O. Box 435
Pablo, Montana 59855
(406) 499-8743
jamie.baldwin7@gmail.com

NOTARY'S JURAT

I am a notary public in and for Lake County in the State of Montana.

On this Tuesday, the 20th Day of January 2026, Jamie Baldwin appeared in person before me to give her oath and to acknowledge, affirm, certify, and swear under penalty of perjury that he had read the above-and-foregoing Response in Opposition to Motion for Remand and that all averments of fact set forth therein are true and correct according to her personal knowledge.

JALEN S CROFF
NOTARY PUBLIC for the
State of Montana
Residing at Ronan, Montana
My Commission Expires
September 25, 2029

Jalen S Croff
Notary Public, State of Montana

Printed Name of Notary: Jalen Croff

My Commission Expires: September 25th, 2029

Business Address & Telephone of Notary: Valley Banks of Ronan

63659 US HWY 93, Ronan, MT 59864

(406) 676-2000

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE with L.R. 7.1

Excluding caption, certificate of compliance, table of contents and authorities, exhibit index, and any certificate of service, as allowed by MT R USDCT L.R. 7.1, my above-Response in Opposition to Petitioner Ryne Mathias' Motion for Remand consists of 8258 words on 40 pages, in 205 paragraphs and 844 lines.

This exceeds the "Length of Brief" limitation of 6,500 words imposed by L.R. 7.1(d)(2)(A), and accordingly I have filed a Motion for Leave to exceed the word limit contemporaneously with this motion.

I am representing myself. I have no prior experience in Federal Court, and I did not discover L.R. 7.1 until I had already finished writing my brief.

I will attempt to reach opposing counsel Justin Kalmbach to ascertain whether he will agree to or oppose my motion.

Respectfully submitted,

Tuesday
January 20, 2026

Jamie Baldwin
P.O. Box 435
Pablo, Montana 59855
(406) 499-8743
jamie.baldwin7@gmail.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby affirm and certify that, as required by 28 U.S.C. §1446(d), I sent a true and correct copy of the above-and-foregoing Response in Opposition to the Petitioner's/Plaintiff's Motion for Remand and request to sustain removal to the Plaintiffs, by U.S. Mail and email as follows:

Justin Kalmbach
601 1st Street, East
Polson, Montana 59860

Email: justin@polsonlegal.com

And I further affirm and certify that I filed a true-and-correct copy of the same Response in Opposition for Remand with the clerk and Judge Bryan Depuis of the Tribal Court of the Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes as if it were the State Court, in order to effect the removal and impose a stay upon all Tribal Proceedings unless and until the case is remanded.

Tuesday
January 20, 2026

Jamie Baldwin,
Respondent/Defendant
P.O. Box 435
Pablo, Montana 59855
(406) 499-8743
jamie.baldwin7@gmail.com

Exhibit A:

Stacey Stinger's January 13, 2026 Letter to Jamie Baldwin stating a Systemic policy of discrimination Depriving Jamie Baldwin and others of Equal Access to the Courts:

The CSKT Laws Codified, § 1-2-504 outlines the requirements for tribal advocates admission to practice in the CSKT Tribal and Appellate Courts.

An individual employed by the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes as a Tribal Court advocate (hereafter "advocate") shall be admitted to practice before the Tribal Court upon employment and certification by a Tribal attorney that the advocate is qualified to represent individuals in actions and proceedings before the Tribal Court.

The tribal advocate must be an employee of CSKT and supervised by an attorney employed by the Tribes in order to be admitted to practice in Tribal Court. The Court provides an application for tribal advocates at https://cskt.org/tribal-court/, numbered [TCF 0157].

In your case, if you are a CSKT employee working in a CSKT department that requires you to practice before the Tribal Courts that is overseen by a Tribal attorney, then you may be eligible to apply for admission in the Tribal Court using form [TCF 0157], attached.

FLATHEAD SALISH KOOTENAI NATION

IN THE TRIBAL COURT OF
THE CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBES
OF THE FLATHEAD NATION
P.O. Box 278
Pablo, MT 59855
(406) 675-2700, Extension 1110
Fax: (406) 675-4704

January 13, 2026

Jamie Baldwin
P.O. Box 435
Pablo, MT 59855

RE: Request for Letter of Admission to the National Tribal Trial College

Dear Ms. Baldwin,

The Tribal Court received your January 8, 2026 letter requesting a letter from the Tribal Court for your application to the National Tribal Trial College stating that you would be "eligible to practice law before the CSKT Tribal Court after successful completion of the National Tribal Trial College Certificate in Tribal Court Legal Advocacy at the University of Wisconsin Law School."

The CSKT Laws Codified, § 1-2-504 outlines the requirements for tribal advocates admission to practice in the CSKT Tribal and Appellate Courts.

> An individual employed by the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes as a Tribal Court advocate (hereafter "advocate") shall be admitted to practice before the Tribal Court upon employment and certification by a Tribal attorney that the advocate is qualified to represent individuals in actions and proceedings before the Tribal Court.

The tribal advocate must be an employee of CSKT and supervised by an attorney employed by the Tribes in order to be admitted to practice in Tribal Court. The Court provides an application for tribal advocates at https://cskt.org/tribal-court/, numbered [TCF 0157].

In your case, if you are a CSKT employee working in a CSKT department that requires you to practice before the Tribal Courts that is overseen by a Tribal attorney, then you may be eligible to apply for admission in the Tribal Court using form [TCF 0157], attached.

If you have any questions, you contact me at 406-675-2700 Ext. 1415 or you can email me at Stacey.stinger@cskt.org.

Thank you,
Stacey Stinger
Stacey Stinger
Tribal Court Administrator

2025

APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION OR RENEWAL OF ADMISSION TO PRACTICE BEFORE THE TRIBAL COURT AND TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS OF THE CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBES (CSKT) OF THE FLATHEAD RESERVATION

For Tribal Court Advocates

Name: _____
CSKT Department: _____
Address: _____
City: _____ State: _____ Zip Code: _____
Phone #: (____)_____-_____ Fax #: (____)_____-_____
Email address: _____

Pursuant to CSKT Laws Codified, § 1-2-504, I verify that I am an individual employed by CSKT and request to:

- ☐ be admitted to practice before the Courts of the CSKT as a Tribal Court Advocate
- ☐ to renew my admission to practice before the Courts of the CSKT as a Tribal Court Advocate.

The CSKT attorney, _____, hereby verifies my employment with CSKT and certifies that I am qualified to represent individuals in actions and proceedings before the Tribal Court.

I agree to act as an officer of the Courts of the CSKT in any action or proceeding in which I appear and to conduct my legal practice in accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct. I also agree to support the Constitution and laws of the CSKT and to maintain proper respect for the Courts of the CSKT.

The admission fee of **$100.00** for the **2025** calendar year is waived based on my status as a CSKT employee.

Signed: _____ Date: _____
Tribal Court Advocate

Signed: _____ Date: _____
Tribal Attorney

Return to: Clerk of Tribal Court, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
P. O. Box 278, Pablo, MT 59855