Last week, in R. v. Collins, the Ontario Court of Appeal lessened the sentence an Aboriginal woman received from 16 months incarceration and two years probation to 10 months incarceration and two years probation.
Susan Collins was a participant in a scheme to defraud Ontario of money from social assistance benefits. The amount directly attributed to Collins was in excess of $96,000. But Collins was only one part of a larger scheme and the total estimated financial loss due to the fraudulent activity while the scheme was operating is $1.285 million. Collins’ role was to provide identities for which false claims were created and to then cash the cheques issued on those files. She processed 67 cheques in the total amount of $96,298.
Her sentence was reduced by six months because the Gladue principle, originating from R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, was in play.
The Gladue principle decrees that judges must take into account the unique circumstances of Aboriginal people when passing sentence on Aboriginal offenders. Since 1999, the Gladue decision has created considerable disagreement as to its meaning and application. Proponents see it as a sensitive acknowledgement of Aboriginal issues during the sentencing phase while opponents see it as an unfair Aboriginal “sentencing discount.”
Here’s an enlightening (pro-Gladue) video on the virtues of Gladue sentencing:
http://www.bearpaweducation.ca/gladue-decision
And here’s a paper, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Gladue at Ten and in the Courts of Appeal, from Professor Kent Roach, who argues that “[b]y and large, the hopes for Gladue have not been realized.”
Just one day after Ontario’s R. v. Collins, the British Columbia Court of Appeal, in R. v. Ladue, [2011] B.C.J. No. 366, (not to be confused with “Gladue”) lowered an Aboriginal man’s three year incarceration sentence to one year because…
Although the sentencing judge was alive to the accused’s history and circumstances, she overemphasized the principle of separating the offender from society and gave insufficient weight to the principle of rehabilitation. The sentencing judge also erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the accused’s circumstances as an Aboriginal offender. The direction to exercise restraint with particular attention to Aboriginal offenders was still to be applied even in the circumstances of a long-term offender. The sentence imposed was not proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the accused’s degree of responsibility. A sentence of one year would be enough time for the accused to achieve sobriety and for the correctional staff to find an appropriate half-way house for him which emphasized Aboriginal culture and healing.
Turtle Talk 