Here is the opinion in Nare v. Omaha Discovery Trust.
Briefs:
District court materials:

Paul Spruhan has posted “The Unfulfilled Liberation: The Navajo Nation, the Federal Government and the Legal History of Indian Slavery in the Reconstruction Southwest” on SSRN.
Here is the abstract:
The article discusses the legal history of enslavement of American Indians, particularly Navajos, in territorial New Mexico during the Civil War and Reconstruction. It focuses Indian slavery within the relationship between the Navajo Nation and the Federal Government from 1846 to 1877, spanning the federal occupation of New Mexico in the Mexican-American War to the end of Reconstruction. It discusses in detail the role of the Army, the Office of Indian Affairs, and Congress in declaring the legal emancipation of Navajos and other Indian slaves but failing in implementing true liberation. It also discusses the role of the slavery issue in the negotiations and implementation of the Navajo Treaty of 1868, and the failure of General William Tecumseh Sherman and other federal officials to liberate Navajo slaves after the execution of the Treaty and the return of Navajos to their homeland. The article concludes with a discussion of why the Federal government tolerated the continued existence of Navajo slavery despite the end of southern slavery, and its place in the longer arc of federal assimilation policies against Indian people.

Here is the opinion in Legend Lake Property Owners Assn v. Kashena:
Briefs here.


Geoffrey Heeren has published “Native Nations, Noncitizens, and the Supremacy Clause” in the Brooklyn Law Review.
Here is the abstract:
Native Nations and noncitizens have often prevailed in the face of adverse state action by asserting treaty rights, arguing that state actions are preempted by federal authority, or relying on federal common law. These claims are largely rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, rather than Native Nations’ or noncitizens’ rights of their own. At the same time, the Supremacy Clause jurisprudence that developed as Native Nations and noncitizens raised these claims coincided with the growth of federal “plenary power” in both areas, depriving immigrants and Native Nations of strong rights of their own when faced with federal action. The Supreme Court’s approach to the Supremacy Clause in immigration and federal Indian law is inconsistent with the textualist and originalist method preferred by its majority. Existing scholarship has extensively examined the Supremacy Clause through a textualist lens, but has not addressed federal Indian law and immigration law. This is a particularly stark omission since much Supremacy Clause litigation centers on the experience of Native Nations and noncitizens. This article offers a new framework for Supremacy arguments in Immigration and federal Indian law. Under a textualist reading of the Supremacy Clause, the Court should alter its doctrine concerning self-executing treaties, return to an approach grounded in the inherent sovereignty of Native Nations rather than federal common law, and abandon its strongest form of “plenary power preemption.” Finally, the article situates these supremacy claims within the larger landscape of the Court’s retrenchment from anti-subordination principles and growing solicitude toward states’ rights. Moving forward, preemption claims may be less effective for the immigrants or Native Nations that assert those claims against states. Moreover, preemption arguments reify the experiences of noncitizens and Native Nations by translating them into arguments about federal power. In contrast, rights claims—even when they do not prevail—can mobilize and ground a political strategy for subordinated groups. In this shifting doctrinal landscape, treaty rights claims may be the supremacy arguments most likely to support a multifaceted movement to empower some historically disempowered groups.

Melissa Fergusson has published “#Landback to Indigenous Peoples from “Land-Grab” Universities” in the Cornell Law Review. PDF
Here is the abstract:
The Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 (Morrill Act) was the first federal legislation to fund public higher education in the United States, funding fifty-two land-grant universities (LGUs) that still exist today. While the purpose of the Act was to “democratiz[e] . . . education” focusing on the study of agriculture and mechanical arts, it created LGUs by taking Indigenous land. In 2020, High Country News issued an investigative report, “Land-Grab Universities,” documenting how LGUs were established both on occupied Indigenous land and through the sale of Indigenous land taken by treaty, land cession, or seizure, which provided seed money for the universities. While some LGUs have increased support for Indigenous students through tuition assistance or increased funding for Indigenous studies, none have implemented land return to Indigenous peoples.
This Note analyzes potential remedies to redress the taking of Indigenous lands by the Morrill Act in the context of the #LandBack movement. Part I discusses the Morrill Act provisions and impact as well as the historical context. Part II discusses the modern-day #LandBack movement and past #LandBack actions at the federal and state levels. Part III provides a survey of current responses from LGUs to their Morrill Act legacy. Part IV explains why #LandBack is needed to make amends to Indigenous peoples for the taking of their lands via the Morrill Act. Part V identifies #LandBack remedies that LGUs can take to recompense Indigenous peoples and provides an implementation framework. It also proposes legislative reform, including creating a cause of action for land claims, to compensate Indigenous peoples for the taking of their lands via the Morrill Act.

Here is the order in Pechanga Band of Indians v. City of Corona (Cal. Super. Ct.):
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