Jemez Pueblo brief sealed
Lower court materials here.
And the briefs in Apache Stronghold v. United States (9th Cir.):
Lower court materials here.
Here is the minute order in State of Washington v. Vought (W.D. Wash.):
MINUTE ENTRY for proceedings held before U.S. District Judge John C. Coughenour- Dep Clerk: Gabriel Traber; Pla Counsel: Kristin Beneski, Lauryn Faas, and Lloyd Miller; Def Counsel: Brian Kipnis; CR: Nickie Drury; Time of Hearing: 9:00 AM; Courtroom: Zoom;Motion Hearing held on 2/12/2021 re 15 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Quileute Tribe Of The Quileute Reservation, Puyallup Tribe of Indians, American Historical Association, Tanana Chiefs Conference, Duwamish Tribe, Samish Indian Nation, Chinese American Citizens Alliance, Doyon Ltd, Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, HistoryLink, Confederated Tribes Of Siletz indians, Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon, Skokomish Indian Tribe, Confederated Tribes Of The Coos Lower Umpqua And Siuslaw Indians, Port Gamble S’Klallam Tribe, Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, Spokane Tribe of Indians, Kalispel Tribe of Indians, Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation, OCA Asian Pacific Advocates Greater Seattle, Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, Wing Luke Memorial Foundation, Central Council of the Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska, Washington Trust for Historic Preservation, State of Oregon, Squaxin Island Tribe, Nooksack Indian Tribe, Quinault Indian Nation, Cow Creek Band Of Umpqua Tribe Of Indians, Association Of King County Historical Organizations, Suquamish Tribe, Nez Perce Tribe, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, Historic Seattle, Hoh Indian Tribe, Museum Of History And Industry, The Klamath Tribes, State of Washington, Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe.
After hearing argument from Counsel, the Court informs the parties that an order granting the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction will be issued. (GT) (Entered: 02/12/2021)
Briefs are here.
Trevor Reed has posted “Indigenous Dignity and the Right to be Forgotten,” forthcoming in the BYU Law Review, on SSRN.
Here is the abstract:
Indigenous cultural documentation amassed over more than two centuries currently occupies the shelves and databases of American museums, universities, archives and other institutions. Field notes, photographs, sound recordings, maps, kinship charts, and all manner of other cultural materials collected from Tribal members constitutes what is perhaps America’s first instance of “big data.” While often touted by collectors and institutions as rich historical and cultural resources, I argue that some of these collections have become toxic in their preserved forms, separated from their communities’ modes of care. These materials are among those that Indigenous groups should have the right to remove from settler archives, museums, digital repositories, and other institutions and if necessary, erase, delete, or destroy. The kind of Indigenous right to erase sensitive cultural material held by settler institutions, the contours of which I begin to etch out in this symposium essay, is not unlike the right to be forgotten and other data privacy rights already adopted by the European Union, and to some extent, the State of California. While much of the debate surrounding the right to be forgotten in the United States has focused on tensions between personal autonomy and the right of the public to be informed, the collective rights of Indigenous peoples to maintain cultural dignity and sovereignty in the wake of colonization, I argue, provides a compelling case for recognizing an Indigenous right to be forgotten.
Stephanie Hall Barclay & Michalyn Steele have published “Rethinking Protections for Indigenous Sacred Sites” in the Harvard Law Review. Here is the abstract:
Meaningful access to sacred sites is among the most important principles to the religious exercise of Indigenous peoples, yet tribes have been repeatedly thwarted by the federal government in their efforts to vindicate this practice of their religion. The colonial, state, and federal governments of this Nation have been desecrating and destroying Native American sacred sites since before the Republic was formed. Unfortunately, the callous destruction of Indigenous sacred sites is not just a troubling relic of the past. Rather, the threat to sacred sites and cultural resources continues today in the form of spoliation from development, as well as in the significant barriers to meaningful access Indigenous peoples face.
Scholars concerned about government failure to protect Indigenous sacred sites on government property have generally agreed that the problem stems from the unique nature of Indigenous spiritual traditions as being too distinct from non-Indigenous religious traditions familiar to courts and legislators, and therefore eluding protection afforded to other traditions. By contrast, this Article approaches the problem from an entirely different angle: we focus instead on the similarities between government coercion with respect to Indigenous religious exercise and other non-Indigenous religious practices. We illustrate how the debate about sacred sites unwittingly partakes in longstanding philosophical debates about the nature of coercion itself — a phenomenon that has previously gone unnoticed by scholars. This Article argues that whether or not one formally labels the government’s actions as “coercive,” the important question is whether the government is bringing to bear its sovereign power in a way that inhibits the important ideal of religious voluntarism — the ability of individuals to voluntarily practice their religious exercise consistent with their own free self-development. Indeed, this is precisely the sort of question courts ask when evaluating government burdens on non-Indigenous religious exercise. The failure to ask this same question about voluntarism for Indigenous religious practices has created a double standard, wherein the law recognizes a much more expansive notion of coercion for contexts impacting non-Indigenous religious practices, and a much narrower conception of coercion when it comes to Indigenous sacred sites.
This egregious double standard in the law ought to be revisited. Doing so would have two important implications. First, when government interference with religious voluntarism is viewed clearly, tribal members and Indigenous practitioners should be able to prove a prima facie case under statutes like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act much more easily. Second, this Article makes the novel claim that clearer understanding of the coercive control government exercises over sacred sites should animate a strong obligation under the government’s trust responsibility and plenary power doctrine to provide more — rather than less — robust protection of Indigenous sacred sites.