Brooklyn Law Review

Geoffrey Heeren has posted “Native Nations, Noncitizens, and the Supremacy Clause,” forthcoming in the Brooklyn Law Review, on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

Native Nations and noncitizens have often prevailed in the face of adverse state action by asserting treaty rights, arguing that state actions are preempted by federal authority, or relying on federal common law. These claims are largely rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, rather than Native Nations’ or noncitizens’ rights of their own. At the same time, the Supremacy Clause jurisprudence that developed as Native Nations and noncitizens raised these claims coincided with the growth of federal “plenary power” in both areas, depriving immigrants and Native Nations of strong rights of their own when faced with federal action.

The Supreme Court’s approach to the Supremacy Clause in immigration and federal Indian law is inconsistent with the textualist and originalist method preferred by its majority. Existing scholarship has extensively examined the Supremacy Clause through a textualist lens, but has not addressed federal Indian law and immigration law. This is a particularly stark omission since much Supremacy Clause litigation centers on the experience of Native Nations and noncitizens. This article offers a new framework for Supremacy arguments in Immigration and federal Indian law. Under a textualist reading of the Supremacy Clause, the Court should alter its doctrine concerning self-executing treaties, return to an approach grounded in the inherent sovereignty of Native Nations rather than federal common law, and abandon its strongest form of “plenary power preemption.”

Finally, the article situates these supremacy claims within the larger landscape of the Court’s retrenchment from anti-subordination principles and growing solicitude toward states’ rights. Moving forward, preemption claims may be less effective for the immigrants or Native Nations that assert those claims against states. Moreover, preemption arguments reify the experiences of noncitizens and Native Nations by translating them into arguments about federal power. In contrast, rights claims—even when they do not prevail—can mobilize and ground a political strategy for subordinated groups. In this shifting doctrinal landscape, treaty rights claims may be the supremacy arguments most likely to support a multifaceted movement to empower some historically disempowered groups.

Michael Doran has posted “Tribal Sovereignty Preempted,” forthcoming in the Brooklyn Law Review, on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

In June of 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Oklahoma vs. Castro-Huerta that a state may prosecute a non-Indian for a crime committed against an Indian within Indian country. That decision effectively overruled Worcester vs. Georgia, an 1832 landmark case in which Chief Justice Marshall said that state law “can have no force” in Indian country. Although the conventional wisdom sees Castro-Huerta as a radical departure from first principles of federal Indian law, I argue that it is the natural – although deeply deplorable – next step in a long line of Supreme Court decisions expanding state governmental authority within Indian country. Additionally, this line mirrors a separate line restricting tribal governmental authority within Indian country. Through a critical examination of these decisions, I show how the Supreme Court over the last half century has systematically privileged state interests and the interests of individual non-Indians over tribal interests and that, in so doing, the Court has arrogated to itself the political function of defining tribal sovereignty. I argue that Congress should reject the Court’s relentless subordination of Indian interests to non-Indian interests and reassert its role in defining and defending a robust conception of tribal sovereignty.