Michael Doran on Tribal Sovereignty and Fundamental Rights

Michael Doran has posted “Redefining Tribal Sovereignty for the Era of Fundamental Rights” on SSRN. It is forthcoming in the Indiana Law Journal.

The abstract:

This article explains a longstanding problem in federal Indian law. For two centuries, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the retained, inherent sovereignty of American Indian tribes. But more recently, the Court has developed the implicit-divestiture theory to deny tribal governments criminal and civil jurisdiction over non-members, even with respect to activities on tribal lands. Legal scholars have puzzled over this move from a territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty to a membership-based definition; they have variously explained it as the Court’s abandonment of the foundational principles of Indian law, the product of the Court’s indifference or even racist hostility to Indians, or a simple lack of doctrinal coherence in the Court’s decisions. This article provides a different explanation. The implicit-divestiture cases represent the Court’s effort to address a trilemma among three incompatible objectives: preservation of the traditional territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty; preservation of tribal governments’ placement outside the federalist structure of the constitutional order; and preservation of fundamental rights. The Court has chosen to resolve the trilemma by redefining tribal sovereignty to deny tribal jurisdiction over non-members. Whether right or wrong, the implicit-divestiture theory is the Court’s good-faith attempt to preserve as much tribal sovereignty as possible without infringing on fundamental rights or forcing tribal governments into the federalist structure.

Joe Singer on the Original Acquisition of Property

Joseph William Singer has posted his paper, “Original Acquisition of Property: From Conquest and Possession to Democracy and Equal Opportunity,” forthcoming from the Indiana Law Journal, on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

First possession is said to be the root of title but the first possession theory suffers from two major defects. First, land titles in the United States originate in acts of conquest, and because conquest denies the rights of first possessors, land titles in the U.S. do not have a just origin. We should recognize the unjust origins of our land titles and recognize that the democratic way to deal with the legacies of conquest is to refuse to engage in further acts of conquest. This requires recognizing the pre-existing sovereignty and persisting property rights of Indian nations. Second, first possession is justified only if others have equal opportunities to acquire property. The equal opportunity principle is not only one that is crucial to justifying and limiting the historical rights of first possessors but constitutes a core moral principle that must be satisfied in each generation. Property rights are therefore justified today only if they are defined and regulated in a manner consistent with the norms that define a free and democratic society which treats each person with equal concern and respect. Property has legitimate origins not in first possession or conquest but in the practice of democracy and the ideal of equal opportunity. This does not mean that possession is irrelevant; it means that its moral significance must be judged in light of the democratic ideal of equal opportunity.