Rare Published Notice Opinion out of California Court of Appeals

In re EH (Fourth District, 1st Div). For reference, so far this year California has had 48 unpublished notice decisions and 19 unpublished inquiry decisions. This is the first published notice case this year.

We agree with Mother that, considering Sally Y.H.’s statement to the Agency that her paternal family had Tohono O’odham Nation heritage, the Agency had a duty to attempt to obtain Sally Y.H.’s father’s identifying information and to provide notice of any such information obtained to the Tohono O’odham Nation. We further conclude that the Agency has not demonstrated that it fulfilled that duty by providing the Tohono O’odham Nation with information pertaining to an individual named Bruno Y. since it is not clear from the record that Bruno Y. is Sally Y.H.’s father. Moreover, if Bruno Y. is Sally Y.H.’s father, and E.H.’s great-great-grandfather, the Agency failed to properly describe his ancestral relationship to E.H. on the notice provided to the Tohono O’odham Nation. Finally, given that Sally Y.H. told the Agency that her paternal family had heritage from the Tohono O’odham Nation, we cannot conclude that the Agency’s errors were harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment for the limited purpose of having the Agency provide the Tohono O’odham Nation with proper notice of the proceedings in this case, including accurate information pertaining to all known direct lineal ancestors of E.H., in accordance with all applicable law.3

***

FN 3. Mother also contends that the notice that the Agency provided to the Tohono O’odham Nation was deficient for several additional reasons, including that the Agency erred in listing her current address as being “no information available,” and in failing to update the notice when information about her residence became available. In light of our reversal, we need not consider these contentions, but we direct the juvenile court to ensure that the Agency provides Mother’s correct current address at the time of noticing upon remand, if known.

In addition, Mother contends that the Agency provided the tribe an incorrect address for Sally Y.H. The Agency concedes that the address that it provided for Sally Y.H. contained typographical errors, including listing the city of her residence as ” ‘Alpaso’ ” rather than ” ‘El Paso,’ ” but argues that any errors were harmless. In support of its harmlessness argument, the Agency asks this court to take judicial notice of the fact that “El Paso is a city in the state of Texas and Alpaso is not.” The juvenile court is directed to ensure that the Agency provides Sally Y.H.’s correct current address at the time of noticing upon remand, if known. We deny the Agency’s request for judicial notice as moot.

Finally, Mother states that the Agency was required to list Mother’s and Sally Y.H.’s telephone numbers on the notice that it provided to the Tohono O’odham Nation. On remand, the juvenile court shall direct the Agency to provide Mother’s and Sally Y.H.’s telephone numbers, if known. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2 [specifying that notice sent to a tribe shall include “[a]ll names known of the Indian child’s biological parents . . . and great-grandparents . . . as well as their current and former addresses, birthdates, places of birth and death, tribal enrollment numbers, and any other identifying information, if known”], italics added; unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.)

***

This argument is unpersuasive since the letter from the Tohono O’odham Nation does not indicate the basis upon which the tribe made its determination as to E.H.’s Indian child status. Nor can we agree with the Agency’s suggestion that the fact that the Tohono O’odham Nation did not ask for further information demonstrates that the Agency’s error was harmless. The tribe was not required to ask the Agency to provide information that the record indicates the Agency should have reasonably attempted to obtain and provide to the tribe. Thus, we decline to find the Agency’s error harmless simply because the tribe did not indicate that further information might have altered its determination, particularly given the other noticing errors acknowledged by the Agency.

Montana Supreme Court ICWA Notice Case

Here

¶28 In this case, CPS Lebrun’s testimony that an unidentified person orally confirmed that “they are not eligible, just they can only be descendent members” does not satisfy the Department’s ICWA burden. As a direct result of the Department’s failure to satisfy this burden—and likely assuming the Department had, prior to filing its Notice of No ICWA Involvement, followed up with formal inquiry with the Blackfeet Tribe as CPS Lebrun testified he would—the District Court proceeded to termination without conclusive determination from the Tribe. No documentation or testimony of an authorized tribal representative either dispelled or confirmed the District Court’s and Department’s belief that the children were not Indian children as defined by ICWA. Under the circumstances of this case, we hold the District Court erred by proceeding to terminate Mother’s rights to D.E. and A.E. without a conclusive tribal determination of their tribal membership status and eligibility.
¶29 Accordingly, we hold the District Court abused its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights without a conclusive tribal determination of tribal membership status and enrollment eligibility. We reverse and remand for an appropriate threshold determination of whether D.E. and A.E. are Indian children based on a conclusive tribal determination of tribal membership and eligibility in the Blackfeet Tribe. Further, if D.E. and A.E. are conclusively identified as Indian children subject to the requirements of ICWA, the District Court shall hold further proceedings as may be necessary to meet the evidentiary burdens of ICWA.

AppellantBriefDE
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North Carolina “Reason to Know” ICWA Notice Case

Here.

*Whether the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing should have caused the trial court to have reason to know an “Indian child” may be involved and trigger the notice requirement is the issue before us. The federal regulations implementing ICWA and promulgated in 2016, clearly the states court has reason to know an “Indian child” is involved if: “Any participant in the proceeding, officer of the court involved in the proceeding, Indian Tribe, Indian organization, or agency informs the court that it has discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian child.” 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(c)(2) (2018).

The ICWA proscribes that once the court has reason to know the child could be an “Indian child,” but does not have conclusive evidence, the court should confirm and “work with all of the Tribes … to verify whether the child is in fact a member.” 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(b)(1). Federal law provides: “No foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding shall be held until at least ten days after receipt of notice by the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe or the Secretary[.]” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). Further, a court must “[t]reat the child as an Indian child, unless and until it is determined on the record that the child does not meet the definition of an ‘Indian child.’ ” 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(b)(2).

Other jurisdictions have recognized that “Indian child” status of the juvenile can only be decided by the tribe itself; therefore, only a suggestion that the child may be of Indian heritage is enough to invoke the notice requirements of the ICWA. In re Antoinette S., 104 Cal. App. 4th 1401, 1408, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 15, 21 (2002). Additionally, ICWA provides that even after the completion of custody proceedings, if the provisions of ICWA were violated, “any parent or Indian custodian from whose custody such child was removed, and the Indian child’s tribe may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action.” 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (2012).

In In re A.R., the Respondent-father claimed that he had “a family connection to a registered Native American group” which consequently qualified his children for the protections under ICWA. In re A.R., 227 N.C. App. 518, 523, 742 S.E.2d 629, 633 (2013). . . . Further, this Court held that “[t]hough from the record before us we believe it unlikely that [the juveniles] are subject to the ICWA, we prefer to err on the side of caution by remanding for the trial court to … ensure that the ICWA notification requirements, if any, are addressed … since failure to comply could later invalidate the court’s actions.” Id.

In the case of In re C.P., the respondent-mother made the bare assertion that she and her children could possibly be eligible for membership with a band of Potawatomi Indians. In re C.P., 181 N.C. App. at 702, 641 S.E.2d at 16. The trial court required the ICWA notice to be sent. Id. When the time required under ICWA had passed without response from the tribe, the trial court allowed two continuances before determining ICWA did not apply and resumed the proceedings. Id. at 703, 641 S.E.2d at 16-17.

***

Our Court has required social service agencies to send notice to the claimed tribes rather than risk the trial court’s orders being voided in the future, when claims of Indian heritage arise, even where it may be unlikely the juvenile is an Indian child. See In re A.R., 227 N.C. App. at 524, 742 S.E.2d at 634; In re C.P., 181 N.C. App. at 702, 641 S.E.2d at 16.

2018 ICWA Agents for Notice Includes Incorrect Contact Information

ETA: This is NOT limited to California

I have received word that some information in the 2018 Fed Reg ICWA Agents for Notice publication is completely (and wildly) incorrect, even though the information in 2017 was correct (and hadn’t changed): “It was absolutely correct last year. The person listed is not and has never been affiliated with [TRIBE]. The address is completely wrong, including the city.”

Tribes! PLEASE check this document to make sure your ICWA agent for notice information is correct. If you can, let me know if it isn’t. We are trying to get a sense of whether this is limited to California tribes or not.  This is the document we all train on and send people to (I was honestly in the middle of teaching a class on notice when I received this information). Thank you.

2018 Designated Agents for ICWA Service

Here!

Apparently last year I threatened some of you with embarrassment if you didn’t use these, which I’m not doing this year (but seriously, use these. Do not send notice to the tribal newspaper [yes, that has happened]).

 

ICWA Notice Decision in the Colorado Court of Appeals

Opinion here

This is a fairly standard notice decision, but the instructions on remand are the kind that more courts of appeals need to provide in ICWA cases. As they are nearly four full pages long, I’m not quoting them here, but I am posting the opinion because of them.

Also, by “fairly standard notice decision”, I mean the Department was aware of possible American Indian/Cherokee heritage in May, and no one did any notice till December, a month after the Department filed the TPR. The Court of Appeals sent it back down to fix that.

Tribal Consultation on the Proposed AFCARS Changes

Here is the letter sent today: Tribal Consultation Notification 4-16-2018

This is on the proposed changes to the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS), the way the feds collect from the states on adoption and foster care. This is specifically about removing ICWA data elements added in last year’s final rule because of the burden of collecting information about ICWA compliance and Native kids in care.

Both consultations will be done by phone, and if there are not enough participants “may end early”. Maybe tribal leaders or their designees would like to consult about how to weigh that “burden” of gathering information so tribes and states know what is happening with Native kids in foster care for the full 90 minutes:

Tribal Consultation seeking input on the ANPRM and potential changes to AFCARS will be held through two teleconference calls on the following dates and times.

Tuesday, May 15, 2018 @ 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm (EDT).

Please register here: https://acf.adobeconnect.com/efdd2gqe733x/event/registration.html

Wednesday, May 16, 2018 @ 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm (EDT)

Please register here: https://acf.adobeconnect.com/enhysqrbcyal/event/registration.html

For both consultations, the call-in number and passcode are: 877-917-3403, Passcode: 2498350. (Please note, if there are a small number of participants on the call, the call may end sooner than 3:30 p.m.)

Both Tribal consultation teleconference calls are open to all tribal leaders or their designees and may address any aspect of the ANPRM’s request for comments on AFCARS data collection, including data elements relating to ICWA that would reported by states and all other AFCARS elements that would be reported by both states and tribes operating title IV-E programs. Overall, we are interested to hear both recommendations on data elements to retain with a justification for using the data at the national level and recommendations on any data elements to remove because they may be either overly burdensome for title IV-E agencies to report or may not be reliable or necessary at the national level.

In addition to participating in the tribal consultation conference calls, the Children’s Bureau encourages tribal leaders to submit comments in writing in response to the ANPRM, as only written comments may be included in the regulatory record. The deadline for the receipt of written comments in response to the ANPRM is June 13, 2018.

There is also a briefing webinar:

The briefing webinar to learn more about AFCARS will be held on Wednesday, April 25, 2018 from 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm (EDT). If you are interested in participating in this webinar, please register at:

https://acf.adobeconnect.com/afcars/event/event_info.html

Because:

We recognize that while states have many years of experience in reporting AFCARS data, tribes may not be as familiar with AFCARS. To prepare for consultation, the Children’s Bureau is offering a briefing webinar for tribal leaders and/or members of your staff. The briefing webinar will be an opportunity for tribal leaders and members of your staff to learn more about AFCARS, including current data reported by states since the 1990’s and the changes to AFCARS that were promulgated in December 2016, but have not yet been implemented.

If only well over 60 tribes and tribal organizations had submitted comments in support of the additional data elements explaining in great detail why they are needed in the last comment collection on this issue in 2016 . . .

A non-tribal specific information session/briefing webinar earlier this month was problematic on ICWA (at best). There are a number of groups working on written comments, including model versions for tribes. When they are available, we will make sure to post that information. If you’d like to post comments now, here is the comments page.

Previous posts on AFCARS here.

Montana Supreme Court: State has Duty to Actively Determine if Child is Indian Child

Here.

In this case, as early as 2014, the State, through the Department, had reason to believe and, as asserted in its various petition averments and request for the District Court to proceed under ICWA, did believe that L.D. was an Indian child by affiliation with the Chippewa Cree Tribe. Though it gave due notice to the Tribe of the pendency of the initial foster care and subsequent parental rights termination proceedings, there is no evidence that the Department ever formally sought or received a conclusive tribal determination that L.D. was or was not eligible for tribal enrollment. Instead, the Department passively relied on the inaction of the Tribe and the assertions or beliefs of the parents that L.D. was not eligible for tribal membership. However otherwise reasonable, this passive reliance was insufficient to satisfy the Department’s ICWA burden to actively investigate further and ultimately make formal inquiry with the Tribe for a conclusive determination of L.D.’s membership eligibility.

Also, with briefing (a rarity in ICWA cases)!

DA 17-0419AppellantBrief

DA 17-0419AppelleeBrief

DA 17-0419ReplyBrief

Colorado Court of Appeals ICWA Notice Case

Here.

The 2016 Guidelines recommend that if only the tribal ancestral group is indicated, then the Department should notify each of the tribes in that ancestral group to identify whether the parent or child is a member of any such tribe. 2016 Guidelines at 18. Thus, because ICWA’s intent is to provide notice to tribes so that the tribes themselves can decide whether children are tribal members, see B.H., 138 P.3d at 303-04, when a parent is unable to provide detailed information on potential tribal affiliations, the Department should provide notice to all identified tribes and the tribes that have been historically affiliated with those identified tribes, see Tribal Agents by Affiliation, https://perma.cc/K3DDKQR5.

Colorado Court of Appeals Case on Inquiry for ICWA

Here

This is a special one:

 In this case, the trial court first inquired about the applicability of ICWA at a termination hearing regarding J.A. after orally ordering termination of parental rights. For purposes of ICWA, this was the second child-custody proceeding involving J.A. Under 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a), the trial court should have made that inquiry at the first hearing after the petition in dependency and neglect was filed and again at the start of the termination proceeding.

(emphasis in original)

It continues:

The Department asserts that mother did not provide a relative affidavit identifying her biological parents. It is true that the Department should try to provide sufficient information for the tribe to make the determination as to whether the child is a member or eligible for membership. L.L., ¶ 37. But the lack of complete information does not relieve the Department of its duty to send notice with the information it has. Accord 25 C.F.R. § 23.111(d)(3) (notice shall include direct lineal ancestors if known). Thus, we must remand the case to the trial court so the Department may comply with the notice requirements of ICWA.

At the termination hearing, mother’s counsel stated that he had spoken with mother’s adoptive family and determined that “the ICWA relationship that [mother] had brought to the [c]ourt’s attention was not viable.” But he did not elaborate, so we don’t know the basis for his representation. Moreover, it was for the Kiowa and Pueblo of Taos tribes, not mother’s adoptive family, to determine whether the children were members or eligible for membership.

(Emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals remanded the case, focusing on the Guidelines and Regulations:

We recognize that the 2015 Guidelines, unlike the regulations promulgated in 2016, were not binding on the trial court. But, as recognized by both the 2015 Guidelines and the 2016 Guidelines, early identification of ICWA applicability promotes proper implementation of ICWA at an early stage, protects the rights of Indian children and their families, prevents delays, and avoids sometimes tragic consequencesSee 2016 Guidelines at 11; 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,148.

Regardless, as discussed above, the termination proceeding was subject to the 2016 Guidelines and regulations. And, more importantly, the Department failed to send notice to the appropriate tribes when mother identified a reason to believe the children were Indian children. Under these circumstances, the record does not support the trial court’s finding that ICWA does not apply.

(Emphasis added, if we had a nickel for every time any ICWA trainer said that, etc.)