The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the lower court terminating the parental rights of Cheryl Lee, stating that there had been sufficient active efforts. However, the Court did explicitly state that the AFSA does not supersede or relieve the State from providing active efforts.
Unfortunately, the Court also held that:
In this case, however, the fundamental disagreement is not about the nature
of the required services, but about the timing of those services. Indeed, respondent acknowledges that the DHS and the tribe provided active efforts in the past, but argues that 25 USC 1912(d) requires current active efforts, which the DHS failed to provide because it did not offer services in connection with the termination of her parental rights to JL. We decline to read the word “current” into 25 USC 1912(d). This statutory language does not impose a strict temporal component for the “active efforts” requirement.
and:
Similarly, we decline to hold that active efforts must always have been provided in relation to the child who is the subject of the current termination proceeding. Again, the question is whether the efforts made and the services provided in connection with the parent’s other children are relevant to the parent’s current situation and abilities so that they permit a current assessment of parental fitness as it pertains to the child who is the subject of the current proceeding. The evidence must satisfy the court “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the parent’s continued custody of that child “is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child,” as required by 25 USC 1912(f).
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