Turtle Talk

Grant Christensen has posted “Tribal Judicial Power,” forthcoming in the University of Southern California Law Review, on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

In 1978’s Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe the Supreme Court announced a new common law rule: tribal courts lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants. Under the guide of the common law, unmoored from interpreting the text of any treaty or statute, the Oliphant opinion made reservation communities less safe by denying tribal governments a critically important tool in law enforcement – the power to arrest, charge, prosecute, and sentence persons who commit crimes on tribal lands. This unilateral evisceration of an inherent tribal power has contributed directly to the crisis of missing and murdered Indigenous women in the United States by preventing tribal law enforcement from prosecuting non-Indian offenders. The Oliphant precedent has made Indian country less safe for everyone by hobbling the ability of tribal governments to criminally convict non-Indians who openly violate tribal law.

In 2004 the Court made its first concession to the absolutist approach taken in Oliphant by recognizing that its decisions limiting the scope of the inherent power of Indian tribes were not constitutionally mandated but rather reflected the understanding of the Court “at the time of those decisions.” It is a new day, and the Court’s understanding of inherent tribal power can evolve. It can remove the common law barrier preventing tribes from exercising their pre-constitutional powers.

This Article takes the position that Congress’s reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act in 2022 is the death knell of the Oliphant opinion and a congressional restoration of tribal judicial power. The gossamer strands of the Court’s 1978 reasoning can no longer survive even cursory review in an era when Congress has given its imprimatur upon both inherent tribal power and tribal court criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants. Oliphant was never a constitutional nor statutory barrier to the assertion of inherent tribal power, and it should not take an act of Congress to reverse. As non-Indians again contest their criminal prosecution in tribal courts under the expanded powers recognized in VAWA, federal courts should reconsider the common law rule announced almost fifty years ago and, consistent with the direction of legal and congressional precedent, make clear that Oliphant no longer accurately reflects American common law.