Child Welfare

California Court of Appeals Finds No Good Cause to Deviate from Placement Preferences in Alexandria P. Case

Kate Fort

Opinion here. The Court of Appeals upholds that the order placing Alexandria P. with her family in Utah.

Information page with previous posts and holdings here.

We have twice remanded the matter because the lower court used an incorrect standard in assessing good cause. The dependency court has now correctly applied the law governing good cause, considering the bond Alexandria has developed over time with the P.s, as well as a number of other factors related to her best interests. Those other factors include Alexandria’s relationship with her extended family and half-siblings; the capacity of her extended family to maintain and develop her sense of self-identity, including her cultural identity and connection to the Choctaw tribal culture; and the P.s’ relative reluctance or resistance to foster Alexandria’s relationship with her extended family or encourage exploration of and exposure to her Choctaw cultural identity.

And

The P.s also do not—and in our view cannot—provide an adequate response to an issue raised most effectively by minor’s appellate counsel. Even though they appear before the court by virtue of their status as de facto parents, the P.s’ efforts to show good cause are motivated by their own interests. Minor’s counsel, not the P.s, has a legal and ethical obligation to represent Alexandria’s interests.(In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 675-677.) The P.s lack the right to assert Alexandria’s interests because Alexandria has her own counsel, who represents her interests and also acts as her guardian ad litem.
***

We recognize that the P.s are claiming that Alexandria’s best interests are served by a finding of good cause, but their argument is undermined by the fact that minor’s counsel argued just the opposite. We are unaware of any published case where a court has upheld a departure from the ICWA’s placement preferences contrary to the position of the minor. In other words, in every published case upholding a good cause finding,
counsel for the minor either advocated for the finding, was aligned with the party advocating for a finding of good cause, or was silent.

California Supreme Court on Issues ICWA Notice Opinion

Kate Fort

Here.

This is the In re Isaiah H. decision, where amici included the United States and California Indian Legal Services on behalf of appellant mother. Briefing was completed in this case more than a year ago, and oral arguments were heard in May.

We granted review to decide whether a parent who does not bring a timely appeal from a juvenile court order that subsumes a finding of ICWA‘s inapplicability may challenge such a finding in the course of appealing from a subsequent order terminating parental rights. Because ICWA imposes on the juvenile court a continuing duty to inquire whether the child is an Indian child, we hold that the parent may a challenge a finding of ICWA‘s inapplicability in an appeal from the subsequent order, even if she did not raise such a challenge in an appeal from the initial order.

***

The continuing nature of a juvenile court‘s duty to inquire into a child‘s Indian status appears on the face of section 224.3(a). As noted, that provision reads: “The court . . . ha[s] an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under Section 300 . . . has been . . . filed is or may be an Indian child in all dependency proceedings and in any juvenile wardship proceedings if the child is at risk of entering foster care or is in foster care.” (§ 224.3(a).) The plain language of this provision — declaring an “affirmative and continuing duty” that applies to “all dependency proceedings” — means that the juvenile court in this case had a present duty to inquire whether Isaiah was an Indian child at the April 2013 proceeding to terminate Ashlee‘s parental rights, even though the court had previously found no reason to know Isaiah was an Indian child at the January 2012 proceeding to place Isaiah in foster care. Because the validity of the April 2013 order is necessarily premised on the juvenile court‘s fulfillment of that duty, there is nothing improper or untimely about Ashlee‘s contention in this appeal that the juvenile court erred in discharging that duty.

Briefs here.

Motion and Briefing for Partial Summary Judgment in Oglala Sioux v. Fleming (Van Hunnik)

Kate Fort

This filing is part of the ICWA class action case in South Dakota over the interpretation of 25 USC 1922 (emergency jurisdiction):

The third reason why this Court’s ruling on § 1922 has been inoperative is because the State’s Attorney for Pennington County, Defendant Mark Vargo, and the person Mr. Vargo has assigned to handle abuse and neglect cases in Pennington County, Deputy State’s Attorney Roxanne Erickson, see Erickson Dep. at 5-7, is failing to properly employ the federal standard. Indeed, Mr. Vargo’s interpretation of § 1922 threatens to forever prevent Plaintiffs from obtaining the benefit of this Court’s ruling on § 1922.6 The instant motion for partial summary judgment seeks to remove this final obstacle to the implementation of § 1922 in Defendants’ 48-hour hearings.

Plaintiffs deposed Ms. Erickson on May 25, 2016. Ms. Erickson testified that she interprets the word “harm” in § 1922’s standard “physical damage or harm” as including emotional harm. Id. at 131 made that ‘harm’ would also include emotional harm to the child. . . . [T]hat is how I would read it, that you have to show some form of harm which could include emotional harm.”). Thus, Defendant Vargo continues to use the state standard rather than the federal standard, given that Ms. Erickson interprets the federal standard to authorize DSS to consider emotional harm in determining whether to seek continued custody of an Indian child at the 48-hour hearing.

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Memorandum in Support of S.J.

Affidavit in Support of Motion

Statement of Undisputed Facts

Ex. 1-Vargo

Ex. 2-Vargo

Ex. 3-Vargo

Ex. 4-Vargo

Ex. 5-Vargo

Ex. 6-Vargo

Now Published Case out of California on Application of ICWA to Eligible Children

Kate Fort

Here. (original unpublished opinion we posted last week). Appellants requested this opinion be published, so the published opinion is here.

We’d like to point out that the fact that mother was a minor and a dependent of the court meant that the state should have been treating MOTHER’S own case as an ICWA case, which does not seem to have happened (and if you’re keeping track, yes, I’ve now used italics, allcaps, AND red ink on this one).

In this case, BOTH the Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa AND the Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Tribe responded to the Department’s notice. Both Bands stated the children were eligible for enrollment, and Red Cliff asked for more information. Mother was a minor and a runaway from her placement. But instead of sending the information, or following up to assist in getting the children enrolled, or provide active efforts, the Department requested the juvenile court find that ICWA did not apply. Which the juvenile court did. Specifically:

Our record discloses no further action after November 2013, until an interim review report, dated April 22, 2014, stated, “[i]t is respectfully requested that the Court make a finding as to the children’s Indian Child Welfare Act Status.” The report further stated that ICWA “does or may apply” as each child might be an Indian child in the Chippewa tribe and was ICWA “eligible” (capitalization & boldface omitted). SSA proposed the court find “ICWA does not apply,” and the juvenile court’s minute order, dated April 22, 2014, contains the finding, “ICWA does not apply.” In a minute order dated June 19, 2014, the juvenile court again stated: “Court finds ICWA does not apply.”

The Court of Appeals held:

Given the above cited authorities, the juvenile court erred by finding ICWA did not apply. Not only did insufficient evidence support that finding, but also two tribes responded to SSA’s ICWA notice, by stating that the children were eligible to enroll in them. The court was thereafter required to proceed as if the children were Indian children.

Under these circumstances, we must reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand with directions for the juvenile court to order SSA to make active efforts necessary to secure tribal membership for the children. (In re K.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 450, 458–459.)

Preliminary Report on from California’s ICWA Compliance Task Force

Kate Fort2 Comments

Prelim Final – CA ICWA TF Report 6.10.2016

Press Release

SACRAMENTO – Insufficient services, severe underfunding, barriers preventing tribal participation and inadequate reunification efforts have undermined the effectiveness and promise of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in California, according to a preliminary report from a Task Force of tribal leaders from across the state, working independently to apprise the California’s Attorney General’s Bureau of Children’s Justice of these inadequacies.

The ICWA Compliance Task Force’s report recognizes that efforts have been undertaken to overcome cultural, procedural and funding challenges, but these ongoing obstacles continue to severely limit the implementation of ICWA in California, resulting in devastating impacts to Indian children, their families and their tribes.

Link to Official Federal Register for ICWA Final Rule

Kate Fort3 Comments

Here. The actual rule starts at 81 Fed. Reg. 38864.

Also, now word searchable and only 100 pages (well, with three columns on each page and a font size that makes me happy I finally got reading glasses).

 

Chronicle of Social Change Article on Native Foster Home(s) in L.A.

Kate Fort

Here.

In 1978, Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), which was meant to keep Native American families together, after foster care and adoption practices had seen thousands of Native children taken from their families, ancestral lands and culture to be placed in non-native homes. That law created a system of “preferred placements” for Native children who enter care. The first choice is to place children with family members, followed by members of the same tribe and finally Native foster parents from other tribes. The last resort is placement in non-native homes.

But the federal government has never compelled states to share how well they satisfy that “preference,” leaving little or no data to indicate who is doing a good job placing Native children in Native homes.

The reporting that does exist is spotty at best.

In 2005, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) surveyed all 50 states and Washington D.C. about their ability to identify Native children in the system who were subject to ICWA in 2003.

“Only five states—Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Washington—were able to provide these data,” according the GAO report.

It doesn’t appear that reporting on ICWA compliance improved much in the subsequent years.

In 2015, Casey Family Programs, one of the largest charitable foundations in all of child welfare, tried to ascertain ICWA compliance in a brief entitled “Measuring Compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act.”

“Although cross-jurisdictional and collaborative efforts are emerging, compliance measurement remains characterized by relatively small, idiosyncratic efforts,” the thin report reads. “Empirical study results are scattered, inconsistent, and highly specific to the state and jurisdiction being examined.”

Commentary on the Native American Children’s Safety Act

ilpc

Last week, the Department of the Interior published final regulations implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act, along with a legal opinion from the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior regarding the authority to issue such regulations. The Department’s regulations, and the accompanying legal opinion, garnered a lot of attention across Indian country and Indian child welfare advocates, and may prove to be the capstone on the Administration’s work for Native children.

However, last week the President also signed of the “Native American Children’s Safety Act” (S.184 or “NACSA”). NACSA amended 25 U.S.C. § 3207 – requiring character investigations for certain individuals who have regular contact with Indian children.

As its title suggests, NACSA is intended to protect Indian children in tribal foster care by doing several things:

  1. Prohibiting child placement in foster care, or licensing foster homes, unless the tribe has completed a criminal background check on each individual residing in the foster home and certified that each of those individuals meets the requirements of the statute;
  2. Requiring tribes to adopt placement standards in accordance with the statute;
  3. Requiring tribes to recertify existing foster homes to ensure that they meet the new standards required under the statute; and,
  4. Requiring the Department of the Interior to issue guidance on appropriate placement standards (and subjecting tribal standards to the Department’s guidance).

Given its subject matter and intent, NACSA moved through Congress with little opposition and broad support. But, the details of the statute’s mandates seem to have caught a number of tribal courts and social services agencies off-guard. Some tribal judges (including one of the authors of this post), tribal social services agencies, and Indian child welfare advocates are concerned about unintended consequences that could flow from the mandates in this new law. Those mandates include the following:

  1. Tribal courts and agencies are required to conduct fingerprint-based checks of national crime databases, as well as checks of state abuse and neglect databases in every state where any adult in the foster home resided for the past five years.
  1. If those checks reveal that any adult in the home has been convicted of a felony in any federal, state, or tribal court for crimes listed in 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(20)(A)(i) or (ii), tribal courts and agencies are prohibited from placing children in the foster home. Those crimes are a host of felonies, but also include “drug-related offenses.” Because the statute makes a cross-reference rather than specifically enumerating the crimes, it’s not clear whether the five-year limit in the referenced statute carries over as a limit on this provision.
  1. The Department of the Interior is required to issue “guidance” sometime in the next two years that is binding on Indian tribes regarding placement standards. That guidance must address “self reporting requirements” for the head of the household if he/she knows that another adult in the house is listed on any tribal or state abuse registry, or has been convicted of any of the crimes listed above.

While well intended, these provisions will leave tribal foster care agencies and tribal courts without any discretion to certify foster homes and make placements within their communities. It is likely to further limit the availability of eligible foster homes in tribal communities.

As people across Indian country know, many households on the reservation include temporary residents – including extended family members, adult children, family friends, or other community members in need. A member of the household may have gone through the tribe’s healing to wellness court. NACSA does not leave tribal agencies much flexibility to account for these homes or living arrangements. Where tribal courts and agencies previously had discretion to make those judgment calls, NACSA removes that discretion. Any adult living in the home with a prior drug-related offense may automatically disqualify that home from being approved as a foster care placement.

In addition, NACSA requires the Department of the Interior to issue binding guidance on implementation of the statute, including procedures for “self-reporting” by the head of the household if he/she has knowledge that any other adult in the home was convicted of a crime listed above. Tribes will be required to enforce this mandate, but it is unclear how.

NACSA’s mandate that tribes conduct background checks on state databases presumes that state agencies will cooperate with tribal agencies in their efforts to conduct such searches. The statute does not provide Indian tribes with any legal tools, other than the authority to enter into “voluntary agreements with State entities,” to require such cooperation. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which state agencies are uncooperative in conducting those searches, thus slowing down foster care placement in Indian country. It is one thing for a tribe to have solid relationships with a local county or even the state—it is quite another to have to reach out to every state where an individual lived in the past five years (let’s say, Ohio, for example) for cooperation.

Perhaps most importantly, NACSA does not provide tribal courts and social services agencies with any additional resources to carry out these new mandates. The courts and agencies with the least amount of resources will now have to spend more money to remain in compliance with federal law. Failure to remain in compliance with these new mandates will likely jeopardize the already meager federal funds that flow into tribal courts and child welfare agencies.

None of this is to say tribal judges or social services agencies don’t have an interest in making sure that foster children are placed in safe homes, or that the proponents of NACSA had bad intentions. As a tribal court judge and ICWA advocate, we applaud the fact that Congress and policy makers care about the importance of safe foster homes in Indian country.

But NACSA may turn out to be a law with drastic unintended consequences (we hope not). This statute could benefit from some amendments to allow tribal courts and agencies to have more discretion to solve problems at the local level, as well as authorization of funding to help tribes meet these new requirements. Absent those amendments, the Department of the Interior must work closely with tribal judges and social services workers to ensure that the law is implemented in a way that prevents unintended consequences.

 

 

Child Welfare League of America Statement of Support of ICWA Rule

Kate Fort

Here.

The regulations put forward a standard of practice for Indian children and families that is consistent with other federal law and nationally-recognized practice standards (including CWLA’s) for all children. As part of a coalition of 18 nationally-recognized child advocacy organizations, we recognize ICWA as the “gold standard” in child welfare practice.

With these regulations, CWLA will redouble its work to ensure that service providers fully implement ICWA and the CWLA standards of excellence in child welfare.

Previous posts here and here.