Michigan Supreme Court Rejects One Parent Doctrine as Unconstitutional

This case will have broad ramifications for child welfare cases. This is a huge victory for parents and families. While not mentioned in this opinion, this case was also an ICWA case.

Opinion, written by Justice McCormack, here.

At issue in this case is the constitutionality of Michigan’s one-parent doctrine. The one-parent doctrine permits a court to interfere with a parent’s right to direct the care, custody, and control of the children solely because the other parent is unfit, without any determination that he or she is also unfit. In other words, the one-parent doctrine essentially imposes joint and several liability on both parents, potentially divesting either of custody, on the basis of the unfitness of one. Merely describing the doctrine foreshadows its constitutional weakness.

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Because the jurisdictional inquiry is focused on the child, once there has been an adjudication, either by trial or by plea, the court has jurisdiction over the child regardless of whether one or both parents have been adjudicated unfit. MCL 712A.2(b). In cases in which jurisdiction has been established by adjudication of only one parent, the one-parent doctrine allows the court to then enter dispositional orders affecting the parental rights of both parents.

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Because application of the one-parent doctrine impermissibly infringes the fundamental rights of unadjudicated parents without providing adequate process, we hold that it is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Unpublished Active Efforts Decision from the Michigan COA

Here.

With some troubling language, given this was an abuse and neglect case:

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In this appeal, the parties have not directly addressed whether respondent father ever had “custody” of the children, or whether respondent father is part of an “Indian family” within the meaning of ICWA or MIFPA. For purposes of this appeal only, we assume that respondent father was a parent from whose custody the Indian children were removed, within the meaning of 25 USC 1914 and MCL 712B.39. We further assume that mother, respondent father, and the children comprise an “Indian family” within the meaning of ICWA and MIFPA. Cf. In re SD, 236 Mich App 240, 244; 599 NW2d 772 (1999) (holding that no “active efforts” were required when the family had already been broken up at the time the proceedings began); Adoptive Couple v Baby Girl, ___ US ___; 133 S Ct 2552, 2563-2564; 186 L Ed 2d 729 (2013) (same).