Here.

In this case, the trial court explicitly recognized that Hillert, the only expert witness at the termination hearing, did not support termination and specifically testified that returning AP andDP to Stenman’s care would not likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to either child. Nonetheless, considering the other evidence presented, the trial court determined that returning AP and DP to Stenman’s care would result in such damage beyond a reasonable doubt. In so doing, the trial court essentially disregarded Hillert’s testimony, contrary to the plain language of 25 USC 1912(f), MCL 712B.15(4), and MCR 3.977(G)(2). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court failed to adhere to the requirements of ICWA and its Michigan counterparts, and remand for further proceedings with respect to AP and DP.

The testimony of a qualified expert witness under ICWA is part of the necessary proof to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that return of the child to her mother will cause serious emotional or physical damage. Without that testimony, the state has not met its burden to terminate parental rights. If the state cannot provide a QEW that agrees with termination, the court cannot terminate parental rights. In situations like this, where the QEW not only testifies that he does not agree with the termination in this case, nor in termination generally as a tribe, this ought to force the state to look to other long term permanency solutions that don’t require the termination of parental rights, like Michigan’s long term juvenile guardianships, or at ways other states have addressed this issue (like California).