racial bias

New Article on Racial Bias in Evidence Rules

Ann Tweedy1 Comment

Jasmine Gonzales Rose has posted Toward a Critical Race Theory of Evidence on ssrn. The article is forthcoming in the Minnesota Law Review.

Here’s the abstract:

Scholars, judges, and lawyers have long believed that evidence rules apply equally to all persons regardless of race. This Article challenges this assumption and reveals how evidence law structurally disadvantages people of color. A critical race analysis of stand-your-ground defenses, cross-racial eyewitness misidentifications, and minority flight from racially-targeted police profiling and violence uncovers the existence of a dual-race evidentiary system. This system is reminiscent of nineteenth century race-based witness competency rules that barred people of color from testifying against white people. I deconstruct this problem and introduce the original concept of “racialized reality evidence.” This construct demonstrates how evidence of people of color’s lived experiences of systemic racism are regularly excluded at trial, while evidence of white norms and beliefs receives “implicit judicial notice.” Finally, I advocate for a new critical race theory of evidence law and offer solutions — including a reinterpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 — to increase equality in the courtroom.

New Study on Racial Bias in Legal Writing

Matthew L.M. Fletcher3 Comments

Here.

The study, titled “Written in Black & White: Exploring Confirmation Bias in Racialized Perceptions of Writing Skills,” is well worth the short read.

An excerpt:

We undertook this study with the hypothesis that unconscious confirmation bias in a supervising lawyer’s assessment of legal writing would result in a more negative rating if that writing was submitted by an African American lawyer in comparison to the same submission by a Caucasian lawyer. In order to create a study where we could control for enough variables to truly see the impact of confirmation bias, we did not study the potential variances that can be caused due to the intersection of race/ethnicity, gender, generational differences and other such salient identities. Thus, our conclusion is limited to the impact of confirmation bias in the evaluation of African American men in comparison to Caucasian men. We do not know (although we plan to study the issue in the very near future!) how this impact will splinter or strengthen when gender and/or other identities are introduced.

The data findings affirmed our hypothesis, but they also illustrated that the confirmation bias on the part of the evaluators occurred in the data collection phase of their evaluation processes – the identification of the errors – and not the final analysis phase. When expecting to find fewer errors, we find fewer errors. When expecting to find more errors, we find more errors. That is unconscious confirmation bias. Our evaluators unconsciously found more of the errors in the “African American” Thomas Meyer’s memo, but the final rating process was a conscious and unbiased analysis based on the number of errors found. When partners say that they are evaluating assignments without bias, they are probably right in believing that there is no bias in the assessment of the errors found; however, if there is bias in the finding of the errors, even a fair final analysis cannot, and will not, result in a fair result.

U.S. v. Benally — CA10 Reinstates Conviction after Juror Alleged Racial Bias against Indian

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

In United States v. Benally, the Tenth Circuit reinstated a federal criminal conviction for assaulting a BIA officer against a Ute Mountain Ute tribal member. An excerpt:

On October 10, 2007, a jury convicted Kerry Dean Benally of forcibly assaulting a Bureau of Indian Affairs officer with a dangerous weapon, inviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(b). The next day one of the jurors came forward with a charge that the jury deliberations had been tainted by racial bias and other inappropriate considerations. The district court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)’s general rule against jurors testifying about jury deliberations did not apply and that the evidence of juror misconduct was sufficient to warrant a new trial. We disagree. Rule 606(b)’s prohibition covers juror testimony of racial bias in jury deliberations of the kind alleged in Mr. Benally’s trial, and the Sixth Amendment does not require an exception. The original conviction is reinstated.