Here is the opinion: dct-order-yancey-v-bonner

An excerpt:

Plaintiff is a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Indian Nation of Oklahoma. He is the father of Baby Boy L., who was born out of wedlock on October 4, 2002. In July 2002, the mother, who is not of Indian descent, decided to place the baby for adoption. Shortly after the birth, the Prospective Adoptive Parents took the child to Missouri, where he has since resided. On October 10, 2002, the mother relinquished her parental rights in Oklahoma County. On December 26, 2002, an adoption petition was filed in Cleveland County. The Plaintiff’s parental rights were terminated and he appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, claiming that the trial court erred in holding that the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. (“the Act”), did not apply. The Supreme Court agreed, reversing the termination of the Plaintiff’s parental rights. The Prospective Adoptive Parents then filed a new application to terminate the Plaintiff’s parental rights. In February 2006, the trial court determined that the Act applied but that there was good cause to avoid the placement preferences of that Act, leaving the child in the custody of the Prospective Adoptive Parents. In January 2008, the Plaintiff filed a motion to transfer the case to Tribal Court. In February 2008, this motion was denied and the trial court terminated the Plaintiff’s parental rights, finding that his consent to the adoption was unnecessary. The Plaintiff appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court in March 2008 and filed the present complaint in May 2008. The adoption proceeding is still pending in Cleveland County District Court. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant failed to follow the mandates of the Indian Child Welfare Act and is thereby depriving him of his rights under that statute and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

And more:

Finally, the Plaintiff has a sufficient opportunity to raise his federal claims within the context of the state court proceeding. This prong requires the Plaintiff to demonstrate that state procedural law clearly bars him from raising these claims in the state proceeding. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 14; Moore, 442 U.S. at 432. The Plaintiff here has provided no evidence indicating state law bars him from litigating his claims under the Indian Child Welfare Act in state court. On the contrary, the Plaintiff has in fact raised such claims in the past in the state court system and received favorable results. (Dkt. No. 1.) Therefore, the Plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to raise his federal claims in the current state court proceedings.