Here.
Lots of good information here.
Press coverage here.
The longer movie is due out in 2017, but it’s very nice to have this short film and supporting website available now as an antidote to all of the Goldwater blitz.
Latest filings in Nat’l Council for Adoption v. Jewell:
DOJ Memorandum for Summary Judgment
A favorite footnote (5 is good too):
10 Finally, BAF does not elaborate as to why placement with an Indian child’s family or tribe could not also be “loving,” and its silence is telling. ICWA was designed as a remedy for precisely this type of bias: the stereotype held by some child-welfare advocates that Indian children will be better off placed with a non-Indian family. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 37 (reiterating that Congress feared that application of a “white, middleclass standard” will, “in many cases, foreclose[] placement with [an] Indian family”). BAF’s misguided view is, at best, an “abstract concern” that is insufficient to create standing. See Lane, 703 F.3d at 675 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 40).
National Organizations (NCAI, NICWA, AAIA) Amicus Brief in Support
Posting this one more time because it worked smashingly for a tribe yesterday. Fill it out! Forward it on!
In an attempt to better protect ICWA, tribes, and AI/AN families, NICWA and the ILPC have put together a short survey to collected ICWA attorney information nationwide. If you are in-house or outside counsel, if you are a parents’ attorney interested in taking ICWA cases, if you are legal aid agency who represents tribes, if you stumbled on this post and would be willing to represent a tribe from another state in an ICWA proceeding, please fill this out this poll.
The information will be sent to NICWA, and not sold or otherwise distributed beyond what is indicated. Please forward this questionnaire to the ICWA attorneys in your network and encourage them to submit their information as well.
Here is the link.
We don’t post every time a document is filed in the current federal ICWA cases (EDVA, AZ, MN, NDOK), but will be posting updates as orders are filed or briefing is completed on an issue, as usual.
However, many filings for all four cases are being updated regularly here.
Here.
Bolstering accountability of the U.S. justice system and providing regulations for its interaction with Indian child-welfare cases secures the safety, health and well-being of Indian children and their tribal nations. The act is a public-health policy that prompts prevention-based measures to restore wellness for Indian children and their families. A sharp focus on the legal status of native children as citizens of self-determining tribal nations is fundamental. Indian children possess an inherent political status that predates the United States, a reality supported by centuries of U.S. law and policy.
Edited to add Senator Dorgan’s letter in the WaPo as well. Here:
When we talk about “blood-stained” laws, we should talk about the history of the treatment of Native Americans: laws of genocide, sterilization, forced removal and assimilation; compulsory boarding schools; underfunding of critical health care; and a trail of broken promises.
These were written in response to a particularly egregious and racist syndicated column by George Will we did not post.
On Friday he put up a second column about the Washington football team. If you want to know what he’s saying, given that his columns are syndicated and run nationwide, here are links to them that don’t boost them on a google search:
Here is the complaint.
This case mirrors the ongoing Doe v. Jesson case (where Mille Lacs defeated the preliminary injunction, and we are currently waiting for a decision on summary judgment). Filed after we wrote the ICWA Legal Defense memo discussing the other three ongoing cases, this case involves a voluntary adoption, the Oklahoma state ICWA, and Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma. The arguments involve right to privacy, and due process and equal protection concerns.
Here.
Among other things, this case demonstrates some of the confusion going on in the courts about WHEN certain provisions of ICWA are required. Must there be a qualified expert witness at disposition hearings? What if the court makes a finding about returning a child to a parent at a disposition hearing? And finally, who is responsible for getting QEW testimony?
(The answer to the last one is the State. Not the tribe, not the parent, and it’s not waive-able [though that happens] since it’s the evidentiary burden of the State to have a QEW who agrees with termination or foster care.)
Here.
The purpose of this funding opportunity announcement is to support the creation of effective practice model partnerships between state courts and/or Court Improvement Program, state public child welfare agency and a tribe, group of tribes, or tribal consortia, including both the tribal child welfare agency and tribal court for effective implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) of 1978 (Pub.L. 95-608).
Demonstration sites will be required to jointly develop protocols and practices to promote effective and timely:
– Identification of Indian children;
– Notice to tribes;
– Tribal participation as parties in hearings involving Indian children;
– Tribal intervention in dependency cases;
– Transfer of ICWA cases to tribal courts; and
– Placement of Indian children according to tribal preferences.Partnership models must be co-created by states and tribes, jointly implemented, and designed to generate and capture clear, measurable outcomes such as:
– Compliance with identification methods;
– The number of Indian children identified;
– Length of time from removal or petition filed until identification is made;
– Number of notices sent;
– Length of time from identification until notice sent (state measure)
– Number of notices received (tribal measure)
– Length of time for tribal intervention or participation; (tribal measure)
– Number of cases in which a tribe intervenes; (joint measure)
– Number of transfers; (joint measure); and
– Number of Indian children placed according to tribal placement preferences (joint measure).
Here. The case cites to the In re K.S. case here.
The court found a way to splice the burden of proof issue, finding that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard only applies to the finding that continued custody of the child by the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child, not to the termination of parental rights.
Here. From Kalamazoo County.
Of note: There are six tribes in Michigan alone that should be noticed if a parent family in a “Chippewa tribe,” and DHHS noticed one of them. MIFPA requires the notice of the tribe in the county where the case arises, though the Pokagon Band service area does not include Kzoo county, while the other two (unnoticed) Potawatomi tribes do cover the county. Finally, it’s not clear from the opinion why Cherokee was noticed at all.
There is no question that the ICWA and MIFPA notice requirements were triggered early in these proceedings when father indicated at an April 2013 preliminary hearing that he might have some family membership—specifically, through his brother—in the “Chippewa tribe.” There is some indication in the record that respondent-mother also claimed potential Indian heritage, although it is unclear what tribes, if any, she identified. Because “sufficiently reliable information” of possible Indian heritage was provided, the trial court had “reason to know” that an Indian child could be involved, thus triggering the ICWA and MIFPA notice requirements. 25 USC 1912(a); MCL 712B.9(1); In re Morris, 491 Mich at 109.
The record indicates that DHS sent notifications to several different tribes, including the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee, the Cherokee Nation, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, and the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians. DHS also sent a notification to the Midwest Bureau of Indian Affairs. On June 18, 2013, both the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians responded and indicated that the child was not eligible for membership. The Cherokee Nation also responded with a request for more family information, although there is no indication that further information was thereafter provided. There is also no indication that the remaining tribes or the Bureau of Indian Affairs responded. Based on the responses that had been received, the trial court indicated at a November 2013 review hearing that the ICWA/MIFPA inquiry was “at an end.”
We conclude that the record sufficiently evidences DHS’s compliance with the ICWA and MIFPA notice requirements. DHS sent notifications to several tribes, as well as the Bureau of Indian Affairs. On appeal, father does not identify any other tribes that should have been notified. Moreover, while father takes issue with the fact that DHS apparently never provided further information to the Cherokee Nation, he does not identify what further information could have been provided, nor does he argue that he provided the information requested to DHS but that DHS failed to forward it to the Cherokee Nation. Moreover, we note that DHS does not have an affirmative responsibility “to conduct independent research to obtain a parent’s detailed genealogical information.” In re Morris (On Remand), 300 Mich App 95, 105; 832 NW2d 419 (2013). Finally, despite father’s argument to the contrary, the trial court did in fact make a conclusive determination that the child was not an Indian child by noting that the issue was “at an end” and by leaving unchecked, in its subsequent orders, the box indicating that the proceedings involved an Indian child. There was no plain error affecting substantial rights.
Here is DHHS’s map of tribal service areas in Michigan.
You must be logged in to post a comment.