Here are the materials in Herpel v. County of Riverside:
Here is the unpublished opinion in California Valley Miwok Tribe v. California Gambling Control :
Here is the opinion in Yavapai-Apache Nation v. La Posta Band of Diegueno Mission Indians:
This appeal arises from a contract dispute between two Indian tribes: Yavapai Apache Nation (YAN) and La Posta Band of Diegueno Mission Indians (La Posta). YAN is an Arizona-based tribe with about 2,400 members, and La Posta is a California based tribe with about 15 adult members. In the parties’ contract, La Posta promised to repay more than $23 million to YAN for funds borrowed to develop a casino that later proved unsuccessful. The parties waived sovereign immunity in their contract.
In the final judgment, the superior court awarded YAN $48,893,407.97 on its contract claim, and entered judgment against La Posta on its declaratory relief claim based on the court’s finding this claim was not ripe. Both parties filed appeals from this judgment. For the reasons explained, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment in its entirety.
Here is the unpublished opinion in California Valley Miwok Tribe v. California Gambling Control Commission (Cal. Ct. App. — 4th Dist.): D068909
Plaintiff California Valley Miwok Tribe (the Tribe) appeals from the trial court’s award of costs in favor of defendant California Gambling Control Commission (the Commission), following the Commission’s successful summary judgment against the Tribe in its lawsuit seeking an order requiring the Commission to pay over the funds to the Tribe from the Indian Gaming Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF). The Tribe contends that it is protected by tribal sovereign immunity from incurring any obligation to pay costs to the prevailing defendant in a lawsuit that it initiated. As we will explain, the Tribe’s position lacks merit, and accordingly we affirm the award of costs.
Related materials here.
Here is the opinion in Wells Fargo Bank NA v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.
The indenture and note between the Bank and the Tribe were secured by a perfected security interest in the DAR, after being deposited into the Tribe’s custodial account with the Bank. The indenture agreement at issue here did not confer any authority, control, or responsibility to the bondholder or the Bank for the conduct of any gaming activity. It merely provided the Bank and the bondholder with a security interest in a specific bank account. It did not and could not control what was deposited into that custodial account. A contract creating a security interest in a custodial account does not convey authority or responsibility for the conduct of any gaming activity. Therefore, it does not violate the sole proprietary interest rule.
Only brief I’ve found: Wells Fargo’s Reply brief
Here is the opinion in In re D.C.:
Reported case on notice, where the social service agency attempted to fix the notice issues while the case was on appeal. Fourth District remanded for proper notice.
An unreported case where the trial court refused to apply ICWA because of a lack of written communication from the tribe, though the agency received verbal confirmation of the children’s membership. The case was reversed, also by the Fourth District.
Finally, an unreported case using the “family lore” argument to find there was no notice necessary. Haven’t seen a family lore case in California since 2011. Those cases were all out of the Second District, while this one is out of the First.
Among other things, this case demonstrates some of the confusion going on in the courts about WHEN certain provisions of ICWA are required. Must there be a qualified expert witness at disposition hearings? What if the court makes a finding about returning a child to a parent at a disposition hearing? And finally, who is responsible for getting QEW testimony?
(The answer to the last one is the State. Not the tribe, not the parent, and it’s not waive-able [though that happens] since it’s the evidentiary burden of the State to have a QEW who agrees with termination or foster care.)