Indian status

Ninth Circuit Affirms Conviction of Former Fort Peck Member as “Indian” under Major Crimes Act

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in United States v. Smith.

An excerpt on blood quantum:

The government presented sufficient evidence of Smith’s Indian blood to satisfy Bruce’s first prong. We have held this requirement satisfied by as little as 1/8 (12.5%) Indian blood. See Maggi, 598 F.3d at 1080; Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1223. Here, the government presented evidence that Smith has 25/128 (19.5%) Assiniboine and Sioux blood, well in excess of the 1/8 we approved in Bruce and Maggi. We acknowledge that Smith’s § 2255 motion attached a letter from the Fort Peck Tribes Enrollment Office stating that Smith “does not meet the required blood quantum of 1/8 for Associate Membership [in the Fort Peck tribes], nor 1/4 Full Enrollment.” But this evidence was not presented at trial, and even if it had been, a rational trier of fact could have chosen to credit the more specific, higher figure established by the government’s evidence.

An excerpt on the defendant’s relinquishment of tribal membership:

We recognize that Smith relinquished his tribal enrollment in 1996. This decision does not definitively show, however, that Smith or the tribe ceased to consider Smith an Indian person. See Cruz, 554 F.3d at 850 (holding that Bruce requires an analysis of Indian status from the perspective of the individual as well as from the perspective of the tribe). A tribal investigator, Tom Atkinson, testified he had known Smith for most of his life, that Smith had lived on the reservation that entire time and that, as far as Atkinson knew, Smith held himself out to be an Indian person. A rational jury could have concluded that because Smith was once formally enrolled in the tribe and continued to hold himself out as an Indian even after his enrollment ended, both Smith and the tribe continued to view Smith as an Indian despite his unexplained decision to relinquish his formal enrolled status.

 

Ninth Circuit Decides “Indian Status” Case under Major Crimes Act

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is last week’s unpublished opinion in United States v. LaBuff.

Here is an excerpt:

At trial, the government presented the testimony of Helen Butterfly (“Butterfly”), a health records lab technician at the Blackfeet Community Hospital. Butterfly testified that on the basis of LaBuff’s classification as an Indian descendant of a tribal member, he was eligible to receive healthcare services at the hospital, which is operated by the federal government and whose non-emergency services are limited to enrolled tribal members and other non-member Indians. Butterfly further testified that since May 1979, LaBuff received healthcare services from the Blackfeet Community Hospital. Because the evidence showed that LaBuff repeatedly accessed healthcare services “reserved only to Indians,” we conclude that the government sufficiently established the second Bruce factor.

Similarly, we conclude that because LaBff frequently received healthcare services on the basis of his descendent status of an enrolled member, he enjoyed the “benefits” of his tribal affiliation, as required by Bruce’s third factor.

In addition to establishing the second and third Bruce factors, the government also presented evidence that on multiple occasions, LaBuff was arrested, prosecuted, and convicted under the jurisdiction of the tribal courts. As we observed in Bruce, the assumption and exercise of tribal criminal jurisdiction is strong evidence of tribal recognition. 394 F.3d at 1227. At the time he was prosecuted, LaBuff did not challenge the authority of tribal authorities to arrest him or the exercise of tribal criminal jurisdiction. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that, contrary to LaBuff’s contention, the evidence was sufficient for any rational fact-finder to have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is an “Indian person.”

Ninth Circuit Reviews Who is An “Indian” under Major Crimes Act

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

The opinion in United States v. Cruz is here. An excerpt:

At first glance, there appears to be something odd about a court of law in a diverse nation such as ours deciding whether a specific individual is or is not “an Indian.” Yet, given the long and complex relationship between the government of the United States and the sovereign tribal nations within its borders, the criminal jurisdiction of the federal government often turns on precisely this question — whether a particular individual “counts” as an Indian — and it is this question that we address once again today.

***

Because the evidence adduced during Christopher Cruz’s trial does not satisfy any of the four factors outlined in the second prong of the Bruce test, we hold that, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, his conviction cannot stand. The district court’s failure to grant Cruz’s motion for judgment of acquittal was plain error, and accordingly we reverse.

Here are the briefs:

cruz-opening-brief

united-states-appellee-brief

cruz-reply-brief