HUD Must Provide Hearing Prior to Recapturing NAHASDA Funds in Allocation Formula Dispute

Here are the materials in Lummi Tribe v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

DCT Order Denying US Motion to Dismiss Count 2

HUD Motion to Dismiss

Lummi Response

HUD Reply

An excerpt:

In conclusion, we read Section 405 as governing HUD’s actions and thus as precluding HUD from exercising any common law right the agency might otherwise possess under circumstances not directly addressed by the statute. We further read that section as applying only in cases that do not involve a grant recipient’s substantial noncompliance with NAHASDA (which would fall instead under Section 401). In addition, we construe Section 405’s implementing regulations as requiring the Secretary to provide notice and the opportunity for a hearing before making an adjustment to a recipient’s grant amounts and as preventing the Secretary from recapturing grant amounts already expended on affordable housing activities. To conclude otherwise would allow HUD to deny grant recipients the protections Congress has afforded them when faced with a reduction in their grant funding, would further allow the agency to circumvent a process put into place by consensus rulemaking at the direction of Congress, and would lead to the anomalous result that a grant recipient in substantial noncompliance with NAHASDA would receive greater procedural protections before experiencing a recapture of their grant funds than recipients in full compliance (a target for recapture through a fault of HUD’s rather than their own). We are unwilling to endorse such an unsatisfactory result.

Yakama Nation Housing Authority Trust/Contract Claims against US Survive Motion to Dismiss

Here are the materials in Yakama Nation Housing Authority v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

DCT Order Denying US Motion to Dismiss YNHA Complaint

US Motion to Dismiss YNHA Complaint

Yakama Housing Opposition

US Reply to YNHA Opposition

However, the government has filed a motion for reconsideration:

US Motion for Reconsideration

 

Intertribal NAHASDA Claims Proceed in Court of Federal Claims

Here are the materials in Lummi Tribe v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

DCT Order Denying Motion to Dismiss (mostly)

Government Motion to Dismiss

Lummi et al Response

Government Reply

An excerpt describing the claims:

This action is one of a dozen or more law suits currently pending before both this court and the United States District Court for the District of Colorado brought by various Indian tribes and tribal housing authorities to challenge actions by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) in calculating and seeking the repayment of grant funds paid to the tribes pursuant to the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (“NAHASDA”), as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4212 (2006). In particular, plaintiffs in this case contend that HUD improperly determined that certain of plaintiffs’ housing units could not be included in their grant calculations, thereby depriving plaintiffs of funding to which they allegedly were entitled both under the payment mandates of NAHASDA and under their annual funding agreements.

Fort Peck v. HUD Cert Petition

Here: Fort Peck Cert Petition.

Questions presented:

Under the Native American Housing Assistance and Self Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA), Congress directed the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to establish a formula to allocate annual block grants to Indian Tribes for affordable housing activities. Congress directed that the formula be based on factors which reflect housing need, including three explicit factors. The first factor is the number of dwelling units owned or operated by the Tribes under the 1937 Housing Act at the time the regulations became effective. 25 U.S.C. § 4152 (b) (1). The Secretary promulgated a regulation, 24 C.F.R. § 1000.318, that removes some of these dwelling units from the formula. After the regulation was invalidated by the district court as violative of the statute, Congress amended the statute to incorporate, with significant exceptions, part of the regulation into the statute. The questions presented are:

(1) When Congress mandates a definitive number of units to be considered as a factor in an annual funding formula, may the Secretary lawfully impose a regulation that fails to include all of the units in the formula?

(2) The Tenth Circuit declined to address the effect of the 2008 amendment on the regulation’s validity. Does the amendment of the statute following the district court’s decision support the district court’s ruling that the regulation was invalid prior to the amendment?

(3) Does the Tenth Circuit’s decision that the Secretary may exclude dwelling units from the formula conflict with the decisions of other circuits holding that statutory factors which Congress mandates for consideration by an Agency must be considered in full?

Lower court materials here.