Govind Persad on Allocating Medicine Fairly in an Unfair Pandemic

Govind Persad has posted “Allocating Medicine Fairly in an Unfair Pandemic,” forthcoming in the University of Illinois Law Review, on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

America’s COVID-19 pandemic has both devastated and disparately harmed minority communities. In this Article, I focus on the pressing question of how the allocation of scarce treatments for COVID-19 and similar public health threats should respond to these racial disparities. Many policymakers and popular commentators have recognized that the inevitable initial scarcity of vaccines presents questions about racial disparity. Therapeutics like monoclonal antibodies raise similar questions, as do emergency interventions such as ventilators and ICU beds. Some have proposed that members of racial groups who have been especially hard-hit by the pandemic should receive priority for scarce treatments. Others have worried that this prioritization misidentifies racial disparities as reflecting biological differences rather than structural racism, or that it will generate mistrust among groups who have previously been harmed by medical research. Still others complain that such prioritization would be fundamentally unjust.

In Part II, I provide a brief overview of current and proposed COVID-19 treatments and identify documented or likely scarcities and disparities in access. In Part III, I argue that randomly allocating scarce medical interventions, as some propose, will not effectively address disparities: it both permits unnecessary deaths and concentrates those deaths among people who are more exposed to infection. In Part IV, I explain why using individual-level racial classifications in allocation is precluded by current Supreme Court precedent. Addressing disparities will require focusing on factors other than race, or potentially considering race at an aggregate rather than individual level. I also argue that policies prioritizing members of Native American tribes can succeed legally even where policies based on race would not. In Part V, I examine two complementary strategies to narrow racial disparities. One would prioritize individuals who live in disadvantaged geographic areas or work in hard-hit occupations, potentially alongside race-sensitive aggregate metrics like neighborhood segregation. These approaches, like the policies school districts adopted after the Supreme Court rejected individualized racial classifications in education, would narrow disparities without classifying individuals by race. The other strategy would address the starkly disparate racial impact of deaths early in life by limiting the use of policies that explicitly deprioritize the prevention of early deaths, and by considering policies that prioritize their prevention.

Illinois Law Review Student Note on Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions and ICRA

The University of Illinois law Review has published “Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions: The Sixth Amendment, Tribal Sovereignty, and the Indian Civil Rights Act.”

Here is the abstract:

Tribal courts tasked with the prosecution of Native American defendants are not constrained by many Constitutional provisions, including the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal proceedings. Currently, the Indian Civil Rights Act only requires representation in tribal court prosecutions of indigent defendants that may lead to incarceration of more than one year. State and federal courts require the opportunity of representation for all defendants in criminal proceedings. This discrepancy between the rights afforded in tribal courts and in state and federal courts lead to unique legal issues for Native American defendants indicted in federal court after being convicted without counsel in a tribal court.
Native Americans prosecuted under federal re-peat-offender statues could be exposed to harsher penalties based on prior uncounseled tribal con-victions. Thus, even if a Native American lacked representation in tribal court, those convictions might be used as predicate offenses for the purposes of federal repeat-offender laws. Different approaches to this issue are presented from the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. This Note ad-dresses the reasoning of each Circuit and offers a Recommendation that balances tribal sovereignty concerns, Sixth Amendment ramifications, and justice implications for both victims and defendants in the tribal court system.