The tribal child custody case here has received a lot of social media attention with very few details. The case is in Selawik Tribal Court.
Here was the attempt by the foster mother to receive a federal injunction in the case:
Memorandum In Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction to Stay Tribal Court Judgement
Native Village of Selawik Motion to Dismiss
Exhibits accompanying Motion to Dismiss:
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss
Yes, in fact, some states and foster parents are back to arguing the Existing Indian Family exception to ICWA.
Our decision in this regard is further supported by guidance from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) set forth in its 2016 BIA Guidelines pertaining to application of the Act’s provisions. Guidelines for Implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act (“2016 Guidelines”), 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.1 to -23.144 (2016). The 2016 Guidelines state, in relevant part:
In determining whether ICWA applies to a proceeding, the State court may not consider factors such as the participation of the parents or the Indian child in Tribal cultural, social, religious, or political activities, the relationship between the Indian child and his or her parents, whether the parent ever had custody of the child, or the Indian child’s blood quantum.
Id. § 23.103(c). This unequivocal statement plainly dispels any notion that the EIF exception is compatible with the ICWA. Accordingly, we join the “swelling chorus of [jurisdictions] affirmatively reject[ing] the EIF exception[,]” ICWA Proc., 81 Fed. Reg. 38778, 38802 (June 14, 2016), and hold that West Virginia does not recognize the Existing Indian Family exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 to -1963 (2021). Accordingly, the circuit court erred in adopting the EIF exception and subsequently relying on that exception to determine that the ICWA was inapplicable to this case.
There are also a whole lot of parties citing to the 1979 Guidelines again these days, despite them being not in effect since 2015. It’s giving late 90’s/early 2000’s in ICWA practice these days.
Before this Court several of the parties cited this guidance as a basis for arguing that the Tribe is not entitled to transfer because it knew of these proceedings in December 2021 but did not move to transfer until eight months later in August 2022. What the circuit court and the parties fail to recognize is that the 1979 Guidelines were explicitly abrogated and replaced by the BIA when it promulgated the 2016 Guidelines. See Guidelines for Implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 96476 (Dec. 30, 2016) (“The [2016] guidelines replace the 1979 and 2015 versions[.]”). Therefore, we do not find the 1979 Guidelines persuasive, nor do we rely upon any guidance contained therein.
But the WV Supreme Court saw through it:
For the reasons stated herein, we grant the Tribe’s petition for writ of prohibition and prohibit enforcement of the circuit court’s September 30, 2022, Order Denying Transfer. We remand this matter to the circuit court with directions to enter an order transferring jurisdiction in this action to the District Court of the Delaware Tribe.
[14]We consider the Washington Supreme Court’s reasoning to be persuasive and note that other states also consider a specific, recent claim of Native heritage to be a “reason to know” the child is an Indian child.47 Tribes have many methods to determine membership or eligibility for membership, including lineal descent or blood quantum.48Additionally, a tribe may enroll an eligible child after being notified by a state agency that the child is involved in a child custody proceeding.49 Because the tribe as sovereign has exclusive power to determine tribal membership or eligibility for tribal membership, notifying the tribe when a child who may be a member is involved in a child custody proceeding is imperative to implementing ICWA’s protections of tribes and tribal members.
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Perhaps more importantly, treating a parent’s uncertain statements as determinative in a context like this could undermine tribal sovereignty, because the tribe decides who is a member.56 It is a “basic federal rule” that tribes are the exclusive authority on their membership.57 We have previously held that absent a determination by a tribe, a child’s membership or eligibility for membership in a tribe is likely not subject to judicial admission, recognizing the legal authority of tribes to determine membership.58 Giving too much weight to the statements of a party without proof or input from the tribe would undermine this fundamental principle.
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We reiterate that a “reason to know” that children are Indian children may arise in many different ways, based upon a multitude of different pieces of information, and determining whether there is a “reason to know” is a fact-intensive analysis requiring consideration of the record of information and context presented in any given case.64 Here, Jimmy’s specific claim that he is a recent descendant of a CIRI shareholder, paired with his early assertions related to his children’s tribal affiliation, gave OCS and the court “reason to know” his children are Indian children, triggering OCS’s duty to inquire and to treat the children as Indian children pending a definitive answer as to their status.
The Administration (DOI, HHS, and DOJ) are asking for input on the following:
What additional supports would Tribal leaders find helpful to build their Tribe’s capacity to exercise their rights and responsibilities under ICWA?
Are there specific supports you believe the federal government could provide to help state courts and child welfare agencies meet their obligations under ICW A?
In your experience, are there specific aspects or requirements of ICWA where state courts and agencies need to build greater understanding or capacity?
Are there existing State-Tribe collaborative partnerships or processes that you believe have helped support effective implementation ofICWA?
Consultation is August 7 online and August 11 in Anchorage. Commends are due by September 15, 2023.
I might note the lawsuit regarding data and ICWA is ongoing in the Ninth Circuit, though the Administration has promised to issue a notice of rule making in October. A description of the issue of funding tribal systems (with citations) can be found here.
And here is another one!
Not sure how this one slipped by–the Governor of Nevada signed this into law just before Brackeen came down.
Media coverage here.
Assemblywoman Backus (the sponsor of the bill) graduated from ASU with an Indian Law Certificate. She is also a commissioner on the Uniform Law Commission’s study committee for a uniform state ICWA law.
This Article lays out the history of the fight over ICWA from Baby Girl to Haaland, from my perspective as a clinical professor who has been involved with every major ICWA case since 2013, as well as my observations about why ICWA was so vulnerable to an organized litigation attack despite continued bipartisan and widespread support of the law.
The rest of the issue is here, with an essay by Chemerinsky and an article on Dobbs by Delgado and Stefancic.
The decision was written by Justice Barrett with all but Justice Thomas and Alito joining her opinion. Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh wrote (very different) concurrences. Justices Thomas and Alito dissented.
Essentially the Court held that ICWA is not beyond the power of Congress to effectuate, and does not violate commandeering concerns by making states follow federal law. Neither the foster parents or the state of Texas had standing to bring the equal protection arguments related to the third placement preferences. They did not rule on any merits regarding equal protection and ICWA. Gorsuch’s concurrence laying out the history of federal Indian Law and ICWA is veritable who’s who of Indian law professors. Kavanaugh’s concurrence wants us to make sure we understand there was no ruling on equal protection, only on standing to bring the claim. Justices Thomas and Alito did their usual thing.
This is, without question, a massive win. It’s a stunning victory upholding both the foundations of federal Indian law and the Indian Child Welfare Act. The original district court decision finding ICWA unconstitutional, as well as the parts of the Fifth Circuit decision finding the same, are no longer good law. There is, at this time, no major change in ICWA practice. We can talk details in the coming weeks. So for now I’ll leave you with the last sentence of the Gorsuch concurrence while we all breath a sigh of relief:
In adopting the Indian Child Welfare Act, Congress exercised that lawful authority to secure the right of Indian parents to raise their families as they please; the right of Indian children to
grow in their culture; and the right of Indian communities to resist fading into the twilight of history. All of that is in keeping with the Constitution’s original design.
More to come:
C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., joined as to Parts I and III. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion. THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J., filed dissenting opinions.
Turtle Talk 
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