ICWA Defense Project Press Release on ICWA Final Rule

Here.

The Initial Observations post has been updated through out the day today with additional information from some of the first 300 pages, including the fact the Department plans to issue updated Guidelines in the next 180 days.

Initial Observations on the ICWA Regulations

Today’s additions to this post have been added in red text.

The Rule is organized in much the same way as the Guidelines. They do not mirror each other, however. These are just highlights of the actual rule, not the 300+ pages addressing all of the comments, which look to be incredibly useful.

The Department anticipates issuing updated Guidelines in the next six months, before the final rule goes into effect. p.10, “Overview of Final Rule”

The Rule does not use the phrase “existing Indian family”, but pp 90-94 of the text explain that the Rule overrules the application of the EIF through other means:

The final rule no longer uses the nomenclature of the exception, and instead focuses on the substance, rather than the label, of the exception. Thus, the final rule imposes a mandatory prohibition on consideration of certain listed factors, because they are not relevant to the inquiry of whether the statute applies. If a child-custody proceeding concerns a child who meets the statutory definition of “Indian child,” then the court may not determine that ICW A does not apply to the case based on factors such as the participation of the parents or the Indian child in Tribal cultural, social, religious, or political activities, the relationship between the Indian child and his or her Indian parents, whether the parent ever had custody of the child, or the Indian child’s blood quantum.  

Rule at 93.

Highlights:

The definitions of continued custody, custody, and domicile are extensive and helpful, includes tribal custom and tribal law, makes clear that any custody at any time in the past counts as “continued custody” and makes the child’s domicile dependent on the custodial parent, not just mother. 23.2.

The active efforts definition is marginally different than the one in the Guidelines. It does not specifically state they are more or different than ASFA’s reasonable efforts, but it does say they must be “affirmative, active, thorough, and timely”. The list of elements under what active efforts “may include, for example” are also slightly different, and combine some of the Guideline elements (4 in the regs is 9&5 in the Guidelines; 7 is 10&14). 23.2.

The Department’s reasoning regarding ASFA is as follows, though is contrary to how state courts have been comparing the two at the appellate level, and not entirely helpful:

Unlike the proposed rule, the final rule does not define “active efforts” in comparison to “reasonable efforts.” After considering public comments on this issue, the Department concluded that referencing “reasonable efforts” would not promote clarity or consistency, as the term “reasonable efforts” is not in ICW A and arises from different laws (e.g., the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as modified by the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), see 42 U.S.C. 670, et seq., as well as State laws). Such reference is unnecessary because the definition in the final rule focuses on what actions are necessary to constitute active efforts.

Rule at 50.

“When Does ICWA Apply?” addresses the issue of “continued custody” thrown into doubt by Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl. It also specifically states a child’s blood quantum may not be considered by the state court. 23.103(c).

State laws that provide higher protections to the rights of the parent control over the regulations. 23.106.

State courts must ask each participant in an emergency or voluntary or involuntary child-custody proceeding whether the participant knows or has reason to know the child is an Indian child. 23.107(a).

A parental request for confidentiality in a voluntary proceeding does not relieve the court, agency, or other party from any duty of compliance with ICWA, including the obligation to verify whether the child is an Indian child. 23.107(d).

Only tribes can determine if a child is an Indian child under the law, that is a final determination that cannot be substituted by the state, and the state can use tribal enrollment documentation (for example) to make the judicial determination a child is an Indian child. 23.108.

A court must determine domicile of the child in any voluntary or involuntary child-custody proceeding. 23.110(a).

If a parent or Indian custodian appears in court without an attorney, the court must inform them of their rights under the law, including the right to appointed counsel, the right to request transfer to tribal court, the right to object to transfer, the right to request additional time, and the right to intervene in the child custody proceedings. 23.111(g).

23.113 Emergency removals (or the Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming section) addresses all the requirements of emergency removal including length of time (30 days), how to terminate an emergency proceeding (initiate a proceeding subject to the provisions of ICWA, transfer to the tribe, or send the kid home), and the standard of “imminent physical damage or harm to the child”.

The regs direct state courts what they cannot consider “good cause” not to transfer a case to tribal court, but do not specify what is good cause not to transfer. States cannot consider advanced stage, prior proceedings where there was no petition to transfer, whether transfer will affect placement, cultural connections, and socioeconomic conditions. 23.118(c).

There is no standard of evidence for active efforts (states are still split on this), but similar to the Guidelines, the evidence must show a causal relationship between the particular conditions in the home and the likelihood of serious emotional or physical damage to the child. Evidence with no causal relationship of poverty, isolation, single parenthood, custodian age, crowded or inadequate housing, substance abuse, or nonconforming social behavior does not on its own constitute evidence that continued custody is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 23.121

Who can be a qualified expert witness is fairly vague, but the regulation specifically excludes the social worker regularly assigned to the Indian child from being the QEW. 23.122(c)

The state court must determine if a child is an Indian child in voluntary proceedings, and that determination may mean contacting the child’s tribe to verify. 23.124(b)

Consent to a voluntary adoption largely mirrors the law, but also includes that when a parent request confidentiality, the execution of consent must still be before a court of competent jurisdiction, but not in open court. 23.125(d).

Good cause to not follow the placement preferences must be made on the record, the party seeking to deviate bears the burden of proving good cause by clear and convincing evidence, and may not be based “solely on ordinary bonding or attachment that flowed from time spent in a non-preferred placement that was made in violation of ICWA.” 23.132

The regs do give good cause reasons to depart from the preferences. They include the request of one or both parents if they attest they have reviewed the placement preferences that comply with the order of preference, the request of the child, the presence of a sibling attachment, the extraordinary physical, mental, or emotional needs of the child, and the unavailability of a suitable placement after the court finds a diligent search was conducted. 23.132(c).

Courts should allow participation by telephone, videoconferencing, or other methods. 23.133.

If there are certain changes in an adopted Indian child’s status (the voluntary termination by the adoptive parent, or the final decree of adoption was set aside or vacated), the biological parent, prior Indian custodian, and tribe must be noticed. 23.139. Of course, the child remains an Indian child regardless of the adoption, so ICWA should apply to these situations anyway.

The state must maintain certain records of every voluntary or involuntary foster care, preadoptive, and adoptive placement of an Indian child, including the petition or complaint, all substantive orders, the complete record of the placement determination. That record must be made available within 14 days of a request by the child’s Tribe or the Secretary. 23.141.

 

Solicitor’s Opinion on the New ICWA Regulation

US DOI Solicitor Opinion on the implementation of ICWA through legislative rule:

Congress understood that these issues went beyond reservations and significantly impacted Indian children who lived off reservations as well. Congress noted that there were approximately 35,000 Indian children in foster care, adoptive homes, or institutions whose families did not “live on or near reservations”52 and yet who were subject to the same problematic State child custody proceedings. In the AIPRC Final Report, which was included as part of the Senate Report on ICWA, the Commission recommended that any final legislation address the fact that because “[m]any Indian families move back and forth from a reservation dwelling to border communities or even to distant communities, depending on employment and educational opportunities,” problems could arise when Tribal and State courts offered competing child custody determinations, and that legislation therefore had to address situations where “an Indian child is not domiciled on a reservation and [is] subject to the jurisdiction of non-Indian authorities. ”  Congress accordingly fashioned ICWA to address the removal of Indian children, as defined in the statute, regardless of where their families were located.

Final Indian Child Welfare Act Regulations

Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings Federal Rule Here. The rule itself starts on page 321.

The new regulations are not binding for 180 days (6 months), and will be located at 25 CFR 23. As the document appears to be about 300 pages long, we’ll have more analysis of it in a later post.

Press release here

Q&A here.

Article on the Disparity Between the States Regarding Termination of Parental Rights

Here. Not ICWA-specific, but an interesting article on the wide difference of the states in terminating parental rights.

Across the country, the availability of effective support services is viewed as crucial in helping reduce the need for foster care placements and parental rights terminations, both of which are considered undesirable outcomes for most children.

Professor Martin Guggenheim, a child welfare expert at New York University School of Law, is among those contending that too many parents lose their rights and too many children go into foster care. Parents’ legal prospects vary widely from state to state when it comes to challenging termination, he says; many who are indigent are represented by court-appointed lawyers with heavy caseloads.

Too often, Guggenheim said, terminations produce “legal orphans” — young people who are separated from their parents, then do not receive a successful adoption placement, and eventually age out of the foster care system on their own.

“They’ve lost their family and gained nothing in return,” he said.

Nationwide, according to federal figures, the number of children affected by parental rights terminations declined from 85,525 to 64,398 between 2005 and 2014, mirroring a broader drop in the number of children placed in foster care. Arizona and Texas were among a handful of states bucking the trend, with more terminations and more children in care.

Figures from Arizona show how difficult it is for a parent to block a termination order once it’s requested by child-welfare officials. In a six-month period last year, 2,232 termination petitions were granted and seven were denied.

As a side note, Professor Guggenheim was one of the lead attorneys on the ICWA/Gold Standard Baby Girl amicus brief.

Two Recent State Supreme Court Oral ICWA Arguments

Here is the argument for In re B.B. case in the Utah Supreme Court, where the unmarried Native father appealed the trial court’s decision denying him intervention in a voluntary adoption case, primarily based on Utah’s definition of paternity. Father is asking the state to interpret “acknowledge and establish” under ICWA broadly. The Utah Court of Appeals sent it on directly to the Supreme Court with no decision.

Here is the argument for In re T.A.W. in the Washington Supreme Court, addressing the issue of applying WICWA to step-parent adoption proceedings, particularly the requirement of active efforts. Here is the decision being appealed.

Determination of Application of ICWA from Oregon Court of Appeals

We are getting a lot of questions about when the standards of ICWA apply if a child or parent is enrolled after the initiation of the child welfare case. Here’s a not particularly helpful or clear decision out of the Oregon Court of Appeals:

Parents’ position depends on a selective understanding of the record before the juvenile court. Specifically, as noted, testimony at the August 22, 2014, hearing established that the “Karuk Tribe” notation for mother in DHS’s database had been entered, as a preliminary matter, in 2004, but that, in response to subsequent, contemporaneous inquiries from DHS, the tribe had explicitly denied that mother or her children met the requirements for tribal membership. See 278 Or App at 431-32. That negative response—a response within DHS’s constructive knowledge in 2011—negated the 2004 preliminary notation. Further, the record established that, while that notation automatically “popped up,” there was no evidence that it had ever been renewed or supplemented based on any subsequent information. Similarly, parents’ reliance on mother’s reference to having a tribal membership card does not engage with the complete context that, at the same time mother made that remark in February 2011, she was adamantly refusing to complete ICWA-related forms provided by DHS. Indeed, mother did not obtain a tribal membership card until May 2012—and, even then, did not so inform DHS.15 Given the totality of the circumstances, the juvenile court did not err in denying parents’ motions to dismiss. See State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Tucker, 76 Or App 673, 677, 10 P2d 793 (1985), rev den, 300 Or 605 (1986) (affirming juvenile court’s denial of petition to “invalidate” foster care placement based on purported ICWA noncompliance; record did not establish that, as of the time the child was placed, ICWA applied, and subsequent determination that the child was an Indian child did not render ICWA retroactively applicable to prior actions of the juvenile court).

Burden of Proof ICWA Case out of South Dakota

Here.

In this case, Mother challenged the QEW and the burden of proof requirement for termination of parental rights. The concurrence is particularly useful:

The circuit court in this case found many of the facts beyond a reasonable doubt where that was not the correct standard of proof and failed to find certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt where applying that high standard is required. This may indicate that confusion exists on the applicable standards of proof in abuse or neglect proceedings, including those where ICWA applies. I write specially to clarify the standards of proof by which the court must issue certain findings.

The concurrence also explains that South Dakota is a state that requires active efforts to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a termination of parental rights. Contra State of New Mexico v. Yodell. B. (N.M. Ct App. 2015) 

Sherman Alexie on NPR’s Morning Edition

Here.

My life changed dramatically, and started to change dramatically, when I read The Snowy Day by Ezra Jack Keats. I was 4 or 5 on the reservation, and it was the first book I ever read with a brown-skinned character — this, you know, inner-city black kid wandering the snow-blanketed city all by himself. And the book spoke to me in a way few books have ever spoken to me throughout my life. But in that instance, I had this recognition of another human being in the world, fictional as he was, but that there was another person in the world who was like me. … This person was a total stranger to me — a black kid living in the city. You know, I didn’t know any black kids living in the city, but I reached across the fictional and the real barriers and boundaries to connect my heart to him.

 

Developments in Carter v. Washburn (Goldwater Litigation)

Here is the latest in the class action lawsuit arguing that ICWA is unconstitutional:

In the past month, the plaintiffs were granted leave to file an amended complaint with new named class representatives. Both the federal and state government again filed motions to dismiss.

Gila River then filed a motion to ask the court to make a decision on their motion to intervene, which the court denied in a particularly aggravating order.

Finally, in one of the strangest and most unprecedented actions in the case, the Ohio AG filed an amicus brief in support of Goldwater and against the Arizona AG’s motion to dismiss. For those who have contacts in their state AG’s offices, we continue to encourage you to be in touch with them and offer to provide information regarding ICWA and this case.