Here. Addie Smith of NICWA will be doing the presentation, which is a very good thing.
via A.H.
Child Welfare
Materials in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl
In response to a request, we’ve created a page to collect law review articles, bar journal articles, and cases after Adoptive Couple. It is a work in progress.
If you’re interested, bookmark this link.
Contested ICWA Adoption Case out of Alaska Supreme Court
An example of how state law is going to determine how potential Baby Girl cases are decided:
A married couple sought to adopt an Indian child over the objection of the biological father, who wished to maintain visitation rights. The couple and the biological mother appeal the superior court’s denial of the adoption, claiming that the biological father’s consent to the adoption was unnecessary. Under AS 25.23.050(a)(2)(B), the consent of a noncustodial parent is not required for adoption if that parent unjustifiably fails to support the child. But the superior court did not clearly err by concluding that the biological father had justifiable cause for his failure to support the child. We affirm.
See also FN 33.
Side note–it seems (non-Native) father might also be a veteran, given this quick line in the case, “And in the summer of 2008, he took college classes, paid for with student loans and GI Bill benefits.”
Previous AK Supreme Court decision in the case here.
Existing Indian Family Case out of the Kentucky Court of Appeals
Here, from the state that gave us Rye v. Weasel.
In the present case, the testimony of Ms. C[] indicates that the mother and father abandoned the child, with the mother ceasing all contact with the child after a short period of sporadic visitation following the child’s removal from her custody on May 1, 2012, by emergency contact order, only days after the child’s birth on April 28, 2012. The record further reflects that The Lower Brule Sioux Tribe had communicated to Cabinet officials that it was unable to provide any placement or assistance to the child in this case and thus would not intervene in the termination proceedings.
We agree that in the instant case, the child was not in any way raised in an Indian home or environment and then removed, which is what Congress intended to prevent with the creation of the ICWA. Thus, under the Existing Indian Family Doctrine, which the highest court in this state adopted in Rye, the ICWA is not triggered and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard was not appropriate.
Two Unpublished Michigan Court of Appeals Child Welfare Opinions
Here.
This case was a conditional reversal for ICWA notice violations.
Here.
This case is not an ICWA case (father claimed Tuscarora but neither he nor child were eligible). There’s a lot going on in this case, especially given the medical concerns of the child. However, there are two reasons I post it: the first is the exchange between father and the referee when father wants to wait to have an attorney present– on page 3. The second is the reason the maternal grandmother was denied placement, detailed on page 4.
Michigan COA Termination of Parental Rights Case Based on Prior Tribal Court Termination
State court used tribal court termination of parental rights to another child to fulfill a state termination of parental rights. Seems strange there is no mention of ICWA or MIFPA in the case, though it’s possible the father only appealed the reliance the on tribal court termination.
Class Action Case on Canada’s Sixties Scoop Moves Forward
Attorney General Holder Announces ICWA Initiative
From the text of his speech:
Today, I am pleased to announce that the Department of Justice is launching a new initiative to promote compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act. Under this important effort, we are working to actively identify state-court cases where the United States can file briefs opposing the unnecessary and illegal removal of Indian children from their families and their tribal communities. We are partnering with the Departments of the Interior and Health and Human Services to make sure that all the tools available to the federal government are used to promote compliance with this important law. And we will join with those departments, and with tribes and Indian child-welfare organizations across the country, to explore training for state judges and agencies; to promote tribes’ authority to make placement decisions affecting tribal children; to gather information about where the Indian Child Welfare Act is being systematically violated; and to take appropriate, targeted action to ensure that the next generation of great tribal leaders can grow up in homes that are not only safe and loving, but also suffused with the proud traditions of Indian cultures. Ultimately, these children – and all those of future generations -represent the single greatest promise of our partnership, because they will reap the benefits of our ongoing work for change. In the last six years, we have worked together in a shared effort to end misunderstanding and mistreatment, and to bring about a triumph of vision over the status quo; of ingenuity over incapacity; and of progress over stagnation. We have laid an enduring foundation as we strive to empower vulnerable individuals, and give them the tools they need not to leave their communities, but to bolster them; not to abandon their ways of life, but to strengthen them.
Of course, there are many more challenges still before us. And we’ve seen all too clearly that the barriers erected over centuries of discrimination will not be surmounted overnight. But we face a brighter future today because we have placed our faith not in conflict or division, but in cooperation and respect; in the understanding that, though we live in different cultures, with different traditions, we share the same values. We believe that sovereign nations have the right to protect their citizens from harm, and that no perpetrator of domestic violence should be granted immunity because of the color of his skin.
We understand that promises of autonomy have meaning, and should not be overturned through the changing desires of different federal Administrations. And we recognize that any child in Indian Country – in Oklahoma, or Montana, or New Mexico – is not fundamentally different from an African-American kid growing up in New York City. And neither child should be forced to choose between their cultural heritage and their well-being.
Two Additional Unpublished Notice Cases out of California
Apparently this is the week for notice cases with particular cause for posting.
Here. While the court in this case remands for notice violations in a guardianship case, it sadly does not also hold that Wikipedia is not a solid source for determining whether a tribe is federally recognized or not.
Here. And in this case, the appellate court wrote:
We begin with a concern not addressed by either party. California Rule of Court, rule 5.481(b) mandates that in asection 300 proceeding, the social services agency must send a “Notice of Child Custody Proceeding for Indian Child.” This form is designated ICWA–030. The ICWA–030 form sent by the Bureau here, however, differs from the ICWA–030 form available on the Judicial Council website.7 Significantly, that ICWA–030 form, which consists of 10 pages, requests identifying information on the biological mother (section 5c), the mother’s biological mother (section 5c), and the mother’s biological grandmother (section 5d).8 The ICWA–030 used by the Bureau, which was 12 pages, appears at first glance to be the same, but upon closer examination materially differs. It requests information on the biological mother (section 5c) and the mother’s biological mother (section 5c), but it then skips to the mother’s biological great grandmother and great, great grandmother (section 5d). Nowhere does it contain a section for information on the mother’s biological grandmother.9 By using what may be a faulty ICWA–030, the Bureau completely omitted all information on R.K.’s grandmother—Robin’s great grandmother.10*6 Additionally, although the ICWA–030 requested information regarding R.K.’s mother, the Bureau omitted all information for her, stating “No information available” for every single category, including her name. This is, quite simply, inexplicable. At the very least, we can only assume that an inquiry of R.K. would have revealed her mother’s name and, quite likely, additional information called for by the notice. But it is also probable that the Bureau could have obtained the information from R.K.’s mother herself. At the outset of the dependency proceeding, R.K. informed the social worker that her mother was involved in her own dependency proceeding. Additionally, R.K.’s mother was present at the June 5, 2013, 12–month review hearing, as evidenced by the reporter’s transcript from the hearing. At one point, the court interrupted the proceeding to ask audience members to identify themselves, and one person responded, “I’m the mother of [R.K.]” Both of these circumstances suggest that R.K.’s mother was accessible had the Bureau made an effort to speak with her. Additionally, the Bureau omitted the current and former addresses and the place and date of birth for R.K.’s great, great grandmother.
Published (!) Notice Case out of Illinois
Here.
A long, complicated, aggravating notice case from the Illinois court of appeals.
Turtle Talk 
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