Jason Robison on Arizona v. Navajo Nation

Jason Robison has published “Relational River: Arizona v. Navajo Nation & the Colorado” in the UCLA Law Review.

Here is the abstract:

It is not every day the U.S. Supreme Court adjudicates a case about the water needs and rights of one of the Colorado River Basin’s thirty tribal nations and the trust relationship shared by that sovereign with the United States. Yet just that happened in Arizona v. Navajo Nation in June 2023. As explored in this Article, the Colorado is a relational river relied upon by roughly forty million people, reeling from climate change for nearly a quarter century, and subject to management rules expiring and requiring extensive, politically charged renegotiation by 2027. Along this relational river, Arizona v. Navajo Nation was a milestone, illuminating water colonialism and environmental injustice on the country’s largest Native American reservation, and posing pressing questions about what exactly the trust relationship entails vis-à-vis the essence of life. Placing Arizona v. Navajo Nation in historical context, the Article synthesizes the case with an eye toward the future. Moving forward along the relational river, the trust relationship should be understood and honored for what it is, a sovereign trust, and fulfilled within the policy sphere through a host of measures tied, directly and indirectly, to the post-2026 management rules. Further, if judicial enforcement of the trust relationship is necessary, tribal sovereigns in the basin (and elsewhere) should not view the Court’s 5–4 decision as the death knell for water-related breach of trust claims, but rather as a guide for bringing cognizable future claims and reorienting breach of trust analysis.

Kevin Washburn on Landback as Federal Policy

Kevin K. Washburn has published “Landback as Federal Policy” in the UCLA Law Review.

Here is the abstract:

Demands for the return of land to tribal nations have become much louder and more compelling in recent years. While “landback” has been part of federal policy for nearly a century, lawmakers and presidents from both parties have embraced landback initiatives more firmly in the last half century. But the quantity of lands returned is almost insignificant in comparison to the vast lands taken. Landback efforts are based in compelling moral claims. This Article summarizes the moral claims for landback by briefly recounting the widespread loss of land by Indian tribes through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and highlighting the unique role of the federal government in this tragedy. It also showcases some of the tribal and federal counterefforts to the loss of land, including existing federal landback efforts that have returned millions of acres to tribes. The federal government has many tools available, and it should deploy them more effectively. Advocates must also be more strategic. Landback can be viewed in context with related federal initiatives, including renaming, comanagement, and costewardship, as well reservation expansion, retrocession, and other federal efforts to restore and expand tribal selfgovernance. These numerous related federal and tribal initiatives can support tribal landback and restorative justice efforts.

DiGrazia and Juliano on the Native Women’s Wage Gap

Danielle DiGrazia & Ann Juliano have published “Addressing the Gender Wage Gap for Native American Women” in the University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender & Class.

An excerpt:

Native American women experience one of the largest wage gaps. Failure to remedy the wage gap for Native American women could lead to catastrophic consequences for generations of Native people. As it stands, the wage gap could amount to a financial loss of over $1.1 million over a 40-year career for a Native American woman starting her career today. This loss would disproportionately impact Native families over time, due to the prominent financial role played by women in Native households. Specifically, 64 percent of Native American mothers are the breadwinners for their families, meaning their families rely heavily on their income. Further, “[n]early one in four Native . . . households . . . are headed by women, and 30 percent of those households live below the poverty level.” Without equal pay, Native American women will continue to struggle to pay for “basic family necessities like rent, groceries, and school supplies” and to “invest in savings, higher education, or property.” However, if the wage gap were eliminated, the average Native American woman would be able to afford “[m]ore than 34 months of food; more than 29 more months of child care; their entire student loan debt in 16 months; almost 15 months of mortgage and utilities payments; or more than 17 additional months of premiums for employer-based health insurance.” The lack of sufficient funds today could also have ripple effects for future generations–for example, Native American women may struggle to put their children through school, then those children may have a more difficult time getting higher-paying jobs, and the cycle of economic disenfranchisement will continue.

Arcoite and Johnson on Land Back Reduces Indigenous Poverty

Brigette Arcoite and Daniel K.N. Johnson have posted “Land-Back to Move Forward? The Measurable Relationship between Land-Back Movements and Economic Outcomes in Indigenous Communities within the U.S.” on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

The land-back movement in its current state began in 2018 and has rapidly gained traction since. The main call in this movement is for the return of government owned ancestral lands to their Indigenous stewards. This paper quantifies the economic impacts of land-back movements on income and employment for over 1,700 Indigenous communities, using both panel data instrumental variables and endogenous treatment techniques. We find uniformly promising results (reductions in the percentage of citizens living on low incomes, and reductions in the unemployment rate) that recommend continued return of tribal lands not only for racial justice reasons, but as a catalyst for economic stability of populations living in proximity to Indigenous peoples.

Grant Christensen on Oliphant

Grant Christensen has posted “Tribal Judicial Power,” forthcoming in the University of Southern California Law Review, on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

In 1978’s Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe the Supreme Court announced a new common law rule: tribal courts lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants. Under the guide of the common law, unmoored from interpreting the text of any treaty or statute, the Oliphant opinion made reservation communities less safe by denying tribal governments a critically important tool in law enforcement – the power to arrest, charge, prosecute, and sentence persons who commit crimes on tribal lands. This unilateral evisceration of an inherent tribal power has contributed directly to the crisis of missing and murdered Indigenous women in the United States by preventing tribal law enforcement from prosecuting non-Indian offenders. The Oliphant precedent has made Indian country less safe for everyone by hobbling the ability of tribal governments to criminally convict non-Indians who openly violate tribal law.

In 2004 the Court made its first concession to the absolutist approach taken in Oliphant by recognizing that its decisions limiting the scope of the inherent power of Indian tribes were not constitutionally mandated but rather reflected the understanding of the Court “at the time of those decisions.” It is a new day, and the Court’s understanding of inherent tribal power can evolve. It can remove the common law barrier preventing tribes from exercising their pre-constitutional powers.

This Article takes the position that Congress’s reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act in 2022 is the death knell of the Oliphant opinion and a congressional restoration of tribal judicial power. The gossamer strands of the Court’s 1978 reasoning can no longer survive even cursory review in an era when Congress has given its imprimatur upon both inherent tribal power and tribal court criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants. Oliphant was never a constitutional nor statutory barrier to the assertion of inherent tribal power, and it should not take an act of Congress to reverse. As non-Indians again contest their criminal prosecution in tribal courts under the expanded powers recognized in VAWA, federal courts should reconsider the common law rule announced almost fifty years ago and, consistent with the direction of legal and congressional precedent, make clear that Oliphant no longer accurately reflects American common law.

Bethany Berger on the McClanahan Case and the DNA Lawyers Who Litigated It

Bethany R. Berger has posted “Rosalind’s Refund: The Woman, the Lawyers, and the Time that Created McClanahan v. Arizona,” forthcoming in the Kansas Law Review, on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

Rosalind McClanahan was just twenty-two when she set one of the most important cases in federal Indian law into motion.  On April 1, 1968, she filed her Arizona tax return, along with a protest that all the money withheld from her pay—$16.29—should be refunded because she was a Navajo citizen whose income was earned entirely on the Navajo reservation.   The Arizona Tax Commission ignored her claim and the Arizona courts rejected it. But the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in her favor, building a foundation for many more decisions rebuffing state jurisdiction as well as  landmark legislation such as the Indian Child Welfare Act  and Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. This Essay, the first full history of McClanahan,  examines the origins of the decision as part of the Kansas Law Review’s symposium on impact litigation in Indian country.

Rosalind McClanahan was born in an era of renewed pressure for Indian assimilation but came of age as tribes and Indigenous people increasingly insisted on self-determination.  This moment had a direct influence on her case: her education at Window Rock High School (where she was elected Class Treasurer) resulted from new pathways to challenge Indian exclusion from public schools; her employer was the First Navajo National Bank, which opened in 1962 as the first bank on the 16-million-acre Navajo Nation; and her lawyers came from Diné be’iiná Náhiiłna be Agha’diit’ahii-Legal Services (shortened to “DNA”),  which the Navajo Nation brought to the reservation as part of a new wave of federally funded organizations providing legal services to the poor.  Each of these developments shaped both the decision and its impact.

Translation: I am a sad tax collector.

Neoshia Roemer on Equity for American Indian Families

Neoshia Roemer has published “Equity for American Indian Families” in the Minnesota Law Review. PDF

Here is the abstract:

For the better part of two centuries, the cornerstone of federal Indian policy was destabilizing and eradicating tribal governments. In the process, federal Indian policy also dismantled American Indian families via child removal. Attempting to equalize American Indians through the practice of assimilation, decades of Indian child removal policies destroyed Indian families. In 1978, Congress responded to these horrors by passing the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), a revolutionary law that was responsive to its trust responsibility to American Indian Tribes. By providing for the best interests of Indian children, heightened protections for parents of Indian children in certain child custody proceedings, and vesting Tribes with a legally recognizable interest in their children’s futures, Congress issued a referendum on equality for American Indians and the very nature of colonialism.

For nearly fifty years, ICWA has governed certain child custody proceedings involving Indian children in state courts. In 2018, a group of state and private actors decided to challenge ICWA’s constitutionality in Haaland v. Brackeen. Among their claims, these parties alleged that ICWA violated the equal protection rights of potential adoptive parents who are non-Indian and that ICWA placed Indian children at a disadvantage. However, just beneath the surface of these claims lies the real allegation: American Indian children should be available for the “good families” or for the “right kind of families” to adopt them. By claiming American Indians had special rights via ICWA, these plaintiffs hoped to re-introduce a version of equality that allowed generations of federal, state, and individual actors to enact assimilationist policies. Ultimately, the goal of equality in this area remains to ensure that “good families” maintain access to Indian children. Contrary to congressional goals, Indian children remain a commodity in demand for “good families” looking to save Indian children.

Blending family law, federal Indian law, and constitutional law, this Article evaluates the fallacy in applying the Equal Protection Clause to claims about ICWA. In doing so, this Article demonstrates that ICWA contains an anti-colonial equity principle that is contrary to the equal protection doctrine—a doctrine that Congress knew could never apply when the matter came to accessing the rights of American Indian families against those of the settlers, primarily because the rights of American Indian individuals are intricately linked to the federal trust responsibility. This Article argues that given ICWA’s character as an anti-colonial statute, applying the Equal Protection Clause to it will only stand to yield absurd results in furtherance of a colonial project that Congress has abandoned. Instead of the equality the Supreme Court promises through its equal protection doctrine, ICWA’s mandate requires equity.

Alex Fay on Elk v. Wilkins

Alexandra Fay has posted “”Subject to the Jurisdiction Thereof”?: Citizenship and Empire in Elk v. Wilkins,” forthcoming in the Washington & Lee Law Review, on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

In 1884, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of birthright citizenship did not apply to Native Americans. In Elk v. Wilkins, the Court denied John Elk the right to vote on the grounds that he was born a tribal member, not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and thus ineligible for citizenship. This Article explores that decision, its context, and its consequences. It considers the radical promise of the Fourteenth Amendment’s text alongside the intentions of its Framers and the expectations of minority litigants. It situates Elk in a transformative period for both federal Indian policy and American federalism. The Article offers several readings of the Elk decision. It explores both the racist paternalism and the respect for tribal sovereignty evident in the Court’s reasoning, as well as the rapid shifts in Indian policy coinciding with Reconstruction. It ultimately argues that Elk v. Wilkins is emblematic of a distinct inflection point in federal Indian law, in which the Court’s formal adherence to longstanding principles of tribal sovereignty could simultaneously service federal assimilationist policy goals and a larger turn to American empire.

Pommersheim and Drapeau on the Black Hills SCT Case

Frank Pommersheim and Bryce Drapeau have published “United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians Revisited: Justice, Repair, and Land Return” in the South Dakota Law Review. PDF

HIGHLY RECOMMENDED!! A Frank Pommersheim joint is always worth it.

The abstract:

The amazing legal journey of this case begins in 1923 and ends with a Sioux Nation of Indians “victory” in the Supreme Court in 1980. Before reaching the Supreme Court, the case was litigated four different times before the Court of Claims because of the ineffective assistance of counsel and the necessity of a congressional statute to clear away the threatening ghost of res judicata. The historical backstory begins not in 1923, but with the signing of the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 and the United States’ illegal taking of the sacred Black Hills in1877. And the case does not end with the Sioux “victory” before the Supreme Court and its award of “just compensation” for the illegal taking. The Sioux Nation of Indians rejected—and continues to reject—the remedy of financial compensation without an attendant search for mutual repair and a justice that includes some form of land return. Despite some modest examples of land return in other parts of Indian country, no such efforts involve the Black Hills. This article seeks to inform all, but particularly those two generations of Lakota and non-Native citizens born since 1980, that now is the time for renewed effort and commitment to realize reconciliation and a justice that includes land return. This must be done before history closes its door for a second and final time and the Black Hills will remain stranded in historical infamy. No, this article is not just another twist on classic Indian Law principles gone awry, but the first of something we might call the Historical (Trauma) Trilogy of stealing Lakota land (and breaking treaties), suppressing the teaching and learning of the Lakota language and culture, and the battering ram of boarding schools to break-up Lakota families where a core value has always been to be a “good relative.” In its own careful way, this article is also about the persistence of Lakota resistance and the hard work of restoring the (sacred) hoop of land, language, and family for these new days.

Fletcher’s “Nanaboozhoo and Derrick Bell for a Walk”

Here is “Nanaboozhoo and Derrick Bell Go for a Walk,” published in the B.U. Law Review Online, now posted on SSRN.